The Death of an Alliance, Part XV: Ministries and Silly Talks
The (anti-)Unification Ministry, hereafter known as the Ministry of Silly Talks ©, appears to be going into the foreign policy business, but forgot to tell the Foreign Ministry. Meanwhile, the United States is sending signals that it may press for U.N. sanctions even over Seoul’s opposition.
April 21, 2005 ã…¡ Mixed messages regarding the six-party talks came out of Seoul yesterday, with South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon refusing to rule out referring the North Korean nuclear issue to the U.N. Security Council, while Unification Ministry officials said they would oppose such a course of action.
The story, from the Joongang Ilbo, doesn’t have a quote from the “officials” from the Ministry of Silly Talks, and it appears that the statement was made in a (presumably public) meeting with other Uri party members. No word on who the officials were, either. So what is the MST view regarding sanctions? This FAQ page from the MST Web site is somewhat more compelling–notwithstanding its ducking of the question–because it purports to speak for the entire ROK government:
Q.8 Given that the North’s nuclear problem is unresolved, is inter-Korean economic cooperation desirable? (Should the South not resort to sanctions instead of economic cooperation in order to deal with the North?)
o Our government’s basic position is that we will make efforts to resolve the North’s nuclear issue while seeking improvement in inter-Korean relations. -Through the improvement of inter-Korean relations, our government is making efforts to strengthen its leverage towards the North on the nuclear issue.
o Inter-Korean dialogue channels including inter-ministerial talks are not only useful for improving inter-Korean relations but also for resolving the North’s nuclear issue. The importance of these dialogue channels is not only appreciated by the United States but also by China. – Our government attaches great importance to inter-Korean dialogues. Through these dialogues, we have an opportunity to explain the trends and realities of international relations to the North and thereby help it make the right decision.
o Progress in inter-Korean relations through inter-Korean dialogues, contacts, private level exchanges and cooperation, as well as economic assistance could induce the North’s change in a desirable direction. – It is important to induce changes in the North to prevent it from becoming isolated and posing a threat to the international community.
o There are views that the “stick only” policy is the only solution to resolving the North’s nuclear issue as well as inducing its change, – Such a policy, however, could force the North to become more aggressive, further isolated and reclusive.- Moreover, the disruption of inter-Korean contacts could lead to increasing tension on the Korean peninsula, which would, in turn, have a negative impact on the rating of South Korea’s economy. (emphasis mine)
The Blue House is on record as opposing sanctions, too:
The South Korean government took pains yesterday to say it would object to presenting the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear arms program to the U.N. Security Council, but a top official offered no option other than pursuing efforts to revive the stalled six-party negotiations. Song Min-soon, the government’s top envoy to the nuclear disarmament talks said yesterday, “Referring the matter to the UN Security Council is not a universal remedy.” In a broadcast interview, he said neither the South Korean government nor Washington has brought up the issue.
The problem is that someone in the Blue House hasn’t been talking to Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon, who says–
“That is a strategic problem that will be discussed between South Korea and the United States in accordance with developments of the situation.” He added that such discussions were part of contingency plans that are being drawn up as participants in the six-party talks have to consider scenarios if current efforts fail to end the North Korean nuclear crisis through diplomatic means. . . . Mr. Ban said that South Korea and the United States are not discussing such possibilities, but he made clear that patience is running thin among other participants in the nuclear disarmament talks. “Not only the United States, but other countries, are deeply concerned that North Korea is not returning to the talks and is using stalling tactics,” said Mr. Ban. . . . “It’s a matter of grave concern if North Korea intends to reprocess additional fuel rods. . . .”
It’s not directly contradictory, but it certainly leaves open possibilities that the MST forecloses.
No wonder the Foreign Ministry is saying it’s been a tough month. This isn’t exactly full-scale internecine warfare, but Ban increasingly looks marginalized and plagued by ideological purges and general chaos that appear to be caused by an absence of leadership at the top. You could have predicted something like this when the Blue House began its last round of purges of “pro-American” officials from the Foreign Ministry over a year ago. Either Ban Ki-Moon is irrelevant, is the last to know, or is on one side of a foreign policy dispute that someone should referee fairly soon. Such a person is sometimes referred to as a “president.”
Meanwhile, the United States is leaking its readiness to push for sanctions notwithstanding South Korea’s position on the matter:
A U.S. State Department official spoke of tougher options. Speaking to the JoongAng Ilbo on condition of anonymity, the official said Washington believes that Pyongyang, if left alone, will eventually conduct a nuclear test. He said the United States would likely impose economic sanctions against North Korea in a few months, adding that Washington will have to act, rather than “bluffing,” during the summer to cope with the worsening situation.
He said the United States will seek cooperation with Japan on economic sanctions, and that it expects opposition from China and South Korea. While the actual impact of economic sanctions imposed by the United States alone will be relatively small, Japan-led sanctions could be damaging. China is North Korea’s largest trade partner, followed by South Korea and then Japan.
The State Department source also mentioned the possibility of increasing military pressure on the North, including sending more U.S. troops and an aircraft carrier to the Korean Peninsula. He said, however, that the United States will wait until June to observe the North’s moves.
We’ve seen threats like this before, and so far they’ve proven to be empty.
After four years of American efforts to negotiate a common position with South Korea, South Korea continues to press business deals with the North and offer it no-strings aid. And to what result? The North hasn’t even showed up to the talks for a year, has declared that it won’t return to them, and has been caught selling enriched uranium to the A.Q. Khan network. Eventually, the United States will reach a breaking point and will (ironically) be declared “unilateralist” anyway, while North Korea will be portrayed as a victim.
All of this poses a clear danger for the United States, and whether or not you believe Bush’s opponents could have done better, Bush’s policy certainly hasn’t made us safer, either. As with the long, divisive, and ultimately pointless U.N. debate over Iraq, the six-party policy is seeks to accomodate two contradictory ends–our own security and diplomacy with those for whom it doesn’t matter. The result is that it ends up serving neither one.
Meanwhile, the United States continues to send humanitarian aid to the North, which I agree with, notwithstanding some reservations about distribution channels.