Archive for January 2009

Eberstadt: What Went Wrong

So over the weekend, I finally had a chance to read Nicholas Eberstadt’s fine summary of the Bush Administration’s eight years of drift and indecision on North Korea (hat tip to Robert Koehler). It’s hard to pick a favorite passage, but this one certainly struck a chord:

In the absence of a coherent policy, though, the imperative of “success” in talks with North Korea suddenly took on a life of its own for the Bush team. (After all, there was no alternative strategy, no “plan B,” for what to do if the talks came to an unsuccessful end.) Consequently, instead of crafting our conference diplomacy with Pyongyang in accordance with our overall strategy for North Korean threat reduction, our efforts at North Korean threat reduction came to be tailored to the perceived needs of our conference diplomacy. [Nicholas Eberstadt, The Weekly Standard]

I’d be sincerely flattered if that choice of words wasn’t coincidental. The main shortcoming of Eberstadt’s piece may have been its lack of explanation, beyond the Banco Delta Asia example, of what Eberstadt’s own Plan B might include. What’s really been missing from almost every discussion about how to deal with North Korea is an alternative to the false choice between appeasement and war; after all, it’s hard to sell a better alternative if you don’t articulate what it is. So, with the duty to pick nits duly discharged, Eberstadt’s work is certainly the best historical summary of GWB’s North Korea policy I’ve seen anywhere.

It’s too bad so little will be learned from it.

Robert is probably right that South Koreans are a lost cause when it comes to the development of some unselfish compassion for the North Korean people. I’ve been ready to write South Korea off as an ally in any meaningful strategic sense for years, ironically because I believe that it will take a U.S. demonstration of its willingness to “see other people” before South Koreans re-learn the difference between alliance and colonialism. (If this piece is correct, that demonstration may not be far off.)

Robert also questions whether squeezing North Korea can work without China’s cooperation, pointing to the example of Rhodesia’s success at evading some poorly designed, poorly enforced U.N. sanctions. Thinking that some more current economic statistics would be helpful here, I tried to call my local Rhodesian embassy, but for some reason, I was unable to locate a listing for one. I was able to find this Peterson Institute study, however, which notes that the success of economic sanctions depends on many factors, such as the goal of the sanctions, the economic resilience of the target, the attractiveness of the target’s exports, and the will of other parties to support the sanctions regime. Rhodesia was a major exporter of minerals and agricultural products, including beef and tobacco. North Korea’s export customer base consists of crank addicts in Harajuku. Indeed, we’ve learned that the microeconomy that sustains North Korea’s power structure is actually quite fragile.

But what really distinguishes the failure of the Rhodesia sanctions from the demonstrated success of the Banco Delta sanctions was the willingness of the U.S. Treasury to impose and enforce them unilaterally on banks doing business with North Korea, thus severing the regime’s ability to recoup its ill-gotten gains. That’s why U.S. sanctions could be applied to a Chinese bank located on Chinese soil, without China’s cooperation, and still have such a devastating effect. If you won’t take my word for the success of those sanctions, take Marcus Noland’s. And the BDA sanctions were a pale shadow of the many financial tools in America’s kit bag. Since the BDA sanctions were imposed, the United Nations has passed two new resolutions (1695 and 1718) that are far tougher than anything it levied against Rhodesia. China voted for 1718, which contains very tough economic restrictions, but has thus far felt little U.S. pressure to enforce it.

Now, I don’t suggest for a moment that President Obama is likely to impose tough economic measures on the North Koreans right away, if ever. He’ll dither for at least a year while his new diplomats try their new Jedi mind tricks on their ruthless interlocutors. But when the diplomats finally realize that negotiations alone will get us nowhere, they will have other, stronger cards to play.

Jay Lefkowitz: Requiem for a Bantamweight

To the limited degree history remembers Jay Lefkowitz at all, it should remember him as a good and well-meaning man who was unequal to the great task laid before him. I have sometimes suspected that this was the very design of those who appointed him. With the change of administrations this week, Lefkowitz departed as Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea, leaving behind a final report that still clings obediently to the myth of constructive engagement with sociopaths:

The Pyongyang initiative, Lefkowitz said, “may consist of a new framework for dialogue and effective steps to interact more deeply with North Korea. This should involve a candid and ongoing human rights dialogue with Pyongyang as a condition for the future normalization of relations.”

