Sorry, everyone. There are just so many spare hours in a day, and too many important things to do. Thanks in advance for your understanding.
Sorry, everyone. There are just so many spare hours in a day, and too many important things to do. Thanks in advance for your understanding.
Professor Lee recounts the long history of North Korea committing outrages against peace, international order, and every standard of human civilization, and of American presidents of both parties doing approximately nothing about it.
Pyongyang’s countless provocations since the Korean War have never set off a meaningful punitive response. Even in egregious cases like assassination attempts against South Korean leaders or the shooting down of an American reconnaissance plane in international airspace in 1969, the United States and its allies have answered with restraint.
Since the early 1990s, American presidents have treated the growing threat of the North Korean nuclear program as a priority — but one to be dealt with later. North Korea’s deep poverty and the apparent clownish nature of its leaders have sustained the illusion that its nuclear program could be bought out, the regime itself could be waited out, and that its largely concealed crimes against humanity could be tuned out.
While the United States has vacillated between expedient deals, halfhearted sanctions, pleas to China for greater intervention and doing nothing, the North has methodically advanced its nuclear arsenal and missile capacity.
Through each of Pyongyang’s tests, American policy makers have harbored the hope that Beijing would come around and put real pressure on the regimes of Kim Jong-un and his father, Kim Jong-il. But all Beijing has done is demonstrate a disingenuous pattern of diplomatic ambidexterity. China has made token gestures like signing on to United Nations Security Council resolutions while failing to enforce them fully, and at times even increasing trade with Pyongyang.
Although most North Koreans are cut off from the global economy, the regime elite remains beholden to international finance for moving proceeds from weapons trafficking. Pyongyang’s international currency of choice is the United States dollar.
North Korea is the only state known to counterfeit dollars as a matter of state policy. And the United States has largely declined to go after the Kim regime’s money trail because of concerns that doing so would push Pyongyang to escalate its provocations. The United States has also mostly shied away from imposing sanctions on the regime’s Chinese partners. [NYT, Sung-Yoon Lee]
Read the whole thing. For all its tough talk, the Trump administration shows little sign of implementing the tough policy it has articulated. It’s increasingly conspicuous to close observers that this administration has imposed no sanctions or taken any perceptible action to execute its “maximum pressure” since Xi Jinping came to Mar-a-Lago and confirmed his intention to turn Korea into its next semi-autonomous ethnic reservation. Trump is now in danger of falling into the same pattern as his predecessors, at a time when we can no longer afford to wait for some other president to solve this problem. By then, an extortionate, mass-murdering crime syndicate will have the means to nuke Seattle, its hegemony over a consensually finlandized South Korea will be functionally irreversible, and no sensible leader would ever trust America as an ally and security guarantor again.
In conclusion, terrorize your neighbors and your critics. Make sure you only let in the most pliable, controllable, and corruptible journalists. Hide your atrocities well — if there’s no video, no one really gives a shit anyway.
[Also, most people still don’t give a shit when there is video.]
Bolster the credentials of the most gullible academics and washed-up, has-been bureaucrats by giving them special, preferential access while denying it to those with the principle and basic common sense call you out. Proliferate with abandon and sell your work to the highest bidder. Keep your proles and peasants hungry. If your model of statecraft doesn’t include providing for them, and if you keep them too famished, isolated, exhausted, and cowed to start downloading plans for DIY Sten guns and shaped charges that might make the local SSD boys hesitate before hauling their families off to the gulag, it’s a winning strategy. After all, we’ve established that international institutions are either apathetic, impotent, or both, and that no democratically elected leader would sacrifice a portion of his domestic political support — such as it is — to challenge that business model.
Is South Korea’s new president, Moon Jae-in, forming a cabinet or a politburo? As I’ve written here, there has long been good reason to be worried. Moon has a long association with Minbyun, the hard-left lawyers’ group that is acting as Pyongyang’s law firm in South Korea by using the courts to wage lawfare against refugees, in violation of their human rights. He was chairman of the campaign of Roh Moo-hyun, the “anti-American” and “a little crazy” president who rode to power on the shoulders of a violent mob that attacked, spat on, and threw firebombs at American soldiers. As Roh’s Chief of Staff, Moon decided to seek Pyongyang’s input before abstaining from a U.N. resolution denouncing severe human rights abuses against its people, and then lied about it.
The most alarming development of all may be Moon’s choice of Im Jeong-seok as his Chief of Staff. Im was jailed for three-and-a-half years for
accompanying organizing the illegal 1989 visit to Pyongyang that made Lim Soo-kyung a North Korean propaganda star. (Lim is now a lawmaker in Moon’s party. I previously discussed her drunken 2012 tirade against North Korean defectors and human rights activists. A previous version of this post, since corrected, said that Im had gone to Pyongyang with Lim.)
Via Benjamin Young, we also learn that Im was “involved with a Juche Study Group during the 1980s.” After I retweeted this, Oranckay, who was a student in South Korea at the time and thus almost necessarily a close observer of left-wing political groups, responded that Im had also headed a radical student group called Chondaehyop. Researching this group further, Chondaehyop turns out to have adhered to the pro-North Korean “national liberation” ideology, and had a violent history:
Chondaehyop was involved in a series of arson and vandalism attacks against Hyundai showrooms in 1989 during a strike by Hyundai shipyard workers. On June 12, 1990, 300 members of Chondaehyop staged a firebombing attack on the Kwangju American Cultural Center, which damaged a police station and injured four officers. Then, on October 18th, eleven members of Chondaehyop were arrested for attempting to firebomb the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and planting IEDs on the roof of the Consular Annex (all of the IEDs failed to explode).
After Chondaehyop was banned, it reemerged under the name Hanchongryon, under which name it was active in leading violent anti-American demonstrations during my tour in Korea. Even during the democratically elected Kim Young-sam administration, the prosecution accused Hanchongryon of being under the control of North Korea’s United Front Department, the agency responsible for overseeing the manipulation of public opinion in South Korea.
To be fair, Oranckay did not observe Chondaehyop engaging in violence at the time Im led it, but not much time could have separated Im’s leadership from its occurrence.
Then, there is the worrisome fact that Moon Jae-in gave one of his first post-inauguration interviews to Tim Shorrock, a pro-North Korean hack (he calls himself a “journalist”) with a long career of denialism of Pyongyang’s crimes going back to the 1983 Rangoon bombing, and its crimes against humanity.
More recently, Mr. Shorrock has been spreading unsubstantiated anti-American agitprop, which I can’t ask him to substantiate because he blocked me on Twitter months ago.
Shorrock is also really, really angry at Bernie Sanders for being too critical of North Korea.
Now, when you call someone a Marxist, you’re apt to be called a McCarthyist, so instead, I’ll just link to, say, this post where Mr. Shorrock wrote, “I’m a Marxist.” Or, I’ll announce that I have in my hand a list of Mr. Shorrock’s tweets, to give you a better idea of his political views. Draw your own conclusions. (Sorry for the image quality. As mentioned, Mr. Shorrock blocked me several months ago, but a couple of readers sent me screenshots from his feed. I didn’t know then they’d come in handy later.)
And here’s Shorrock defending Roh Kil-nam (who I discussed here).
I believe the specific reason why Mr. Shorrock blocked me, incidentally, was that I repeatedly tried to get him to state whether he still demanded that the South Korean government release Lee Seok-ki, a hard-left ex-lawmaker who was recorded plotting violent attacks against critical infrastructure in South Korea in support of a North Korean invasion, even after Mr. Lee was convicted of treason and sent to prison and his conviction was affirmed by an appeals court.
In conclusion, a bigger dirigible bag of combustible gas has not been seen in America since May 6, 1937, over Lakehurst, New Jersey. And like Mr. Shorrock, this predecessor was a propaganda banner for a fascist state that sent children to die in concentration camps — only Shorrock is either too blind or too stupid to distinguish between Marxism and hereditary rule by an organized crime family that has created a society of permanent classes, propagates vile racism, enforces racial purity with infanticide, anointed its ruling family as gods, and created arguably the world’s greatest gap between rich and poor. That President Moon granted an interview to Mr. Shorrock should alarm us for the same reason it alarmed us when Donald Trump gave an interview to Alex Jones.
As they say, the apple doesn’t fall far from the tree. Personnel is policy. You judge a man by the company he keeps. Pick your own expression. The clear message Mr. Moon is sending to Pyongyang is, “I’ve chosen sides, but for now, there are some understandable political constraints.” You might choose to assume that Moon and Im have moderated with age. You might cite any number of Moon’s statements during the campaign to take comfort from the moderate views he expresses now. Most politicians, after all, are highly sensitive to what views they can express without losing votes.
But this collection of circumstantial evidence of Moon’s origins and associations suggests the more alarming — and equally plausible — explanation that Moon and those closest to him cannot be trusted with the most sensitive U.S. intelligence about our contingency plans, and that their unreconstructed views are merely latent for the time being. It’s time to be very worried about Moon Jae-in.
~ ~ ~
Update: Veteran journalist Bradley K. Martin’s detailed Asia Times story about Im Jeong-seok is an absolute must-read:
There seems to be little surprise in Seoul about the appointment of Im, who’s now 51. After all, Moon is a former militant anti-government activist. Later, he was a close supporter of two earlier presidents’ decade-long pursuit of the “Sunshine” policy of making nice to the North in the hope the two could negotiate their differences.
Moon has since his election sought to downplay his differences with US policy toward North Korea. So the suggestion that Im’s appointment sounds like an appalling development is left to just a few observers.
Read the rest on your own. Those zany right-wing conspiracy theories about a quiet coup in South Korea suddenly aren’t sounding all that zany at all. “Appalling” is right.
What exit polling data I do have come to us from the Asan Institute. And while Asan’s analysis contains much interesting information that political types would call “internals,” it doesn’t tell us all that much about voters’ attitudes about North Korea policy. The first thing it tells us is that North Korea didn’t really weigh much on the minds of voters at all, compared to economic issues.
I wonder whether you’d see more concern among Americans about the North Korean threat if you took a poll here. South Koreans have become practiced and skilled at ignoring the North Korea problem over the years.
Our only “rare glimpse” of voter opinion on security issues comes in this surprising finding that almost by 60-40, the voters still want THAAD. That’s a surprising result given Donald Trump’s ham-handed demands that South Korea pay for it on the eve of the election. Frankly, I’d have expected something closer to the opposite result. That suggests that any plans Moon has to pass legislation in the National Assembly reversing the deployment of the system (which is now operational) could run into trouble.
