Marcus Noland on Containing North Korea

Wouldn’t it be great if we actually could?  Noland comes within a whisker of answering the question he begs:

History suggests that abandonment of nuclear weapons or an advanced nuclear weapons program is usually preceded by political regime change: In three of the four cases where states gave up nuclear weapons (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), newly installed governments seeking to assert democratic credentials and gain international acceptance voluntarily surrendered weapons left over from the Soviet Union….

The prospect of subjecting its people to hardship is unlikely to deter North Korea’s government from its chosen path. As Pyongyang has surely deduced, the sanctions threat is not entirely credible. China and South Korea, its primary economic patrons, fear political instability on the Korean peninsula more than they fear a nuclear-armed North Korea. In the end, they will resume support for the regime. From the standpoint of the North Korean government, a couple years of “arduous marching” and the world will have to come to accept North Korea as a nuclear power.

Like Richardson — and like me — Noland thinks we’re about to see an arms race in the region.  I think we’re already in an arms race, and that an arms race is not entirely unhealthy if it keeps the forces in balance, thus preserving the peace.  Here’s an especially interesting quote:

Another party that will watch these developments closely is Taiwan. In some ways in an analogous position to North Korea–feeling threatened militarily by a much larger power–if North Korea is able to develop a nuclear weapons capability without suffering severe penalties, the Taiwanese will surely consider emulation. Of course, China would not handle such a situation with the phlegmatic appeasement that Seoul has shown.

I partially disagree with  Noland on the “credibility” of sanctions.  I believe that we’ve only employed them in earnest since last August, and they’ve taken a  hard bite since then.  In fact,  they might even explain why so much of Kim Jong Il’s recent behavior has  seemed, well, desperate and  erratic.  I also believe that sanctions alone are not enough.  We must attack the regime’s political legitimacy and sow dissent, too.  We  must give the people hope and strength  to believe in a better alternative. 

Thanks to Mr. Noland for forwarding.