Lefkowitz called the working group on normalization of relations, established by a February 2007 agreement at the six-party talks, a “good starting point for this discussion.” [Yonhap]

Either Lefkowitz is still toeing the line of a Secretary of State who hushed him and held him in public contempt or he still doesn’t get it. To the North Koreans, constructive engagement means about as much as it does in your average prison holding cell. In principle, however, he is correct that money is the best lever to force the regime to modify its behavior. It’s just that Lefkowitz doesn’t dare advocate a sufficiently aggressive approach:

Lefkowitz proposed that the U.S. and its allies cooperate closely to link any aid to North Korea with human rights improvements. Such aid would include development assistance, World Bank loans, trade access and food.

“When countries provide unilateral aid to North Korea, it is easier for Pyongyang to resist monitoring,” he said. “If aid donors could be syndicated and would agree to offer large amounts of humanitarian assistance to North Korea contingent on full access and monitoring, Pyongyang might feel impelled to accept.”

“Were this to happen, the misery of the North Korean people could be partially alleviated in a way that does not strengthen the regime,” he added.

By the end of 2007, the U.S. and Korean press were paying noticeably less attention to his testimony and his conferences. Not surprisingly, the more unconditional concessions the State Department offered and the less it said about North Korea’s atrocities, the more atrocities it committed. Yet even as the State Department sidelined him from its policymaking, its talks with the North Koreans, and the public face of U.S. government policy, Lefkowitz somehow clung to the belief that he still mattered. What else could have kept him from resigning?

Christopher Hill, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July that he would invite Lefkowitz, to attend “all future negotiations with North Korea, except those specifically dealing with nuclear disarmament.”

His assurances cleared the way for some reluctant Republican senators to approve the nomination of Kathleen Stephens as the first female U.S. ambassador to Seoul.

The irony is that by renouncing the policies of the president who appointed him, he could have mattered. Certainly Lefkowitz owed Condi Rice no great debt of respect.

What will happen to the Special Envoy’s position now? (I know — the position title has recently been changed. I just don’t care.) The rumor in Washington today is that the Democrats plan to dual-hat the position with that of the nuclear negotiator, meaning that a person of Chris Hill’s inclination would have the deference to discuss human rights as little as he chooses. If that is so, we can be fairly certain that human rights will never be mentioned in any place where the North Koreans might hear.

A Smaller Army, in More Ways Than One

Chronic food shortages will considerably reduce North Korea’s pool of military recruits in the coming years, with nearly a quarter of young adults unfit for service due to malnutrition-related mental disabilities, a U.S. intelligence report said. [Yonhap]

Malnutrition may also be taking an intellectual toll on North Koreans:

The famine of the 1990s has caused severe cognitive deficiencies among young North Koreans, said the report by the National Intelligence Council that used studies from several U.S. intelligence agencies.

I doubt don’t that the misrule of the Kims will also take a severe toll on the North Korean people morally and psychologically as well. It will take generations for North Korea to recover from this era.

Kim Jong Il Death Watch

He’s not quite dead, alas:

North Korean television, monitored in Seoul, showed photos of Kim holding talks with Wang and hosting a reception for the Chinese official. Dressed in his trademark Mao suit, Kim appeared a little thinner, but generally in good health in the pictures.

KCNA and the North’s TV said Wang delivered a personal letter from Chinese President Hu Jintao to Kim, but did not elaborate. [AP, via IHT]

Or at least, that’s what he wants us all to think:

Analysts in Seoul saw the meeting as a North Korean attempt to demonstrate to the outside world that Mr. Kim was in control of his government, well enough to make key decisions about its nuclear weapons program and deal with the new U.S. administration. [N.Y. Times, Choe Sang Hun]

This is one of those rare cases in which (a) the truth really is somewhere in the middle, and (b) the “analysts in Seoul” haven’t lost all contact with it. I could be a flat-earther about this and insist that neither the Chinese nor the North Koreans are above staging a sham, but Kim Jong Il seems to have emerged from a rumored stroke with some degree of tyrannical capacity intact.