Another glimpse comes from recent data, which I discussed here, showing that Xi Jinping’s unilateral sanctions against South Korea have caused a rise in anti-China sentiment, while pro-U.S. sentiment is high, and pro-North Korea sentiment isn’t. The political environment in South Korea is nothing like 2002, although I suppose that most South Koreans would probably favor some form of engagement and oppose confrontational policies in the abstract. I’m sure the administration’s war talk makes them nervous (me too).
To delve deeper into South Koreans’ views, I had to go back to 2015, because the 2016 version of this poll wouldn’t download. That poll was taken after Park’s handling the 2015 land mine incident, but before Park closed Kaesong (at least permanently). At first glance, this graph suggests that the softer line wins plurality support. But if one assumes that voters perceived Park’s policy as hard-line, and if you combine the status quo and pro-hard-line figures, you see that at that time, a majority of South Koreans who had an opinion wanted a North Korea policy that was as tough or tougher than Park’s.
Indeed, as I’ve noted before, Park’s North Korea policy was about the only thing voters liked about her. I’d say that goes for me, too (always has) although unlike most South Koreans, I don’t have to work Saturdays, stay out late drinking with my boss, or watch him promote his incompetent college classmates ahead of me. Not surprisingly, then, I differ from most South Koreans on which issue that concerns me.
The data mostly support what I said yesterday: despite voters’ fatigue with the political right, and their desire to punish it for Park Geun-hye’s sins, they are uneasy about the security situation and wary of a lowering their guard. Moon hedged carefully on THAAD, and he’s begun to hedge on Kaesong, too. He’s a smart enough politician to continue to hedge if he senses that he can’t push harder for policies he really prefers without losing political support. What Moon and those around him probably do prefer is where things take an alarming turn, but I’ll have to leave that topic for another day.
If any readers have newer or better polling data to add to this mix, kindly drop a link in the comments. (Note: Comments are moderated, so it might take a few hours until I have a chance to approve them. Please be patient. Comments here have been of very good quality lately; thanks for submitting them.)
I’ll have to keep this post short because of time constraints, but my interest in South Korea’s election is mostly related to how Seoul’s policies toward North Korea will shift. I’ll refer you to this post and this one on why it’s likely to change less than John Delury might like, this piece in NK News where I offer some thoughts, and this excellent post by Marcus Noland and Kent Boydston. Much will depend on how hard President Trump pushes back. Maybe Moon will completely win Trump over in their first call, but I’m more inclined to believe that it will turn into a difficult cost-sharing negotiation (which Moon can use to his political advantage).
If Trump is skillful in his handling of Moon, however, he can exploit Moon’s political and legal weaknesses to prevent him from catapulting money over the DMZ. For one thing, Trump has U.N. sanctions on his side. For another, North Korea policy wasn’t the main reason people voted for Moon, and compared to past South Korean presidents, Moon’s win was hardly commanding. If you eliminate candidates who received less than 1 percent of the vote, in 1997, Kim Dae-Jung won 40.3 percent in a three-way race; in 2002, Roh Moo Hyun, won 48.9 percent in a three-way race; in 2007, Lee Myung Bak won 48.7 percent in a five-way race; in 2012, Park Geun-hye won 51.5 percent in a two-way race; and this year, Moon won 41.1 percent in a five-way race.
It’s worth asking why Moon actually performed worse in terms of percentage of the vote this year despite his name recognition, the advantage of an anti-Park backlash, and a fractious (and frankly, pathetic) field of opponents on the right. Because it was a five-way race, of course! But why was this a five-way race at all? The right had as weak a field as Moon himself could have conjured, and Moon has run against Ahn Cheol-soo before and made quick work of him. In 2012, Ahn’s support collapsed and his supporters coalesced behind Moon. This time, Moon couldn’t close that deal. Surely Moon would have preferred that outcome, and surely he still does, given that he only controls 120 (not 119) seats in the National Assembly now. He will need 151 votes to legislate his policies on THAAD, Kaesong, other elements of his agenda. Give him the Justice Party’s 6 votes. He still needs most of the People’s Party votes to pass legislation, and even then, don’t forget that Moon’s own party was able to delay passage of a North Korea human rights law for more than a decade. Can he get those votes? Probably so on less controversial issues, and hopefully so on needed reforms to make South Korea a fairer, safer society with a better quality of life, and a better work-life balance.
On the specific issue of resuming Sunshine, however, I see little evidence of a mandate. Of course, past vote totals are hardly predictive of the impact of past presidents on South Korea’s policies toward North Korea — one could argue that there is almost an inverse relationship. What does seem to be predictive of South Korea’s policy is the mood of the times, and the best data I have suggests that that mood has shifted strongly toward the center since 2002. Each nuke or missile test will weaken Moon’s hand in capitalizing Pyongyang. How Trump deals with Moon, what Kim Jong-un does next, and the results of South Korea’s next by-elections will give us a better sense of whether the voters want Moon to have a mandate or checks on his power. (Who knows when those will be?)
The immediate impact of Moon’s election is that the herculean efforts of Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se to secure other nations’ compliance with U.N. sanctions on North Korea will end. Over to you, Secretary Tillerson. The question that weighs on me more is whether Moon will listen to the counsel of his most extreme advisors, who might endanger the rights of North Korean refugees in South Korea.
One of my cruel habits lately has been to ask the holdouts who still advocate the economic, cultural, and scientific “engagement” of Pyongyang to name a single significant, positive outcome their policies have purchased at the cost of $8 billion or more, over 20-odd years, as thousands of North Koreans died beyond our view and our earshot. I’ve yet to receive a non-sarcastic answer to that question. Yesterday, I salted this wound by pointing out that the largest remaining engagement experiment, the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, has become a pool for hostages for Kim Jong-un, exactly as the Malaysian Embassy in Pyongyang recently was, and exactly as the Kaesong Industrial Complex will be if Moon Jae-in is foolish enough to reopen it — and if we’re foolish enough to let him draw us into this potential flashpoint for conflict (think Desert One with nukes).
It is now beyond serious debate that the Sunshine Policy (and every rebranded variation of it) has failed, and that it will never succeed as long as Kim Jong-un weighs down a throne in Pyongyang. Engagers will answer that it is essential to keep open lines of communication to prevent war. Fine, but such communications are best left to diplomats who can meet their North Korean counterparts in safe, neutral locations, not to anyone addlebrained enough to visit or take up residence in North Korea in times like these.
Engagers will also argue that North Korea will never change if North Koreans aren’t exposed to better ideas and ways of life. But if you were to interrogate the engagers and me, you’d find that I believe this point more strongly than the engagers themselves do. We differ in their belief, and my skepticism, that Pyongyang-approved engagement programs have the potential to catalyze positive change from the top down. Rather, it’s the smuggling and broadcasting of media that Pyongyang is waging an unrelenting war to suppress that have the proven potential to change North Korea from the bottom up, and for the better. Remember 2012, when the engagers figured Kim Jong-un for a Swiss-educated reformer? Instead, his signature domestic policy has been a counterinsurgency campaign — a violent war by his regime against an unorganized popular uprising. Except that in this war, only one side is organized and armed, and consequently, the other side has done all of the dying.
~ ~ ~
The evidence that has accumulated over 20 years yields no basis — none — to believe that we will see a kinder, gentler Kim Jong-un if we just throw enough money at him. Indeed, the legacy of the Sunshine Policy is far worse than its mere failure to succeed. It has also set back the cause of reform, opening, and change by financing the machinery of oppression and terror (of both the domestic and foreign varieties) that guards the status quo.
Several years ago, for example, I linked to reports that the dreaded State Security Department finances its salaries and expenses through a China-based trading company. Since then, the Treasury Department has designated three North Korean trading companies that sell coal and iron ore — Daewon Industries, which supports the Munitions Industry Department; the Kangbong Trading Corporation, which supports North Korea’s military; and Paeksol Trading Corporation, which supports the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the spy agency that carries out most of North Korea’s terrorist and cyber attacks. To these, the Wall Street Journal‘s Jay Solomon adds another example, involved in financing North Korea’s nuclear programs.
From this evidence, it follows that we would do more to disarm and transform North Korea by targeting those companies with sanctions and bankrupting them, and by forcing the soldiers and cadres that rely on their revenue to turn to corruption, than by financing them. If we’re serious about bringing change to North Korea, our sanctions policy should preferentially target North Korea’s security forces and border guards as much as it targets its proliferation network. That’s the part of “maximum pressure” the Trump administration gets.
The even greater potential source of pressure, which the Trump administration may or may not understand, is to employ an engagement strategy that seeks to reach the North Korea people directly, using technology to bypass Pyongyang’s minders and censors. The people of North Korea are looking for that bypass from within:
Amid heightened levels of surveillance and border control, an increasing number of North Koreans in the border areas are purchasing South Korean smartphone, which they perceive as more secure from detection by the authorities.“Most smugglers own mobile phones that enable them to communicate across the border, but recently an increasing number of residents are looking for South Korean touch-phones (smartphones). There are rumors that the South Korean phones are not as easily detectable by the devices used by the security agencies,” a source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on May 1.“Some say that residents with South Korean smartphones are able to send texts and pictures more quickly and evade detection. For this reason, individuals are paying large sums of money to smugglers for South Korean phones.” [Daily NK]
An engagement strategy that goes directly to the North Korean people has far more potential to achieve cultural, social, and political change than another rebranded variation of Sunshine. It would follow the plan I’ve written about at length and described as “guerrilla engagement” — one that directly engages North Korea’s discontented by harnessing the jangmadang economy and North Koreans’ hunger for information about the outside world. It would use entertainment and practical information (weather and market reports) as gateway drugs for those who might later opt to listen to overtly religious and political content. An essential reagent for the second phase of that strategy will be deploying the technology that not only allows North Koreans to hear our messages, but also to communicate and organize with each other. In time, it would organize and coalesce their grievances into a broad-based popular resistance movement with the capacity to broadcast photographs and video of the regime’s human rights abuses, stage strikes, deny the regime control of the market economy, and further strain the regime’s finances.
~ ~ ~
True, the election of Moon Jae-in threatens to reanimate the old, failed approach to engagement, though without much of a popular mandate. In due course, a revival of Sunshine will collapse under the weight of Kim Jong-un’s predatory and impulsive nature, just as Kim Jong-Il’s conduct eventually discredited Roh Moo-hyun’s policy. Until then, neutralizing South Korean opposition to “maximum pressure” will require us to bargain harder with Seoul that George W. Bush or Barack Obama ever did. Moon’s election may require us to find information strategies that circumvent his obstructionism by relying on our own technological innovation, and perhaps by shifting toward a closer operational partnership with Japan.
