Food Shortages Widen N. Korea’s Class Gap

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1. Joshua,

   This is not on point as far as this posting is concerned, but I am sure your avid readers would like to hear your usually excellent in-depth analysis of the beef importation imbroglio. It certainly highlights the two issues that you relentlessly highlight about the South Korean public: Its runaway (though I still say more theatrical than substantive) anti-Americanism, and its utter lack of respect for the rule of law or, to be frank, civilized conventions. Moreover, this certainly seems to be an issue that ought to be publicized Inside the Beltway, given that American policy can dramatically affect the ultimate outcome in Seoul.

2. There are a few reasons I haven’t blogged this:

   * I just don’t have time.

   * Other blogs are covering this adequately, whereas they’re not covering the N. Korean famine and the politics of appeasement here in America.

   * So far, the protestors haven’t gotten violent. Frankly, there seems to be a lot more to criticize in how the cops are behaving. I’m more tempted to post about that right now than anything. I’m all for arresting and hosing down violent protestors, but I absolutely don’t favor excessive police force against peaceful protest. If Koreans get violent with our soldiers or display the sort of ugly discrimination we saw in 2002, I’ll probably become very interested.

   * There’s absolutely nothing new or game-changing about South Korea exhibiting deep-seeded anti-Americanism or media sensationalism, accepting urban myth as scientific fact, or placing national pride over national or personal interest. They’re going to get the government, economy, and national defense they want and deserve. Why is that my problem? I think Robert has already expressed the obvious answer to this, which is to apply countervailing trade restrictions to Korean products. Free trade means free trade. If we give full access to our markets without gaining full access to the markets of other countries, we create a perverse incentive for trading partners to haggle for unbalanced and unilateral benefits. Of course, Koreans have a sovereign right to decide not to let in unsafe products, but I question the legitimacy of those concerns. If this is really about safety, I wonder how many of them are rubbing lead-test swatches on the Chinese-made Thomas trains and Dora dolls at the corner mungu.

   * I don’t support the FTA as written anyway. I can’t accept the Kaesong carve-out and I think the agreement is already so chock full of protectionism for South Korea that “free trade” is a complete misnomer. Sure, the protestors are addlebrained fools, and it’s my personal theory that Mad Cow would be aysmptomatic on most of them anyway. I’m still hoping they can kill this FTA. For that matter, I’ve believed since 2002 that most of USFK should pre-position some equipment and park itself on Guam or Ft. Lewis. The only question mark in my mind is how much of an air component we should leave behind. I generally favor giving the ROKAF time to build up its own capabilites, while retaining enough of the intel, command, and control to help prevent a war over Tokdo, Ieodo, or Manchuria.

   That said, you know how highly I think of your writing and thinking. You also have the advantage of language skills. Why not e-mail me a guest post?

3. Excellent points, Joshua. I’ll add one more: rising US beef exports will bring little, if any, net economic benefit to the US. A large number of agricultural and meat processing workers are undocumented immigrants making very low wages. These workers do put some of their measly paychecks into the local economy by cramming ten people into a three-bedroom home and buying food at the local mercado and Chinese-made household goods at the local Wal-mart. The rest is remitted. Morever, factory farms are big polluters. Many midwestern towns are virtually uninhabitable because of the stench and run-off into soil and water. If we’re going to promote exports, let’s pick a product or service that will create jobs that pay a living wage and improve communities where they do business.

4. Careful, now Sonagi. I’m a rancher’s son who comes from the prairie that produces the word’s finest grass-fed beef and buffalo meat. There are a lot of ranchers in the earthly paradise from which I hail* who would be badly hurt by falling beef prices.

   * Except from mid-December to mid-February.

5. It seems to me that those who misuse the freedoms of expression living in a democratic country to create scandal and controversy–while at the same time working to support totalitarian regimes–ought to be hinged in gibbets for the sport of the crows; but that’s not how we operate ’round here… 😉

   Perhaps the falling value of the US dollar will help ease the strain of US Beef imports to the Land of Perpetual Outrage?

   Or not. Let them eat Nork bondeggi, if they so desire… “Tastes like chicken,” I’m told…

6. hinged hanged sorry!!

7. Careful, now Sonagi. I’m a rancher’s son who comes from the prairie that produces the word’s finest grass-fed beef and buffalo meat. There are a lot of ranchers in the earthly paradise from which I hail* who would be badly hurt by falling beef prices.