Then again, the absence of video and audio is telling. A stroke often affects the victim’s voice, speech, and ability to walk normally and would give us a better idea of whether the original reports were true, the extent of any disability, and approximately how long until His Porcine Majesty will be rolled off to join North Korea’s largest stockpile of preserved meat.

As KCTU Calls for ‘All Out War,’ Rally Attendance Declines

The thugs at the Korean Confederation of trade unions see opportunity in their country’s bad economic times, reports the sympathetic Hankyoreh:

The KCTU plans to launch an “all out war” against the Lee administration in February, since it has again made known its intention to have the ruling Grand National Party pass revisions to laws on irregular workers and the minimum wage in the extraordinary National Assembly session scheduled for that month. The KCTU plans to launch its offensive with demands for labor-government negotiations early in the month, and will then hold large daily rallies beginning in the third week, leading to a protest involving 30,000 of its members on the 28th.

“We can’t stop the bad legislative proposals originating with Lee Myung-bak,” said KCTU Secretary-General Lee Yong-sik. “Unless we have a war. [The Hankyoreh]

If you live in South Korea, mark your calendars and plan on spending those days with your Wii. The KCTU has a history of bringing iron pipes, bamboo poles, and like implements of free expression to its demonstrations. Yet things aren’t really working out the way the KCTU had hoped:

It is unfortunate to see that the economic stagnation is weakening the union’s ability to wage labor struggles and that it could see a rise in self-interest among regular, as opposed to irregular, workers, and among unions at different companies.

For starters, there are fewer participants at KCTU rallies. Fewer than 100 KCTU members actually joined in its “48-Hour National Action to Stop the Broadcast Law” in the final days of 2008.

Union officials confirm that they are seeing a continued lack of power to involve large numbers of people in protests.

The Hanky helpfully theorizes that in bad economic times, workers may not want to rock the boat. I wouldn’t be astonished if the KCTU’s violence had begun to alienate workers, employers, and smaller unions considering an affiliation with them.

The KCTU has also suffered from its sudden inability to sow anarchy in the streets with impunity. The jihad the KCTU declared against Lee Myung Bak a year ago played a significant role in the beef riots that seriously damaged President Lee’s presidency, but when the entire basis for the riots was exposed as false, the radical left may well have emerged from the entire crisis with less public confidence that the U.S. beef that’s now flying off Korean store shelves. President Lee, not the sort to back down magnanimously when confronted, arrested the KCTU’s president and several other of its leaders in December for organizing “illegal” and characteristically violent demonstrations. The KCTU president sits in jail to this day.

When you subtract out all of the hours the KCTU devotes to anarchy and juche, it’s a wonder they have any time at all to think of their rank and file. Personally, I’ve long believed that South Koreans need to set aside an outlet for their more combative side where the fisticuffs wouldn’t impede traffic. They could set aside a special gladiators’ arena for that specific purpose, complete with bamboo poles, riot shields, and tear gas grenades for rent by the opposing sides. Think of the revenue the season ticket sales would generate … for education, of course. We could call it “Demo Land.” I even know where there’s some vacant land they could use.

Gullible’s Travels: The Selective Disbelief of Selig S. Harrison

Here’s the latest installment of North Korea’s hostile policy:

The North Korean military declared an “all-out confrontational posture” against South Korea on Saturday as an American scholar said North Korean officials told him they had “weaponized” enough plutonium for roughly four or five nuclear bombs.

American intelligence officials have previously estimated that the North had harvested enough fuel for six or more bombs, although it has never been clear whether the North constructed the weapons. The scholar, Selig S. Harrison, said the officials had not defined what “weaponized” meant, but the implication was that they had built nuclear arms.

The North conducted a test of a nuclear device in 2006, but it appeared to result in a fizzle and experts concluded the explosion was relatively small. While the country has often claimed to possess a “deterrent,” this appears to be the first time it has quantified how much plutonium it says it has turned into weapons. [N.Y. Times, Choe Sang-hun]

There are several reasons this doesn’t excite me very much: (1) we’d already have to assume as much; (2) the North Koreans said it, so who really knows if it’s true? and (3) we can take some comfort from the fact that their weapons don’t work very well. The demonstration of an effective nuclear capability will require at least one more test. That will probably panic a lot of jittery diplomats and KOSPI traders, but it will also consume a few more grams of their fissile material — material that won’t be put in a bomb a sold to a terrorist.