We tend to forget that until just over a year ago, engagement and sanctions worked at cross purposes — effectively, sanctions and subsidies were mutually canceling. But consider the potential of those two strategies if we ever coordinated them. It is one thing to bankrupt the border guards, but entirely another to do so while helping smugglers bribe or evade them. It is one thing to bankrupt the security forces, but entirely another to do so while helping clandestine journalists show their abuses to the world. It is one thing to bankrupt the military’s commissary system, but entirely another to do so while empowering clandestine humanitarian NGOs to minister to, and provide for the material needs of, demoralized, hungry, and mistreated soldiers. If the Sunshine experiment was allowed so many years to double and triple down on failure, might we at least experiment with an engagement strategy designed to shift North Korea’s internal balance of power, gradually enough so that Kim Jong-un never faces the dangerous use-it-or-lose-it proposition that our loose talk of “decapitation” raises?
Engagers will say this means regime change, and it’s certainly some kind of change, but a kind that looks less like Iraq than the unkept promises of glasnost and perestroika we heard from the engagers themselves 20 years ago. As Professor Lee, Bruce Klingner and I pointed out in the pages of Foreign Affairs recently:
The failure of engagement was just as inevitable as the failure of the Agreed Framework. Its premise—that capitalism would spur liberalism in a despotic state—was flawed. After all, over the past two decades, both China and Russia have cracked down on domestic dissent and threatened the United States and its allies abroad, even as they have cautiously welcomed in capitalism. In 2003, even as it cashed Seoul’s checks, Pyongyang warned party officials in the state newspaper that “it is the imperialist’s old trick to carry out ideological and cultural infiltration prior to their launching of an aggression openly.” For the regime, engagement was a “silent, crafty and villainous method of aggression, intervention and domination.” Given this attitude, it’s no surprise that Kim Jong Il never opened up North Korea. The political change that engagement advocates promised was exactly what he feared the most.
That is to say, the Sunshine Policy could never work because it was a strategy for regime change that depended on the very people with the most to lose if it succeeded — the ruling class in Pyongyang. (Either that, or Sunshine was really a marketing strategy for overcoming U.S. objections to subsidizing Pyongyang and canceling out the effect of sanctions by clothing it as regime change. In which case, it succeeded brilliantly.)
Taking the aims of Sunshine at face value, however, its manifest failure calls for a complete rethinking. Engagement must appeal, first, to the people who seek change, rather than those who resist it. The information component of this strategy must be tailored to different constituencies — soldiers, the elites, and of course, the poor who are trapped at the bottom of the songbun scale. By engaging the North Korean people directly, we can help expand the private farming and trading that fill the markets. We can broaden the cracks in Kim Jong-un’s blockade to expand the freedom of information that really can bring social and political change. We can slow the pace of proliferation and relax the grip of the state’s oppression on the people. We can hasten the erosion of belief in Kim Jong-un’s personality cult, promote peace, and help prevent (or shorten) a war.
We will also need a separate strategy to engage the elites in Pyongyang, to persuade them not to resist change, to abstain from crimes against humanity, and to refuse (as much as they are able) to attack civilian targets in South Korea. This must be an appeal to the interests of the men with the guns. We should seek to undermine their confidence in Kim Jong-un and convince them that they have a better and safer future in a reunified Korea. That may require the difficult choice to offer some form of clemency to those who have taken innocent life, but only if they save innocent North or South Korean lives at critical moments. We must speak to them with candor about the recent purges in Pyongyang — how the status quo eventually means physical obliteration for them and a slow death in the prison camps for their families. If we employ these strategies in tandem, the elites will realize that time is not on their side, and that their reward for preserving Kim Jong-un’s reign will be physical extinction for themselves, a bleak future for their families, and a legacy on the ash-heap of history.
No pressure can ever be “maximum” if it excludes this reinvented, disruptive new approach to engagement.
Just one week after I predicted that the misbegotten experiment known as the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology would soon be at the center of a hostage crisis, the inevitable has happened.
North Korean state media reports the country has detained a U.S. citizen — the fourth U.S. citizen being held there amid rising tensions between the two countries. The official Korean Central News Agency identifies the man detained Saturday as Kim Hak Song, an employee of Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST).
He was detained by North Korea “on suspension of his hostile acts against it,” according to the news agency, and “a relevant institution is now conducting detailed investigation into his crimes.” [….]
Kim Hak Song is the second PUST staffer detained within a month. As NPR’s Lauren Frayer reports from Seoul, the first, named Kim Sang Duk, “was arrested late last month while trying to leave North Korea, and accused of trying to overthrow the government in Pyongyang. North Korean media haven’t said whether the two men knew each other.”
The other two detained U.S. citizens “are already serving prison terms, with hard labor, for alleged ‘anti-state acts’ and ‘espionage,'” Lauren adds. [NPR, Merrit Kennedy]
NBC, drawing a conclusion that’s increasingly difficult to avoid, calls the latest arrests “hostage diplomacy.” President George W. Bush removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008. Under his successor, Barack Obama, the State Department’s official position was that North Korea has not sponsored acts of terrorism since 1987. Discuss among yourselves.
Meanwhile, this event is opening a contrast between the Trump administration’s rhetoric and its policy — after all, rhetoric is what you say (and let’s give Rex Tillerson credit for saying the right things); policy is what you actually do. For all of Donald Trump’s talk of “maximum pressure,” there still isn’t really a Trump administration North Korea policy worth speaking of. Below the secretarial level, most of the second-level appointments of the officials who turn the dials and pull the levers of policy still haven’t been made. More than 100 days into this administration, the administration has yet to take simple, discretionary executive actions like re-adding North Korea to the list of state sponsors of terrorism, issuing sanctions designations that go beyond the slow pace of the Obama administration, or suspending PUST’s Commerce and Treasury Department licenses as U.N. resolutions require us to do, preferably before the next class of hackers graduates.
Still, it’s unlikely that revoking those licenses would have prevented this crisis or its likely growth over the coming weeks as Pyongyang takes more PUST faculty members hostage. After all, anyone who still believes that economic, cultural, or scientific engagement can change Pyongyang for the better would probably still defy travel warnings, common sense, and perhaps even the law to stay in Pyongyang anyway. One could hardly invent a better demonstration of how “engagement” has failed to change Pyongyang than a hostage crisis at PUST, the largest remaining experiment in the Sunshine Policy, but anyone who was open to drawing obvious conclusions about the potential of that policy from the abundant evidence probably did so years ago — after the killing of Park Wang-ja at Kumgang, the first Kaesong shutdown, the second Kaesong shutdown, the Cheonan attack, the Yeonpyeong attack, any of the last five nuke tests, the embarrassing flops of the AP’s Pyongyang bureau and Koryolink, the failure of 20 years of international aid to end North Korea’s food crisis, or the murder of Kim Jong-nam.
“We’ve really tried everything in good faith to bring North Korea into the mainstream,” says NSC’s Matt Pottinger. pic.twitter.com/W4SsxJgyyJ
— Steve Herman (@W7VOA) May 2, 2017
The human mind arrives at its most stubborn beliefs for reasons that transcend logic, reason, and evidence. It is often the highly educated and intelligent who are, perhaps out of intellectual arrogance, the last to abandon beliefs built on a foundation of emotions. For 30 years after the end of World War II, Japanese soldiers (the last of them an intelligence officer, Lt. Hiroo Onoda) were still emerging from their jungle hideouts on islands all over the South Pacific, having refused until then to believe that the war was over. In certain parts of Washington, one still encounters equally stubborn believers in the idea that there is a kinder, gentler Kim Jong-un beneath a disposition that became obvious to the rest of us years ago. Increasingly, I find myself tempted to grab these North Korea holdouts by their shoulders, shake them vigorously, and shout, “Come out of the jungle, Lieutenant Onoda! The war has been over for 20 years!”
It is in this historical and evidentiary setting that Moon Jae-In, who commands the largest cadre of these holdouts, will begin his minority presidency of another (de facto) island in the Pacific this week — bereft of a strong popular mandate, a plausible approach to North Korea, or the support of his most important ally. One hopes that it will take less time for President Moon than Lt. Onoda to draw the obvious conclusions, but if you’ve explored his background, don’t count on it. In which case, Mr. Moon’s party could face some extinction-level losses in the National Assembly in the coming months, and will richly deserve to.
This week, I’ve had to reallocate my limited blogging time to some other high-priority, not-for-publication projects I have to get done. Hopefully, normal service will be restored next week.
There is a certain view, popular mostly among the soft-liners who did so much to get us into this crisis and now seek to reassure themselves, that North Korea only wants nukes to protect itself from us. They aren’t wrong; it’s just that they’re less than half right. Pyongyang says it wants nukes as a defensive deterrent, and of course, it does:
Pyongyang, April 29 (KCNA) — The Korean People’s Army is providing strong support for the nuclear power in the East, the invincible military power as it reliably protects peace and security of the Korean peninsula, resolutely smashing the reckless moves of the U.S. imperialists and their vassal forces for a nuclear war against the DPRK, Rodong Sinmun Saturday says in an article.
The DPRK’s nuclear deterrence for self-defence is the powerful guarantee for defusing the danger of a nuclear war and ensuring durable peace on the Korean peninsula and a common treasure of the nation for reunification and prosperity of the country, the article notes, and goes on:
The U.S. is the arch criminal increasing the tension and escalating the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.
Peace cannot be protected by submission and begging. It is the nature of the imperialists to become more violent when someone begs for peace. And it is the bitter lesson taught by history and reality that submission and concession to imperialism will result in wreck of peace and stability and ruin of a country and nation.
The DPRK has bolstered up its nuclear deterrence despite all sorts of ordeals to foil the U.S. brigandish moves for a nuclear war and defend the destiny of the entire nation.
But the soft-liners willfully ignore the greater part of Pyongyang’s stated intentions. If you want to know what those intentions are — and some of us are trying very hard not to — the best-educated speculation is worth less than Pyongyang’s own declarations. All you have to do is read them:
The era for independent reunification advancing under the banner of By Our Nation Itself was ushered to end the history of national division spanning more than half a century and the inter-Korean relations achieved epochal development. This would have been unthinkable without the invincible military strength of the DPRK provided by the Songun politics.
But surely, you say, it’s still unthinkable — the idea of a backward, impoverished state imposing “independent reunification” on its own terms over one of the world’s most prosperous states. Surely the days when Sparta could conquer Athens are centuries behind us. Surely the North’s conscripts would be agog and disillusioned at the first sign of the South’s prosperity (or whatever remained of it). But as I’ve argued, the North has no intention of occupying the South for the foreseeable future, until it subdues the South politically, ideologically, and economically. And as I’ve also argued, it’s closer to achieving this than most of us know, or dare to admit.
All Koreans are benefiting from the Songun politics and living under the protection of the nuclear power in the East. The DPRK’s strong nuclear deterrence for self-defence provided by the great Songun politics is the symbol of the national dignity and precious treasure common to the nation.
