Links for 8/24: OFK Forecast, A Family’s Escape, Flood Updates, Nuke Talks ‘Positive’ But Stalled

More Sunshine, But Overcast Later:   The Daily NK tracks the GNP’s North Korea policy.  I could more credibly  claim to do eye surgery with a whipsaw than say just what that policy is today, but good for them for taking that one on. 

Although things can change very quickly in South Korean politics, Lee Myung Bak is clearly a heavy favorite to win.  In the increasingly likely event of Lee’s inauguration, I don’t expect that U.S.-ROK relations, or North-South relations will change dramatically.  There are still fundamental problems in the U.S.-ROK alliance because the force structure is out of line with the current political, diplomatic, and military realities in both nations. 

Likewise, I don’t think that Lee  intends to  dramatically change South Korea’s policy to the North, only to  inject some reciprocity into it.  The question, however,  is how the North Koreans will react if Lee does insist on some tangible reform, disarmament,  transparency, or the release of South Korean abductees.  What few in South Korea seem to grasp is  just how much Kim Jong Il fears concessions like these.  The strength of the  North’s  reaction will probably surprise Lee and his cabinet. 

What then?  Will Lee stick to his demands, or will he take the path of least resistance and keep the aid spigot mostly open?  Since Lee’s views on North Korea have been so inconsistent, my guess is that he may display occasional  flashes of temper or slightly reduce aid, but he’s not sufficiently grounded in principle to know just what to stick to, at least not initially.  On the other hand, Lee strikes me as someone whose emotions strongly influence how he deals with others.  That means that by the end of his first year in power, whatever the North does to piss Lee off personally will increasingly affect the relationship between the two nations.

One important question is who will be Lee’s foreign minister.  If it’s the intelligent  and stable Park Jin,  that would be a  good sign.   Park would bring the spine, intellect,  and adult supervision that Lee badly needs.  I hope that Park has postured himself appropriately in the GNP nomination contest. 

Unlike Roh Moo Hyun, Lee Myung Bak is nobody’s bitch.  And North Korea’s rulers  don’t know how to have relations on any other terms.

See also:

*   Don’t forget to stop by tonight for Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard’s long and thoughtful response to my review of their book, “Famine in North Korea:  Markets, Aid & Reform.”  I will leave it at the top of the blog thoughout the weekend.

*   Must-Read No. 1: 

In a small flat, inside North Korea, a mother and daughter pose for pictures.

And a father and son.

This, their secret family album, shot on a camera-phone, an illegal device in North Korea. Owning one is a crime that could land them in labour camp.

Overwhelmed by hopelessness, struggling to survive, the Park family has decided to try to escape.

To do so will cost them their every last penny. They all know it could also cost them their lives.  [Channel Four News]

This one is a remarkable piece of journalism that you shouldn’t miss.  It tracks the flight of an entire family from North Korea to Thailand.  Tellingly, the family is relatively well-off in the North.  Big hat tip to NK Econ Watch, and I see that Richardson also has this one.

*   Must-Read No. 2:   “Concession to North Korea over the NLL is tantamount to an act of treachery, like giving away Dokdo to Japan.   Via GI Korea.

*   Mind Games:   The summit is postponed, but as of today, the Arirang Festival is still on.  NK Econ Watch, the Florida Masochist,  and GI Korea  all  have posts on this.  My money is on Arirang being cancelled, too, in the end.  Arirang is all about projecting a utopian ideal. 

*   Nuke Talks ‘Positive’ But Still Stalled:  

Working-level talks on ending North Korea’s nuclear ambition were held in the Chinese city of Shenyang last week after dealing with how to proceed with the February agreement on dismantling the North’s nuclear weapons program. The six nations closed the two-day meeting on Aug. 17 in what a South Korean official called a “positive and friendly” mood, but they failed to reach agreement on how to disable the communist country’s nuclear facilities.

The lack of an agreement apparently came as a disappointment to the chief U.S. nuclear envoy, Christopher Hill, who earlier said he hoped to have a “common definition of disablement” by the end of the meeting.