   And I’m a loyal consumer of locally raised pastured meats and eggs. How would not selling factory farm beef to Koreans lower grass-fed beef prices and harm real farmers and ranchers like your father? Does your dad, like many farmers around my area, sell his cattle to be fattened at a feedlot?

8. Joshua,

   Your quick explanation of why you can’t write an in-depth post is far more comprehensive and thoughtful than most Bloggers’ considered posts!

   And thanks for the invitation for writing a guest Blog on the beef importation brouhaha. I am of course honored, and I would ordinarily jump at the chance of writing about a topic I feel pretty strongly about; but in this case I don’t think I have the requisite background knowledge to do a fair job. To begin with, I don’t have an iota of understanding as far as the medical issues are concerned (beyond the knowledge that MCD is a rare disease and that the presumption that the Korean fears of contracting it are greatly exaggerated). Nor am I familiar with the minutiae of the FTA agreement in question; and I would also be required to examine the general Korean claim that the agreement is not fair toward the Korean side relative to similar American agreements with Japan and other nations that Koreans think are “peer” nations. (This claim, as I am sure you know, was incessantly bandied about regarding the treaty governing the USFK, whether accurate or not—the national “jajonsim” issue is at least the surface rationale for many of these anti-American theatrics.)

   As far as your other points, my understanding is that the SWAT police was brought in because the protesters threatened to storm the Blue House so I am less sympathetic to claims of police brutality. Further, having once accidentally walked into a state of nature-evoking Yonsei protest as a clueless college student visiting Korea, I have a hard time envisioning a peaceful Korean protest even in theory or as a concept.

   I also unreservedly agree with you and Robert on the nature of the problem, as well as Robert’s proposed solution, as long as it is carefully orchestrated, and it does not spiral out of control amid passionate rhetoric or sheer stupidity. Perhaps I am too much of a congenital cynic, but I think South Korea behaves like a spoiled, petulant child toward the U.S. in large part because it thinks the U.S. will never be so callous as to actually throw the kid away. To put it in a different way, the South Koreans know that the U.S. is indeed a benevolent hegemon, and that it would not, for instance, behave the way China did when the garlic spat occurred (which is the same thing as to say I wonder whether Robert’s envisioned policy option of U.S. trade retaliation even exists in practice).

   Now, given that the fundamental problem as I see here is an under-estimation of American resolve, or at least an over-estimation of its indulgence, I have always thought the best way to deal with Korea from an American perspective is to precisely demonstrate that America can act like another hegemon—or even a normal country. That’s why Robert’s proposal—albeit perhaps not serious—of tariffs on other South Korean electronic goods, or even a strong signal that the FTA agreement is off the table, would be a welcome antidote to South Korea’s psychic delirium.

   But there is a risk here too, as we’ve discussed in e-mails in the past. Unlike you, I am not sure pulling off the U.S. support in South Korea completely (including a wholesale withdrawal of the USFK) would actually make South Korea an independent, mature nation. Given country’s historical or cultural legacy of “sadajuee,” as well as current geopolitical realities, I think the more likely possibility is that South Korea runs to China’s waiting embrace. I don’t think that is a scenario that the U.S. (or Japan) ought to be nonchalant about, because it would likely deprive the U.S. of dominant influence in any of the mainland Far Eastern nation.

   In fact, the delicate part is to threaten to abandon the petulant kid without going so far in rhetoric or deed as to persuade the kid that the parent is being serious. So withdraw a bit—or a lot—but not wholesale; and start up a minor trade skirmish, but not a full-scale fight where a rapprochement is no longer feasible.

   Is such a carefully moderated or calibrated approach capable from the U.S.? Probably not. As both Tocqueville and Kissinger have demonstrated, America seems constitutionally unable to plot out long-term strategy unless there is an immediate, mortal danger involved.

9. Lady Sonagi,

   All this time you had me convinced that you were a rational, moderate woman. But no, you’ve unveiled yourself as a true believing Lefty!

   Pray, do not tell me you are a feminist as well! 🙂

10. Here I must admit that my father sold his last cattle before I was born.

11. Unlike you, I am not sure pulling off the U.S. support in South Korea completely (including a wholesale withdrawal of the USFK) would actually make South Korea an independent, mature nation. Given country’s historical or cultural legacy of “sadajuee,” as well as current geopolitical realities, I think the more likely possibility is that South Korea runs to China’s waiting embrace.

