Archive for May 2008

Guest Post: Dan Bielefeld Goes to a Screening of “Crossing” at the National Assembly

[Update:  Apologies -- I had Dan's name misspelled before.] 

I met Dan Bielefeld at a LiNK event in Washington two years ago, and he has been living in Seoul since shortly thereafter.  After Dan’s excellent photography of the Chinese riot in Seoul last month, I invited him to guest-post here.  He was recently invited to a screening of “Crossing” at the Korean National Assembly, and here is review.  Since this is Dan’s first post, I’ll introduce him this time.

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I saw Crossing today. Just last week I had been disappointed to learn the original release date of June 5 was pushed back — so I was thinking I’d have to wait another month to see it — and then suddenly a friend invited me to a big showing for the National Assembly this afternoon (at the 국회 의원회관, which is next to the National Assembly building).

We got there maybe 10 minutes before the program began, and there were already people standing in the aisles. Through some luck, we ended up with front-row seats (basically the big-wigs only occupied them before the movie began). Before the movie Dr. Vollertsen apparently was sitting next to the older brother of the president and a few seats over from Park Geun-Hye (who, along with a few other people, spoke briefly before the movie). Dr. V with a smile remarked to me afterwards on the nature of Korean politics that yesterday he was briefly arrested in front of the Blue House and today he was patted on the knee by the president’s brother!

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Park Geun-hye’s entrance generates a lot of attention.

Crossing, as others have said, is very moving. Yet, as affected as I was, there were two reasons I don’t think I felt the “punch” quite so much as I would have otherwise. First, much of the main storyline is based on the experiences of an extraordinary man who comes to the weekly 444 demonstrations in Insadong, so I roughly knew what was going to happen. And, second, I was sitting next to (the only other?) non-Koreans and we were frequently given translations by a Korean friend. Normally, I prefer watching movies without commentary or other interruption, of course, so it sort of broke the mood for me, if you will.

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The director, Kim Tae-gyun, speaks briefly before showing his movie.

That said, I cried several times; I doubt there were any present who didn’t at some point. As someone pointed out afterwards, the director intentionally included very little politics in the movie; it’s just the story of a man trying to help his family. This makes it all the more powerful. The script, the acting, and most aspects of the movie (it was shot in three countries) are excellent, though I thought the music was so-so.

I didn’t get a chance to talk to people in the crowd today to see what they thought, though I suspect many of them were like us; ie, they already are aware of / active in NK issues or at least politics in general. Those I went with all thought it was very good — including the North Korean among us, who said it reminded him of many things he went through in getting to South Korea.

So the stage is set. The movie is good, there’s a well-known star, Cha In-pyo, in the lead roll, and fingers-crossed that the marketing will be sufficient”¦now the real question is how will the Korean public react, if at all, when the movie is released June 26th? A few weeks ago I started asking Koreans if they’d heard of it yet, and most of them hadn’t. But now it appears the media campaign is getting going. For example, last night apparently there was a big promotional gathering in Jamsil with entertainers, singers, etc. Eg, see photos here. Also, late last night I happened to see Cha In-pyo interviewed on a Charlie Rose-type interview show on KBS.

I heard there is a showing this Friday at 2pm at COEX for the western media, so English subtitles will be shown. I may try to go to that so I can pick up more of the nuance.

Documentary: Escape from North Korea

This will be the first of two documentaries from Journeyman Pictures I’ll be featuring this week. “Escape from North Korea” follows an entire North Korean family all the way from their relatively privileged life in Pyongyang to the end of their long journey to escape the North, starting with clandestine camera phone images.

escape-from-north-korea.jpg

For both of these documentaries, a big hat tip to commenter and blogger usinkorea.

“China Hand” Owes Me a Retraction

[Update, 31 May 08:  China Hand publishes a retraction:

In a comment on Arms Control Wonk in 2007, I made the statement that the website Onefreekorea had apparently received an advance copy of a government ruling concerning Banco Delta Asia. I inferred this from my reading of the timestamp on the OFK post, which I believed indicated that the post had been put up the day before the ruling was officially announced and publicly available. OFK's proprietor has advised me that he obtained the ruling through an electronic subscription to the Federal Register and did not receive it in advance. I regret the error, withdraw the statement, and apologize to OFK. I've also asked ACW to delete the comment. 

End update.] 

