North Korea has told the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency that it will not shut down its 5-MW reactor at Yongbyon until the U.S. lifts its sanctions against the North:
“The DPRK mentioned that they are waiting for the lifting of sanctions with regard to the Macau bank before they implement the part of the agreement allowing the agency to monitor and verify the shutdown of the Yongbyon facility,” ElBaradei told a news conference…. [Reuters, Chris Buckley]
Kim Gye-Kwan didn’t actually manage to fit Baradei into his busy schedule, so Baradei met with some lower-level official. Anyone who dismisses the significance of that doesn’t understand the role of status in Korean culture. This was a contrived snub.
Needless to say, the agreement does not make the lifting of sanctions a precondition to the shutdown of Yongbyon. This may well be our critical failure point. The U.S. side has just said North Korea won’t come off the terror-sponsor list quickly, and without that delisting, plenty of sanctions will remain. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service predicts, and I agree, that Japan will use its influence to block that delisting. Treasury’s “fifth special measure” against Banco Delta Asia will also put scowls on plenty of pruny faces in Pyongyang. Chris Hill, for his part, says the sanctions issue won’t be a “stumbling block” anymore, but didn’t really explain why.
More than half of North Korea’s 60-day deadline to shut down the Yongbyon reactor has passed, and even the South Koreans concede that there’s no sign the North Koreans have even begun the process. One Australian diplomat says the North Koreans have begun “planning” it, and you can make of that what you will. I suspect that our State Department will want to give them a pass, but with North Korea setting new preconditions, that may not be possible.
You beat me to it… have to get up earlier… hell, not *that* early.
The current ‘situation’ reminds me of a friend’s neighbor who had a ‘mad’ dog.
My friend had a wife …
and kids …
and a lot of job travel requirements.
Not good.
Without going into the ugly details, the moral of the story was … sooner or later … ya shoot the dog.
In looking back … ‘sooner’ would have been the preferred ‘option’.
[…] What annoys me about the media coverage of this latest North Korean antic is that the unfreezing of money in the Macau bank was not an agreed upon pre-condition for the US to give to North Korea in return for freezing their nuclear reactor. I recommend everyone read OFK’s excellent run down on this issue. However, I felt the tone of the article made it sound like the US side is the one not living up to the agreement by not unfreezing the accounts when in fact it is the North Koreans making demands that are not in the original agreement. […]
[…] According to a slew of reports, the North Koreans were demanding nothing less than the return of all $25 million — criminal proceeds and all. [AP] [Yonhap] [NY Times]. Because the now-forgotten U.N. resolution that required this isn’t being enforced, Kim Jong Il has a pretty good idea of just how little attention he need pay to the U.N., as if that were still in doubt. But don’t worry. Chris Hill thinks he has ironed over that unfortunate misunderstanding, and he’s even going to push the North Koreans very, very hard to disclose the uranium program they built in violation of the Inter-Korean Denuclearization Agreement, the NPT, and the first Agreed Framework, and which they still deny even having despite Agreed Framework 2.0. Place your bets. […]
[…] Failure.  Yongbyon (GE pictures) is still not shut down or sealed, and no IAEA inspectors have returned to North Korea, and none have been invited. North Korea added a new U.S. requirement to release its criminal proceeds from a dirty, fetid, corrupt bank in Macau, and we let them. The Treasury investigation was so incomplete, and the parentage and ownership of those funds so obviously illegitimate, that not even the Bank of China wanted to touch them. Supposedly, the North Koreans now have their money, but we’ve been stood up again, because we refuse to learn. 2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement. […]