    I fear you overestimate the tolerance of American voters for maintaining a presence they see as unwanted. I can make a lot of excuses for Iraq. Sixty years after the ROK was founded, I can’t make any of those excuses for Korea. If Korea can’t govern itself wisely now — and I certainly don’t accept that it can’t — might disengagement be a prudent course for America?

12. “I fear you overestimate the tolerance of American voters for maintaining a presence they see as unwanted.”

    It appears to me that the dominant mood of the American voter–and the U.S. Congress, by extension–seems to be indifference rather than intolerance or indignation when it comes to Korea. That is, absent people (esp. Americans) being killed or in danger of being killed, is the American electorate ever sufficiently aroused to demand a dramatic change in foreign policy? Certainly I can’t imagine the indignation rising to the level where it would over-balance the seeming consensus of the foreign policy establishment that seeks a strong engagement with Seoul. But I will defer to your greater expertise in this issue, given that you are actually in DC and have had interactions with the people who run American foreign policy.

    “I can make a lot of excuses for Iraq. Sixty years after the ROK was founded, I can’t make any of those excuses for Korea. If Korea can’t govern itself wisely now — and I certainly don’t accept that it can’t — might disengagement be a prudent course for America?”

    I am not arguing for a permanent, large U.S. troop presence in Korea; but my idea of “temporary” or “transitional” is concededly longer than your idea, partly due to our different cultural background. In the same vein, I would also point out that a genuine liberalization/democratization is a long, halting process, and Korea has been on the path not sixty years but some twenty years–as I’d count the onset of a quasi-genuine liberal democracy from the emergence of the Roh Taewoo government. That’s a measly generation.

    I guess the hinge of the matter goes back to how we envision South Korea if the U.S. packed up and left now. You lean toward a South Korea that will rapidly mature and become self-reliant; I see South Korea hurtling toward the Chinese orbit. Your scenario may be possible in another generation, perhaps, given no dramatic change in the security environment in the region for the worse, but I don’t think that time is yet.

13. We can’t keep South Korea out of the Chinese orbit if South Korea won’t even protect Koreans from Chinese thugs on the streets of its own capital. I don’t presume that South Koreans will immediately grow up when the Americans leave. I’m only saying that USFK’s presence exacerbates South Korea’s immaturity, and that South Korea — which has been prosperous and free for decades now — has no excuse for not growing up in fairly short order.

14. I’m only saying that USFK’s presence exacerbates South Korea’s immaturity, and that South Korea — which has been prosperous and free for decades now — has no excuse for not growing up in fairly short order.
    

    Exactly. In education, it’s called a gradual release of responsibility. Korea’s long history has demonstrated time and time again that the Koreans are resourceful, tenacious survivors. I am confident Koreans will step up to the plate if we step back.

15. Joshua,

    I guess we will merely reanimate our earlier disagreements on this issue by discussing it. But it says volumes that a natural friend of Korea–someone who has married a Korean woman and cares so much about Korea that he seemingly spends most of his free time keeping alive the plight of its one tragic half–would be exasperated enough to say, well, “enough”!

    If South Korea cannot convince the Joshua Stantons of the world to remain on its side, what hope has it with your average Joe in Peoria? (But then, perhaps that Joe in Peoria is too indifferent to care.)

16. Miss Sonagi,

    Two points:

    1. What Joshua seems to be pushing for is a precipitous withdrawal, not “gradual” withdrawal.

    2. Yes, Koreans have survived as a people for some 2000 years or so (I date from the inception of the Three Kingdoms period) in a tough neighborhood, and that fact alone testifies to its people’s resiliency.

    But much of that sovereign history took place in thralldom rather than in freedom. How many years was Korea truly autonomous during those two millennia? Almost never when China was dominant. So being a pragmatist that I am (or a cynic, if you prefer), I think Korea ought to ally itself with a distant, benevolent power as a junior partner than a close, menacing power that may even have designs on its own territorial integrity.

17. For some reason my last paragraph didn’t post. It was:

    “The Swiss option is simply not feasible for South Korea, given the geo-political circumstances.”