Original Post:  So, what did you do this weekend? I took my kids to the circus, mowed my lawn, fixed the tires on my bike, and received a belated notice that I’ve arrived as a made member of the neocon conspiracy, complete with 3-karat pinkie ring and powder blue Coupe de Ville. The belated part is unfortunate, really. Such powers have shelf lives, especially when you use them for world domination. No doubt, my potent svengali juju has begun to wane before I could begin toppling ChiCom satellites like dominoes just in time for the Olympics. My notice came in the form of a year-old blog post about Treasury’s issuance of its final rule putting the hammer down on Banco Delta Asia, with this confident statement:

Definitely some Boltonian shenanigans at work. It appears regime-change advocate Onefreekorea had the text of the Treasury decision ahead of its release and was pushing the idea that the BDA issue would be the “critical failure point” that could derail the Six Party Agreement (perhaps because Treasury’s strongly-worded statement of zero tolerance for ongoing North Korean malfeasance was meant to intimidate other banks and provoke the North Koreans to a precipitate response). Judging from the State Department and Chinese response so far, they’re going to be disappointed. I blog http://chinamatters.blogspot.com/2007/03/twilight-of-boltonians-treasury-works.html the issue at China Matters.

China Hand · Mar 16, 10:27 PM · [Comment, Arms Control Wonk]

Off to show some leg in the big city, are we, China Hand? (The link in that comment goes to his “China Matters” blog.)

I’m just finding out about this today by accident because China Matters never took time out of the sisyphean work of tongue-bathing pandas and justifying the shooting of Tibetan nuns or somesuch to ask me about my Boltonian shenanigans. Truthfully, John never calls anymore (the bitch). Now, I admit to the occasional bout of self-importance when people leak me things, but here, I must protest. There is no importance. Not only did I not get any advance from Treasury, that probability is plainly obvious to a careful reader. China Hand seems in awe of my ability to find the very same information he could have found on public U.S. government web sites. Again, the suggestion that I had any advance notice of Treasury’s final rule is false and made with a reckless disregard for the truth. So are the skullduggery and delusions about my importance he infers from his own error.

China Hand probably refers to this post of mine, dated March 13, 2007, which links to the final rule on Banco Delta Asia published by the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (Fincen). Being just literate enough to make a buffoon of himself, China Hand clicked the link to Fincen’s pdf — not mine — of the pages in the Federal Register publishing the BDA final rule. No doubt, he saw the date March 19, 2007 printed on the header.

Presto — neocon conspiracy! Hey, what more proof do you need?

The funny thing about the Federal Register is that sometimes, the date a proposed rule is filed can precede the actual date of publication by several days. Had China Hand read the date of filing at the end of the rule, he’d have seen that it’s actually March 14, 2008. So why is that still the day after I published my post? Because I linked to the Federal Register page in an update, which I must have put up the same day the final rule was issued.

But how could anyone possibly be so all over the publication of the final rule without the guiding hand of John Bolton? Please allow me to demystify that as well. Anyone with the interest can go to Fincen’s web site and subscribe to their updates. Long-time readers know how interested I was in this story. I subscribed. And in fact, the very same FR page that I uploaded to my blog and which you see linked at this post was sent to me by Fincen in one of its subscriber updates on March 14, 2007, at 11:35:58. Yes, I still have the e-mail.

Now as to the charge that I seek to “change” a regime that does this kind of stuff to people, there’s no point in pressing an accusation I freely confess, proclaim, and wear as a badge of honor. Nor is it a secret that I am not cheering for the success of State’s series of surrenders to Kim Jong Il. There’s nothing hidden about any of this, and I haven’t cut politicians of either party any breaks for the stupid stuff they’ve been saying or doing.

Still, it galls to see such carelessness and sloppiness when people write about you. China Hand / China Matters constructed his conspiracy theory on such a slender reed without showing the rigor — or the cojones — to at least confront the one he accuses. He flatters me if he actually believes this. On the other hand, it’s probably no accident that China Hand did not link back to my blog when he made his accusation, knowing that this would probably leave tell-tale trackbacks or show up in my visitors’ log. In light of what passes for due process in China, maybe that shouldn’t surprise anyone. But in the blogosphere, there are certain rules of conduct you follow if you want credibility and respect. One of them is that you don’t write baseless things about people without some minimally diligent investigaton of the facts, and another is that when you get a fact wrong (as we all do) you correct it.

I’ve asked China Matters to print a prominent retraction, including over at Arms Control Wonk, where comments probably closed moths ago. I posted my request many hours ago, but there’s complete radio silence over at China Matters. I understand how time-consuming it can be, constructing those justifications for the starvation of Burmese peasants. Regrettably, this requires me to undertake, as a public service, to post the corrections China Hand won’t.

Good Friends: As Famine Worsens, Soldiers Go Hungry, Disease Spreads

Good Friends has released two more newsletters, numbered 129 and 130. No. 129 is partially made up of material I had passed along here yesterday, but picks up from there with some interesting reports about the food supply to the military. The reports are from Kangwan Province, which lies just north of the DMZ’s eastern sector.

