http://freekorea.us/2007/03/13/breaking-the-bank-in-macau/ Tue, 22 May 2012 21:47:26 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 http://freekorea.us/2007/03/13/breaking-the-bank-in-macau/comment-page-1/#comment-55160 OneFreeKorea » Fighting Hard Power With Soft: Sanctions, Iran, and Burma Sat, 20 Oct 2007 15:00:14 +0000 http://freekorea.us/2007/03/14/breaking-the-bank-in-macau/#comment-55160 [...] Iran’s ongoing inflexibility in its nuclear diplomacy with the United States and Europe, may have inspired Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to send this strong new signal about Iran’s money laundering.  The mention of money laundering suggests that the Bush Administration may be thinking about applying PATRIOT 311 sanctions, the single most devastating weapon in our financial arsenal.  You will recall a PATRIOT 311 designation declares an entity to be one of special concern for money laundering and bans U.S. financial institutions from holding corresponding accounts for any bank that holds assets for that entity.  In simple terms, it forces every bank on earth to choose between that account holder and the American financial system, which effectively means the global financial system.  The effect is to cut the offending entity off from global finance.  It is the measure we used to nearly destroy Banco Delta Asia, which was once Kim Jong Il’s principal foreign bank.   [...] [...] Iran’s ongoing inflexibility in its nuclear diplomacy with the United States and Europe, may have inspired Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to send this strong new signal about Iran’s money laundering.  The mention of money laundering suggests that the Bush Administration may be thinking about applying PATRIOT 311 sanctions, the single most devastating weapon in our financial arsenal.  You will recall a PATRIOT 311 designation declares an entity to be one of special concern for money laundering and bans U.S. financial institutions from holding corresponding accounts for any bank that holds assets for that entity.  In simple terms, it forces every bank on earth to choose between that account holder and the American financial system, which effectively means the global financial system.  The effect is to cut the offending entity off from global finance.  It is the measure we used to nearly destroy Banco Delta Asia, which was once Kim Jong Il’s principal foreign bank.   [...]

]]> http://freekorea.us/2007/03/13/breaking-the-bank-in-macau/comment-page-1/#comment-30536 OneFreeKorea » So Much for ‘Peace in Our Time’ Thu, 22 Mar 2007 14:31:58 +0000 http://freekorea.us/2007/03/14/breaking-the-bank-in-macau/#comment-30536 [...] How predictable.  I feel compelled to repeat that this breakdown originates in the U.S. Treasury Department’s action against a bank where North Korea was laundering the proceeds of crime, including the counterfeiting of our currency.  After months of insisting that “law enforcement” matters were not part of denuclearization talks, Hill met Kim in Berlin and reversed that position, apparently promising to “resolve” Treasury’s investigation into Banco Delta Asia within 30 days.  We did “resolve” it, and of course, Treasury told us what everyone — especially Kim Jong Il — already knew, that BDA was a dirty bank.  We never agreed to give the North Koreans back a penny, at least not on the face of Agreed Framework 2.0.  If the North Koreans expected otherwise, I have to wonder why Hill didn’t dispossess them of that expectation.  On the other hand, the North Koreans did agree to show up and talk this week, and that was in Agreed Framework 2.0.  The North Koreans broke their word; we didn’t.  So whose fault is that? Russian envoy Alexander Losyukov, who also left for home Thursday, was quoted by ITAR-Tass news agency as saying “the whole problem came from the American side.” [...] [...] How predictable.  I feel compelled to repeat that this breakdown originates in the U.S. Treasury Department’s action against a bank where North Korea was laundering the proceeds of crime, including the counterfeiting of our currency.  After months of insisting that “law enforcement” matters were not part of denuclearization talks, Hill met Kim in Berlin and reversed that position, apparently promising to “resolve” Treasury’s investigation into Banco Delta Asia within 30 days.  We did “resolve” it, and of course, Treasury told us what everyone — especially Kim Jong Il — already knew, that BDA was a dirty bank.  We never agreed to give the North Koreans back a penny, at least not on the face of Agreed Framework 2.0.  If the North Koreans expected otherwise, I have to wonder why Hill didn’t dispossess them of that expectation.  On the other hand, the North Koreans did agree to show up and talk this week, and that was in Agreed Framework 2.0.  The North Koreans broke their word; we didn’t.  So whose fault is that? Russian envoy Alexander Losyukov, who also left for home Thursday, was quoted by ITAR-Tass news agency as saying “the whole problem came from the American side.” [...]