18. (But then, perhaps that Joe in Peoria is too indifferent to care.)

    That’s it.

    On the “China was dominant” – I think that is post-modern hype.

    Korea was Korea. It worked with China in trying to deal with the troublesome tribal groups in Manchuria/Mongolia and at times the Japanese.

    Korea benefited socially and culturally from the relationship with China and China benefited in security.

    It was an alliance the vast majority of the time.

    It is people closer to the twentieth-century who have looked back at mostly textual phraseology and proforma ceremony —- and looked sideways at the colonial-moving to-post colonial world view of the twentieth century who claim Korea was “a slave” to China — not really a free or independant nation.

    And the more they push toward this end —- towards some misguided idea of sadaeism —– that Juche becomes much easier to force on the masses….

19. WJC – Korea could still persuade me and plenty of other Americans that the two nations share common interests and values — plenty of individual Koreans have — but after ten years of wondering when this “phase” would pass, not only do I increasingly doubt that day will ever come, I have to acknowledge how little I understand the Korean Street. This may be another reason I haven’t said so much about The Beef — I don’t really have enough understanding of what brought this on to really add much insight or perception.

    Really, I don’t claim to have any inkling of what bizarre left-field anxiety is going to be the next National Crisis that crowds what you, Wolmae, and I would think are more existential national issues (unification, famine in NK, concentration camps, human rights, China’s intentions) out of the national conversation. I don’t know a single American who does. The closest we can come to creating a predictive framework is parody.

    We don’t have Roh to blame for this anymore, either.

    Still, in this case, the parody has impressive predictive value, no? But is it possible to build a post-Cold War alliance on the quaking silt of spasmodic emotion? The idea of this FTA was to shore up the foundations of the alliance. Can we admit that that was a miserable failure, largely because two successive Korean governments let the street lead them instead of the other way around?

    And what does this portend for the majority of South Koreans to ever grow a conscience about what’s happenning up North or see the value in an alliance with America, beyond individual pecuniary benefits? Frankly, I doubt it will happen within the next two generations, and our presence only seems to retard the each passing generation’s journey toward emotional maturity.

20. I think Korea ought to ally itself with a distant, benevolent power as a junior partner than a close, menacing power that may even have designs on its own territorial integrity.
    

    I agree, but why should the US continue to provide significant military support to a country that is, at best, ambivalent about its presence. In plain English, what benefits does the alliance bring to the American people to justify the cost and hassle of maintaining USFK?

21. Afternoon Greetings to OFK particpants.

    On this thread there has been much excellent discussion about the merits of the ROK-USA alliance. May I toss my oar in?

    The alliance as it is was born in a time profoundly different from the prsent, in terms of the relative and actual capacities of the parties concerned. The Korean generations present at the creation have been justly appreciative for the military salvation the alliance gave, but that tiome, and that heroic generation to whom young Koreans owe so much, are largely gone. The manifold psychological dependence of today’s Koreans on the alliance as it is seems to make its security returns negative for both parties.

    A very substantial argument may be made for a Korea-USA alliance that serves to give Korea a measure of independence from any putative regional hegemon, and serves USA interest by preserving a balance of power and regional stability in an area very important for USA trade.

    If the above is conclusive, then an alliance can be justified. But it should begin with a clean sheet of paper, the expectations of both sides need be fully addressed, and should garner bipartisan support on both sides of the Pacific (Republican/Democratic,하나라당/민주당). Is this possible?

22. I’ve often thought that the Korean government should submit the question of the alliance to a national referendum.

23. I’ve often thought that the Korean government should submit the question of the alliance to a national referendum.

    Also, I hope the Korean commenters here, whose thinking I value so much, will understand that my aggravation with the Korean Street is in no way directed at them. It’s at times like these and when I really value the depth and tone of the comments section here.

    And as to Rand’s charge that Americans are also superficial and uninformed, I won’t argue with that. Admittedly, the Korean question isn’t so so close and existential for us. On the other hand, I happen to think that the proliferation concern makes it much more urgent than most of us realize. And here, with a few outstanding exceptions, we’re generally not well served by the media coverage of these issues.