According to one soldier in Keumkang County, the soldiers in this county are experiencing a food shortage as well. They are fed with less than half a bowl of long grain rice(안남미), a couple of pieces of Korean radish, and seaweed soup that tastes like seaweed, yet does not contain any actual seaweed. Lamenting on how bad their food situation was, he said that only on traditional holidays, can he see some oil floating in the seaweed soup. “Because we can’t eat well, we do not have any energy to participate in military training. Thus, sometimes we get into vacant houses, steal food and resell them to other residents. With that money, we get a good amount of food. Sometimes the owners of the stolen food come and complain about the theft, but we dismiss their claims and scold them for their negligence. He added that to save themselves, there is no choice but to do some harm to the other residents. [Good Friends Newsletter No. 129]

This means that there are food shortages in both of the provinces — South Hwanghae and Kangwon — that border the DMZ, and that at least some soldiers in one of those provinces are feeling the effects of food shortages. Assuming these reports are accurate, they suggest good reason to think that the regime is worried that food shortages could trigger social unrest, though I continue to believe that the regime could localize and crush any uprising short of a general military mutiny or a coup in Pyongyang.

(What would change this equation? The North Korean people first need a galvanizing ideology, an organized resistance movement, and the means to communicate dissident ideology and the events of the day from city to city and province to province. If any kind of armed resistance is to have any chance of challenging the regime — and in the long run, armed resistance is the only kind with any chance of success — its political/logistical/intelligence infrastructure would have to be established among the local population. All of this would probably take years, although outside support could accelerate it.)

Newsletter number 130 reports that opportunistic disease is spreading, with the reports mainly originating from the far northeast — Hoeryong and Chongjin. The diseases said to be claiming more victims include colitis and tuberculosis. Skyrocketing food prices are also crushing North Korea’s nascent mercantile economy. Most people cannot afford even the most basis non-food items.

One farm is reported to have sold its seed for next year’s crop because of the dire shortages. Along with reports that farmers are too weak to plow and sow their fields, this also suggests that next year’s harvest will be even worse than this one. Previous reports have also cited shortages of fertilizer and plastic sheeting. Without substantial and effective international aid, next year’s famine will be far worse. Other reports of note:

* The regime has launched a public education program to dissuade growing numbers of starving women from turning to prostitution to survive. (Meaning, the regime would prefer the alternative?);

* There are more reports that starving people are headed for the hills to pick wild plants, even grass, to eat. These foods have so little nutritional value and do so much harm to one’s digestive tract that the net effect of expending energy to gather them may be to hasten starvation;

* A magnesium clinker mine in South Hamgyeong Province was forced to shut down because so many workers abandoned their duties in an effort to gather these “alternative foods”;

* A recent visit to the northeastern city of Chongjin by Kim Jong Il had the effect of further driving up already high food prices because of the interruption it caused to the city’s food supply:

Due to the Chairman’s visit, the Chungjin area was blockaded for 2 days, which is adjacent to Kyongsong County. All vehicles and passengers were prohibited from entering the area, causing the price of rice to rise. After the lift of the blockade on May 13th, the price of rice stabilized back to the 3,000-3,100won level again. Critics complained that “A national level economic blockade brings a lot of difficulties, which are magnified on the domestic level. It is like our hand and feet are bound. Despite severe criticism by the public, the authorities move forth with the blockade.

It is fair to note that Good Friends wants to go back to the same no-string-attached, government-to-government aid that the regime used to dominate the people and keep them on the verge of starvation for so many years. The reports, nonetheless, are interesting reading (the usual cautions apply). You can read both newsletters in full here:

nkt129-eng1.pdf

nkt130-eng1.pdf

Of Hollow Men: Obama Flip-Flops on Removing N. Korea from Terror-Sponsor List

In March of 2005, I blogged about this letter from the Illinois congressional delegation to the North Korean government, in which all members of the delegation warned Kim Jong Il that they would firmly oppose removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism unless North Korea accounts for the fate of the Reverend Kim Dong Shik, a lawful permanent resident of the United States who had resided in Illinois.

In 2002, Rev. Kim was in northeast China assisting North Korean refugees. It was at this time that Kim, who was in his 60′s and wheelchair-bound, was kidnapped by North Korean agents and spirited back across the border to North Korea. (All of this somehow escaped the notice of the Chinese police, although only a few bridges cross the border between China and North Korea.) One of Rev. Kim’s kidnappers, Ryu Young-hwa, confessed to his role in the kidnapping in a South Korean court in 2005. Leaked details from South Korean prosecutors suggest that 10 other North Korean agents took part in the plot. We still do not know whether the Rev. Kim is alive or dead, although Andrei Lankov’s new book reports that, according to a recent defector, Rev. Kim died under interrogation.