]]> http://freekorea.us/2007/03/13/breaking-the-bank-in-macau/comment-page-1/#comment-28674 OneFreeKorea » Ill-Gotten Gains: Who Still Remembers Resolution 1718? Sun, 18 Mar 2007 16:53:45 +0000 http://freekorea.us/2007/03/14/breaking-the-bank-in-macau/#comment-28674 [...] I have some ambivalence about all of this myself. I’ve already said that the fate of BDA matters more than the paltry sum we’re discussing here. I invest little faith in the U.N. as law-giver in any event and would rather have done everything 1695 and 1718 do through the Treasury Department, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and various ad-hoc coalitions. With the evidence that China, Russia, and South Korea are reading both resolutions through kaliedoscopes anyway, I don’t think eschewing the moral authority of the United Nations is too great a sacrifice. And the next time the Chorus of the Perpetually Aggrieved cites the sacred name of Dag Hammarskjold to say that we must obey the next joint Cuban-Sudanese-sponsored resolution demanding that we close down Gitmo, I’ll have a few belts of fresh ammo I can use to stitch the words “the U.N. is a farce” onto their scrawny, hairless chests. [...] [...] I have some ambivalence about all of this myself. I’ve already said that the fate of BDA matters more than the paltry sum we’re discussing here. I invest little faith in the U.N. as law-giver in any event and would rather have done everything 1695 and 1718 do through the Treasury Department, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and various ad-hoc coalitions. With the evidence that China, Russia, and South Korea are reading both resolutions through kaliedoscopes anyway, I don’t think eschewing the moral authority of the United Nations is too great a sacrifice. And the next time the Chorus of the Perpetually Aggrieved cites the sacred name of Dag Hammarskjold to say that we must obey the next joint Cuban-Sudanese-sponsored resolution demanding that we close down Gitmo, I’ll have a few belts of fresh ammo I can use to stitch the words “the U.N. is a farce” onto their scrawny, hairless chests. [...]

]]> http://freekorea.us/2007/03/13/breaking-the-bank-in-macau/comment-page-1/#comment-28329 OneFreeKorea » Peace in Our Time! Yongbyon Edition Thu, 15 Mar 2007 11:36:58 +0000 http://freekorea.us/2007/03/14/breaking-the-bank-in-macau/#comment-28329 [...] Needless to say, the agreement does not make the lifting of sanctions a precondition to the shutdown of Yongbyon.  This may well be our critical failure point.  The U.S. side has just said North Korea won’t come off the terror-sponsor list quickly, and without that delisting, plenty of sanctions will remain.  South Korea’s National Intelligence Service predicts, and I agree, that Japan will use its influence to block that delisting.  Treasury’s “fifth special measure” against Banco Delta Asia will also put scowls on plenty of pruny faces in Pyongyang.  Chris Hill, for his part, says the sanctions issue won’t be a “stumbling block” anymore, but didn’t really explain why. [...] [...] Needless to say, the agreement does not make the lifting of sanctions a precondition to the shutdown of Yongbyon.  This may well be our critical failure point.  The U.S. side has just said North Korea won’t come off the terror-sponsor list quickly, and without that delisting, plenty of sanctions will remain.  South Korea’s National Intelligence Service predicts, and I agree, that Japan will use its influence to block that delisting.  Treasury’s “fifth special measure” against Banco Delta Asia will also put scowls on plenty of pruny faces in Pyongyang.  Chris Hill, for his part, says the sanctions issue won’t be a “stumbling block” anymore, but didn’t really explain why. [...]

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