Regime “Transformation”: The Hot New Strategic Ambiguity

Even I didn’t see this coming, and I’ve been salivating for it for years now. Nicholas Eberstadt sat down with the Chosun Ilbo today. He did more than take off the gloves; he’s swinging his numchucks. His comments seem to have scared even the Chosun, the proponent of what passes for “conservative” in South Korea–we hate you, but you’re very good for business.

In today’s critical journalism consumer exercise, see if you can spot the interviewer’s sneer and the interviewee’s well-developed sense of irony. I’ll even help you:

Q: Regarding comments issued by Korean President Roh Moo-hyun during his recent tour of Europe, to the effect that he would oppose any form of sanctions or pressure on the North, Eberstadt labeled such sentiments “a unilateral and pre-emptive attack on the United States… No matter what the U.S. government says officially, tension in the Korea-U.S. alliance is continuing to rise.”

The Chosun Ilbo met with America’s self-appointed neocon spokesman Sunday to unravel the meaning of some of his more controversial statements.

It gets better:

Q: You have claimed there can be no solution to the nuclear issue without regime change in North Korea. What is the basis of your statement?

A: “It is built upon two premises. Firstly, we have been negotiating to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear program for the last 15 years. During that time, the North Korea threat has grown, and it has violated all its international agreements related to nuclear development. In the end, North Korea has said it has no intention to give up nuclear development.

“Secondly, North Korea will not change its attitude before new ruling forces appear. The current North Korean regime has not kept any of the deals it has negotiated up till now. Now, we must work so that a new regime appears in the North.”

Q: Are you saying Kim Jong-il must be expelled?

A: “At the very least, regime change means a new leadership in North Korea. At most, it means ‘after North Korea,’ i.e., the complete end of North Korea. Without an end to the North Korean regime, there could be no future unification of the Korean Peninsula under a non-communist regime.”

For those in the Blue House who found as much reason for hope in “regime transformation” as I found reason for concern, Eberstadt dashed their hopes:

Q: But recently, didn’t White House National Security Advisor designate Stephen Hadley say that the United States was pursuing “regime transformation,” not collapse or regime change in North Korea?

A: “Regime transformation means changes in the behavior of the North Korean regime, but as the current regime has neither the intention nor capability of changing its behavior, how can it transform? The only way to change its behavior is to place a new regime in Pyongyang.”

Q: The Korean government opposes “regime change,” but it seems to accomodate the term “regime transformation.”

A: “Hadley’s message was meant for the Korean audience. Both the U.S. and Korea could agree to that term. The idea behind the term, however, is vague, and the meaning behind its use is completely different in both countries. For the Korean government, regime transformation means changing North Korea’s society and economy so that it helps unification from a long term perspective, while for the United States, it means changes in the nuclear and other security issues right now.”

In other words, B.S. for public consumption. Which makes you wonder why Eberstadt is now labeling it with 60-point arial bold. And by the way, Mr. Eberstadt, can you give us a straightforward answer on your views of the Sunshine Policy, Agreed Framework, and other pillars of engagement with North Korea?

Q: You’ve said that for the last 15 years, there has been nothing but “dialogue and bribes” with the North Korean nuclear issue. Isn’t this a bit harsh?

A: “Giving economic compensation to North Korea in return for it to drop its nuclear program is nothing more than a bribe. North Korea is a country that lives on bribes from foreign countries, and it participates in the six-party talks in hopes of getting bribes.”

Finally, Mr. Eberstadt, before I run out of this interview to send a text message to my stockbroker, do you have any parting thoughts on the eternal, ironclad alliance between the United States and Korea, which is forged in blood? Actually he put his question this way:

Q: You’ve called South Korea a “prodigal ally.” What is your basis for that?

A: “South Korea believes military tension on the Korean Peninsula no longer exists. It’s even going to erase reference to North Korea as the ‘main enemy.’ Does this mean that the South Korean military of several hundreds of thousands of men exists because of Russia and China? This brings about a serious self-contradiction in the alliance, because while South Korea behaves as if North Korea is no longer a threat, at the same time, it is preserving its alliance with the U.S. premised on the current North Korean threat. This is the ‘prodigal ally’ about whom I talk.”

Q: Do you think if this contradiction continues, it could end the Korea-U.S. alliance?

A: “The Korea-U.S. alliance is currently in serious danger and crisis. The first thing that must be done is for both sides to honestly discuss their differing thoughts and principles. For too long, both sides have pretended that their alliance was solid. If this masquerade continues, the heart of the alliance will simply rot as time passes.”

You may not like hearing it, but it–needed–saying. For all of you who are enthusiastic about diplomacy and reason with those who were not reasoned into their present views, I remind you to take another look at this week’s photo essay. We are dealing with a nation (in fact, two nations) of hard bargainers who don’t buy their food in Albertsons. We don’t haggle. If we don’t like the price, we shop at another store. Koreans learn to negotiate, and I’m convinced that Eberstadt is one who has caught on to that.

Saddest of all is that fact that as natural negotiators, the leaders of South Korea could be a useful ally to the United States, the North Korean people, and most of all, to themselves. By gradually and unilaterally disarming themselves, they allow a foreign power to subvert their national interest. In this case, the foreign power is the one with 10,000 guns aimed at them, not the one that’s willing to remove its troops whenever it’s asked.

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In the practice of law, you can always spot a losing argument by its reliance on the authority of a bitter dissent. In that vein, contrast what you see above with this exercise in selective analysis in the Korea Herald, which hopefully entitles its piece “New Approach to N.K.” Not surprisingly, Selig Harrison takes the place of the bitter dissenter whose passion is inversely proportional to the true weight his words will carry:

An article in the latest edition of Foreign Affairs magazine authored by Selig Harrison, who chaired the task force, said the Bush administration, relying on sketchy data, presented a worst-case scenario as incontrovertible truth and distorted its intelligence on North Korea (much as it did in Iraq), seriously exaggerating the danger Pyongyang is secretly making uranium-based nuclear weapons.

Harrison and other critics have pointed out that Washington’s emphasis on the North Korean HEU issue and the subsequent stalling of the six-way talks has rather allowed Pyongyang to go ahead with its plutonium project, including reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods, to possess a suspected six to eight nuclear bombs.

Pyongyang could really be cheating about the uranium enrichment program but experts find it highly improbable that North Korea, with its limited technological capabilities and resources, has developed any HEU program to a significant level. It is recommended that the five parties in the six-way talks shelve the uranium-enrichment suspicion for the time being and make concerted efforts to dismantle the already confirmed plutonium-based nuclear weapons project in North Korea.

You can sleep better at night knowing that the only thing Selig will be negotiating in the next four years is his next book deal.