Rev. Kim is the forgotten “American” abductee. Although he was abducted and possibly killed by an act of politically motivated intimidation, he is an inconvenience the State Department desperately wishes to overlook so that it can falsely say that North Korea does not sponsor acts of terrorism, which 18 U.S.C. sec. 2331(1) defines as activities that:

(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;

(B) appear to be intended –

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and

(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum;

Oh, well. That was then:

U.S. Democratic presidential frontrunner Senator Barack Obama has recently indicated he no longer opposes the removal of North Korea from a U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Obama in January 2005 came out against the removal of the Stalinist nation from the list until it gives an account of the kidnapping and death in the North of the Rev. Kim Dong-shik in 2000. [Chosun Ilbo]

Obama’s latest shift goes far to confirm my worst fears that he is a political cream puff — sweet, squishy, and mostly hollow except for the airy, sugary filling. When the prevailing winds blow in the direction of principled outrage, Obama gives us principled outrage. When the winds shift toward easy accommodation, so shifts Obama. Take the question of genocide. Apparently, Obama believes that “[s]ilence, acquiescence, paralysis in the face of genocide is wrong.” Meaning, we should break our silence with mere words, or by forming a large drum circle? Or should we should actually do something effective? It’s far from clear, but what if actually doing something to prevent genocide comes with some unpopular cost? So shifts Obama:

“Well, look, if that’s the criteria by which we are making decisions on the deployment of U.S. forces, then by that argument you would have 300,000 troops in the Congo right now — where millions have been slaughtered as a consequence of ethnic strife — which we haven’t done,” Obama said in an interview with The Associated Press. [MSNBC]

This seems to be meant to justify doing nothing effective in either place.

“We would be deploying unilaterally and occupying the Sudan, which we haven’t done. Those of us who care about Darfur don’t think it would be a good idea,” he said.

We’re all ears.

At convenient moments, Obama has readily agreed to sign onto principled-sounding statements about human rights in North Korea. In these final months of the presidency of another well-meaning and “compassionate” — yet essentially shallow — man, we’d be fools not to wonder whether Obama’s words amounted to more than just that. It gives no comfort that Obama has expressed a willingness to fly directly to Pyongyang to supplicate to His Porcine Majesty. To say what that Chris Hill has not already said? What else do we still have to surrender?

If Obama can’t be principled about something as fundamental to our security as terrorism, one can only wonder what other evils he might flutter toward easy accomodation with. Regrettably, it’s his readiness to tell us — and on some level, to believe — whatever we want to hear at any given moment that may well get Obama elected this fall. The American people have never been hungrier to be told that we can have drive-up ease and Barco-lounger comfort without cost or sacrifice, that if we smile at the evils of the world and click our heels three times, apocalyptic prophets will come out of their caves and set up day care centers. It’s not easy to perceive, of course, how much worse things really could be. In the absence of any consistency of principle from either our current president or our next one, however, we have good reason to fear that they will be.

Related: As I had feared, the Bush Administration’s determination to de-list North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism continues to do harm to our relations with our most important Asian ally, Japan. Two significant points I take from this Washington Post piece are first, that Japan’s Prime Minister made himself available to the Post to show the depth of Japan’s concern; and second, that the Japanese are sensibly turning to China to put pressure on the North. If China secures the release of Japanese abductees after the United States, after years of empty rhetoric, essentially betrays Japan, it will be a major step toward making China dominant in the region at America’s expense. Japanese voters will move in the direction of accommodating China, and away from rearmament and strengthening their defense alliance with the United States.

Good Friends: Some Districts of Pyongyang Near Starvation

While some reports continue to suggest that North Korea’s elite is still surviving by spending their savings in food markets, it also appears that the elite isn’t what it once was. Without as much food to go around, it no longer includes the entire population of Pyongyang or the “core” areas surrounding it. Today, according to Good Friends, the inhabitants of several districts in the privileged capital may be surviving on watery gruel. Nampo, the port city that serves Pyongyang, is also experiencing famine conditions, as are the areas just outside the capital.

The hardest-hit area is South Hwanghae, the North’s main food-producing region, which was spared the worst of the Great Famine a decade ago. The reason — the regime has seized most of the province’s crops to feed the military.

This year’s famine is affecting even key defense industries whose workers have never had to miss their rations before. In the past, workers who suddenly lost their rations either starved or adapted by learning to trade. The state-owned industries they abandoned largely ceased to function. This year’s famine could leave North Korea’s surviving industrial production severely stunted.

