North Korea hasn’t lost its talent for making enemies
[Update: This seems as good a place as any to tack on two more sets of comments from Chris Hill; plus, the Administration’s loyal soldier Victor Cha weighs in at the Chosun Ilbo. Scroll down.]
Let’s face it: American conservatives are more interested in and concerned by events in the Middle East than they are in North Korea, and a bad deal with North Korea might not have been enough to mobilize their opposition if it only affected Korea. There may be some good reasons for that, such as the fact that it was Muslim Arabs who murdered 3,000 of American civilians in our own country, and who regularly promote their own culture by demanding the heads of people who slight them by writing books, drawing cartoons, or naming their teddy bears. The Middle East has been exporting trouble pretty much everywhere for much longer, and plenty of people older than myself have spent a lifetime of thought on just how truly messed up that region is (one three-day visit to a Hamas-controlled village in East Jerusalem was all the time it took me; I concluded that the entire region should be walled off from civilization and moved on to other topics).
The operative point being: sending anything nuclear to a region that chooses to let this kind of behavior predominate tends to alarm people, at least those who can open their eyes and see something other than large intestine.
That’s why North Korea miscalculated so gravely when it decided to continue whatever proliferation activities it was engaging in with Syria, even as it was promising us that it was disarming and coming clean. Proliferation anywhere would have been bad enough, but proliferation to Syria draws in an important new cadre of opponents of the State Department’s three-monkeys diplomacy toward North Korea. Here’s Herb London of the Hudson Institute on Powerline:
On the other hand, the secrecy is having and will continue to have a profoundly negative effect on United States’ diplomatic credibility. Since North Korea was involved in one way or another with the Syrian facility either by providing enriched uranium, nuclear technology or plutonium, it makes sense to discuss Kim Il Jung’s pernicious role in exporting nuclear material.
Yet the State Department, leading a discussion in the Six Party talks over North Korea’s nuclear capability, does not want to upset the so-called apple-cart by describing North Korea’s malevolent influence. Silence in this case is deadly, but the State Department goal is an agreement, however empty the ultimate result might be. [Power Line]
I seem to recall hearing a lot less talk like that before last September’s Israeli air raid, although it’s never been in short supply here. If the North Koreans actually gave Syria any of the things London mentions above — HEU, plutonium, or nuclear technology — they have just made our next decision an exceedingly easy one. If we don’t make it, it’s nobody’s fault but our own.
Update: Here are two more transcripts from Chris Hill, who is starting to sound noticeably crankier. Infer what you will from that.
Remarks by Christopher R. Hill
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Morning Walk-Through, Kerry Center Hotel
Beijing, China
December 6, 2007
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Hi, I am just going to see Wu Dawei right now and brief him on my trip to the DPRK, and then I will ask him how we stand on the Six-Party meeting. And I will talk to him about travel schedules and see what is feasible. I have been in touch with my ROK counterpart. I also, tomorrow, will see Ken Sasae at Narita. This afternoon I will see the Russian Ambassador and brief him on what has been going on. I think we will all be in touch.
QUESTION: Mr. Hill, at this point how do you anticipate that the declaration will be transmitted to the Six Parties?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think the correct procedure is to the Chinese. I want to talk to Wu Dawei and see how he sees that happening. I think we want to make sure that when they do transfer even a first draft that it is a creditable effort. I felt, in that vein, that our conversations were useful in Pyongyang, but I need to talk to Wu Dawei about all that. OK. And speaking of Wu Dawei, I am kind of late.
QUESTION: What is your schedule today?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think I see Mr. Wu Dawei, and then see Vice-Minister Zhang at 11:00, and the Russian Ambassador in the early afternoon. So I think I have lunch free.
QUESTION: Mr. Hill, is one of the questions waiting to be resolved whether North Korea in fact received gas centrifuge cylinders from Pakistan?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, we have had a lot of discussions with them about uranium enrichment. As you know, we have consistently maintained ““ and I would say with very good evidence coming from more than one source ““ that they made some purchases of materials and equipment entirely consistent with a gas centrifuge program, materials including means to build gas centrifuges, patterning them after the Pakistani model that we also have information that they received.
