My position is that engagement is the best option (out of very few good ones) of forcing change in the country, even if that change wil have to wait until after Kim Jong Il dies.

And I contend, again, though not for you specifically but on the “engagement” people in general, that they have largely decided to stick with talk of “engagement” because they cannot stomach the potential horrors of a collapse —– which means on the flip side — they can stomach the amount of horrors currently going on…

A key to this idea is that they really don’t believe engagement will work or they have forced themselves to believe it — because they can offer little to nothing to back it up….

Meaning, the main thrust of their argument for engagement stems from pointing out the “what if” horrors rather than any signs of progress.

Your line about having to wait until Kim Jong Il dies fits in perfectly….

Hard line or soft line, the death of Kim could produce massive changes on its own….

I prefer the hardline of forcing NK to collapse, and absorbing whatever pain comes with it, and doing our best to minimize it, because at the end of the day, prolonging the regime over time could lead to just as much misery and suffering and deaths as forcing collapse.

Forcing collapse is also at least a real solution that we can hope to bring about. Whereas “engagement” is a pipe dream (though on these two points I know we disagree fundamentally….)

Despite what WWII is supposed to have taught us, we haven’t done well at working against genocides. And our track record seems to highlight the fact that the only reason Hitler’s final solution was not carried through was the fact he kept trying to grab territory……….

We like to think we would do something about the Hitler’s of our time…..

…..when we have a clear contemporary example staring us in the face……..and we talk about engaging him…….

Let’s hope there is a plan in case of a hard landing.

Odds are it will be a hard landing or a harder landing. There are plans, but who knows how realistic and useful they will turn out to be.

Let’s hope there is a plan in case of a hard landing. If there is one, the ROK is remaining mum about it.

USinkorea, I don’t agree with your assumptions on engagement people, particularly this stuff:

“I’m satisfied enough with the level of deprivation and tyranny North Koreans live under…I don’t want to feel bad…we also make ourselves feel better…at least making ourselves feel better about being progressive and friendly…” etc etc. Talk about making assumptions. Who is this imaginary person you just invented? It might surprise you to know that most “engagement people” want the same thing as you do: change, asap.

re: “but at least it doesn’t make me have to face a sudden onslaught of violence that a regime collapse could bring.” I didn’t mention the sudden violence of a regime collapse, because I don’t foresee a regime collapse resulting from “simply cutting off any aid whose fair distribution we can’t assure” to quote Joshua.

My position is that engagement is the best option (out of very few good ones) of forcing change in the country, even if that change wil have to wait until after Kim Jong Il dies.

I do think you can actively subvert and engage at the same time – just requires some scapegoats and some creative diplomacy/manoevering.

But subverting the regime and choking off its access to material from the outside world are both aimed at the same goal: bringing the regime down.

Well, you could argue that sanctions also or primarily have in mind convincing the regime to change its ways……but sanctions untimately have as an alternative end the discontent of the people and pressure on the government if not outright revolution.

But, it seems to me the people (like yourself) who push for engagement are against the idea of encouraging revolution….because it could unleash chaos and cause the deaths of so many of North Korea’s citizens and possibly South Koreans and Japanese (and Americans) too.

Basically, what the usual engagement people boil down to is, “I’m satisfied enough with the level of deprivation and tyranny North Koreans live under. At least the hundreds of thousands are dying slowly, and I don’t have to turn on CNN one day and see footage of massive unrest and bloodshed. That might make me feel bad – well – worse than I do now about the plight of North Koreans. I don’t want to feel bad……so, let’s just accept that the concentration camps are going to stay around while we also make ourselves feel better by taking a progressive approach called ‘engagement’ that might only have a snowball’s chance in hell of working, but at least it doesn’t make me have to face a sudden onslaught of violence that a regime collapse could bring.”

I know — you said that cutting the regime’s supply to material wealth from the outside also has a snowball’s chance in hell at working……..that the regime will survive no matter what we do……..which I guess would leave us with, what? at least making ourselves feel better about being progressive and friendly….even toward evil……

But, I think we got to see over the last twelve months that the moves the US made to tighten up on Pyongyang made it squeal and that is why it agreed to come back to the 6 party talks…

…….and I still have half a mind that says in 50 years, if I’m still around, when documents related to the 6 party talk negociations become available, they will show that the reason the US flip-flopped from applying what seemed to be effective pressure back to giving NK outlets to support it needs —- is that people in the State Department and elsewhere in the government believed North Korea was moving toward collapse and the government decided that was a worst case scenerio – and should be avoided…..

But that is pure speculation on my part….

http://www.dprkstudies.org/2006/11/06/dprk-defectors-still-calling-for-regime-change/

Fortunately, this syndrome wears off after several weeks, and very soon you’ll come to the conclusion that you’re actually non-the-wiser and as a matter of fact, you may actually be more confused hadn’t you bothered coming in the first place.

I would like to add that I think Richardson is correct in his ‘positioning’ of the guides ; most of them live in or near Kwangbok Street and got a lot of spare foreign cash in their pockets – especially euro’s.

just a few points. handicapped people and elderly are not shipped out of the capital – i saw plenty of them. amoung those who have been back and forth, this is considered one of the myths. politicals on the other hand…

For what it’s worth I also think the Sunshine Policy is a huge failure and needs to be scrapped. I agree entirely on your thoughts about subversion and the lack of will by the SK Government to actively take hardline stances on certain matters and to actively engage in subversion.

I do think you can actively subvert and engage at the same time – just requires some scapegoats and some creative diplomacy/manoevering.

Again, if you read defector interviews, so many of them had got a leaflet drop and remembered it. Almost all of them think it’s a good idea. I would expand that program on a huge scale: soap operas, food, even smal denominations of money to encourage macro economics, black markets etc…

Don’t lecture me, I understand it very well.

Apparently not.

Pyongyang residents are the elite, but our guides are not the “elite of the elite” which is the point I made in reply to Joshua. They are not the “cream of the elite” or the “ruling class”. can we move on from that point now?

C’mon Van, I didn’t say your tour guides were the “elite of the elite,” I said the ruling class is. And you either didn’t look up songbun, or don’t understand it.

Nobody will ever be able to bottle up the North Korean State.

You don’t know much about PLA capabilities (search on “PLA modernization”) in regard to the border; it’s not as hard as you seem to believe, aside from what a blockade could do – it’s not like there are a lot of other routes. Some trade would surely slip through, but not a fraction of enough for the needs of Kim Jong-il (basically payoff to the elite). Half-assed strangulation hasn’t worked, but that’s all that’s been applied.

The same goes for financial sanctions. Freezing 25 mill of british money and then giving it back just doesn’t cut it, I’m afraid.

The $25 million was a drop in the bucket; the point was about the international banking system, which now refuses to handle North Korean funds for the most part. That has hurt the regime.

I’m glad you’ve raised your awareness by reading a book or two about North Korea and visiting for a few days; but keeping your head in the sand about the rest doesn’t help you much.