North Korea Today News Flash – No. 129

People Subsisting on Thin Porridge

With the suspension of food distribution in some parts of Pyongyang, the number of people who are subsisting on watery porridge is on the rise. Residents of areas like Sadong district사동구역, Ryukpo district력포구역, Rakrang District락랑구역 and Seungho district승호구역, are likely to be resorting to these measures. The food stores in these areas are completely empty and have closed their doors, and factories and businesses that used to distribute food on their own have suspended distribution because of the lack of food.

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[Famine-risk map of Pyongyang; click for full size]

Chairman Kim Jung-il has several times ordered that the food rations for Pyongayng to be guaranteed that even in April, the chairman has called in the trade minister, Secretary of the Pyongyang City Party, Chairman of the People’s Assembly to ensure that the food rations will be provided to people in the city of Pyongyang.

A part of a shipment of food that entered the country through Sinuiju was immediately released to residents of Pyongyang, but because of the overall lack of food, food distribution was suspended again shortly thereafter. Households that are well off and live in the central districts of Pyongyang have, at minimum, 6 months of food in reserve, in addition to US dollars, which gives them the option of buying food if they run out. However, in other districts that are occupied by people with less power, households are more reliant on food distribution by the government and have few other options when food distribution is suspended.

One official in Pyongyang said, “I recently went to Gangwon Province because I had some work to do there. It was on that trip that I truly realized that the extreme disparity in living standards between Pyongyang and its outlying regions. It seems like another world in areas outside of Pyongyang. The living conditions of residents are so poor that I couldn’t help tearing up. Compared to other areas, Pyongyang is like heaven. If even people in Pyongyang are subsisting on porridge water, it is easy to believe that people in other areas are dying of starvation

People’s Supreme Assembly of the Nampo City Request Emergency Food Aid

Conditions in Nampo city are much worse than in Pyongyang. All of the food stores within the city have closed their doors, and even the factories and businesses that were designated as important by the government stopped providing food rations long ago. The officials in Nampo all say that “because of the pressing food situation, the young, the elderly, and all of the citizens are facing death and human casualties.

The officials went on to say that if the government wishes to prevent large-scale deaths due to starvation, food aid must enter the country as soon as possible. The People’s Assembly of the city is urgently requesting the central government for food aid.

Nampo’s food crisis began in December of last year, and food distribution was suspended beginning in February of this year. Only the workers at Nampo’s port receive a small amount of food rations, and even the workers who work at Nampo’s artillery and military armaments factories are facing difficult times.

The central government released party funds on a one time basis in order to provide a month of food rations to workers in military related factories such as these and other important industries such as specially designated businesses and factories. If these workers were like the other citizens who never received a grain of rice from the government, they would have resorted to working in the markets or farming earlier, but because these workers were all used to receiving their food rations without fail, the cessation of food distribution has had an even greater effect on them.

An official from Nampo said, “Originally, there were plans to get rid of the markets on April 15th, the Day of the Sun 태양절 (Birthday of Kim Il Sung), but now they are unable to get rid of the markets and the policy became vague. Things that can be regulated are being regulated, but the minimum age requirement is not being enforced. Since the amount of food stuffs are so scarce, the authority are fearing that the public reaction would worsen even further. Women who were arrested for offense, often they are physically protesting, for instance, scratching the police’s face or grab on the ears of the officers when the women’s goods are being confiscated.

Once again, the obvious cautions apply — these reports are hearsay, and although subsequent reports have largely borne out Good Friends’s reports this year, there’s no way to confirm most of this independently. You can read two more new dispatches from Good Friends here:

nkt127-eng1.pdf

nkt128-eng1.pdf

Noland and Haggard on North Korea’s New Famine

Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard have just published three new op-eds in an attempt to sound the alarm about North Korea’s growing new famine. The first of these you should read is an extensive discussion of the evidence supporting their dire predictions in the Korea Herald (normally unlinkable, but uploaded in pdf here).

The second is this op-ed at Newsweek, which draws an apt comparison to the situation in Burma. Although Noland and Haggard place most of the blame for this situation on wreckless and ruthless decisions by the regime, they also cast blame at the U.N. World Food Program for “unwittingly” exacerbating the situation by crying wolf — to which I would add the greater sin of being so compliant with North Korean restrictions on the delivery of that aid that the people who needed it probably saw very little of it. Just ask them.

Here, at openDemocracy, Noland and Haggard are joined by Tim Weeks.

You can read my review of their excellent new book here, and their response to my review here.

Murder, Plain and Simple: North Korean Snipers Killing Refugees Along the Chinese Border

[Updated below with photographs; Digg it here.]