Now we are trying to have these conversations with a view to resolving the issue. The number one issue is, we want to be completely sure that they don’t have any ongoing program. The number two issue is, we want to know what they have been up to in the past. Now a lot of people try to suggest that what is past is past, but actually I think being clear about what has happened is also a means for us to build the future relationship. So I would not just say that the past is the past. I think the past is also a prologue in this regard. We need to know what they are doing. We need to get them to step up and show some trust in us and some trust in the process so that we can go forward. We are not playing a game of “got you. We are not trying to create new problems. We are trying to resolve issues and move on. So it is a very delicate negotiation — or discussion, I should say. But I am confident that we have made some progress on it. And I am confident that we will be able to resolve this, as the DPRK said we would when they made their statement in the denuclearization working group in Shenyang that this matter would be resolved to mutual satisfaction. OK. I am really late for Wu Dawei. So see you later. QUESTION: What time do you think you will be coming back?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I don’t know, because I will meet with Wu Dawei at 9:00. I think my next meeting is at 11:00. So I am not sure. Be in touch with the Embassy. All right? Bye bye.
# # #
Remarks by Christopher R. Hill
ASSISTANT Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Morning walk-through with journalists
Kerry Center Hotel, Beijing, China
December 7, 2007
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: What are you doing up this early?QUESTION: So what’s your plan in Japan? What are you going to talk about?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I talked to Ken Sasae on the phone, but I want to brief him in person on the trip to the DPRK, tell him my assessment on where we are on the disablement, but also my assessment of where the DPRK is on the question of declaration. I’ll also convey the letter. I will meet with Ambassador Schieffer at the airport as well, and through them convey the letter from President Bush to Prime Minister Fukuda.
QUESTION: Do you know if the discharging of nuclear fuel rods has begun at Yongbyon?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I expect the discharge to start very soon. They’ve had clean-up activities which I understood would be completed this week and possibly have already been completed as of Thursday, but I would have to refer you to the technicians on the spot to get an update on that.
QUESTION: When you talked to the Russian Ambassador yesterday, did you discuss when the Russian heavy oil will be transported to North Korea?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: He said there has been a decision to do so and that they are working on it. And it should be shortly, but I didn’t ask for a date. But he said people are working on it as hard as they can.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I have a plane to catch. All right?
QUESTION: So this month, which country will transfer the heavy oil to North Korea?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think the U.S. will go next.
QUESTION: The President today, does that change (inaudible)?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: The President sent letters to all five heads of government, heads of state, in the Six-Party process urging everybody to ““ underscoring the need to complete the tasks in December or as soon as possible and get on to the final phase. Whether it will have an effect on Chairman Kim Jong-il, you will have to ask him. See you later.
# # #
Victor Cha’s piece at the Chosun Ilbo is probably worth reading in full. His choice of venue is interesting, and is clearly shaped at sending a warning that will be heard by Korea watchers, Koreans, and hopefull no one else. He still appears to be very much plugged into the Administration’s current thinking: all engagement, no hawk. When you package potato chips that way, you get sued for deceptive packaging. When you package national policy that way, they write books about you.
I heard most of a talk that Cha gave to a small group at Yonsei University last week. As for his continuing connections with the Administration, he declined at one point to answer a question about Syria because, he explained, he still held a security clearnace he didn’t want to jeopardize by talking out of school. He wasn’t so shy on a couple other issues. He volunteered the acknowledgement that the Administration fudged the Banco Asia matter as a negotiating tool, without admitting that its actions were contrary to law. He also stated that regime change was “never” part of the US agenda vis-a-vis North Korea. He generally presented himself as the ulitmate realist, who harbored NO optimism about the prospect of success in talking with the NORKS, but nevertheless insisted that the show must go on, if only to preclude anyone from claiming that the US didn’t do everything reasonably possible to bring about a diplomatic solution.
He said the same thing when he resigned months ago. I didn’t believe it then either.
That’s what I’ve been saying – and more recently doubting – with my ‘giving KJI enough rope to hang himself’ post. We’ll see (how long things are delayed) with the soon-to-come nuclear declaration.
But for that whole thing to make sense, the idea has to be that he will eventually be hung. It seems to me that the regime change people, if there ever were any, and I thought there were, have been replaced in holding the president’s ear, because we clearly seem to have in control the “avoid collapse” crowd running the show.
You can’t give Pyongyang enough rope to hang itself if you aren’t willing to see it die…..or at least not willing to give it a shove in that direction.
I think all we can hope for is that the U.S. would reverse any and all deals with North Korea and initial full-spectrum sanctions (as opposed to the watered-down sanctions previously applied). I thinks that’s the best case scenario from now until Bush leaves office.