24. Just to clarify some points about the alliance as I view it. I do favor a fairly quick timetable (3-5 years) to remove the ground component of USFK, with the exception of as large a task force as is needed to protect Osan and Kunsan. I’d guess that’s probably what Rummy had in mind by consolidating USFK and moving its HQ to Humphreys. As GI Korea has stated elsewhere, there isn’t much of a USFK ground component left anyway. Most of the 11,000 U.S. military who were pulled out in the last 6 years have been Army, including one of the two 2ID brigades. The vast majority of those who remain are in support functions, not combat arms.

    The removal of U.S. ground forces simply reflects the reality of the times in which we live. Does anyone seriously believe — though OPLA 5027 supposedly says so — that America would actually send 600,000 soldiers to defend South Korea if the North invaded tomorrow? We’ve lost 4,000 people in Iraq, which is a pale shadow of what a defense of Korea would cost in lives, yet the whooping of the surrender monkeys is deafening notwithstanding the fact that our main enemy there is one that killed 3,000 Americans on our own soil. I would add that long before Iraq, I realized that the first North Korean strike would probably mean our political defeat, to say nothing of how bloody it would get digging all those North Koreans snipers out of the university campuses, or when the truck bombs start hitting Hannam Village. The fighting on the ground should be done by Koreans, and that should also include any occupation of the North, should that become necessary.

    I take a more nuanced view of USFK’s air component. Air power is one field where USFK adds enormous combat power that the ROKAF will need time and money to build. How much of that remains should defend on how quickly the ROKAF can upgrade, how it’s getting along with the neighbors, and the extent to which that commonality of interests and values develops after EUSA is gone.

    I’m not interested in throwing the ROK’s defense planning akilter. I just think that the ROK is capable of a more self-sufficient defense, and that psychologically, this will enhance Korea’s self-esteem (that word again), pride (that word again), and sense of independence (if there is such a thing in an interdependent world). I believe all of those traits will help Koreans make better decisions and make them better allies.

25. We’ve lost 4,000 people in Iraq, which is a pale shadow of what a defense of Korea would cost in lives, yet the whooping of the surrender monkeys is deafening notwithstanding the fact that our main enemy there is one that killed 3,000 Americans on our own soil.

    Our main enemy did not establish a significant presence in Iraq until AFTER we invaded. The US soldier body count is already 1,000 more than the people who lost their lives on 9/11, and that doesn’t include the invisible contractors whose casualties don’t count, plus all the severely disabled and PTSD cases who don’t really have PTSD because the government doesn’t want to pay for their treatment. I think maybe some Iraqis have died, too, in the five years since we liberated them.

    whoop, whoop, whoop!

26. usinkorea,

    With all due respect, I’d have to rather strongly disagree with you. When China was unified and strong, Korea had little foreign policy autonomy and even its domestic politics was often heavily influenced and shaped by China. For instance, after Koryo’s capitulation to the Mongols, the Yuan had a seizable military commandery in norther Koryo, and it essentially selected every king and demanded every queen be a Mongol princess until King Kongmin evicted the Mongols, as the latter was busy fighting off the Red Turbans. In fact, the bureaucracy was more properly a Yuan administrative arm than a Koryo one, with a majority, or at least a plurality, of it probably more loyal to the Yuan. While Joseon never suffered this kind of continuous direct meddling, direct intervention was not exactly few and far-in-between, with the most prominent being when the Ching invaded in part because Injo–one of the most incompetent kings in Joseon’s sorry history–removed his pro-Ching predecessor. The result was that Injo had to, oh, bash his head against the ground until it cracked and bled in submission to the Qing.

    In short, Chinese interference did not limit itself to demanding a few ginseng boxes and virgins.

    I also do not see what you exactly mean by the claim that China gained security benefits from its “alliance” (!) with Korea, given that Korea was essentially a demilitarized society, free rider in the Chinese umbrella system. And that demilitarization began not merely after Yi Song-gye’s founding of Joseon–which is the traditional view–but much earlier, probably with the overthrow of the Choe dictatorship in early-mid Koryo.

27. Lady Sonagi says:

    “I agree, but why should the US continue to provide significant military support to a country that is, at best, ambivalent about its presence.”

    I’ve expressed this view many times both in op-eds and in Blog commentary, and my succinct response is that I do not believe that South Koreans are ambivalent but acts like it for feel-good purposes, because it (perhaps mistakenly) believes that the Americans will never cut the proverbial umbilical cord.

