You are obviously more astute at this than I, and I will not presume to contradict you. I am in Korea now and learn more every day about conditions on the pen and in the region.

I do not share the view that China will want the messy, expensive and dangerous job of occupying the failed Juche state. Japan and the US will not go for that. The ROK people acknowledge nK as their brethren. I honestly believe you are grossly underestimating the zeal, influence and means of the sK Churches. They are aflame with zeal for evangelization, humanitarian assistance and reunification. The influence is so prominent that the Buddhists protested the LMB government for preceived pro-Christianity policies. The clandestine Church in nK could be as large as a million believers.

Lastly, I do not agree that any perceived coercion of the ROK government as you suggest would move them to the actions you anticipate would follow. Anti-US sentiment is growing here.

I also believe that air and naval support for the ROK is robust, committed, and very effective if deployed in support of regime change or stabilization operations.

Once again, your insights are incredible. I will continue to study your blog every day and hopefully grow in my understand of the great and admirable Korean people and their aspirations for unity and peace.

1. Confrontation – action = empty words. Sure, you can blame Bush’s initial failure to contain Kim Jong Il on Roh (and the Chinese) but at what point does Bush become responsible for putting up with that kind of crap from a supposed ally we happen to be subsidizing? While Roh was pretty much giving Kim Jong Il a free hand to build nukes and spew missiles without fear of adverse consequences, Bush continued to subsidize South Korea’s defense at a steadily increasing risk to our troops and cost to our taxpayers. We held all the cards, but we didn’t play them. Simply put, South Korea needs us and we don’t need South Korea. Our own interests aren’t in protecting South Korea or in halting the spreading global hegemony of juche, they’re in preventing Kim Jong Il from giving nukes to terrorists or using them against actual U.S. allies (Japan). Had Bush NOT opted for my more drastic recommendation to announce the withdrawal of all ground forces from the USFK, he could just as well have targeted Roh’s main conduits for Roh Moo Hyun’s aid to the North with financial sanctions. For example, he could have invoked Executive Order 13,382 or Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to Kumgang or Kaesong. UNSCR 1718 and Roh’s flouting of it greatly bolstered the case for such measures. Instead, we offered the most anti-American president of our most anti-American ally in the region a free trade deal that contains a potential stealth FTA for the North Koreans (see Annex 22, “Outward Processing Zones”). And naturally, Roh screws that up by simultaneously demagoguing it and trying to tout it as a long accomplishment.

2. If Obama is clueless, that only means that his advisors and the State Department (who are wrong but not clueless) will be firmly in charge, and that Obama won’t even know what questions to ask them. I question how much worse they could do than Rice and Hill have. Rice and Hill have given the North Koreans exactly as much as they could get away with, and were able to keep most of the natural skeptics — Republicans, mostly — quiet through partisan and tribal alliances. Just as only Nixon could go to China, only Condi could really get away with a deal this bad, and it’s not as if Clinton and Albright really did that much worse, than Rice, either. We have even less reason to trust the North Koreans now, so Obama won’t have total freedom to do much worse. The usual critics won’t be silent next year.

3. Lee may not be weak, but he isn’t stupid. He isn’t going to send his troops into a collision course with the ChiCom Army without a strong expression of American support and air cover at an absolute minimum, and even that would necessitate some kind of signal that China isn’t going in. I repeat: LMB will not risk war with China over a post-KJI North Korea. He would seek alternative means to pursue his interests, such as agitating against the Chinese occupation and supporting North Korean resistance to it.

4. Yes, but see #3 above. And for that matter, the North Korean people are now desperate enough that the same tactic would work for the Chinese. Even big-nosers would be welcomed by most — briefly — if they had armloads of food and cash. Any foreign occupation exceeding six months would be another matter.

5. Maybe, but the difference between an insurgency and really well-armed gangs of thugs is that insurgents have a political vision they market to the population. That’s why AQ was destined to fail in Iraq — they saw enough of AQ’s vision to know it wasn’t for them. A vision based on restoring the Kim Dynasty probably wouldn’t generate much popular support, either. A more naked version of nationalism/racism/fascism that breaks cleanly with the old regime might. After all, when you get beneath all of the bluster, han, and packaging, the Cult isn’t really that different from State Shinto.

6. Yup, but see #3 above. Never underestimate Korean nationalism. And if America makes a graceful exit and leaves a strong and independent ROK government behind, we could help support its ambition to throw out the Chinese and unify Korea. Korean “bargains” with China would be repudiated amid rising hostility against the Chinese occupation. If we maintained a token presence of air power in the South, we could support the South more effectively from afar than from Camp Humphreys. If China actually falls into this trap, smart American diplomacy could substantially weaken China’s regional power. Of course, that last sentence is premised on an oxymoron.

I think your final paragraph is more optimistic than realistic. And to make matters worse, it’s quite possible that China would see Obama’s election as a superb opportunity to establish its dominance over Taiwan, perhaps through a blockade ending with a peace treaty on terms much like those China used to absorb Hong Kong.

1. At least Bush confronted NK as a third of the axis of evil and stepped up the 6 party talks. Wouldn’t you agree his administration was at leat partially hamstrung by the pollyanna Sunshine Policy of the ROK during most of the Bush years?

2. I totally understand your consternation at the appearance of appeasement (and actual appeasement) during the Bush years, but an Obama presidency will be a blank check to extend the Kim dynasty into the next 20 years. Obama is clueless about strategic defense, foreign policy and oriental regional politics. Obama will give away the farm to the DPRK and undo a generation of weakening the failing Juche state.

3. If the collapse occurs during the Lee Myung Bak administration (God please) then he will have the spine and resolve to quickly move upon the imploded north as an act of self defense of the ROK and containment of a serious refugee crisis. No substantial deployment of US ground troops will be a part of the stability operations in the failed DPRK.

4. Carrots have power, too. A failed state full of hungry people demoralized by Juche’s collapse may welcome their southern brethren more or less because of the rice and cash. The missionary surge over the 38th parallel will establish informal, unofficial footholds in the collapsed state and humanitarian support will be funneled by dozens of NGOs through intrepid missionaries determined to evangelize the despirited northerners.

5. The activities of unregulated militias and former regime loyalists will present an insurgency against the ROK/UN stability force. This may force the ROK to dissolve the NK regulars (at least the top echelons) and counter the insurgency with nation-building measures involving an Iraq-styled clear/hold/build effort to restore order and essential services.

6. Famous for paying ransom to intimidating powers, the ROK government may broker a deal with China to keep them out of Korean sovereign territory that will be an embarrassingly lopsided advantage for China. Voters will support the rip off to keep the Chinese regulars out of Korea.

In all this, Obama will be a distant consultant, voting ‘present’ as the peninsula descends into [temporary] chaos. This will be the hour of valor for the ROK forces and the hour of decisive committment for the Lee government. Obama’s inaction, indecision and flip flopping will confuse the UN and the ROK which will pal up with the American Generals that seem decisive and confident considering the shaky signals sent from Washington, DC. Obama will not listen to his Generals but will not confront them publicly a la Truman. The whole thing may happen so quickly that Obama’s indecision will be overcome by events and the results will be dictated very much by the ROK and perhaps an unexpected level of support from regional partners, especially Japan.