Here’s a very good 2004 piece that tells us about the growth of Sino-South Korean economic and military ties up to the time of Roh’s infamous “balancer” policy. You could see that policy as, in essence, a declaration that South Korea is a neutral power (that still demands American protection). South Korea’s defense minister, Yoon Kwang-Ung, continued to expand Sino-Korean military ties afterward.

Here are two two other well-written analyses since then, by Corey Richardson and Bruce Klingner. Overall, China has made some very significant diplomatic, political, and economic gains in its desire to influence South Korea in the last five years. It has probably made significant gains in the North, too, though it’s harder to quantify those.

Even after Roh is gone, South Korea’s neutrality as to China is probably an established fact. Witness the controversy over the USFK and “strategic flexibility,” meaning that the US could potentially use Korea-based US forces to deter or oppose a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Korea wants no part of that, which is understandable, but Korea needs to understand that having US forces on its soil doesn’t mean those forces cease to serve US interests first.

Now, much of that influence is necessarily hidden beneath the surface, but what’s most telling is how differently this South Korean government deals with the United States and China. It positively seeks out controversy with the United States (and Japan, of course) — because that’s what its base wants. It carefully avoids conflicts over things like North Korean refugees or Koguryo, and the Chinese and South Korean positions at the six-party talks are nearly indistinguishable. At those talks, South Korea was effectively in China’s lap, while the United States’s only really ally was Japan, until we turned on them.

Somewhat related prediction: when the Roh government leaves office, there will be a massive scandal related to Chinese and/or North Korean influence in South Korea. Note also that the North Korean handlers of the Il Shim Hue ring worked out of a safe house in the Beijing suburbs, and that cell members had secured key positions in South Korea’s radical anti-American movement. How likely is it that China had no idea who all those foreigners were, coming and going from that apartment at all hours? Not very.

China’s influence in the North is more of a question mark. Plenty of people have taken note of China’s investments and trade there, such as in the North’s mines, or its lease of the Rajin port. Still, well-informed friends tell me that the NK regime is increasingly wary of Chinese influence, especially within its military. It’s obviously hard to know the full extent of this, and the excellent Jasper Becker also questions how much influence China has on NK, at least politically. My guess is that in certain regions, and at the lower and mid-levels, the influence is considerable, but is less strong in the NK regime’s “core” areas and at the higher levels, except with NK officials whose families live in China, or who frequently move back and forth. And at some point, Kim Jong Il may grow suspicious of those people, which will be dangerous for them.

Not that I disagree with you–on the contrary I am in total agreement but would love some more evidence to explain this to the starry-eyed Koreans who think pushing America away and leaving a vacuum for the PRC to fill is leading to “independence”

However, since the North is never going to return to strength to contemplate pleasing Bruce Cumings by unifying the peninsula through brotherly Civil War —– Roh noted the two primary and sole likely causes of such a conflict….

What he didn’t way is that —- such a situation is predicated on the United States remaining South Korea’s bitch“blood ally” – and just as importantly….

…..remaining unconcerned about the plight of the average North Korean millions……..and unconcerned about US security interests.

I dislike the South Korean position — for South Korea’s sake — because it ignores the fact North Korea is likely to collapse sometime in the coming decades, regardless of SK’s appeasement approach — so that despite throwing resources at it and working against US interests, the war through collapse they are trying to avoid still has a good chance of taking place.

If I were a S Korean, I’d have a hard time deciding to risk one of the worse case war scenerios by working to collapse the regime, but it is an option I’d have to come close to making since I see such a possible war as inevitable….

As an American, I see no persuasive reason to continue to guarantee the North will never consider war with the South due to our strength and its weakness………

….while agreeing to watch South Korea do all it can to keep the North alive and a threat to the US.

I understand why many South Koreans are looking at a potential collapse of the North and saying it is in their best interest to avoid collapse and hope for the best in the future…

I have no idea why Americans should agree that those South Koreans are thinking things that are great for America too.

Roh might be have some point for South Korea’s sake.

But his points are directly against the interests of the US for the most part —- unless we agree it is ultimately best for us to ensure the North will not attack South Korea or Japan by helping it remain a broken down atrocious dictatorship a stone’s throw from collapse….