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In the case of a DPRK regime collapse, what power would South Korea have?

Had an interesting conversation this weekend with a North Korea watcher where for the first time, the idea of reunification seems realistic and within reach, yet at the same time, also at risk. It all has to do with the current health of Kim Jong Il who appears to be hanging on by a thread, the relatively short grooming period of his son to succeed him, and of course, China and the U.S. But not South Korea interestingly…

First, what makes the reunification scenario more possible this time around compared to previous predictions that have fallen short throughout the years? It’s obviously the brief grooming period for Kim Jong Un combined with his youth and inexperience. Should Fat Boy Kim croak within the next two years, the scene is perfectly set for a power struggle: How much loyalty will DPRK leaders and the people have for KJU? (Remember, his father had virtually decades of grooming – enough time for a loyal following to form.) Also, how much influence can a 26-year-old kid who has spent most of his years being educated in Europe (versus China or Russia) have on leaders who no doubt hold seniority over him not only in age, but also experience within the regime? Is a military coup possible in someone’s greed for power? Or will KJU act as a figurehead leader and let those in the regime control him as they see fit?

Granted, it could go any direction.

So what about China?

I’ve heard arguments both ways regarding possible actions China might take. There has been wide speculation that China would attempt to absorb North Korea while others say the country does not want to inherit the massive problems of starvation and desperation that would come with such a move.

It has also been suggested that in the event of a regime collapse, China may want to stage a coup in North Korea and rule by proxy. All it would take is money, and we all know the Mainland has a pretty good track record of throwing money at potential problems in attempts to get what it wants. All it’d have to do is buy out a few high-level government officials and there you go, right?

So where do all these scenarios leave South Korea, for I have heard very little about what South Korea could or would do besides perhaps protest or appeal to the U.S. to intervene on its behalf.

My contact seems to think that in order to prevent a China rule by proxy or invasion of North Korea after a regime collapse, the U.S. (not South Korea) would have to step in and try to hatchet out an agreement with the Mainland. Such an agreement, he believes, would require the absolute, 100% withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea which would leave the U.S. military nowhere near China or any of its borders. In such an event, perhaps then, China would back off and allow South Korea to occupy the North.

It’s an interesting prediction. In fact, all of the scenarios he and I went through yesterday were interesting to discuss. The idea that has really stayed with me, however, is the relatively powerless role South Korea would play. Any thoughts?

19 Responses

  1. I have said this many times before, and I’ll do so again: South Korea and the United States, perhaps along with Japan, should make clear to the Chinese that they have nothing to fear from a unified Korea.

    The case for a unified Korea versus a rogue North Korea or an occupied Inner Chaoxian is that it is far more stable — politically, militarily, and economically — for the region in the long run. But if having American forces a stone’s throw from Dandong is part of the package, it is a hard sell for Beijing.

    The US should assure Beijing that its military bases are about maintaining stability in the region, not grabbing land, and they will not put military bases in any territory formerly part of the DPRK. Furthermore, they will continue to keep South Korea and Japan under their nuclear umbrella rather than allowing or encouraging them to pursue nukes on their own. This is about as close to a win-win for everyone as you will get, and Beijing probably knows this.

    But, yeah, it needs to be reminded, not just that the US is not a threat to its territory around Korea, but also that it is the US that is preventing Beijing’s neighbors — particularly Japan — from going nuclear.

    And this, again, goes toward the Pax Americana and its success and continued importance in maintaining stability in the region, bucking past history.

  7. In a recent Chosun Ilbo story, a North Korean studies scholar noted that the line of succession looked very weak because Kim Jong-il does not have the same authority that his father had and because the successor is not only young but also an illegitimate son of a Japanese-born Korean.

