That’s Wonk, With an “O”

Check out this story in the Korea Herald on Roh’s new “independent” Korean Multipurpose Helicopter project. This has “Made in South Cholla” written all over for it (for you folks in Washington, South Cholla is to the Korean left what West Virginia is to Robert Byrd).

I’m quoted as an “avid military enthusiast.” And while I prefer the more vague description of “Korea watcher,” which might apply to, heck, racing girl fans, for that matter, I will certainly admit that I was occasionally enthusiastic when I was in the military–like the day I drove the Russian tank. I was especially pleased to get top billing over John Pike, who is a real expert on defense procurement, as well as a reliable skeptic. All kidding aside, however, Andrew Petty asks the right questions and has a very sensible take on a story that’s so laden with the nationalism that seems to blind so many in Korea to very real obstacles.

I wonder how Korea can expect to succeed in building this flying white elephant (and taking over for the departing U.S. forces, AND rebuilding the capital) despite the fact that the road to independent defense is a taxing on that is littered with the skeletal wrecks of European and Israeli consortia. Taiwan succeeded in building its own fighter, but only with a great deal of American help which it wasn’t afraid to accept. Brazil succeeded by using cheap labor, abundant domestic natural resources, and a willingness to strip off all the high-tech advantages to compete in the export market. Korea, which is already building Black Hawks (both cargo and attack configurations exist, if you MUST use a single airframe), now wants to build an entirely new platform. Like Taiwan, the U.K., and Israel, Korea must rely on the U.S. for most of the key components for top performance–composites, fly-by-wire, commo, targeting, and weapons. Unlike Taiwan, the U.K., and Israel, however, the Pentagon no longer fully trusts Korea to keep its technology out of the hands of Beijing and Pyongyang.

I also alluded to the fact that the cargo/attack helicopter concept hasn’t had the best track record. In Afghanistan, the Soviets used their Mi-8 cargo helicopter as an attack helicopter. It was easy meat for machine gunners. They tried to use their Mi-24 attack helicopter as a troop carrier, but found it carried not enough troops and too much extra weight to carry out its main mission. They eventually phased out the Mi-24 and got themselves a two-seat attack helicopter. Even the Americans never really tried to use the Black Hawk as an attack helicopter, although such a configuration exists. Of course, the Koreans really haven’t figured out exactly how different the cargo and attack versions will be.

Finally, the generation of Koreans who will determine the success of the project simply lack their parents’ determination, focus, and drive. Can the whiney 386 generation be the Atlas that stood up the Daewoo shipyards and Hyundai Motors?

My money is with Pike’s–the cost overruns (and I would add, the graft) will be the stuff of legends. Pike also asks the right question: what is the program really designed to do? I suspect that defending against North Korea is way down on the list.