    If South Koreans are disabused of that delusion, I think they will act like a normal country.

28. Joshua says:

    “I’ve often thought that the Korean government should submit the question of the alliance to a national referendum.”

    I agree, but the government must obviously choose the most propitious time to do so–which is obviously not now! 🙂

29. Joshua,

    Given that you’ve 1) already broached the technical military issues anyways, and 2) you were a military officer in Korea, I actually have somewhat of a side question.

    What is your view of South Korean military capability/readiness vis-a-vis its northern neighbor. I have never served, nor am I exactly well-informed in these matter. But the little I read appear to be wildly contradictory. That is, there are those who claim that the hardware superiority that the South has is so overwhelming that the North has essentially no chance. Others conversely claim that the South Korean military has been so demoralized by post-Kim Young-sam purges and reforms (as well as the general bourgeoisification of the society) that its soldiers, in spite of their hardware edge, won’t be a match against their northern counterparts in circumstances where hardware won’t have a decisive role (e.g., perhaps city fighting and mountain fighting).

    Any takes?

30. Whoa,

    OneFreeKorea ate another post?

31. That is part of my point. I don’t think you can use the Mongol period to define the bulk of the historical relationship between China and Korea.

    The bulk of the time, Korea was an independant, autonomous state that kept an eye on the tribes in Manchuria just like China did.

    Korea’s military might not have been as strong as China’s, but it had a military and was focused on the tribal groups. Most of the current area that is North Korea was administered as military districts late into the Chosun Dynasty even though Korea was a neo-Confucianist society that stressed the civil over military side most of the time.

32. Our main enemy did not establish a significant presence in Iraq until AFTER we invaded.

    What a terrific 2002 argument. If only 2/3 of the U.S. Congress, the U.N. Security Council, every Western intelligence agency, and the majority of American voters had known then what we think we know now. Of course, if Saddam Hussein hadn’t run the world’s second-most opaque society, we might not have been staring at a lot of very scary uncertainties.

    I’ll concede the point for the sake of argument because it’s irrelevant. How does that help us make better decisions now that we’re there? Do you deny that a precipitous withdrawal would mean genocide and a terrorist victory of incalculable magnitude? Do you deny that it would mean spilling far more Iraqi and American blood than continuing with the current strategy, which is actually stabilizing the country?

33. WJC — I can only answer your question with guesses. The ROK Army would probably fight if attacked. It would probably give a disspirited performance if the order of the day was puk jin.

    Now, I’m really speculating, but the NKPA’s morale and readiness are probably piss-poor for the most part. I’m sure some special forces and elite units have high morale and are still very well fed and trained. Most of the regular army units, however, probably have lousy morale and aren’t very well fed. They enlist for 10 or more years, don’t get any sex (!), are always stationed far from home, hate their officers, and often make ends meet by pillaging the local populace.

    That would not stop them from dropping a few thousand rounds and rockets on South Korean cities, however. And the few NKPA units that are in good fighting condition could create absolute havoc in the South by going through the tunnels and appearing from nowhere in the middle of S. Korean cities.

34. usinkorea,

    Then perhaps you missed my qualifier “when China was dominant.” For instance, Koguryo was strong (but never as strong as some delirious Korean nationalists claim) and possibly on par with Chinese statelets only when China was completely fractured. It is no accident that Gwanggaeto Daewang’s expansion was smack in the middle of that period of Chinese disintegration, whereas Koguryo’s decline began when Sui reunited China–though Koguryo did win several major engagements due to the sheer military brilliance of Eulji Mundeok and Yon Gaesomun (against Tang Taizong). Besides, Koguryo is an utter anomaly in Korean history; and one can argue that a genuine Korean national consciousness only began with unified Silla or even Koryo, and Korean states that followed were supine most of the time vis-a-vis China.

35. Do you deny that a precipitous withdrawal would mean genocide and a terrorist victory of incalculable magnitude? Do you deny that it would mean spilling far more Iraqi and American blood than continuing with the current strategy, which is actually stabilizing the country?
    

    Iraq = tar baby

    I see our continued occupation versus withdrawal as a question of a long, bloody insurgency versus a short, bloody civil war. Iraq’s neighbors, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, don’t want to see Iraq fall to Al-Qaeda or an Iranian-backed Mahdi Army; the louder we make noises about leaving, the sooner the rich-getting-richer Gulf states will put their money and influence into stabilizing Iraq.

