The other part of my e-mail to the Human Rights Committee was a complaint. You’d think it subject matter would have been obvious enough from the subject line:

Complaint–discrimination based on race and national origin

Here, in relevant part, is what it said:

I am [my bad; should have said was] an American soldier who spent four years defending your human rights. Today, I am an activist for withdrawing US forces from Korea, and for promoting human rights for North Koreans. Why? Because in Korea, this kind of discrimination seems to be perfectly legal:

I linked to this post, which said, in relevant part:

Below: August 2005. South Korean demonstrators show their appreciation for their prosperity and freedom of speech by standing at the entrance to a soccer match holding signs that say, “American soldiers not admitted.” The U.S. team was not playing.

Isolated incident? No.

Barring American soldiers from Korean businesses is quite common, as I can attest from personal experience, but permitting discrimination at a public event is a new low. Does Congress know about this? Why does the South Korean government allow this?

This kind of discrimination goes on with no apparent objection from the Korean government, as I also observed during my four-year tour in Korea, from 1998 to 2002. To be completely clear, I said:

Please consider this to be the submission of a formal third-party complaint that private parties regularly engage in discrimination against US soldiers on the basis of race and national origin, including at a public sporting event in Taegu last week, and that Korean authorities knowingly tolerate this.

Here is the HRC’s response to that part of the complaint:

1. Hello, This is a Human right consult center of National Human Right Associate.

2. I think your inquiry is that Korean government’s ignorance about racism and our commitee’s opinion about North Korean hunman rights.

3. Our committee deals with all the case according National human right act law.

4. So if you want to commit your complain about racism than you can use our instructions which I attached below.

This is where things get curiously circular, because the HRC only takes complaints from foreigners who are “resident in Korea” For confirmation of identity, the site also requires a Korean resident ID number and the name of the complainant. Anonymous complaints are not accepted. This means complaining to the HRC is not an option for U.S. service members in Korea. First, they don’t have Korean resident ID numbers. Second, the military rightfully frowns on its personnel involving themselves in domestic politics.

That means that American soldiers need the help of their friends who are residents of Korea. They need not be Americans. They can be Koreans, Austalians, Canadians, Brits, or anyone who appreciates that the members of the U.S. military don’t make American foreign policy and do the hard, hot, cold, muddy work of protecting Korea from Kim Jong Il. Policy disagreements do not justify giving Private Snuffy the Jim Crow treatment. These are not the values that those soldiers, airmen, Marines, and sailors are there to defend.

American service members also need the help of the American people, regardless of where they live. Americans’ e-mails can exert great pressure on the Korean government to ban discrimination against our service members in Korea. This is not an unreasonable request, because Korea is neither an emerging democracy, a nation at war (in a real sense, at least), or a third-world nation. This is simply a ways we can support our service members while they’re assigned to protect another nation’s freedom and prosperity, and ultimately, our own.

Here are the sites and e-mail addresses to which you may send your complaint:

• S. Korean Human Rights Commission: nhrc@humanrights.go.kr
• S. Korean Embassy, Washington: political_usa@mofat.go.kr
• U.S. Congress (find your rep site)

Your letter need not be long. Just say, “I support a ban on discrimination against American service members in Korea,” and be sure to include the URL of this page. That’s all. And please be polite.

Thank you.

I’m hosting, so if you have submissions, send your links to onefreekorea(at)yahoo(dot)com. My arbitrary and capricious deadline is Sunday morning . . . before I crawl to the computer. The earlier you send it, the better the odds I’ll include it.

One of my main criticisms of the South Korean view of engagement is that it’s seldom permitted to include the people of North Korea. It often reaches the South Korean people, of course, but only with a carefully scripted portrayal of the North as benign and neighborly. Most engagement with the North thus far has been South Korean state welfare for the North’s government and government-owned industries.

See through the schmaltzy emotionalism of this report of a South Korean singer’s concert in Pyongyang to its possible significance in breaking through to the hearts of the people in the audience. Engagement that reaches the people of North Korea may indeed have the potential to spark a mass realization that they are deeply discontented. That’s why the regime is unlikely to let this happen again:

Then a small miracle happened: a song sung by a South Korean pop star brought tears to North Korean eyes. It was about halfway through the concert that Cho launched into the North Korean favorite “We Meet Again After a Dangerous Storm”, which turned some eyes decidedly misty, and there was no stopping the flow of tears with songs such as “Touch-me-not” and “Old Castle”.