Helping Hands Korea, one of the most intrepid and trustworthy organizations that assists North Korean refugees escape from their repressive, famine-plagued homeland, has written to me with a detailed account of how the North Korean and Chinese militaries have joined forces to prevent North Koreans from escaping their homeland, one where large numbers are people are now starving to death once again because the government won’t feed them and won’t let them fend for themselves.

The most chilling detail: Helping Hands has spotted North Korean snipers stationed in various vantage points along its border with China, ruled by a nominally friendly regime. One Helping Hands member, a U.S. military veteran, has identified the sniper rifles as Soviet-designed Dragunov SVD’s. Helping Hands believes that the North Korean soldiers are under orders to shoot and kill border crossers, most of whom are either refugees or people trying to smuggle goods (increasingly food) into North Korea. Helping Hands has promised to send me photographs of one or more North Korean soldiers carrying Dragunovs. I have also asked him to obtain photographs of the dead bodies of refugees, which he reports can be seen along the banks of the Tumen River.

I am publishing Helping Hands’s complete account here, with no edits, but with a few explanatory notes in brackets:

1. The clear consensus of opinions gathered from field volunteers, as well as my own eyewitness accounts, is that the OG08 [OFK: OG08="Olympic Games 2008"] has had a clear impact on the daunting challenges currently facing the NKRs [North Korean refugees]. Although I will not be able to develop the topics I’m mentioning here, the information gathered is reliable from trusted veterans.

(a) Border patrols on both sides of the Tumen and Yalu Rivers are being beefed up: more guards and shorter distances between them.

(b) Credible reports of “shoot-on-sight” order given to NK border patrol re: NKRs trying to cross the border illegally. One activist reported that snipers are now being posted at elevated positions above the river, giving them a wider view and a longer time to train their scopes on fleeing NKRs. This same activist reported finding several NKRs floating in the Tumen River with telltale small bullet holes in one side of the body at the entry point, and a much larger hole at the bullet’s exit. Even in the five days I stayed near the river, I saw ample evidence of high-powered searchlights at night on the NK side and was later informed by local CN [Chinese national] residents that the searchlights are used to detect NKRs seeking to approach the river under the cover of darkness.

(c) Another side of the crossing situation–deeply imbedded (& worsening) corruption of NK border guards, who will let certain NK citizens cross to CN upon agreement that when they return, a certain amount of money will be given to the guards (usually Y1,000 or about USD$150). It must be added that there is also evidence that Pyongyang is desperately attempting to root out this corruption, and frequent rotation of border guards may be one of the main instruments to stem this tide of bribe-taking. As usual, the bribe-taking and crackdowns on this behavior follows a cyclical pattern.

(d) Deeply troubling and very recent report of a forced abortion carried out on a repatriated female NKR by a NK government physician in a border patrol facility.

(e) Widespread house-to-house checks by CN police in border areas to ferret out NKRs in CN households as of the past few months.

(f) The work of volunteers has been hindered by an extreme tightening of hotel and guesthouse (H/G) registration requirements. It used to be that if a foreigner was traveling with a local volunteer to a border region, that registration at a H/G could be done just with the name of the local, thereby shielding the foreigner from undue exposure. As of the last few months, rules are strictly enforced that the passport of each traveler must be registered with the H/G, and this data processing is directly accessible by the local police office. In a similar vein, I was startled to be denied use of Internet café’s this time in China, as entry could only be gained by showing a Chinese national ID card. I’d never encountered this restriction in the last 12 years!

(g) Police officials in CN/NK border regions are authorized to use substantial bribes to the local ethnic Korean-Chinese population to reveal the whereabouts of NKRs hiding in their neighborhoods. These bribes have reportedly been increased in recent months. These bribes are especially pernicious as they are designed to undermine the very sympathy that the ethnic Korean Chinese population naturally has for their NKR cousins from across the river. Bribes are also offered in larger sums to inform on any local resident or foreigner who might be helping the NKRs in CN.

2. It’s really quite impossible to ascertain how many are crossing secretly along a two-river border that stretches many hundreds of miles between CN & NK. However, due to the rapidly worsening food situation inside NK (much exacerbated by a recent embargo by the CN government of grain exports due to the global food crisis, the more strict regulation of food aid by the new South .Korean government, declining distribution worldwide by the WFP, etc.), the so-called “push factors” on NK citizens to take these chances to cross are growing. Widespread reports at the border area confirm that food shortages are now critical in the central part of the country and that news of death from malnutrition is becoming more widespread, always with comparisons to the severity of food shortages in the mid-1990′s. A kilo of rice in 2006 was roughly NKWon 1,000, in 2007 it rose to 1,400, now in 2008 the price has skyrocketed to about NKWon 2,600 (more than one month’s salary of a normal worker!) It is also reported that a growing number black marketers inside NK are deliberately withholding the rice to further escalate the price, a particularly pernicious practice in time of famine. A very credible report from someone who travels frequently inside NK and is able to talk with some residents, revealed that from early 2008, Kim Jong Il decreed that for every man, woman and child, .2 hectares of land are to be cultivated in either soybeans or potatoes, both of which are uniquely suited for transport. The decree goes on to say that 90% of the harvests from these hectares are to be sent to Pyongyang for the good of the Revolution and the Party. Some sources inside NK claim that food being sent to the capital is being stockpiled in order to be traded for oil.

