Oberdorfer to Be Inducted Into Irrational Exuberance Hall of Fame

I like Don Oberdorfer as a person, but he really should ask the Council on Foreign Relations to put this link in a more obscure place:

This morning when I turned on the BBC, the newscast started by saying that the last days of the Cold War may be near. They were talking about the developments regarding North Korea at the Six-Party Talks and signing of the latest agreement between North and South Korea looking toward an eventual peace treaty, signed by the two leaders. Is this a little overblown?

No, I don’t think it’s overblown if you mean in the sense that finally something is happening on the Korean peninsula that is going to greatly reduce and perhaps end the tension across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that divides the Korea peninsula. As an historian of the Cold War, it was over a long time ago but you have this remaining problem which is inherited from the Cold War and from the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945. This problem–if not ended–is now sufficiently dealt with that it should not be a cause for grave international concern.

As you look at what’s happening, it seems to be that for once on the Korean peninsula, the stars are in alignment, especially the major powers, all of whom would like a reduction of tensions, a greater engagement and understanding across the Korean peninsula. The United States has certainly wanted it, South Korea has for a long time. Japan is hesitant. We may be on the edge of some new day. It’s always dangerous to be too optimistic when you are talking about North Korea. You never know what is going to pop out of the box, but all indications are now that engagement and understanding across the DMZ are moving ahead.  [Don Oberdorfer at CFR, Oct. 4, 2007]

Read on — its only gets more embarrassing:

The next inspection is going to be of greater importance because they are going to be able to inspect the aluminum tubing that was allegedly used to create new centrifuges, which would have allowed North Korea to make a program to enrich uranium to the point to be used to make nuclear weapons, so-called highly-enriched uranium. All indications are they are going to find that the aluminum tubing is there, it has never been made into centrifuges, and this whole thing that caused the breakdown of the Agreed Framework, the earlier agreement on North Korean nuclear weapons, was a fiction. There was no highly-enriched uranium program in North Korea, but the North Koreans at one time admitted there was–although there is controversy about what they actually said back in 2002–and then they’ve been vehemently denying. If you inspect the aluminum tubing and you find it is still there and it hasn’t been made into centrifuges, where was this big program everybody was so afraid of?

Then, two months later ….

And finally, here’s Oberdorfer’s prediction on the future of North-South relations under a Lee Myung Bak administration:

The rapprochement between the two Koreas will go ahead with a few setbacks and strains here and there and a little more slowly than Roh Moo-hyun is doing it now, but it will move ahead unless there are some basically North-generated problems. At the moment, I don’t see it. North Korea needs to have a period of peace.

Oberdorfer’s analysis is flawed in the same way most “realists” are wrong about North Korea — they build in the unrealistic assumption that diplomatic outcomes necessarily depend on American initiatives, as if North Korea’s behavior has nothing to do with those outcomes.  I don’t expect Oberdorfer to be clairvoyant, but by October 2007 a long historical record justified skepticism, and little else.

What’s so jarring about this analysis — aside from how poorly it has held up — is just how commonly held it was at the time.  By October 2007, North Korea has already blown several Agreed Framework II deadlines and was on the verge of breaking its promise to fully disclose its nuclear programs, yet AF II’s believers clung to it with the desperate faith one usually associates with stalkers, not professional analysts.
To drive the point home to a degree that’s probably unsportsmanlike, contrast Oberdorfer’s predictions to that of a snot-nosed unpaid amateur with none of Oberdorfer’s professional credentials.  Other than the whole Al Gore thing, the unpaid analysis seems to have held up quite well.

6 Responses

  1. Oberdorfer needs to enrich his Korean vocabulary with the word janmeori. I’m amazed that an old Korea hand like him believes that the North Koreans would actually trade away their only real bargaining chip.

  2. I am not surprised by Oberdorfer’s rather shallow understanding of the peninsula, given the way they obtain their information (among reasons). I have much to say (and have already said much in print) on the topic of the grossly inadequate character of Western journalism in East Asia in general and Korea in particular, but I want to restrain myself from another rant. So I will just say that the only reporter-trained “Korea hand” who consistently writes useful things about the peninsula seems to be Don Kirk.

  3. I appreciate the work Oberdorfer did in The Two Korea’s, especially in getting the ‘rest of the story’ right on issues like the price for Reagan saving Kim Dae-jung and the Kwangju Uprising (as opposed the the glaring omission by, say, Cumings and Shorrock). It was an easy read I could loan to those w/o a Korea background. But the past several years has been – and Joshua uses the best word – embarrassing.

  4. Not to dismiss Joshua’s uncanny predictions from March 2007, but it doesn’t take a clairvoyant to forecast North Korea’s behavior. Few have Joshua’s literary skills to present future provocations and feeble responses with such biting wit. At the same time, North Korea is one of the most predictable states in the world in terms of the conduct of foreign policy, though this is a fact recognized by but a few.

    Then again, not everyone’s had the time to read the great North Korean Play Book, compiled by the Great Leader in the mid-1960s, now in its twelfth edition and available for free on the Internet in 300 different languages, which goes like this:

    1. Strike the imperialists when they are weak (as in Vietnam after the 1968 Tet
    offensive). eg, the Pueblo, Jan 1968, or missile tests in July 2007 when the US was
    bogged down in Iraq.

    2. Against “angry letters” and other forms of protest, ratchet it up once more. eg, the
    shooting down of the US spy plane on April 15, 1969, or the nuclear test in October 2006.

    3. Blame others for the escalation (US hostile policy, Bush the ideologue, Obama who’s just the same ,
    South Korean lackeys [“political scum Lee MB”], Japanese imperialists [abduction freaks]).

    4. Insist we are sincere in negotiations. Imply return to talks for the right price
    and/or widening the agenda; ie, mutual disarmament talks, peace treaty, etc. eg, allow
    IAEA folks to return, come up with a laundry list of nuclear activities sans samples in
    return for defreezing illicit funds and removal from State’s list of state-sponsors of
    terrorism.

    5. Continue to proliferate and obliterate other would-be red lines with impunity.

    6. Make a meaningless concession like blowing up a cooling tower or letting the NY Phil
    be played in Pyongyang, while building up the bigger 50MW reactor next door to the 5MW
    reactor in Yongbyon.

    7. When others complain, start over again (see no. 2).

    Conclusion: time for a second nuke test accompanied by an assortment of short and long missile.