    At some point we will need to extricate ourselves from the Iraqi tar baby.

36. And you seriously believe that (a) the genocide would be short, (b) and that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are both willing and able to defeat the trifecta of Al Qaeda, Sadr, and Iran?

    Where’s that reality based community when you need it?

37. Won Joon Choe,

    And I’d counter as I did in the last message: the periods of strife between China and Korea were the exception to the general rule of cooperation.

    In fact, it seems we have so far talked about periods of conflict that were technically not China-related:

    The Mongols set up shop in Korea the longest as they tried to get an invasion of Japan off the ground. But when that failed, they withdrew and Korea’s relationship with the Mongol Yuan Dynasty reverted back closer to the historical ties to China.

    The Manchu period is the same except the period of strife was much curtailed compared with the Mongols.

    The Manchu invasion of Korea stemmed from, as with the Mongols, its effort to take over China and the role of Middle Kingdom in the East Asian hierarchy.

    In this period, Korea actually stuck by its China ally – and paid the price when the Manchu’s won and set up shop in China.

    I would think the Manchu invasion and pressure on Korea is actually a point in favor of what I’ve been saying in these last couple of comments. Rather than proving how China kept Korea as a true vassal, it proves China and Korea had a working relationship that was supposed to benefit both sides. Korea tried to help China out — just as China helped Korea out some years before when Japan invaded and set up shop in preparation for an invasion of China. The problem was, China’s military was stronger and could work well with Korean forces in pushing the Japanese out. Korea was not strong enough to wage a full war along side China to defeat the Manchus.

38. usinkorea,

    1. “[T]he periods of strife between China and Korea were the exception to the general rule of cooperation.”

    Your definition of “cooperation,” as has been clear from our hitherto dialogue, is far more expansive or elastic than mine. For instance, it almost appears that you think anything outside military conflict or “strife” as “cooperation,” and I certainly do not. Korea may have acquiesced, but often unwillingly.

    I think the term “coercion” better describes the relationship.

    2. “In fact, it seems we have so far talked about periods of conflict that were technically not China-related.”

    I don’t understand this comment. Do you mean that the the Yuan and Ching were not properly Han dynasties, their relationship vis-a-vis Korea ought not come under the rubric of general China-Korea relationship?

    If so, that’s impermissibly slanting the field of debate your way. And Chinese historians would not agree with you.

    3. “But when that failed, they withdrew and Korea’s relationship with the Mongol Yuan Dynasty reverted back closer to the historical ties to China.”

    I find this statement simply mind-boggling, given that the Yuan de facto controlled even the royal succession, as well as the choice of the king’s consort–among other things until King Kongmin kicked the Mongols out.

    Really, isn’t the most conspicuous signs of autonomy the capacity to choose one’s own rulers or form of government (more on this issue).

    4. “I would think the Manchu invasion and pressure on Korea is actually a point in favor of what I’ve been saying in these last couple of comments. Rather than proving how China kept Korea as a true vassal, it proves China and Korea had a working relationship that was supposed to benefit both sides.”

    My interpretation of the facts (and perhaps grasp of the facts themselves) differ. Gwanghagun and Nurhaci had a cordial relationship; Gwanghaegun certainly didn’t want to help Ming when it demanded a contingent to attack Nurhaci. That Gwanghaegun was forced to accede to the Ming demands demonstrates to me that he his foreign policy options were constrained by Ming. More telling, Gang Hong-rip, the commander of the Korean contingent, seems to have surrendered on Gwanghaegun’s explicit orders, without giving much of a battle (though this fact is disputed by historians).

    5. Returning to the theme of the royal succession I broached in #3, while Ming/Qing did not directly and pervasively controlled it the way Yuan did pre-Kongmin and post-Choe dictators, Joseon was required to submit their own choices to the Ming/Qing approval most of the time. And these approvals were not always pro forma. For instance, kings who obtained power in the unorthodox manner, e.g., Yi Bangwon, Suyang Daegun, Gwanghaegun, and Injo had to face serious worries that they would not be approved and thereafter possibly face forcible removal. In fact, as I have pointed out earlier, Jeongmyo Horan’s initial likely most powerful rationale was to remove Injo and restore Gwanghaegun.

