North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act Passes in House

So I dropped by Open Congress and was pleased to see:

Passed by voice vote in the House on May 15, 2008. On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended Agreed to by voice vote. (text: CR 5/13/2008 H3747-3748)

Here’s more on the House bill.  Here’s the full  text (opens in pdf).  The list of co-sponsors is impressive for its bipartisanship: 

  • Rep Ackerman, Gary L. [NY-5] – 4/17/2008  [Democrat]
  • Rep Berman, Howard L. [CA-28] – 4/17/2008 [Democrat]
  • Rep Burton, Dan [IN-5] – 4/17/2008 [Republican]
  • Rep Chabot, Steve [OH-1] – 4/17/2008 [Democrat]
  • Rep Fortuno, Luis G. [PR] – 4/17/2008 [Democrat]
  • Rep Inglis, Bob [SC-4] – 4/17/2008 [Republican]
  • Rep Manzullo, Donald A. [IL-16] – 4/29/2008 [Republican]
  • Rep Sherman, Brad [CA-27] – 4/29/2008 [Democrat]
  • Rep Smith, Christopher H. [NJ-4] – 4/17/2008 [Republican]

A similar bill is working its way though the utility crawlspaces under the Senate, where it was referred and read on May 19th.  The House bill itself  is a fairly modest effort that merely strengthens some of the provisions of the 2004 Act.  Like every worthwhile effort, it could be improved.   A  particularly timely improvement would be to deny funding for any U.S. humanitarian aid programs in North Korea unless the Administrator of USAID certifies that the  North Korean government is fully cooperative in the transparent delivery of food to all North Koreans, including those who need it most desperately — the inmates of its concentration camps.

The  Committee Report for H.R. 5834 makes it clear that Congress is delivering a strong rebuke to the State Department for defying the law and will of our elected representatives:

Executive Branch implementation of the refugee provisions of the 2004 Act has been too slow and too weak. On February 21, 2006, a bipartisan group of 9 senior House Members and Senators–including the then-Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on International Relations and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific–wrote the Secretary of State `to express our deep concern for the lack of progress in funding and implementing the key provisions of the North Korean Human Rights Act.’ Foremost among their concerns, they noted that, `despite the fact that the Act calls for the Department of State to facilitate the submission of North Korean refugee applications, not one North Korean has been offered asylum or refugee status in the 16 months since the unanimous passage of the legislation.’ The first North Korean refugees did not arrive in the United States until 3 months later, in May 2006.

North Koreans who have requested resettlement in the United States as refugees have also faced extended delays, in some cases longer than 2 years, while residing in circumstances that are frequently unsafe, unhealthy, and insecure. Delays sometimes continue even after the refugees have passed U.S. assessment and security screening, due to foot-dragging in the issuance of exit visas by the governments of the countries where they are located. These delays have been the source of considerable discouragement, frustration, and anxiety among North Korean refugees. Just last month a group of North Koreans awaiting U.S. resettlement in Thailand reportedly conducted a hunger strike in an attempt to obtain information about the status of their cases.

In the intervening 3 1/2 years since the 2004 Act became law, the United States has resettled fewer than 50 North Korean refugees. This does not constitute the `credible number of North Korean refugees [to be accepted] for domestic resettlement’ contemplated by House Report 108-478. [….]

To further the purposes of the 2004 Act, it is also important to clarify and strengthen the role of the Special Envoy. Regrettably, the President did not appoint a Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues until August 19, 2005, more than 4 months after the Special Envoy was required to report to Congress under the 2004 Act. The Special Envoy appointed by the President has filled that position on a part-time basis only, and has continued to live and pursue a career outside of Washington, D.C. Looking ahead to the possibility of a Special Envoy who may not enjoy the same preexisting rapport with and access to the President, it is important to ensure that any successor has adequate stature and presence within the Department of State. An active presence at Main State is necessary to ensure that the concerns at the heart of the Special Envoy’s mandate are adequately represented in the decision-making processes of the State Department’s regional and functional bureaus, especially the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP) and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM).  [Library of Congress, thomas.loc.gov]

In other words, Kathleen Stephens shouldn’t be surprised that her nomination to become U.S. Ambassador to South Korea hit a  wall of opposition  in the Senate.

Here, at the New York Sun — an upstart paper that is producing some first-rate reporting — reporter Eli Lake discusses this bill, along with another sponsored by Rep. Ros-Lehtinen that would put some sensible conditions on North Korea’s removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, including full disclosure of North Korea’s involvement in the secretive construction of the al-Kibar nuclear reactor in Syria.