Near the end, Cho had them in the palm of his hand with renditions of “Arirang Dream” and “Solo Aririang.” By then, most of the audience were singing and clapping along.

With a few melodies, Cho did in two hours what countless politicians and businessmen failed to do over a decade: he touched a nerve among ordinary North Korean people and sparked genuine interest and emotion. The songs may have been new to the people of Pyongyang, but the song in the heart of Cho Yong-pil, who sang of becoming one, was familiar to them all.

Now, read any South Korean press report about an event of this kind with caution, but this appears to have been what truly significant engagement with North Korea will inevitably be: subversive.

In response to an earlier comment, I went and dug up the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and did some analysis. The answer is yes, but with strict conditions that North Korea has not met. I thought the comment worthy of a post on the main page, so I reproduce it, slightly edited, here.

First, I place very little value on what the NPT does and does not allow in a case like this one. What can you say about the NPT’s ability to restrain a nation that lied its way into the NPT, withdrew when it was caught lying, was paid a tyrant’s ransom to somewhat haltingly rejoin it, and then, caught lying again, pulled out again.

However, I don’t agree with your analysis that the NPT simply gives states the unconditional right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT divides states into five permanent nuclear weapons states and a whole bunch of non-nulcear weapons states (for those who see this as “unfair” and want return to non-legal equities, skip back to the top paragraph).

Article II of the NPT binds non-nuclear-weapons-possessing signatories to refrain from acquiring nukes and nuke programs. NK is clearly out of compliance here. Article III requires non-nuke states signing the NPT (presumably for the benefit of “peaceful” nuclear energy) to accept safeguards, which are administred by the IAEA.

Thus, it’s fair to say that compliance with the IAEA safeguards regime is a condition of the “right” to peaceful nuclear programs. North Korea has long been out of compliance with that regime, and it’s the IAEA’s position that it remains out of compliance.

It stands to reason that a nation out of compliance with its safeguards obligation ought not to have any right to nuclear programs under the NPT. That, of course, brings us back to the essential weakness of the UN–its consistent failure to attach real consequences to noncompliance with its resolutions. Here, however, the U.S. government takes a share of the blame. The Agreed Framework undercut what was theoretically a multilateral control mechanism and helped China and other nations undercut whatever stern UN action may have been forthcoming. Thus:

1. North Korea does NOT have the right to a peaceful nuclear program, at least not until it gets back into compliance with the safeguards agreement;

2. The IAEA would be insane to declare NK compliant with the safeguards without a full and unfettered right to inspect anytime/anywhere, and without an admission on the uranium program (read the IAEA fact sheet on the DPRK; the IAEA takes this seriously). North Korea will never agree to those conditions;

3. NPT or not, without an extraordinary departure from its past and present intransigence, North Korea cannot be trusted with nuclear materials.

Take everything you read in this post with extra skepticism, because the reports this week are even less consistent than usual. The main questions this week surround Pyongyang’s claim on a right to “peaceful” nuclear programs. Amid recent signs that the U.S. was ready to cave on that and other issues in the wake of Anti-Unification Minister Chung Dong-Young publicly taking Pyongyang’s side, the U.S. and South Korean positions aren’t exactly manifest.

The Chosun Ilbo reports on South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon’s visit to Washington to seek clarity and unity in both countries’ positions:

The suggestion is that things did not go beyond a restatement of positions and more has to be done before agreement between the two allies can be reached. The U.S. has so far been adamant that North Korea cannot be trusted with a nuclear program of any kind. “We agreed for the head negotiators to harmonize and deal with all issues, including this one, in Beijing when the six-party talks resume” next week, Ban said.

However, the U.S. chief negotiator at the six-party talks Christopher Hill hinted that a solution may be in the works, saying the U.S. had different views on the matter from South Korea and Russia but the issue was unlikely to prove a big stumbling block in the talks. Washington did not otherwise state a clear position on the matter.

The two sides reaffirmed that Pyongyang must dismantle all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs. Ban said, “The nuclear dismantlement we refer to here means the physical destruction of all nuclear facilities,” while a mere nuclear freeze as agreed in 1994 “is not an article of consideration at all.” He added, “This means North Korea must abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs, and even ideas in their heads.” He said North Korea’s 5 mw reactor was also “clearly something to be dismantled.”

As for a timeframe for North Korea to “regain trust” so it can use civilian nuclear energy, Ban said it would take at least two or three years for Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear programs, and that would represent the process of regaining trust as the country improves transparency through international inspections.