If the U.S. and the south Korean puppet group persist in escalating the moves to stifle the DPRK, the latter will further strengthen its nuclear deterrence. -0-
As if they weren’t going to do that anyway.
It would have required no geopolitical genius to predict in 1933 that Hitler’s rule would inevitably end in war and suffering. One would only have had to read an honest translation of “Mein Kampf” to see it. So it is today; Pyongyang’s intentions are on full display to those who are willing to read them. It has a clear and plausible strategy for winning the same goal it has repeated for decades. What’s more, it knows that it cannot long survive as the poorer, failed Korea as the flow of information slowly undermines its legitimacy in the eyes of its own people. It knows very well that within the next decade, and perhaps much less, one Korea or the other must dominate and absorb the other. Are we willing to listen to the protagonist in this escalating crisis?
Korean War II began in earnest with the attacks of 2010. Pyongyang’s war is no longer a conventional invasion, but a war of skirmishes that supports a strategy that is primarily political. It will premeditate a series of escalating provocations, each of them calculated to end with certain concessions that will pave its way to one-country, two-systems hegemony over the South. I would argue that Pyongyang came close to achieving many of its political objectives during Roh Moo-hyun’s presidency. Pyongyang will soon add to this strategy the leverage of an effective nuclear arsenal and the capacity to strike the United States. Given the political instability and mercurial public sentiment in South Korea, and the rising risk of a breach in the U.S.-Korea alliance, our question will soon be, “Who will stop them?”
Like Roh Moo-hyun, the President he served, Moon Jae-in’s ideological origins are found within the leftist lawyers’ group Minbyun (which has since become Pyongyang’s instrument for intimidating North Korean refugees in the South). As lawyers defending left-wing radicals and pro-democracy activists alike against the right-wing dictatorship, Moon and Roh became close friends and law partners in Pusan. Moon went on to become the legal advisor to the Pusan branch of the Korea Teachers’ and Educational Workers’ Union, a radicalized union that would draw controversy for the politicized, anti-American, and often pro-North Korean bias of its members’ instruction. In one case, it was caught using textbooks that borrowed heavily from North Korean texts.
[As political photo ops go, this combines all the appeal of Dukakis-in-a-tank and a Village People USO show.]
But the story of the rise of Moon Jae-in, the man who might be South Korea’s next President, really began with the election of 2002, when Moon managed Roh’s campaign. In many ways, the rise was a remarkable one. Neither man had any national political experience, and what experience they had was hardly predictive of success. (Roh’s only previous run for elected office had ended in defeat.) Roh initially ran on a platform of improving relations with North Korea and cleaning up corruption — an ironic position for a man who would later leap to his death as a bribery scandal closed in on him.
But it was not Roh’s promises of clean government that energized his base; instead, Roh and Moon found victory in tragedy. In June of 2002, the U.S. Army held an exercise near the town of Yangju. It should never have been held in such a heavily populated area. The drivers of the armored vehicles that participated contended with narrow roads, poor visibility, and faulty communications equipment. A series of poor-in-retrospect judgments by young soldiers, none of them criminal, ended horribly, with two 14-year-old girls, Shin Hyo-sun and Shim Mi-seon, crushed under the tracks of a bridge-laying vehicle.
As anyone living in South Korea could see by then — I was nearing the end of my twice-extended, four-year tour with the Army there — anti-Americanism was already rising, and the presence of so many phalanxes of riot police in downtown Seoul made me wonder if this was what Berlin felt like in the late ‘20s. In that politically charged context, false rumors quickly outran the truth. Some newspapers reported that the soldiers had run over the girls intentionally. Former U.S. diplomat and fluent Korean speaker David Straub recalled some Korean media reported that the soldiers stood and laughed over the girls’ crushed bodies. In reality, the soldiers were devastated and traumatized. (I’ve met and spoken with several of the soldiers who were at the scene. One is a close friend and reader.)
It’s difficult to know how many Koreans really believed such spurious rumors, but there was no serious question that this tragedy was an accident. Most Americans viewed that as mitigating, but I’ve since come to realize that this exacerbated the controversy because of the very different ways in which Americans and Koreans respond to accidents — Americans’ first impulses are to regulate and sue; Koreans, whose legal system does not distinguish between torts and crimes, seek to blame and punish. That goes far to explain why everything the Americans said and did only seemed to make matters worse.
“Almost every Korean I speak to says that the verdict should reflect the feelings of the people. We go to great lengths to separate feelings from the law. It is a different concept,” the official said. He also complained that many apologies had been offered, from senior military brass to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who spoke to South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Sung Hong. “In this case, the Koreans just haven’t been listening,” the official said. [L.A. Times, Barbara Demick]
Amid the rising outrage, Korean prosecutors asked the Army to waive the provision of the Status of Forces agreement that gave it jurisdiction over on-duty incidents and the Army. The Army, no doubt fearing that the proceeding would be unfair, declined. That part of the decision was the correct one. As a South Korean law professor told a reporter, the two soldiers “almost certainly would have been convicted in a South Korean court.”
Instead, because it must have seemed like a good idea at the time, the Army charged the soldiers with negligent homicide at a court-martial. In effect, the Army had heard Koreans’ calls for punishment and mistranslated them as calls for justice. Had I stayed in Korea for another year, it might have fallen to me to defend one of the soldiers in court. Instead, that job fell to others. Of course, any competent Judge Advocate could have predicted that no panel would convict, and any competent diplomat should have predicted how certain elements of Korean society would react to the inevitable acquittal. To compound the error, the case went to trial a month before Korea’s presidential election.
~ ~ ~
For Roh and Moon Jae-in, these events were a political godsend. Even the accounts of journalists sympathetic to Roh’s North Korea policy leave little doubt that Roh’s campaign “orchestrated [and] politically cashed in on an anti-establishment movement” that included “bold anti-American rhetoric.” Mike Chinoy wrote that “Roh’s final campaign rallies were marked by renewed pledges to maintain the Sunshine Policy and increasingly sharp anti-American rhetoric, including warnings that a Roh administration would not necessarily side with the United States in the event the crisis led to armed conflict.” Demonstrators chanted Roh’s name and sang that America was “a vulgar country.”
Roh seemed to be their man. He had been criticizing Bush’s tough approach to the North Korean nuclear threat, preaching reconciliation and dialogue. He promised a policy more independent of American influence, and changes in the treaty governing the legal status of U.S. troops stationed here. While insisting he wasn’t anti-American, he said he wouldn’t “kowtow” to America. [….]
During the campaign, Roh seemed less accommodating toward Washington, speaking of the need for the Korean president to play a “leading role” in the nuclear crisis rather than “unilaterally obeying U.S. policy without criticism.”
“Exerting pressure on North Korea could be very dangerous,” he said then. “Now it’s time for South Korea to take the lead. We should no longer be a passive player manipulated by others. We and the United States have different interests on this issue. The United States’ goal is to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but for us, it can be a matter of life or death.” [Choe Sang-Hun, AP]
The Korea-based reporter Bobby McGill recounted how anti-Americanism even became a cultural fad.
The anger was palpable. While reporting on events for the the San Francisco Chronicle, I cited a Gallup poll that showed 75 percent of Koreans in their 20s said they disliked Americans. Sixty-seven percent in their 30s, along with half of those in their 40s, told Gallup they either “did not like” or “hated” the United States.
Few living on the peninsula at that time were immune to the movement. Businesses around the country banned Americans (and by association, Westerners) from entering, US flags were laid on the ground at university campuses allowing students to walk on them en route to class, and graphic banners of Shim Mi-son and Shin Hyo-sun were erected at rallies, as the American military came under increasingly heated scrutiny for what was ubiquitously viewed as an unfair and unjustified handling of their deaths. [Busan Haps]
The occasion for McGill’s recollection was Americans’ discovery that ten years before his ten minutes of fame, Psy had rapped, “Kill those f****** Yankees who have been torturing Iraqi captives — Kill those f****** Yankees who ordered them to torture, Kill their daughters, mothers, daughters-in-law and fathers — Kill them all slowly and painfully.” A popular girl band’s video featured “cowboy-booted Americans being beaten up, fed to dogs, and tossed off buildings.” One protest anthem was called “F**king USA.”
The extent of the anti-American sentiments stirred by the case was evident over the weekend at the entrance to a restaurant in downtown Seoul, which posted signs saying, “Not Welcome. The Americans.” Other establishments near university campuses were reported to be similarly barring Americans.
“I thought about putting up a sign reading, ‘Yankee, Go Home,’ but that seemed too harsh,” said Lee Chang Yong, 41, who had put up the “Not Welcome” sign. Lee said he appreciates the presence of U.S. troops in defending South Korea but believes that they behave arrogantly without respect for Korean culture. [L.A. Times, Barbara Demick]
Even before the accident, there had been acts of anti-American violence. In July 2000, a Korean man had stabbed and killed Major David Berry, a doctor and father of five, on a street I’d walked countless times. In February 2002, protesters ransacked the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Seoul, stole $10,000, and posted video of the incident on the website of a radical group calling itself “Voice of the People.” A poll later showed that nearly half of South Koreans approved.
Soldiers were warned against wearing our uniforms off-post or traveling alone (as a defense attorney representing clients in remote posts, this was an order I could only disregard). By the time my tour in South Korea ended in July of 2002, and just a month after the fatal accident, I had watched anti-American sentiment build for four years (though my affection for Korea, and for one Korean in particular, was still enough that I extended my tour twice anyway). But it is also true that the rhetoric became more violent in the months after the accident and before the election, held on December 19, 2002, and that actual violence was the inevitable result of this rhetoric.
~ ~ ~
On September 16th came the kidnapping of Private John Murphy in an incident that was clearly premeditated and instigated by So Kyung-won, “a former legislator who was jailed” for ten years “after going to North Korea without permission.” After his release, So became co-chairman of “a committee focusing on the accident involving the girls.” Murphy and two other soldiers were riding on the Seoul subway when a group of protesters accosted them. So tried to hand Murphy a leaflet, which Murphy refused to accept. The soldiers got off at the next stop, but as they tried to leave, they were ”pulled, punched, kicked and spat upon by demonstrators.” So and his comrades held Murphy until he made a videotaped apology and confession. (Like Moon Jae-in, So had been a leader in the KTEU. He would earn repeated praise in Pyongyang for his role in the kidnapping and other anti-American agitprop.)