39. Holy grammatical errors. I apologize. Among others I obviously meant by this “Do you mean that the the Yuan and Ching were not properly Han dynasties, their relationship vis-a-vis Korea ought not come under the rubric of general China-Korea relationship?” something like “…Yuan and Ching were not properly HAN CHINESE dynasties, and HENCE, their relationship vis-a-vis Korea…”

40. By the way,

    What happened to your website, usinkorea? It was one of the earliest ex-pat Blogs/websites that I used to visit!

41. My definition of cooperation is much broader than yours.

    Part of my idea of cooperation has much to do with Korea’s importation of elements of Chinese culture like Neo-Confucianism and other things we could call “technologies” — things leading elements in Korean society wanted – not things that were forced on them.

    I also think we’d have to define coercion too. And what is meant by unwillingly.

    I think with the consorts, you have a better argument, but with the kings, I think we’d have to get into case-by-case examples — which I don’t know by that much detail.

    Meaning – I do know that the Emperors in China would “legitimize” a new Korean king, but in many instances it was merely a matter of formality – something like a notification from Korea that a new king had risen to the thrown. — Or at other times, it was a move by factions in Korea to gain legitimacy and the upper hand against other Korean factions.

    We could define China’s court being brought into factional strife in Korea as “interference” —- but that is not the only definition we should end up with in every case.

    Nations that are colonized are interfered with. True. But allies sometimes become involved in issues when one of them is experiencing a period of upheaval. With China being the much strong of the two “allies” it would be natural that China would have been more involved in “helping” its Korean ally than the other way around.

    How often did China directly interfere with succession to the Korean throne? Why did it interfere in this or that case? Was it a distinct case of China having decided to overthrow the Korean throne or more of a mixed bag where confusion reigned?

    It has been a few years since I’ve read on these topics, and I certainly haven’t read as much as you, but my general memory is that conflict between China and Korea over the Korean monarchy was not the norm. That China coming into Korea demanding a stable Korean society do this and do that was certainly not the norm.

    On the question about Yuan and Ching Dynasties, I was focusing on the mostly on the period of founding those dynasties — a period in which the native Chinese kingdom was taken over by a non-Chinese, non-Confucian kingdom —-

    I especially had in mind the Yuan period, because wasn’t that the greatest period of direct, often military discord between “China” and Korea? And the Yuan Dynasty lasted for a little less than a hundred years…….I don’t think you can build a strong case for “China” having bullied and coerced Korea around using the Yuan period as a primary example.

    In the Ching period, after the period of upheaval, once the actual new kingdom was established, it took on more traditional Chinese-centered aspects as it got down to the business of administring the Chinese territory it had captured + assuming China’s place as the Middle Kingdom in the East Asian world view.

    During the period in which power over China was being tested between the Chinese and the outsiders, those changes put Korea in a difficult position, because of its historical ties to China — ties far beyond political connections between the monarchies.

    Korea had accepted much of the China-centered world view. I would say they accepted it without much coercion.

    But, because they accepted that world view and made it Korean, when it was upset by the Middle Kingdom being overwhelmed by a “barbarian” race, it upset Korea’s general view of the world order.

    And the problem for Korea was that it was not militarily strong enough to aid the China-oriented dynasties as China had helped Korea when Japan invaded.

    So, I wonder how much Korea’s desire not to aid the Ming stemmed from an understanding of Korea’s limited ability to help vs a desire to see the Manchu’s succeed….???…

    My point is that Korea shared much with China culturally and ideologically. Korea had imported much from Chinese civilization over the vast period of time. And due to that assimilation of elements of Chinese civilization, the relationship between China and Korea was more one of cooperation than overt subordination.

42. On the website —- the anti-US/USFK site is at http://www.usinkorea.org where it has been for several years.

    I ditched my old blog a few months ago and started over from scratch here:

    http://usinkoreajournal.wordpress.com/

    Until the Cows Gone Wild!! Hysteria, probably the bulk of my posts focused on the US media and American society, because I haven’t been to Korea in several years and my college studies and work have taken me away from Asian Studies.

    When I do get a chance and desire to read up on Korea, it is almost always something on North Korea. I can’t remember the last time I read something about Korean history prior to the Japanese colonization —— (which while I was in Asian Studies, I rarely read anything but Korean history before the colonization…)