This said, however, and despite these growing push factors, the combined tightening on both side of the Tumen & Yalu rivers has resulted in some reduction in the successful crossings of the NKRs into CN. It is very clear that Beijing has put a high priority on keeping the NKRs out of its country while it’s on the world stage. Again, it’s very difficult to put a numeric characterization of this reduction. The bottom line is this: it’s currently harder to cross the Tumen and Yalu Rivers, and it’s harder to survive on the Chinese side. It’s too early to tell if this is a temporary condition, whether the border regime will relax after the OG08.

The best estimate I’ve heard from experts right on the border is that roughly 30% of the NKRs are caught by the CN and sent back at present. One recent and reliable report indicated that the gruesome practice of forced abortions on some pregnant NKR females who are repatriated is still in use. How widespread I do not know. A testimony heard on 5/12/08 regarding a NKR mother of two small children (ages 6 & 7) was repatriated to NK the previous day without her children, i.e. the authorities paid no heed to the mother-children relationship and callously repatriated the mother only. The activist said that this indicated a new level of hardening of the CN position in such cases. As we passed the Tumen Detention Center, one knowledgeable resident who was driving the vehicle stated that the there are currently 600 NKRs being held by Chinese authorities in that one detention center alone. They are repatriated systematically once a month, according to this well-placed source.

As for punishment inside NK, one very reliable source stated that there are a number of indications that punishments on repatriated NKRs for leaving NK without permission are getting heavier these days. One could easily speculate that CN may be providing incentives to the NK government for doing so, to assist Beijing in its quest for a ‘harmonious’ ) G08, but I do not have proof of this.

Moreover, the previous and relatively widespread practice of bribing prison officials and using ‘inside connections’ to get some NKRs out (usually by their family members) of severe punishment is being systematically eliminated. This would seem an obvious attempt to deter people from leaving NK when it becomes clear that any loopholes used to escape punishment are being systematically removed. I don’t have details on systematic changes within the prison camp system, etc. But I was told that some repatriated NKRs in the NK town of Hoeryong are being forced to walk up to 40 km. to a worksite and the same distance back in a work camp, as part of their punishment for fleeing their homeland. How widespread such a practice is would be hard to ascertain.

[E-mail message from Helping Hands Korea to OFK, 23 May 08]

The United Nations and its cowardly South Korean General Secretary have done nothing for the people of North Korea. The Human Rights Industry says next to nothing for them. The Bush Administration has betrayed them. By default of inaction, non-violence has been eliminated as an option. We cannot even give them food without the regime stealing it from them. The North Korean people cannot survive unless the regime is destroyed. To survive, they need guns and the courage to use them. Is there any humanitarian assistance but guns and ammunition that we can give to the North Korean people?

Update: Helping Hands sends these three photographs of North Korean troops patrolling the border area with dogs. The rifles, however, are not Dragunovs; they appear to be standard wooden-stock AK’s. The pictures appear to have been taken several months ago, before the famine really hit. The border is easier to cross when the rivers are frozen over.

Click the thumbnails to see the full-size images.

dscf0050.jpg dscf0048.jpg dscf0052.jpg

Helping Hands has told me that it has better photos, and I hope I’ll get a chance to publish them.

Update 2: The Korea Times picks up the story.

Afterthought: I wonder if Charles J. Hanley would consider this newsworthy. Place your bets….

Update 3: UPI, on the other hand, isn’t so big on attribution; instead, they attributed the story to the Korea Times reporter, who actually did have enough class to attribute OFK (and from what I’m told, made Page One, so congrats to Michael Ha of the Korea Times). It’s probably petty of me to really care about this; after all, it’s the brave people in Helping Hands who are actually gathering the information and taking the risks to do it. Still, after the Voice of America horked my story through a remarkably unlikely coincidence, reported on North Korea’s undergound airfield just one day after I put up this post, this sort of crap is starting to wear thin. I do this stuff on my own time and at my own expense, and I’ll never see dime one of it again. I don’t have a personal or financial interest here other than to be able to bring more attention to this and other newsworthy things that the media pay insufficient attention to. Is a little attribution and a link too much to ask? Evidently. @#$%^! UPI thieves ….