On September 27th, ten Koreans threw Molotov cocktails into Camp Red Cloud, near Uijongbu. More firebombings would follow after Sergeants Nino and Walker were acquitted on November 20 and 22. Three days later, 20 people calling themselves “Korean Students Seeking Punishment for the Murderous American Soldiers” gathered outside Camp Gray in Seoul and threw ten Molotov cocktails into the post. The next day, 50 protesters broke into Camp Casey, near Dongducheon, north of Seoul. Two days after that, more Molotov cocktails were thrown into Camp Page, near Chuncheon. That same month, a U.S. Army colonel and his wife went to Kyunghee University to talk to a group of students when a group of radicals surrounded and damaged their car, forcing them to flee. Thankfully, no one was injured in these incidents.
Protests, some of them violent, surged on through December. Four protesters cut the wire fence around a post near Incheon. Outside, 500 activists protested and fought with riot police. On the evening of December 15th, three men attacked, tried to stab, and injured Lieutenant Colonel Steven Boylan, the spokesman for U.S. Forces Korea who had been the Army’s voice throughout that difficult year. There can be little question that the attack was premeditated. On the morning of December 20th, a day after the election, a passing motorist shot an American soldier with a pellet gun outside a U.S. Army post in Seoul. Later that morning, two U.S. soldiers at Seoul Station were assaulted, grabbed by their throats, and spat on while four South Korean soldiers stood by.
~ ~ ~
Certainly, nothing Roh or Moon said directly encouraged violence against Americans, but they didn’t discourage it, either. (The historical record from that election season is curiously devoid of any comments by Moon Jae-in, or even any coverage of him or his views.) Still, it seems unlikely that Roh could have won without this energy behind him; even with it, he only eked out a narrow win by just two percentage points.
North Korea “welcome[d] Roh’s victory as a defeat for Washington’s harder line” and said that the result “showed that ‘forces instilling anti-North confrontation … cannot escape a crushing defeat.’” It is fair to say that Roh and Moon were no more responsible for all of this than Donald Trump and Steven Bannon are responsible for the rhetoric of Ann Coulter or Milo Yiannopoulos, or for the reaction of their most extreme supporters, but in both cases, the candidates never appealed for an end to the violence or the rhetoric that made it inevitable. Instead, Roh asked, “What’s wrong with being anti-American?”
With the election safely behind him, Roh conceded that it had all gone too far.
“I made various remarks on the campaign trail, but I was just roughly touching upon issues without giving full consideration to the diplomatic and security situations,” he said. “I will consult with people in the government and will make more responsible remarks in the future.” [Choe Sang-Hun, AP]
But this still wasn’t a call for an end to the violence, and the violence was not over. More would follow in the coming years, including violent protests at Camp Humphreys in 2006 that injured 117 policemen and 93 protesters. The violence slowly tapered off as the Sunshine Policy failed to keep its unrealistic promises, as Roh turned out to be another compromised politician, and as North Korea repaid the South’s generosity by sinking one of its warships and shelling a fishing village, killing 50 of its citizens.
Opinions shifted away from the pro-North Korean and anti-American sentiment that dominated in 2002. Today, there is no groundswell to cozy up to Kim Jong-un or kick the Yankees out. Instead, there is the weariness with the industry of politics (see, e.g., America circa 2015) and a combination of anxiety, frustration, and indecision about North Korea (see, e.g., Washington, D.C., circa 2009 to 2015). The spirit of 2002 returned again in 2015, when a pro-North Korean extremist slashed the face of U.S. Ambassador Mark Lippert. With delectable irony, Moon warned that “if this incident is politically used … such a move will rather hurt the Seoul-Washington ties.”
~ ~ ~
That is how, in a few short years, Moon Jae-in rose from radical obscurity as a lawyer and ideologue to becoming the closest confidant of a president whom former Defense Secretary Robert Gates later described as “anti-American” and “probably a little crazy.” (In his memoirs, Gates wrote that Roh had called the U.S. and Japan the two greatest threats to security in Asia.) After Moon defended Roh in the latter’s 2004 impeachment, Roh made Moon a job as Senior Presidential Secretary for Political Affairs, putting him in charge of communications with the National Assembly and South Korea’s political parties. He later became Roh’s Chief of Staff, the position he held when he asked Pyongyang for its instructions as to how Seoul’s man in New York should vote on a U.N. General Assembly vote to condemn North Korea’s human rights abuses (and subsequently lied about it).
If Moon Jae-in’s history and recent statements are predictive of his world view, the U.S.-Korea alliance is headed for what we might call “a critical stage.” For example, Moon was widely quoted as promising that if elected, he would visit Pyongyang before he visits Washington, though he now claims that statement was taken out of context. Moon still says he plans to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a move that would violate U.N. sanctions and directly undermine the Trump administration’s emerging policy of economic pressure on Pyongyang. Moon has opposed, and repeatedly waffled on, the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system that protects not only South Korean cities, but U.S. forces and their families. Whereas Moon calls Kim Jong-un a ”partner for dialogue,” he sells himself as the leader of a Korea that can “say no the U.S.” You can get the full flavor of Moon’s putative North Korea policy here.
I’m already on record as predicting that these policies bear a high risk of going down very badly with the current U.S. President, who campaigned on demanding that Korea pay more for the cost of U.S. forces in Korea (a demand I would readily support) and whose recent policy review will emphasize economic pressure on Kim Jong-un. As Professor Lee, Bruce Klingner, and I recently argued in the pages of Foreign Affairs, one cannot make a coherent policy of subsidizing and sanctioning the same target at the same time. If you wire $7 billion to the man pointing the nukes at you, you forfeit the argument that sanctions haven’t worked. And potentially, you forfeit much more than that.
Moon now says that if elected, he would “pursue [the] realization of the dream that President Roh Moo-hyun was unable to see completed.” Mr. Moon may well realize the dream of another Korean leader, whether he knows it or not.
It’s not worth spending all that much time discussing Minjok Tongshin, despite the fact that when Pyongyang’s official “news” agency, KCNA, talks about an “internet newspaper of Koreans in the U.S.,” odds are it’s referring to Minjok Tongshin, the smaller western cousin of the Korean-American National Coordinating Council. Recently, the site’s proprietor, Ken Roh, or Roh Kil-nam was the subject of a not-very-sympathetic portrayal by Buzzfeed. You may not think NK News’s more recent interview of Roh was exactly sympathetic, but it certainly wasn’t probing, either.
And then there’s Minjok Tongshin: a website believed – by the Republic of Korea government at least – to be so subversive and dangerous that it cannot legally be read from South Korean territory.
Some of its content, to be fair, bears a striking resemblance to the materials which Pyongyang itself regularly publishes: articles about Kimchi-making in the DPRK are interspersed with articles denouncing former South Korean President Park Geun-hye as a “traitor,” and pieces slamming “ridiculous anti-DPRK propaganda.”
As a result of the website’s unique characteristics, NK News has long wanted to speak to Roh Kil-nam, the Korean-American man based out of Glendale, California who’s a driving force behind Minjok Tongshin. Whatever he’s doing, North Korea seem to largely approve, having accepted him to travel in the the DPRK over 70 times, though the makeup of his readership and nature of his funding have remained mysterious. [NK News]
Roh then goes on to present himself as a peace-loving unification activist — all of which goes unchallenged by two otherwise excellent reporters with formidable research skills and a number of Korean-speaking reporters at their disposal. But whereas Buzzfeed’s article can be described as incomplete, what NK News provides ends up being a gross distortion. To report accurately on what Minjok Tongshin really stands for and promotes, you have to begin with the content that’s posted there. Among other things, we learn that some of those who post on Minjok Tongshin have big post-election plans.
We also learn that Minjok Tongshin has a lot in common with Stormfront.
Sure, you say, those are just things posted by nutty users on Minjok’s bulletin board. Fine, then.
오는 5월, 국가채무이자지불을 해결하지 못하면 미 연방재정이 파탄 나는 상황에서 제45대 미 대통령 트럼프에게 닥쳐오는 위기는 《칼빈슨》 핵 항모와 돈에 목숨을 판 용병들의 정신세계로는 정치사상강군 조선을 이길 수가 없음에도 군수산업체들과 유대자본의 협박에 굴복한 칼빈슨으로 조선의6차 핵 시험을 막아보려는 속임수도 들통나버린 오늘 감당할 수 없는 무자비한 조선의 정치군사적 압박을 앞으로 어떻게 막아낼지는 알 수 없으나 “북조선 문제해결은 내 책임이고 한 스스로의 말이 예측 가능한 진담이기를 기대하는 동시에 미국 제일주의고름이 결코 살이 되지 않는 진실”도 깨닫기를 바란다. (끝) [link]
Hat tip to a reader. I won’t translate all of it, but the essence of it is that a combination of the military-industrial complex and “Jewish capital” are trying to intimidate North Korea out of doing another nuke test.
To be clear, I agree with the implication that South Korea’s censorship of these sites is dumb. Koreans are internet-savvy enough to find ways around the blocks and filters. Censorship just gives this content the lure of the forbidden and amplifies its appeal to the attention-seeking, daddy-never-loved-me demographic of losers who feel cheated by a world that never appreciated their latent greatness. Inevitably, those people are going to find one extremist ideology or another. The more violent the rhetoric, the greater its promise to upend a system that has “assigned” them a low station in life, and to offer revenge against those they perceive to have wronged them.
Now, I’d like to hope that we’re talking about a small band of nutters who have no real influence on global events anyway. But news outlets are now covering Minjok Tongshin, and if they are, their obligation extends to exploring their subject matter in more depth than merely accepting Mr. Roh’s statements at face value. Take the silk screen off your lens and show us what kind of hate we’re really dealing with here.
NK News has done some excellent reporting by finding and reporting facts that others missed. Here is an example of the opposite. Despite its occasional misses like this one, I remain a fan. I hope they’ll do better next time.
The news that North Korea arrested its third American hostage over the weekend ought to change the shape of our discussion about PUST, the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology.
Kim Sang-duk, a U.S. citizen and professor at the Yanbian University of Science and Technology (YUST) in Yanji, China, was detained in North Korea on Saturday at Pyongyang’s Sunan airport, a source familiar with the case confirmed to NK News on Sunday.
Chan-Mo Park, current chancellor of the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST), said that Kim and his wife had been on his way back to China after teaching a class in International Finance and Management at the university.
“Professor Kim Sang-duk was arrested on the way out of the country yesterday (22nd),” Park told NK News over email. “From what I heard, he is being investigated for the matters that are not tied to the PUST.”
Kim joins two other U.S. citizens in detention there, 22-year-old Otto Warmbier and 62-year-old Kim Dong Chul, both of whom are serving sentences of hard labor of 15 and 10 years respectively.