That suggests a gradual and careful South Korean retreat from Chung’s position. From Chung’s statements, you’d think that South Korea would return to the pre-2001 pretense that all was peaceful as steam poured from the stack at Yongbyon. From Ban’s statements, you get the idea that we’re talking about tearing Yongbyon down, but letting the North Koreans keep their x-ray machines and smoke detectors.

Reuters has more insight into the U.S. position, which Hill had thrown into confusion two days ago:

“The issue for some of the partners is whether … North Korea could then reclaim a right to nuclear energy,” Hill said. “If you ask me, it’s not exactly a showstopper issue — the real issue is getting rid of all their nuclear programs.”

In the past, Washington has insisted that even if North Korea scraps its military programs it must give up the right to develop peaceful nuclear power because of fears it could use those programs for building atomic weapons.

But Hill played down North Korea’s demand, which had been the main reason the talks broke down earlier this month after 13 days.

It was a “theoretical, downstream” issue and it would be difficult for North Korea to restart any nuclear development after it scraps its programs under a negotiated deal, he said.

The article also includes the interesting detail that North Korea will not in fact return by the end of August, but in early September, at the earliest. U.S. officials will also be meeting with the Chinese and Japanese in the coming days.

So does this mean I win the lunch bet? The difference between the 29th and the 2nd is only four days. I think a clear win requires at least a week of instransigent or dilatory absence by Pyongyang. This article also suggests that Pyongyang will be using that week to capitalize on the complete abandonment of any pretense that this administration is not engaging in bilateral talks.

Not far off the subject, it’s too bad this place is way out in Alexandria, because the Vietnamese food there is exceptional. Try the skewers.

Don’t let the entertainment value fool you. This one appears to have been a bust of major significance, which the feds claim “decapitated” one of the largest crime syndicates operating in the United States:

The guests thought they were headed to an early afternoon wedding on a yacht docked near Atlantic City. They ended up in jail instead, courtesy of an elaborate ruse by federal authorities hoping to bust up an international smuggling ring.

Lengthy undercover investigations on opposite sides of the country resulted in indictments of 87 Asians and U.S. citizens on charges of smuggling counterfeit money, drugs and cigarettes into the United States, law enforcement officials said Monday.

Authorities said they seized $4.4 million in high-quality fake $100 bills, more than 1 billion counterfeit cigarettes worth $42 million, and ecstasy, methamphetamine and Viagra worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Some of the cigarettes were made in China, said acting assistant Attorney General John Richter.

The feds showed some real panache this time:

The affair was seven months in the making, and the bride and groom were actually undercover FBI agents who worked with the accused smugglers for several years, said Christopher J. Christie, the U.S. attorney in New Jersey.

“Invitations were sent out, a date was given and RSVPs were received from different points around the world,” Christie said at a Justice Department news conference. Guests arrived at an area hotel in recent days and mingled with the lucky couple, Christie said.

They were assured transportation would be provided from their hotel to the yacht. They were taken into custody instead.

The reporters did not miss the North Korean connection to the “supernotes,” which are so much like the real thing that their forebears inspired the recent redesign of U.S. currency:

Of particular concern, Secret Service officials said, was the group’s apparent ability to generate counterfeit U.S. currency that could fool even the most sophisticated detection devices. A government source said the bills, known as “super notes” because they were virtually identical to real currency, had been made in North Korea. The bills were seized before they entered the U.S. money supply, authorities said.

North Korea is known to be a producer of illegal drugs, including meth. Although the report doesn’t name North Korea as the source, I can add some relevant knowledge based on my prosecutorial experience. First, almost all meth in the U.S. is produced domestically in hidden labs. Most of the imported stuff comes from Mexico and has a distinctive brownish color, like dried peanut butter or brown sugar. North Korea is known to be a producer, however, and if meth was being brought in through crates of furniture from Asia, North Korea is one of the likely sources. Both meth and ecstasy are also increasingly available in China. Other more disturbing contraband was also on the way:

Two defendants in New Jersey also were charged with conspiracy to ship $1 million in rocket launchers, automatic rifles and silenced pistols and submachine guns, officials said. The weapons were never delivered, they said.

So many interesting questions follow:

1. Were any North Korean nationals caught or implicated?
2. Were other branches of the same organization operating in third countries? What countries?
3. Will international cooperation be sufficiently swift to snip those branches?
4. Will it be enough to shut down the entire network?
5. Is there a connection to North Korean diplomats, who routinely finance their official functions through illegal activity?
6. Where were the drugs made?
7. Were any of those caught connected to the Chinese government?
8. In the end, how badly will this hurt the finances of the North Korean regime?