  8. Jodi,
    For a ROKA officer’s view (in English) I’d recommend Major Moo Bong Ryoo’s SAMS Monograph entitled The ROK Army’s Role When North Korea Collapses Without a War with the ROK. Although published in 2001, the paper is even more relevant now. From the abstract:

    The best course of action to deal with the collapse of North Korea is the ROK Army to lead the multinational and interagency stability operation and support operation. The collapse and unification can
    happen much faster than expected. Once begun, there will be not much time to prepare. The ROK Army needs to be prepared to lead the stability and support operation in coordinate with the major powers to deal with North Korea?s collapse. It must seize the initiative for unification while minimizing foreign intervention to prevent the repetition of the unpleasant history of the UN protectorate from happening.

    Michael E. O’Hanlon, via the Brookings Institute has his version of how the nKorea collapse scenarios will play out and some recommendations.

    And more relevant this week, any scenario must take into account the new “Transformation” of the ROK Military is conducting under the Defense Reform 2020, approved on Friday by Pres 2MB. The Rand Corp did a brief analysis of the original in 2006:

    Stabilizing a North Korean Collapse. A North Korean collapse, especially one that led to a civil war, would be very difficult for the ROK to deal with, especially with limited numbers of active-duty ground-force personnel who would be needed to sort out the various participants in a civil war. Even if WMD were not used, the ROK would still need to rapidly secure North Korean WMD to prevent threats and proliferation, and it would likely have insufficient personnel to do so while trying to stabilize North Korea.

    Stabilizing Postunification. For most North Korean military and security personnel and
    political elites, a ROK-controlled Korean unification would be a disaster: Their elite status
    would be lost, and many could be imprisoned or precluded from most jobs. These personnel may therefore form an active insurgency against the ROK, potentially requiring
    the deployment of hundreds of thousands of ROK ground-force personnel—probably at
    least 400,000 to 500,00014 (more than the planned active-duty ROK Army and Marine
    Corps)—in the North for many years. Moreover, U.S. forces have found that a rotation
    of forces in Iraq has been necessary to sustain active-duty training and to provide rest and relaxation necessary to mitigate combat stress. In addition, the ROK Army would have to significantly increase its logistical support. In wartime, it expects to mobilize this support from the civilian sector, but the civilian sector will have few resources to offer the military in a protracted stabilization, given the need for these resources in the civilian economy to help pay the costs of unification. Unless a new strategy is developed to minimize the potential for insurgency, this is a very high risk area for the 2020 forces if the threat is purely conventional.

    Bottom line: The ROK military must seize the initiative and ensure stability in a collapsed nKorea. This runs against the newly revamped Defense 2020 vision of less Army troops.MoD needs a new strategy, preferably in line with MAJ Ryoo’s paper.

    Charlie,
    The KimcheeGI

  9. What amazes me is that it was not until June 20, 2009 that the President of South Korea finally conceded that “we need to start preparing scenarios for unexpected change in North Korea.”

    http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00600&num=5074

    Doesn’t that imply that South Korea’s government has previously not even initiated preparation of any scenarios for an immediate North Korea collapse? One would assume there is an instruction manual somewhere in the Blue House…

    China always yaps about not meddling in any other country’s internal affairs, so don’t expect them to have a detailed plan in place either. Korean unification should naturally be a matter for Korean people to work out, so I would expect South Korea to have the most power and thereby take control of the chaotic situation. Beijing is all bark and no bite; the chain on China will not allow it to jump over the Yalu.

    I sincerely hope Kim Jong-il dies on July 7 (the same day as his dad) so we can see South Korea’s hastily prepared scenario put into action next month.

  10. I’ve heard the theory that China might try to absorb North Korea from a few different sources. Would it really be so beneficial for them, given not only how much investment they would have to put into infrastructure (among many other things) but also how much it would damage their relationship with South Korea (and would likely gain them little sympathy from more neutral observers)?

    If the two Koreas were to reunify, what sort of potential threat might they pose to China, and besides that how long would it even take them (from the beginning of unification) to become a stable and powerful nation again?

  11. Spelunker,
    Why does it amaze you since S. Korea has had it’s head in the sand for the last 10 years or so. USFK, specifically CFC had a CONPLAN entitled 5029 – Collapse of North Korea drafted in 1999 and waiting for ROK-US approval. It did not pass the muster of the Roh, Moo Hyun administration, because ‘it could limit “South Korea’s exercise of its sovereignty.”‘
    . Even the 2MB administration initially took a restrained approach to the CONPLAN due to the wartime OPCON transition issue.