An earlier report from South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency reported that Kim is a 50-something Korean-American. [NK News, Oliver Hotham]
I’ve previously written that the Commerce Department should review PUST’s licenses for scientific and technological training while leaving its medical training programs intact for now. (The same should go for OFAC’s licenses for PUST’s financial transactions with Pyongyang.) That’s not only because the experiment itself has failed. Nor is it only because PUST has been changed by Pyongyang more than it has changed Pyongyang. It’s not even because of the danger that PUST may be training North Korean hackers, although that would be a good enough reason by itself. It’s because resolutions that our U.N. Ambassador voted for require us to suspend that training pending a review.
“11. Decides that all Member States shall suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges unless:
(a) In the case of scientific or technical cooperation in the fields of nuclear science and technology, aerospace and aeronautical engineering and technology, or advanced manufacturing production techniques and methods, the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that a particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes; or
(b) In the case of all other scientific or technical cooperation, the State engaging in scientific or technical cooperation determines that the particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes and notifies the Committee in advance of such determination; [UNSCR 2321]
In plain English, this language creates three categories of scientific cooperation: medical exchange, which is fine; nuclear science and the other items in 11(a), which must full-stop pending immediate 1718 Committee review; and “all other” scientific and technical cooperation, which member states are obligated under 11(b) to review to ensure they will not contribute to banned programs (note the shifting of the burden). The 11(b) review is also subject to the “suspend scientific and technical cooperation … unless” clause; thus, 11(b) requires us to suspend “all other” scientific or technical cooperation pending that review. That the U.S. government still hasn’t acted on this can only be due to the slow pace of the Trump administration’s appointments and its consequent inattention to the problem.
As far as PUST’s medical training goes, that can continue in Yanbian or other locations outside North Korea for reasons that ought to be obvious now. The other danger that has now come into clearer focus is that the other Americans on the PUST campus will also become hostages. Admittedly, as Ron White says, “You can’t fix stupid,” and the stupidity of intelligent people can be the most stubborn kind. Some of PUST’s administrators and instructors will stay in Pyongyang even if we do revoke those licenses, just as some tourists will find ways to go to North Korea even if Congress finally gets around to banning tourist travel there. What is increasingly worrisome is this question: if Pyongyang is willing to take athletes and diplomats from Malaysia hostage, despite Malaysia being a friendly country, why would Pyongyang hesitate to take any American hostage, no matter how good her intentions?
A recurring theme in the North Korea sanctions debate is that most of those who really understand what our sanctions on North Korea do and don’t do, and how they work, think they can work against North Korea, if we ever bother to enforce them (see, e.g., Juan Zarate, Anthony Ruggiero, Peter Harrell, George A. Lopez, and Bill Newcomb). Unfortunately, the actual experts are at variance with another group, consisting mostly of academics, retired politicians, retired diplomats, and experts in other fields, who say that sanctions either won’t work, or aren’t an alternative to a deal Kim Jong-un doesn’t even want. What most of these people have in common is a lack of any significant training or expertise on sanctions. Yet for whatever reason, some editors just can’t get enough of their op-eds, although it should be said that the editors of the Washington Post are more persuaded by the actual experts).
Because I see a very real danger that the policy views of those who’ve misjudged North Korea’s intentions all along, and who did so much to bring us to the worst nuclear crisis since 1962, could drown out the views of professional sanctions practitioners who offer us our last, best policy alternative to a devastating war, I do what little I can to amplify the views of experts who step forward to inform us. The latest example is David Cohen, who served as Deputy CIA Director and Undersecretary of the Treasury under President Obama:
In dealing with North Korea, the Trump administration should look to Iran. Specifically, it should take a page out of the Obama administration’s Iran sanctions playbook and apply against North Korea the tool used successfully to bring Iran to the nuclear negotiating table — “secondary sanctions” on those who do business with the regime. [David Cohen, The Washington Post]
As I’ve been shouting from the rooftops of this isolated outpost and elsewhere, until the reinforcements began to arrive …
North Korea is not, by any stretch, “sanctioned out.” Despite a broad set of international and U.S. sanctions, North Korea has gotten off relatively easy, especially as compared with Iran. That is largely because the United States has historically been reluctant to impose secondary sanctions to isolate North Korea, particularly against China, the regime’s principal legitimate trading partner. Certainly, the Trump administration should do its best to bring the Chinese government on board. But if China drags its feet, President Trump should proceed anyway.
Secondary sanctions are both simple and enormously powerful. They work by presenting a stark choice to a foreign bank: It can process transactions for a bank already facing sanctions (for example, one of the many North Korean banks that have been listed by the United States) or it can maintain its access to the U.S. financial system, but it cannot do both. That presents an easy choice, because access to the U.S. financial system, which also means access to the U.S. dollar, is a practical necessity for almost any bank anywhere in the world.
Adopting secondary sanctions against North Korea could cut the last tendrils of its access to the international financial system. As a recent assessment by a special U.N. committee reportedly concluded, North Korean banks and trading companies operate in China through China-based front companies. These front companies, in turn, have accounts at Chinese banks, from which they are able to do business globally, including in the United States.
Cohen then addresses the question of how “China” would react. Some experts, including some officials who continue to occupy senior posts in the State Department, insist that sanctions can’t work without Beijing’s voluntary cooperation. Certainly, there are some sanctions, such as customs inspections at China’s ports and borders, that can only work with China’s cooperation, although the NKSPEA and H.R. 1644 both have provisions to sanction uncooperative ports, shippers, and shipping registries.
I’ve also argued for a more nuanced view of “China,” in that such a large and complex country is not a monolith, but a collection of constituencies within both government and industry that would have different responses to secondary sanctions. In Cohen’s view, it’s the views of the financial sector that really matter, and just as with Banco Delta Asia, China’s banking industry responded cooperated.
When I was serving in the Treasury Department during the Obama administration, we employed secondary sanctions to significantly ramp up pressure on the Iranian government. Hundreds of foreign banks that had been transacting with sanctioned Iranian banks voluntarily severed those relationships, thereby isolating much of the Iranian banking system.
But two banks in particular continued to work with sanctioned Iranian banks. One was China-based Kunlun Bank, a midsize institution that, our financial intelligence told us, “provided hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of financial services” to a half-dozen sanctioned Iranian banks. Despite repeated warnings to the Chinese government, Kunlun refused to stop such activity. So in August 2012, Treasury used the secondary sanctions tool and cut off Kunlun from the U.S. financial system.
What happened next is instructive. The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a relatively tepid and formulaic protest — and, behind the scenes, the Chinese government directed Kunlun to stop. Despite what some had feared, employing secondary sanctions against Kunlun neither led China to stop cooperating on Iran nor soured our relations with Beijing in any other respect.
And just as our strategic bombing campaign against Germany only had to paralyze a few critical industries (fuel) to be effective, targeted financial warfare against Pyongyang can be effective without targeting North Korea as a whole, if it can paralyze the regime’s finances.
I’ve pushed the boundaries of the Fair Use Doctrine far enough for one day, so read the rest of Cohen’s op-ed on your own. He goes on to suggest that the White House’s saber-rattling, which I view as harmful to our interests in Korea and Japan, may be designed to show China that the alternative to sanctions would be far worse, and that enforcing sanctions is a prerequisite to effective disarmament negotiations. He then advocates for a strategy of hitting the mid-sized Chinese banks that deal with North Korea first and leaving the bigger ones for later.
I don’t object to the first part of this strategy, although I also believe that some of the bigger banks, which are more likely to have branches in New York, should be targeted now with subpoenas to audit their compliance with the new Treasury regulation cutting off North Korean banks’ provision of indirect correspondent banking services. That’s one way to get the big banks to clean up their acts without actually taking legal action against them.
Banks that turn out to have violated the correspondent ban can don’t have to be targeted with measures as drastic as designation under NKSPEA 104 or Patriot Act 311; rather, they can be hit with civil penalties such as those applied to European banks that violated Iran sanctions. Under those circumstances, I’m confident that Congress wouldn’t object to a waiver under NKSPEA 208(c). In fact, we specifically wrote the exemption in 208(c)(1) to allow banks to agree to cooperate and provide additional financial intelligence, and to clean up their acts on money laundering compliance, pursuant to deferred prosecution agreements. Our options against non-cooperative banks are not all binary or nuclear, but vary across a wide spectrum of options.
For now, it looks like the Trump administration has decided to give China an opportunity to act on its own. I hope that opportunity is brief. Despite reports of fuel shortages and non-functioning ATMs in Pyongyang, you can color me skeptical; I’ve seen it all before. China’s strategy seems to be to generate headlines that it’s enforcing sanctions, only to ease off the moment those headlines reach the eyes of busy White House and congressional staffers. Then, as soon as Washington quits paying attention, it’s back to business as usual. The latest | developments with the so-called coal ban are only the latest example of China’s long record of broken commitments to enforce sanctions against Pyongyang.
I don’t object to giving China a brief opportunity to cooperate voluntarily, but it’s important to understand a few things. First, with China, the negotiation really begins after the contract is signed. Second, cheating is inevitable. Third, all of those diverse constituencies in China are watching how we react very carefully. Fourth, deterrence is as important in financial matters as it is in military matters. In the same sense that we keep forces in South Korea to deter North Korea from a military attack, having a strong legal and investigative team in place can help deter China from abusing our financial system. Right now, that force is badly understaffed and lacks political backing — and China knows it. There is no better way to show Beijing — and more importantly, China’s banking industry — that we’re serious than by staffing up the inter-agency working group that will investigate, enforce, and prosecute the violations of our money laundering laws that keep Kim Jong-un on his throne.
안녕하세요, 한국의 친구들. 저는 워싱턴 DC에있는 미국 변호사입니다. 1998 년부터 2002 년까지 저는 한국에서 군인이었습니다. 저는 아름다운 문화와 사람들로 인해 한국에서의 생활을 사랑했습니다. 1999 년에, 저는 가장 정직하고, 아름다운 사람을 만났고, 그래서 저는 그녀와 결혼했습니다. 오늘 우리에게는 두 명의 자녀가 있습니다.
한국은 제가 사는 한 제 삶의 일부가 될 것입니다. 그래서 저는 북한에 대해 걱정하고 있습니다. 우리는 전쟁을 피해야만 하지만 우리는 또한 대한민국을 자유롭게 해야 합니다.
1998년 젊은 군인으로 처음 한국에 도착했을 때, 한국은 재통일에 대한 희망으로 들떠 있었습니다.
김대중이 대통령이었고, 북한의 경제를 변화시키고 개방하기 위해 원조와 북한과의 무역을 약속했었습니다.
김대중 정권아래 그리고 후에 노무현 정권에서 북한에 100억 달러를 지원했습니다. 그러나 그 누구도 북한이 그 돈을 어떻게 사용했는지 알 수 없습니다. 개성과 금강산은 단지 시작에 불과했습니다. 이제 북한은 외국 공장들로 채워 져야만 합니다.