But after the talks, North Korea’s deputy chief negotiator said it is prepared to reveal all its nuclear programs and facilities in a transparent manner under the six-party disarmament deal struck in February.  [Asia Pulse]

If I try to  visualize this problem  from an alternative perspective — say, the cultish  groupthink of Machiavellian  sociopaths — my strategy would be to send well-mannered  technocrats who have no political  “juice” and who  are empowered to give away nothing.  That way, I’d be able to stall for time while avoiding  media discussion  of my  negotiating tantrums and creating the minimal appearance of good faith negotiations.  Chris Hill isn’t stupid enough not to see through this, but he chooses not to (publicly, at least) for reasons that are expedient for him.  The North Koreans aren’t the only ones playing us.

*   Food Prices in  N.K. Rise:   The Daily NK conveys reports of dramatic fluctuations in food prices, and even hoarding.  Oddly enough, the signs started to appear before the floods.

*   UNDP Scandal:   “The United States urged the U.N. ethics chief to rule on a whistleblower complaint by a former U.N. staffer who raised concerns about his agency’s operations in North Korea, according to a letter obtained Wednesday.”  [AP]

*   The Legacy of Sunshine:   Ten years later, not even senior North Korean officials can define basic economic terms:

“North Korea has published a dictionary of capitalist terminology to help its people grasp basic concepts like ‘principal’, ‘interest’, ‘insurance’, ‘income’, ‘labor force’ and ‘rent.’ North Korea compiled 1,000 of the terms into a dictionary in June last year. Copies of the 220-page work were mostly given to economic officials or elite members of the regime. Former unification minister Chung Dong-young said while in office that he was embarrassed when North Korean people didn’t understand what interest is.”  [Chosun Ilbo]  

No doubt, there were plenty of times when the North Koreans were (silently) embarrassed for ‘Comrade’ Chung, too.  Maybe they can write him a manual of instruction on how to be a man.  On the other hand, Chung characteristically underestimates the economic sophistication some North Korean officials, and we know that some of them understand the concept of insurance very well indeed.

7 Responses

  1. I think you may be underestimating the degree to which simply expecting reciprocity WOULD be revolutionary in terms of North-South relations–namely because, as you have pointed out time and time again, Kim Jong-Il has absolutely no intention of reciprocity, and hasn’t for the last decade.

  2. I think you are right about Lee, I don’t think he is going to take kindly to being Kim Jong-il’s bitch so at some point he is going to expect concessions at some point from Kim Jong-il.

    Also I for one actually hope Lee builds his canal simply because it would probably mean less money going to North Korea. Such a project would be extraordinarily expensive and I doubt Lee can pay for it and keep the current level of aid going to Kim Jong-il as well.

  3. The conservatives don’t want a collapse of North Korea any more than the liberals in SK. The rhetoric and size of the material aid to the North might change, but the basic overall policy will not change – Keep the North alive. Kaesong will not be shut down and the SK gov will seek to get the US to go along with it on Kaesong. The mountain tours will continue. And the South will find ways to get what it thinks the North needs to survive above the 38th parallel…reciprocity or not…..clash with US policy or not…

    The biggest difference for Lee will be not having to deal with a Rumsfeld-oriented Pentagon. The US ship of change not only sailed, it was torpedoed and will never rise again — at least not in the foreseeable future.

    That means great amounts of pressure will be gone from the US side…..which means Lee will have more freedom to talk a good game but change very little…

    In fact, I would expect to see more movement on the South’s side toward “renegociating” US-SK changes than NK policy.

    I expect the USFK transformation and the Yongsan base move to die slow deaths – perhaps being left in a snail’s paced limbo way, way beyond 2012….And I expect the command transfer to go next to nowhere as far as actually coming about….

    It will probably take Lee a good bit of his tenure to make sure this limbo death is established given the momentum the Rumsfeld-Roh era created. I think SK will put more energy into that than any changes in NK policy post-Roh.

  4. GI Korea has actually made a serious argument for that ridiculous canal idea. In light of the fact that Korea is a mountainous peninsula fringed with some of the world’s best seaports, I didn’t really think that was possible.

  5. I think if Lee throws enough bulldozers and concrete at his canal project he will make what now sounds ridiculous possible. However, the only reason I can support this canal project is because it will mean less aid for the North.

    usinkorea is right that the conservatives will keep the North a float but I doubt they are going to be willing to give them everything the Roh administration is now giving them. I just can’t picture Lee giving Kim Jong-il $80 million for a one time train ride for example.

    If the USFK relocation is delayed I really think the US will pull ground forces from Korea but then again that is all subject to who the next US president is.