Four or five bombs? It’s of dubious value to build a bomb that tests poorly, but in theory the actual number of bombs could be higher. This estimate is suspect, because it’s tailored to North Korea’s suspect claim that it had only reprocessed 37 kilograms of plutonium. U.S. intelligence estimates cited by Reuters are closer to 50 kilograms, and other estimates are even higher. We’ll never know, of course, because the North Koreans will never let us verify anything they tell us. Either we demand what the North Koreans will never give us, or we take their word for it.

selig-harrison-leaning-to-his-left.jpgNotice how Selig Harrison manages to be a tool for both the North Koreans and the left-leaning American press. Odd how he can do that so seamlessly:

Despite that news, he said all the officials he met with seemed eager to open discussions with the incoming Obama administration. “All the statements about Obama were very helpful, very respectful,” he said. Mr. Harrison said the North Korean officials had several proposals for Mr. Obama, including allowing North Korea to have access to long-term, low-interest credit to buy food.

You don’t say! I’ll go out on a long limb here and guess that Harrison would have us take the North Koreans at their word and pay up. No wonder he’s such a frequent guest in Pyongyang.

But Harrison doesn’t abandon his skepticism for just anyone. Some of you will remember his Foreign Affairs article, “Did North Korea Cheat?” in which Harrison claimed that “the Bush administration misrepresented and distorted the data” pointing to North Korea’s undeclared uranium enrichment program. The Times unhelpfully fails to point out that Harrison’s article has since been discredited by overwhelming evidence — most of it provided by the North Koreans themselves — that they were enriching uranium. I summarized that evidence the other day, commenting on Hillary Clinton’s remarkable and commendable acknowledgment of North Korea’s cheating:

That’s a pretty big concession when you consider that denying either the fact or the significance of North Korea’s uranium cheat is essential to any defense of Agreed Framework I, and hence of President Clinton’s North Korea policy. Some A.F. 1.0 defenders had tried to minimize the HEU cheat as insignificant, while others suggested that it was all just a trumped up necon causus belli. So what was it that shut all these people up? Was it the enriched uranium we found on those aluminum samples the North Koreans gave us, or was it the enriched uranium we found smeared all over their “disclosure” documents? Was it the damning admissions of A.Q. Khan and Benazir Bhutto? Or was it North Korea’s brazen 2002 admission, which some had feebly tried to ascribe to a translation error? Maybe North Korea’s 2007 admission that it procured centrifuge components, perhaps? All I know is that David Albright has been strangely quiet recently, and that Mike Chinoy’s book — now there is some really bad timing — was forgotten the week after it was rolled out. After all of the noise, the eerie unanimity of North Korea’s cheating includes William Perry, Condi Rice, and now, Hillary Clinton.

There’s more here and here, if that’s still not enough for you.

(In case you were wondering what David Albright — recall my dustup with Albright at this blog — has to say about this, commenter “someguy” points to our answer. Albright now argues that the North Koreans were only caught with an eensy bit of highly enriched uranium, which has the same hollow ring as “only slighly pregnant.” Albright insists, despite mounting evidence to the contrary, that the enriched uranium could have come from Pakistan. But in the grander scheme, so what? The question of origin is secondary to the fact of possession. I’d have more respect for Albright’s scientific objectivity if he’d place any honest doubts he has in the context of the newly discovered evidence and changed facts. Wouldn’t a more intellectually honest, less doctrinaire observer at least acknowledge that there are legitimate questions that we need to have answered? Would Albright be less alarmed, or find the question to be any less legitimate, if the uranium came from Iran?)

The discovery of highly enriched uranium in the possession of the North Koreans — to say nothing of their admissions to having an HEU program — devastates Harrison’s central argument, that the CIA’s intelligence could just as well have pointed to low enriched uranium for the generation of electricity. Note my use of the qualifier “could just as well have;” if anything, Harrison’s argument is even more qualified and speculative in its search for an exculpatory explanation. That explanation has since imploded on contact with the evidence.

