No Legacy for You

The Washington Post declares:

The war in Iraq seems to have taken a turn for the better and the opposition at home has failed in all efforts to impose its own strategy. North Korea is dismantling its nuclear program. . . .  Yet none of this has particularly impressed the public at large, which remains skeptical that anything meaningful has changed and still gives Bush record-low approval ratings.

No, not if the Washington Post does not choose to make it so.  There is so much unintentional insight  about  our journalistic and  political classes  in those brief sentences.  Think of it.  Kim Jong Il throws the switch on one of his nuclear facilities to the “off” position, however briefly, and he’s “dismantling his nuclear program.”   Mr. Kim, here (but not here)  is your legacy.

Yet George  W. Bush, who sacrificed his principles and the support of foreign policy conservatives to do exactly  what liberals have demanded for the duration of his presidency,  gets no public  credit from liberals for it.  Sorry, no legacy for you.

Chris Hill and  Nicholas Burns  will get their book deals no matter what happens, but for Bush, the question ought to be  whether he should  wager his place in history on his principles or on Kim Jong Il’s integrity. 

3 Responses

  1. If North Korea doesn’t own up to its HEU program, things could still fall apart. Also, no formal relations until the give up their nukes, unless Bush backpedals from what he said to Roh in Sydney. So there is still time for the façade to fall to pieces, the truth to come out, and return to the sanctions that should never have been let up. That might serve to galvanize those riding the fence on how to deal with North Korea, though probably wouldn’t phase the diehard, leftwingnuts that call for diplomacy no matter what.

  2. Bush has just over a year left in office. It’s hard to imagine that the sanctions they’d be willing to impose would do that much in a year.

    No, if NK denies the HEU, it will be another long, behind-the-scenes negotiation to run out the clock.

    Hope I’m wrong, of course.

  3. Bush’s legacy will depend on what happens in Iraq over the next two presidencies (next 20 years). North Korea won’t figure into it. It could have – if he’d stuck to the sanctions that were working and forced NK to collapse or have a coup or something — something to where a leadership in Pyongyang would have had the mind to reform.

    I am starting to really believe that history will show this change in Bush and US policy was a product of an intel strong belief that — the North was going to collapse in the near term.

    I don’t believe you can come close to claiming that the dramatic reversal was brought about by corresponding changes in North Korea’s position. If shutting the reactor down was such a huge item, we wouldn’t have dug into the position we were in before. Same with promises only.

    The only real change that I can see (that is real and material) is with the sanctions and pressure we had taken PAIN STAKING YEARS to arrange.

    Why?

    When you have a nut as hard to crack as North Korea.

    When you have a nation that has proven itself to be troublesome in carrying out deals (to put it mildly) to the point its form of geo-politicing has become a scientific law.

    When you have tried and tried and tried and tried a wide variety of things to get NK into an honest brokering environment.

    Why, when you have finally gotten NK into a position where it seems like they might really have to start dealing above board with the global community or fall —

    why would you then suddenly shift your own policy and undo all of it putting yourself back to the same status quo that was so broken and pretty much hopeless for decades???

    The best, most likely answer I can come up with isn’t that Bush himself wanted a legacy.

    The best answer I can come up with is that policy makers in the US have taken a look at signs NK is actually teetering for real on the verge of collapse and have blinked.

    Meaning — that even if the US moved over the last few years to work to position NK into a corner where it had to reform or die, they were never really willing to see NK die.

    In short, it seems to me the US was bluffing.

    We finally found ways to back Pyongyang into a corner, but since the strong belief in Pyongyang is that it is in a catch-22 position — that even if it does reform, such reforms will lead to internal collapse anyway —–

    The US took a look at the potential costs of collapse and —- decided to agree with China and South Korea’s NK policy of — sustain at all costs….