If any of this causes you to feel any sympathy — for the poor refugees, that is, not me — then please help bring some attention to their predicament by digging this post.

Update 4: The Joongang Ilbo is also reporting it.

Death Star

Throughout the year the animals worked even harder than they had worked in the previous year. To rebuild the windmill, with walls twice as thick as before, and to finish it by the appointed date, together with the regular work of the farm, was a tremendous labour. There were times when it seemed to the animals that they worked longer hours and fed no better than they had done in Jones’s day. On Sunday mornings Squealer, holding down a long strip of paper with his trotter, would read out to them lists of figures proving that the production of every class of foodstuff had increased by two hundred per cent, three hundred per cent, or five hundred per cent, as the case might be. The animals saw no reason to disbelieve him, especially as they could no longer remember very clearly what conditions had been like before the Rebellion. All the same, there were days when they felt that they would sooner have had less figures and more food. [George Orwell, Animal Farm]

ryugyong-hotel-lg.jpg

The Buddhist charity Good Friends is reporting that most of South Hwanghae Province, which has historically been North Korea’s rice bowl and the source of most of its seafood, is now experiencing famine. I’ve pasted the text of Good Friends’ latest dispatch below the fold, and I’ve also uploaded another at the link below:

nkt126-eng1.pdf

The picture these dispatches collectively create is catastrophically tragic. North Korean parents are being forced to make agonizing choices about whether to eat their last morsels of food to try to survive and provide, or to feed it to their kids and sacrifice their own lives … knowing that their kids will become street orphans and probably end up starving in a state orphanage anyway. Others are contemplating suicide to put an end to a prolonged agony that offers no hope of any other outcome. It is, simply put, a crime against humanity that any government would have higher priorities than feeding its starving people (worse, it actively prevents them from providing for themselves). Yet that is exactly what Kim Jong Il is contemplating.

The regime that’s allowing this to happen and the most morally impenetrable boosters of “engaging” it want us to share their giddiness at its plans to take more scarce resources from the starving and desperate North Korean people and squander them on “the worst building in the history of mankind.” This is from an e-mail newsletter from the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University which was passed on to me by a reader.

Sources recently returning to China from Pyongyang have reported that North Korea has resumed efforts to complete the 105-story Ryugyong Hotel. With only 20 buildings in the world taller than the 330-meter structure, it would be by far the largest building in all of North Korea.

Baekdu Mountain Architects and Engineers began building the highrise in 1987 but halted construction in 1992 amid economic hardships and rumors of structural deficiencies. The North has been seeking foreign investment of up to 300 million USD to complete the structure.

Traders in Shenyang, China with ties to Pyongyang say the North has now found that funding, partnering with Egypt’s Orascom Group. Orascom has publicized significant investment plans for North Korea in the last twelve months. [IFES Newsletter]

Yonhap is also reporting the same thing, which doesn’t make it true.

If it is true, it tells us two things we knew and one thing we didn’t. We knew that the North Korean regime was untroubled about letting millions suffer and die while squandering their survival on useless vanities. We also knew that among those who would “engage” with this regime, there is a class of people who can look on this obscenity with approval, even enthusiasm. It would also suggest that even while everyone else starves, the regime feels capable of feeding its “core” population and a sizeable number of construction workers for the duration of this project, or until the Ryugyong finally topples into the alluvial mud on which its foundation rests.

There is, of course, another possibility. The North Koreans have a very long history of extracting capital from gullible investors, only to walk off with the money and lock the gates behind them. Just ask disgraced former Senator Robert Torricelli. We can only hope that this is the case yet again. It would not be entirely unpleasant to watch capitalism at its predatory worst crawl into bed with socialism at its repressive worst and break out with something noxious the morning after. That is how economic Darwinism works. It would be far better than seeing so many die for something so false and useless.

[Pic: Cavit Erginsoy]

Read more

Two Dispatches from Good Friends

Blogging will have to be light for a while, but fortunately, I’m now on the distro list for Good Friends, which welcomes recipients to redistribute its dispatches. Ven. Pomnyun also said Good Friends will increase the volume of dispatches it publishes. I’m going to republish two of them today, one of which I’ve grafed before. The obvious cautions apply, but overall, the evidence suggests that trends are very bleak in the short term — famine is killing a lot of North Korean kids, especially orphans — and modestly hopeful in the longer term — there is a lot of discontent among the people, including officials who have compassion for those they can’t help. Read the rest on your own.

nkt124-eng1.pdf

nkt125-eng1.pdf