Selig Harrison was not just demonstrably wrong. He crossed the line from necessary skepticism about what our government tells us to the kind of venomous atheism that presumes the falsity of what it says, regardless of the evidence (here, Harrison could easily prove me wrong by retracting his Foreign Affairs article). This kind of unsupported conspiracy mongering is caustic to any objective threat analysis, a process that badly needs to be less, not more, politicized. But facts are stubborn things, especially when they interfere with the discredited appeasement policies that Harrison spends the first pages of his article advocating. In contrast, one can only wonder what about the North Koreans is so believable to Harrison’s more credulous side.

Likewise, we can wonder why any newspaper editor would still believe that Selig S. Harrison’s expertise and judgment qualify him as an expert authority on how to disarm North Korea.

Megumi Yokota’s Mother’s New Book on Sale

sakie-yokota-book.jpgSakie Yokota’s meeting with President Bush in 2006 may have been one of my last optimistic moments about the GWB administration’s North Korea policy. Mrs. Yokota, whose daughter was kidnapped from the shores of her hometown at the age of 13, has just published an English language edition of her book.

I’d be amazed if Mrs. Yokota didn’t express feelings of anger and betrayal toward the former president and his broken promises not to abandon her cause. All of this would be easier to forgive had it actually served the interests of the United States.

Anyone care to go over to Amazon and write a review?

39.91 N, 127.55 E: Hamhung, Haunted City

In 1997, Washington Post correspondent Keith Richburg was allowed into the city of Hamhung, just inland from North Korea’s east coast, to try to find the truth behind fragmentary rumors of a famine inside the world’s most isolated country. Although Hamhung is North Korea’s second-largest city and a key industrial center, it was an isolated place with few foreign visitors, little commerce with the outside world, and at a great distance from any international border. This is what Hamhung looks like today. But in 1997, the reporter found utter economic blight and devastation there: idled factories, dark streets, dying and displaced people:

HAMHUNG, North Korea — A visit to this remote and desolate city near North Korea’s eastern coast provides a rare glimpse of the country’s near-total economic collapse. The crisis is over food — or the lack of it — but the country’s problems run much deeper, to the core of a socialist system that simply has ceased to function.

You can start at Hamhung’s local hospital, a dilapidated, cavernous 1,000-bed facility without lights, where the stench of urine fills the dark corridors, and patients recovering from surgery writhe in pain on dirty sheets in unheated rooms. There are no antibiotics, no intravenous drips and no stretchers, so workers carry patients on their backs. There were only 250 patients during a recent visit; few sick people bother coming, since the hospital has no food and no medicine.

“We have a shortage of anesthesia, so the patients have to go through pain during surgery,” said Dr. Lee Huyn Myung, as he points to a man gripping his mattress after a colon operation. Most of the patients have rectal, stomach or liver problems, the result of slow starvation, he said. Almost all are malnourished.

From the hospital, travel across this city past gray cement buildings that look half-finished or simply abandoned, past lots strewed with broken-down Soviet-era trucks that cannot be started because there are no spare parts. Then drive down narrow, winding mud roads until you reach the Hamhung orphanage and talk to its director, Choi Kwang Oak.

The orphanage is divided into several small rooms, with playpens for the smallest infants. Almost all the children are malnourished, with browning hair, bald patches on their scalps and sores on their heads and faces. The most severely malnourished are listless and unresponsive.

There are 198 children under age 4 at the orphanage, and about 20 percent are expected to die because they arrived too late to be helped. About 70 percent of the children here were orphaned when their parents died of malnutrition or disease, Choi said. The other 30 percent simply were abandoned and left for dead by parents too poor and too hungry to feed them.

“Some parents just put them outside on the street and leave them to nature,” Choi said. “Sometimes people pick them up and bring them here.” And other times? “They just die.” The orphanage is surrounded by high hills covered with graves and stone markers. It is an old burial ground, she said. But there are also many new graves. [Washington Post, Oct. 19, 1997, emphasis mine]

Similarly, this 1999 Reuters report described widespread malnutrition that had stunted 50% of the surviving children. Visiting a local orphanage, a reporter described it as “surrounded on all three sides by hills covered in graves.” We will return to the matter of those graves in a moment.