The EU appears to have given up on negotiating a defiant Iran out of its nukes. Someone tell Dafna Lizner. It’s not the first time Lizner’s anti-Bush drumbeat has been undermined by the Times.

Breakthrough or Cave-In? The AP, via the N.Y. Times, is reporting rumors that all six nations may be prepared to agree in principle on a path toward an eventual peace treaty with North Korea. Even North Korea’s demand for “peaceful” nuclear power–a demand no doubt emboldened by the statements of our former South Korean ally–is described by Chris Hill as “not a show-stopper.”

If so–and it’s not so yet–it’s disturbing. One wonders how well we would bear up under similar pressure when everything is in place but untidy details about verification and human rights. The administration sounds divided and cowed.

Original Post: “Seoul Asks Pyongyang to Confirm Fate of POWs.” Well, at least they’re finally asking.

Update: James Chen e-mails a link to this must-read James Brooke report in the NY Times.

Until recently, the former Southern soldiers, bent with age and hard labor in Northern coal mines, were forgotten human footnotes in a deeply divided peninsula. After the end of the Korea War, North Korea tried to ease a labor shortage by secretly holding back thousands of South Korean prisoners of war, historians and escaped prisoners say.

“We were hidden away, I did not even know there was an exchange of POWs,” Jang Moo Hwan, a Southern prisoner who escaped from the North in 1998, said in an interview at his apartment in Uljin, a coastal village a four hour drive southeast of here. Now, 79 years old, he lives with his wife, Park Soon Nam, who had waited for him in the South since his capture 1953.

“I never dared to say I wanted to send a letter to the South,” he said of life North Korea, a hard line Communist nation. “I feared that I would be taken as a political dissident and starved to death. A dictatorship is that scary.”

The report notes that the South Korean government estimates “that 542 South Korean prisoners of war are still alive in the North, cut off from virtually all contact with families and friends in the South,” and that “over the year the North has seized 486 Southern civilians, largely fishermen.” Thirty-eight POWs have escaped from the North. It’s not clear from the report whether that number includes those who didn’t make it home. Those that did missed what should have been the best years of their lives. A conspiracy of silence has kept the issue out of the public consciousness, suggests the Times:

[T]he issue rarely surfaces publicly here, partly because much of South Korea’s media seeks to avoid antagonizing the North and partly because the defectors shun publicity, fearing that the Communist government will take reprisals against wives and children left behind in the North.

“I still feel like I am dreaming,” Nam Tae-Kyo, 75 years old, said last January at a ceremony welcoming him back to his mountainous hometown of Juk Jang. On the edge of tears as he spoke in the town community center, he said he labored in underground coal mines, forbidden to even inform his family here that he was still alive.

Later in the story, Suzanne Scholte of the North Korea Freedom Coalition is quoted. She references a talk by two former POWs, which I attended and blogged here. Read the rest yourself.

Do Pat Robertson and I actually agree on something? Not yet. Hugo Chavez is clearly a thug, an anachronism, a supporter of terrorists (principally, in Colombia), and a first-class S.O.B. This fall, Gordon Cucullu will publish a book alleging that Chavez is retailing North Korean heroin. That said, I see a vast gulf between how our government should deal with elected leaders and unelected ones. If there is a sanctifying event at which a government becomes legitimate, it’s called “election.” The troubling fact for those of us who don’t like Chavez is that he won a free election, and his term is not yet up. His theft of an extraconstitutional mid-term referendum doesn’t make the case for his illegitimacy yet, at least not to me.

I will likely be hated for saying this, but by elevating democracy to our highest principle in judging the rule of other governments–and it was right that we did–we incur an obligation to respect freely elected governments we don’t like. That does not mean, of course, that we can’t respond in the unlikely event that a freely elected government commits an act of war against us. It doesn’t mean that the United States can’t exert economic and diplomatic pressure on Chavez to comply with his legal obligations to leave in peace with his neighbors, abstain from crime, and cease his repression of the opposition in the meantime. It doesn’t mean that we have to respect Chavez the man, the myth, the caudillo. But I do think it obliges us to respect his legitimacy as a head of state until he remains in power after the expiration of his term, and without having been freely reelected to the position of power he then holds.

Then, kill him.