김대중 정권이 그의 정책을 시행한 후 20년, 이제는 이 정책이 성공적인지를 알아 볼 시간이 되었다고 봅니다. 실패했다면, 햇볕정책의 목표가 달성될 가치가 있는 것일까요? 그 목표를 달성할 다른 전략은 없는 것일까요? 햇볕정책은 북한을 변화시키지 못했습니다. 남한의 원조는 핵실험이라는 그리고 남한의 영토 공격으로 그리고 남한의 장병들을 살해하
We now revisit the curious case of a leader inside South Korea’s Blue House who sought and followed the counsel of a cult leader with no official position in the South Korean government and (let us hope!) no security clearance, regarding a highly sensitive question of government policy. By which I refer, of course, to Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-il (who else were you thinking of?). To refresh your memory:
Just before the Park Geun-hye scandal buried every other news story in Korea, Song Min-soon, who was Foreign Minister for the late left-wing ex-President Roh Moo-Hyun, revealed in his memoirs that in 2007, before a U.N. General Assembly vote condemning North Korea’s atrocities against its own people, Roh’s then-Chief of Staff, Moon Jae-in, agreed to ask the perpetrators of the greatest crimes against the Korean people in their long history how Seoul’s U.N. Ambassador should cast his vote. [Me, four months ago]
At first, Moon said he couldn’t remember what happened. Then, his memory recovered and he denied Song’s allegation. Then, he sued some of the conservative opponents who attacked him for it (but not Song himself). I’d begun to think that South Koreans had forgotten all about this until last week, when Moon and the other candidates for South Korea’s upcoming presidential election debated.
Two conservative candidates set an aggressive tone from the outset, accusing him of kowtowing to North Korea and flip-flopping on missile defense.
Yoo Seong-min of the splinter conservative Bareun Party revisited the allegation that the former presidential chief of staff consulted Pyongyang before the government abstained in a vote on U.N. resolution on North Korea’s human rights violations in 2007, an accusation that Moon denied again.
Hong Joon-pyo of the conservative Liberty Korea Party denounced Moon for lying, citing a former foreign minister’s memoirs that first sparked the controversy. Moon countered that Hong was amplifying an unverified claim. [Yonhap]
Enter Song Min-soon, who calmly rises from his counsel table with a piece of paper in his hand. He approaches the clerk of the court, asks the judge to mark Prosecution Exhibit A for identification, and enters it into the record.
The document included what appears to be the North’s opposition to a move in the South to vote for the U.N. resolution, saying that it cannot be “justified under any circumstances” and runs counter to what the then leaders of the two Koreas agreed after holding a summit.
It went on to say that the South is urged to take a “responsible” stance on the resolution issue if it wants to advance its relations with the North, adding that it will “closely” watch how the South acts. At bottom was a handwritten memo that hinted that the document was delivered from the then spy agency chief to the then national security adviser.
The disclosure is expected to create a political controversy in South Korea ahead of the presidential election as it took issue with Moon who has denied it.
The former foreign minister said in the interview that Moon has made himself a liar by strongly denying what he claimed in the memoir and that he had no choice but to make public the document to prove himself right. [Yonhap]
For a moment, I imagined that I could hear the souls of the disappeared men, women, and children of Camp 22 weeping.
This underlines again how South Korea’s libel laws, under which truth is no defense, are harming South Korea’s public discourse. In this case, a “liberal” politician and former “human rights lawyer” tried to use the courts to censor an allegation by his political opponents that Moon sacrificed the human rights of 23 million Koreans for political expediency. That allegation has immense public interest to the voters and to Korean history itself. And as it turns out, the allegation is true.
Even before Song showed Moon Jae-in to be a liar, Moon had been weakened by his flip-flopping and evasive answers on THAAD deployment, and by his statement that the Defense Ministry’s plans would not describe North Korea as the South’s “main enemy” in its defense plans. It can’t help that Pyongyang has made its support for Moon Jae-in as clear as it could without formally endorsing him.
As the Wall Street Journal‘s Jonathan Cheng informs us, national security has risen to the top of the list of issues that concern South Korean voters, and the attention to that issue hasn’t been good for Moon, whose support can’t break through a ceiling of 40 percent (less than he earned in his narrow loss in the 2012 election). It’s clear from the views of the candidates that the range of South Korea’s mainstream has shifted significantly (and perhaps, dramatically) since the days when Moon Jae-in ran Roh Moo-hyun’s campaign, and was his closest confidant in the Blue House.
How badly this hurts Moon remains to be seen. Even if Moon wins, he will not enter office with a mandate to pursue some of the more extreme policies he has advanced, such as snubbing the U.S. by visiting Pyongyang before he visits Washington,* canceling THAAD, or violating U.N. sanctions to reopen Kaesong. Almost as importantly, it marks the first time in recent South Korean history that human rights in the North has, however incidentally, become a significant issue in an election.
~ ~ ~
* Moon now says this statement was taken out of context.
As regular readers of this site know, China is opposed to unilateral sanctions, except when it isn’t. In the case of North Korea, China is also opposed to the multilateral sanctions it voted for in the U.N. Security Council; consequently, North Korean missiles ride on Chinese trucks, North Korean proliferation networks operate openly on Chinese soil and launder their money through Chinese banks, North Korea’s weapons are made from components and technology procured from or through China, and those weapons are imported or exported through Chinese ports. North Korean abduction squads kidnap refugees and murder activists on Chinese territory, and North Korean spy rings operating inside South Korea meet in safe houses on the outskirts of Beijing.
China’s answer to these charges, as near as I can make sense of them, is that it only violates the sanctions it voted for because sanctions never work and it’s afraid they’ll work and it has no influence over North Korea anyway and also, it isn’t violating them. But China’s unilateral sanctions to disarm South Korea, which are clearly calculated to leave it prostrate to Pyongyang’s (and Beijing’s) blackmail, put the lie to all of this.
Thus, two weeks ago, I drew the unavoidable conclusion and advanced the inflammatory theory that China’s failure to reign in North Korea’s nuclear program might not be a failure at all. Perhaps North Korea’s nuclear program is a proxy for China to disarm, isolate, Finlandize, and control both Koreas. After all, one could excuse a few lapses in North Korea sanctions enforcement as oversights by a fundamentally corrupt state, but it isn’t plausible that the same people, front companies, and networks could have escaped the all-seeing eye of the world’s most efficiently intrusive surveillance state for decades. And now that Xi Jinping is revealed to have spoken the words that the peoples of Asia fear most — “part of China” — Koreans’ worst fears are confirmed. For the full interview, go here. Here is the quote in context:
But we had a really good meeting [with Chinese President Xi Jinping], and it was supposed to be 10 minute session and then you go into a room with hundreds of people, you know all different representatives, and the meeting was scheduled for 10 to 15 minutes, and it lasted for 3 hours. And then the second day we had another 10 minute meetings and that lasted for 2 hours. We had a — just a very good chemistry.
He then went into the history of China and Korea. Not North Korea, Korea. And you know, you’re talking about thousands of years …and many wars. And Korea actually used to be a part of China. And after listening for 10 minutes I realized that not — it’s not so easy. You know I felt pretty strongly that they have — that they had a tremendous power over China. I actually do think they do have an economic power, and they have certainly a border power to an extent, but they also — a lot of goods come in. But it’s not what you would think. It’s not what you would think. [WSJ]
If South Koreans are worried and outraged, both sentiments are well justified. The scars left by South Korea’s occupation by a certain other predatory neighbor are still raw and painful to South Koreans, and I would argue that the legacy of China’s influence over North Korea has been far worse than the legacy of Japan’s occupation — including war, famine, gulags, smothering thought control, and exploitation of women on a scale and severity comparable to Japan’s exploitation of wartime sex slaves.
In most news outlets, this story is being reported as a Trump faux-pas, which it certainly was to the extent Trump seemed to credit Xi’s imperialist narrative. But that is not the real story, because (1) the world already discounts Trump’s words in ways that it did not discount the words of other presidents, and (2) there are men and women in the White House who are smart enough to disabuse Trump of this nonsense, clean it up, and make the appropriate assurances to South Korea, despite that damage that has been done. Those assurances are going to be very, very important when we are three weeks out from an election in South Korea, when South Koreans are already wondering if we are still a reliable ally.
But in another sense, we should silently thank Donald Trump for (however unwittingly) telling us the real story, which the media seem to be missing entirely. The real story is that Xi Jinping just tipped his hand about his colonial ambitions to control all of Korea. Xi Jinping, after all, does not tweet. He does not ramble, muse, or offer idle, half-considered thoughts. He is nothing if not deliberate and calculating. He went to Mar-a-Lago with meticulously premeditated plans to influence the President of the United States in certain directions, to achieve a certain ambition.
The historically accurate truth is that Korea was never a “part” of China, but was a tributary nation under substantial Chinese influence or control for centuries. Put another way, there is no more historical basis to Xi’s claim than there is to the Northeast Asia Project or Xi’s claim that the South China Sea is a part of China now. Who believes that Xi Jinping will let either truth or law get in his way when he senses that the time has come to make his move? If I were living in South Korea, I’d want missile defense and nuclear weapons now more than ever. I’d also want a president with the greatest possible influence over the United States, and the backbone to stand up to Xi Jinping. In other words, I’d want a choice I don’t have — so I’d pick the lesser evil who can still win.
Bruce Klingner, Professor Lee, and I have a new piece out in Foreign Affairs, in which we continue to ask the question, “What North Korea sanctions?” As regular readers know, I’ve spent the last several years waging | a jihad | against junk analysis and fake expertise about North Korea and sanctions, usually from people who don’t bother to read or research them, and who often flat-out misrepresent what they are and do. These people feel compelled to argue that sanctions can’t work because the possibility | that | they | can | work undercuts the argument that we should keep trying to appease our way out of this problem. For reasons that must be more psychological than empirical, some people are just stuck on the idea that we can only seize the Holy Grail by building that Large Wooden Badger, and that sanctions are an impediment to diplomacy rather than an enabler of it.
Kang and Gray are mostly polemicists anyway, so I can easily believe that neither has actually read what the U.N. Panel of Experts has published on this topic. Gray does add some useful research in his post, although (by which I mean “because”) it undercuts his conclusion that sanctions can’t work. Lewis, on the other hand, clearly has read portions of the U.N.’s reports, which is more damning, because it suggests that he’s selectively ignoring the overwhelming | evidence | that | sanctions | are | indeed | being | undermined | by | China.