These were not the only reports of Hamhung’s silent devastation to leak out to Earth. In 1998, one former engineering student told Kyodo News Service that more than 10% of the city’s population, including his mother, had starved to death, and that another 10% had fled the city to find food. Some would have fled by train. Those who could not afford tickets and obtain travel passes are unlikely to have survived the long walk in their weakened condition. The student added that “the food is going to the troops and that party cadres are hoarding up to a year’s grain for themselves and their families.” Andrew Natsios, a former AID worker, USAID Administrator, and author of “The Great North Koreans Famine” described Hamhung as “the city most devastated by the famine” and reported that hunger had triggered an unsuccessful mutiny against the regime. The journalist Jasper Becker bought back the life of a former Hamhung resident who walked to China after her husband perished in the famine. Chinese police were paying bounties for North Korean refugees, but Becker outbid them to save her from repatriation to a North Korean gulag.

Today, the world knows that between 1994 and 2000, anywhere from 600,000 to 2.5 million people died in what is what Natsios called The Great Famine, or as the official propaganda describes it, The March of Tribulation. North Korea watchers have debated the question of mortality in Hamhung because of how that toll could impact the overall death toll from the Great Famine. If in fact the death toll from the area around Hamhung was worse than what most refugees described — and most refugees came from the border areas further north — then this would suggest that the death tolls these refugees reported would still understate higher death tolls in places like Hamhung.

But is there any empirical evidence that would corroborate stories of such devastation? If those reports are true, we would expect to see numerous grave sites in the hills around the city. Koreans traditionally bury their dead under spherical mounds on high ground, and Korean cemeteries have a distinctive appearance in satellite imagery. This image of the National Cemetery in Seoul provides a baseline comparison for the size, shape, and general appearance of Korean graves, though one seldom sees North Korean graves laid out in such neat rows.

[Update, 8 October 2009:  Recently, I learned that the noted human rights researcher David Hawk would be traveling to Seoul to interview North Korean refugees there.  I asked Mr. Hawk to seek out former residents of Hamhung to confirm that the objects I'd identified as graves really were graves.  One witness reported that he'd recently been to the location shown in the next three images below and reported that he saw only orchards, not graves.  On further examination, I suspect he may be right.  As a result, I am no longer confident that all of the images below show graves.  Given the challenges of revealing what North Korea doesn't want us to discuss at all, I can only follow the best evidence available to me.  I will continue to seek out North Koreans to confirm what these images show and update this post as I learn more.]
Less than a year ago, Google Earth published the first high-resolution images of Hamhung. In the hills around the city, one can see a distinctive rash of small mounds packed haphazardly into the steep slopes. What begins as a small, well-tended cemetery consumes an entire hill …

graves-hamhung-well-tended.jpg[Click image for full size.]

and the hills around it, …

graves-hamhung-1500.jpg
and seemingly, every speck of unoccupied land that surrounds this city of 874,000 souls.

graves-hamhung-4000.jpg
graves-hamhung-21000.jpg
On some of the hills, the graves are crowded together so tightly that the density of death greatly exceeds the density of life in the city below.

graves-at-hamhung-2.jpg
There are other large, seemingly improvised cemeteries in North Korea. This one is just east of the capital, Pyongyang.

signs-graves-e-of-pyang-1.jpg
signs-graves-e-of-pyang-2.jpg
Hamhung, however, is the only city I know of where the combined surface area of the cemeteries rivals that of the city itself. Even in North Korea, Hamhung is the only place where I found it possible to look down on such an immense concentration of death. The fact that no other place even approaches the scale of what we see here suggests that we’re looking a horrible aberration. Every hill around the city is a burial site, though not always of equal size and density. On this rocky ridge west of the city, the forest is seeded with graves:

hamhung-forest-graves-and-ugf.jpg
The small dots in the forest throughout the image are graves. The placemarks in the lower left-hand corner of the image are higher density burial sites. Note the tunnel entrances in the upper right-hand corner of the image. The earthen berms in front of the entrances suggest that they’re probably for some kind of military use. Some kind of large facility is being built just to the east of this image, no doubt at great expense. I’ll venture no guess as to its purpose, except to infer for that it won’t be used for growing food.

It would be impossible to count the graves in these hills, but we can quickly and conservatively estimate that the number must be in the tens of thousands. The polygon in the image below is almost completely filled with graves, in an approximate density of 25 graves for every 400 square meters, for a density factor of 0.0625 graves per square meter. The polygon is 180 meters from north to south, and 980 meters — nearly a full kilometer long — from east to west.

hamhung-graves-polygon.jpg
That works out to more than 11,000 graves on just this one ridge. Starting from the same polygon, let’s rise to an altitude of 35,000 feet to put that polygon into the spatial context of the other burial sites in the hills around Hamhung. The arrows in the image below point only toward large, dense concentrations of graves.

hamhung-graves-polygon-with-placemarks.jpg
Even a cursory examination of these hills shows that the total number of graves probably exceeds 100,000. If other smaller and less dense burial areas are added in, it could plausibly exceed twice that. This estimate would obviously undercount any mass burials, such as those witnessed by Andrew Natsios from across the Chinese border, or the deaths of those who died by roadsides or in detention camps elsewhere. It would overcount mass mortality to the extent that some of these graves represent pre-existing or “natural” deaths.

Obviously, there is no way to determine the date or cause of death from a satellite photograph. At the same time, the devotion of so much space to the dead cannot be the natural state of things; after all, it isn’t the natural state of things anywhere else. We will never know for certain what killed these people as long as North Korea is ruled by such an obsessively secretive regime. All we know is that this city is surrounded by an unusually large number and concentration of poorly tended and haphazardly placed graves in a manner consistent with published reports filed from Hamhung during the famine. If these graves do in fact contain famine victims, and if our very rough estimate of 100,000 to 200,000 graves is accurate, it would generally corroborate the engineering student’s claim that 10% of the population of North Korea’s second-largest city starved to death during the Great Famine.

Stalin infamously observed that a million deaths is a statistic. That is so because of our own incomprehension at the very real significance of each spot on these pock-marked hills. Focus on just one of those graves long enough to imagine the child, the mother, the father, or the provider buried there, instead of seeing mere pixels in a ghastly panorama. It ought to be so even in a nation where for most, to be a pixel in the state’s panorama is the individual’s highest permissible aspiration.

It’s a sobering thing to realize, as a new administration asks itself how to approach this regime, that if these are indeed the victims of the Great Famine, none of them had to die. It wasn’t any disaster or crop failure that killed them. It was the ruthless decisions of one depraved man.

[You can see more Google Earth photo essays of North Korea here.]

National Geographic, ‘Escaping North Korea’

National Geographic’s February 2009 issue is out, and it contains an article about North Korean refugees. It’s written in the form of a narrative about three refugees — “Black,” “Red,” and “White” — and their escape through China to South Korea. “White” and “Red” survived victimization by the cross-border sex trade. After her arrival in the South, White was also diagnosed with and survived cancer.

For “Black,” the deprogramming process began with his first exposure to the truth about Kim Jong Il’s personal depravity:

Black’s faith seemed intense, and as he talked, the missionary beamed. He said that the turning point in Black’s education had come when they were in an Internet cafe. “I asked him to type in ‘Kim Jong Il personal life’ on the browser, and when stories came up of affairs and illegitimate children, I watched the light come on in his face as he realized he had been fed lies all his life.”

Stories like these have a much stronger impact on North Koreans, who are In the caption to the accompanying photo essay, Black illustrates the revolutionary power of religion:

“Though he doubts that North Korea will change its harsh policies forbidding religious worship, Black vows to return home someday, taking a Bible with him. “I will go to my village and bring God’s message,” he said. “I am willing to die if I can bring my family faith.”

You can read the entire article online here, but start with the photo essay.

Some full disclosure: I was interviewed at length by the article’s researchers and, at their request, provided some Google Earth photos of three detention camps where repatriated refugees are believed to be sent. You won’t see me or this blog mentioned in the article, but I’m glad to have helped the authors tell this story.

Now That You Mention It, Yes, The Obama Worship Is Getting a Little Out of Hand.

A fitting video response to “the Obama gold plate” at YouTube:

Being in Washington, D.C., this week is like being locked inside an echo chamber with loudspeakers playing “It’s a Small World” on a continuous feed.

Regardless of your political sympathies, having all four branches of government heaping uncritical adulation on your head of state is bad for you.