Happily, we now have more data to push back this tide of misinformation. In my inbox this morning was an email from David Maxwell, pointing to a new online tool called the Enigma Sanctions Tracker, which has done something I’ve meant to do for years and never found the time to do — make a graphic, comparative representation of how North Korea sanctions stack up against other sanctions programs. And as you can clearly see, North Korea is not the most sanctioned country … not by the range of a Taepodong II.
One important caveat here is that while the vast majority of the WMD designations are against Iran and other targets, a significant number are against North Korean targets, and a small number of third-country enablers. Note that Cuba has fallen on this list because of a large number of sanctions removals. The Zimbabwe number seems suspiciously high; I’d calculated that Zimbabwe is about on par with North Korea if you count all the North Korean ships and planes that have been designated individually. Overall, however, this looks about right to me. Here’s another graph, comparing North Korea designations (yellow) to those of other targets (light gray).
We can also see how it took a push from Congress to get the Treasury Department off the dime. The next graph notes North Korea’s third nuclear test in 2013, but doesn’t mention that shortly thereafter, Congress told the administration that it had started drafting what later passed as the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act. And just look at what happened in 2016, when that law passed — a yuuuge spike in designations.
We can also see that even today, we are still not designating North Korea targets faster than we’re designating targets in the Ukraine, Russia, or Iran. This isn’t to say that those targets don’t richly deserve to be designated, but it’s certainly not because there’s | any | shortage of North Korean targets, either.
And finally, we see that China is still getting a free ride. Again, I have a small quibble here, because I don’t see any little gray dots in Dandong. Still, this is broadly accurate.
This Reuters fact-box is also useful on the subject of U.N. sanctions.
As Enigma correctly notes, the number of designations doesn’t tell the whole story. Designating a low-level retailer doesn’t have the same impact as designating the agency he reports to, and designating Kim Jong-un means nothing if we don’t go out in search of his bank accounts and apply enough muscle to the bankers to get those funds frozen. A few pictures are worth
three five thousand words, but by all means read the three five thousand words, too.
If Kim Jong-un’s strategy is what I think it is, it involves provoking a series of escalating security crises, with a plan to “de-escalate” each one through talks, or ideally, though an extended-yet-inconclusive “peace treaty” negotiation, in exchange for a series of pre-planned concessions that would amount to a slow-motion surrender of South Korea. I say “escalating” because Pyongyang’s provocations have escalated in recent years, and because it’s a sure bet they’ll escalate even more after Pyongyang has an effective nuclear arsenal. From that moment, it could be as little as five years before Pyongyang’s strategy achieves sufficient hegemony to exercise significant control over South Korea’s politics, media, textbooks, defense policies, and economic resources, and to effectively intimidate any noisy defectors and activists into silence.
Along the way, however, the risks are great that either a miscalculation, or a U.S. or ROK refusal to slouch passively toward surrender, would end in the most devastating war since 1945. In this post, I will argue that if North Korea cannot be disarmed without war, war is inevitable, but also that premature talk of war impedes our chances of disarming Pyongyang peacefully.
Those who invited this crisis by counseling us to indulge Pyongyang now insist that Pyongyang’s only purpose for acquiring nuclear weapons is to protect itself. But having watched Pyongyang wage the war of skirmishes it resumed in 2010 with the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong-do attacks, I cannot agree that Pyongyang’s objective is merely regime survival. Pyongyang knows that it cannot survive forever as the poorer Korea. Rather, its strategy is to coerce Seoul into a political framework that allows it to exercise and expand its political and economic control over all of Korea. Its master plan does not involve an occupation of the South for the foreseeable future; instead, it contemplates using South Korea’s own government to enforce its writ.
If this belief makes me an outlier, so be it. Just bear in mind that what you and I believe is possible matters less than what Kim Jong-un believes is possible. I also believe that Pyongyang is closer to achieving these objectives than most Americans or South Koreans suspect. Americans underestimate how many South Koreans would willingly sacrifice freedom for the sake of “peace,” or “inter-Korean relations.” Freedom, after all, is as difficult a thing to appreciate as peace unless you’ve lived without it. But if you think that sacrifice would prevent war, keep reading.
One waypoint toward Pyongyang’s objective is sanctions relief from Seoul. This is not just for the primary economic benefits of, say, reopening Kaesong. Any laxity by Seoul in enforcing U.N. sanctions would have far greater secondary benefits for Pyongyang. It would have domino effects in the capitals of North Korea’s arms clients and enablers throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, would create more diplomatic distance between Washington and Seoul, and would break up the global sanctions enforcement coalition-building strategy that had finally taken shape. It would also put Seoul in direct conflict with the Trump administration’s emerging policy, which will emphasize economic pressure. The economic benefits of unearned sanctions relief would help Pyongyang validate its “byungjin” policy by enriching its elites, by showing off its selective prosperity to its sympathizers abroad, and by underwriting its political control over its own “wavering” and “hostile” classes.
Another waypoint is to undermine political support for Seoul’s military alliance with Washington in both capitals. Pyongyang seeks to strain that alliance by raising war fears, and by getting exercises canceled and key weapons systems (read: THAAD, Patriots) withdrawn. It wants to show South Koreans and Americans that this alliance is more risk than it’s worth. If the point comes when the alliance does more to constrain U.S. options and advance them, that time may come sooner than most of us expect.
The war scare that swept through Twitter last week advanced Pyongyang toward that objective. The Pentagon quickly debunked it, and for now, the White House’s strategy is moving toward a well-thought-through list of North Korean industries and targets for sanctions. I could not have said it better than the headline over Grant Newsham’s recent piece for the Asia Times: “Before attacking North Korea, please try everything else.” The subhead to his piece was, “Try sanctions, real sanctions.” (Do read the entire piece.) War talk is not only premature and unnecessary, it’s apt to help bring Pyongyang closer to realizing its political objectives by scaring South Koreans into wanting the U.S. gone.
Maybe some of this war talk is simple disinformation or bad journalism. My fear is that the White House thinks raising the fear of war will put Pyongyang and Beijing off their game and raise our leverage. It needs to understand that a war panic could cost us the confidence of people in Japan and South Korea whose support we’ll need to prevent war. This crisis is scary enough at it is. Turning well-grounded concerns into panic serves no one’s interests but Kim Jong-un’s.
But it is also true that the anti-sanctions / talk-to-North-Korea crowd is, however unintentionally, also contributing to the risk of war. To their credit, most of them are at least honest enough to admit that they no longer believe a negotiated nuclear disarmament of North Korea is possible. They should also be honest enough to admit that accepting North Korea’s nuclear status will lead to a catastrophic war, not peace. A nuclear North Korea will not coexist with us, with South Korea, or with human civilization itself. As Anthony Ruggiero and I recently noted:
North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un last month sent assassins to Malaysia to murder his half-brother in a crowded airport terminal with a chemical weapon. Pyongyang has sent assassins abroad to kidnap and kill human rights activists and dissidents, proliferated ballistic missiles, and sold weapons — including man-portable surface-to-air missiles — to terrorists and their sponsors. It attacked South Korea twice in 2010: sinking a warship and shelling a fishing village, which killed 50 of its citizens. The hermit kingdom is a state sponsor of terrorism, even in the absence of a formal designation: it has helped Syria use chemical weapons against its own people, and attacked our freedom of expression with terrorist threats against movie theaters across the United States.
Nor can the U.S. invest its hopes in talks alone. Pyongyang insists that it will neither freeze nor dismantle its nuclear and missile programs. U.S. envoys have met with their North Korean counterparts during almost every year in the last decade, yet failed to induce Pyongyang to return to disarmament talks. In 2012, President Obama finally secured Pyongyang’s agreement to freeze its nuclear and missile programs. Two weeks later, Pyongyang reneged.
I might add that in 2007, North Korea secretly built a nuclear reactor in a part of Syria now controlled by ISIS. There is no compromise, no half-surrender, no piece of paper that will secure peace and prevent war without Pyongyang’s disarmament and without fundamental humanitarian reforms. As long as Pyongyang possesses weapons of mass destruction, and as long as its model of survival is based on terror and secrecy, it will still pose an existential threat to the United States, to Americans’ freedom of speech, and to the security of the entire world. As the Sony cyber terrorist threat, the Bangladesh Bank theft, and the horrors in Syria have shown us, North Korea isn’t just a Korean problem, it is, as President Trump said recently, “a humanity problem.” If you really think the solution to this is as simple as “talk to them,” at least review the record on just how many times President Obama and his predecessors tried to do exactly that.
That’s why, in the medium term, the U.S. may well decide that it must strike first to prevent a direct North Korean nuclear threat to the American people. The more Washington trusts Seoul, the more value it sees in maintaining an alliance with Seoul to help disarm Pyongyang peacefully, and the less likely war is. The less Washington trusts Seoul, the less certain it is whose side Seoul is on, and the less certain it is that a warning to Seoul wouldn’t also be a tip-off to Pyongyang, the less likely President Trump is to warn Seoul of a preemptive strike. You don’t have to tell me the risks of this. There are people in South Korea I love. Not that it should matter; the people on both sides of the DMZ who would suffer are human beings. We should want all of them to have a chance not only to survive, but also to live.
[Korean refugees flee south, 1950. This photo, by Max Desfor, won a Pulitzer Prize.]
There are times when I suspect that it requires a Ph.D. to harbor the madness that we can ever have peace with a “responsible” nuclear North Korea. Thankfully, the first 2,000 names in the telephone directory have a firmer grasp on reality than this. Only 35 percent of them support preemptive strikes, but just 11 percent of them support the idea of accepting that North Korea will keep building nukes. Overwhelming majorities want us to enforce sanctions (80 percent) and continue our diplomatic efforts to stop North Korea’s nuclear program (81 percent). They hold uniformly dim views of North Korea (78 percent “unfavorable” and 61 percent “very unfavorable”). Majorities are “very concerned” about North Korea having nuclear weapons (65 percent) but would still support the use of force if an Asian ally got into a “serious conflict” with North Korea (64 percent).
Each week that passes diminishes our chances to prevent another war in Korea. There is no more time to be wasted on the palliative policies of engagement and talks that have produced no positive results, and which have done so much to bring us to the present crisis by paying Pyongyang to nuke up. For now, there is no chance that talks will achieve our key aim of disarming Pyongyang, but it would be a grave error to rule out talks entirely, because the time will come when diplomacy will be essential to preventing war. If sanctions and political subversion bring Pyongyang to the point where it fears (and Beijing also fears) that its regime will collapse — and to achieve the necessary pressure to disarm Pyongyang, they must — then we must leave Pyongyang a diplomatic escape that, while distasteful to it (and in some regards, to us) is still preferable to war. But for now, our choice increasingly comes down to making sanctions work or accepting that war is inevitable.