    BTW, China has its version of 5029…and it doesn’t include South Korea:

    The contingency plans outline three missions in North Korea should the regime become unstable: humanitarian efforts to help refugees, peacekeeping activities such as serving as police, and the securing of nuclear weapons and fissile material as well as cleaning up any nuclear contamination.

    “If deemed necessary, PLA troops would be dispatched into North Korea,” said the report, referring to China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army.

    “China’s strong preference is to receive formal authorization and coordinate closely with the U.N. in such an endeavor. However, if the international community did not react in a timely manner as the internal order in North Korea deteriorated rapidly, China would seek to take the initiative in restoring stability,” it said.

    The report, titled “Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor,” was commissioned by the U.S. Institute of Peace and written jointly by authors from the institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It is based on discussions with Chinese specialists on North Korea in June last year and was posted last week on the Web sites of authors’ organizations.

    At least one of the Regional Powers are poised and ready to react.

  12. I’ve heard from a source who was recently in the region that any semblance of a pro-China faction had been purged by late 2008 – the NorKs are just as afraid of the Chinese as they are of everyone else.

  13. baekgom84,

    I think the realistic answer to most of your questions is — there are too many unknown variables to have much confidence in any guess about them.

    It all depends on how the North collapses and then on how the key players react to whichever collapse scenario happens.

    It is safe to say that there will be immediate threats to some level of stability in parts of China no matter how the North collapses: Refugee flows are likely a given, I’d think. And China will want to keep as much spill-over out of Manchuria as possible, especially given the already sizable ethnic Korean population in that area.

    Beyond that — most guesses are weak – because collapse could reasonably happen in numerous ways.

    How much stability will different provinces in the North maintain or lose if the regime collapses? Will it mainly play out in the Pyongyang area while the rest of the nation sits back and watches or will it engulf all the regions of the country?

    Will collapse come from a military coup or popular uprising? Will such an event be led by leaders with semi-democratic ideals or those of hardline dictators?

    If collapse causes widespread disruption in large sections of the country, will the military start slaughtering the tens of thousands already trapped in the many concentration camps as it also slaughters those outside the camps who might be trying to take advantage of a collapsed central regime authority?

    (Or, might collapse come in the form of the bulk of the military refusing to leave the barracks or fire on civilians if regime collapse is coming from a popular uprising – or – even a coup that the bulk of the military might not have known about beforehand but might be unwilling to stop when they see it making strong gains against the regime?

    Or, once complete collapse of the regime is judged immediate and unstoppable, what are the chances elements of the North Korean military will decide to take out as many American soldiers and South Koreans as they can before it’s too late? If the North does decide to engage in a military clash as it dies, how long or short can they keep up the fight? If a military clash happens, will it drag US troops into North Korea or will the US and SK be able to handle it without sending GIs back across the 38th parallel?)

    Anyway, back to the chance of mass slaughter in the concentration camps — I’ve read before that that has always been the plan when the government started creating “social classes”/categories based on loyalty to the regime – with the lowest level being constantly under watch and pre-ordered for extermination if the US invades or the regime loses control.

    So — the ideal collapse scenario for the US is one in which US troops remain outside of North Korea. The last thing we should want to do is put GI boots on the ground.

    However, if the North Korean military begins exterminating everyone in the concentration camps, how likely is it that the US could just sit back and watch it happen or count on China’s (and/or South Korea’s) military forces to stop it?

    Next, obviously due to the amount of reasonable possibilities in the area of regime collapse, we can’t really have any confidence in guessing how much material wealth it will take to stabilize the regime much less how long it will take a unified Korea to become a strong economic competitor against China…

    This is the problem…at least to me….— there are just too many things that can happen. Too many different and sometimes opposite chain of events that could take place.

    Hopefully, the US government (and others) are making more than one plan — or at least putting in such a thorough examination of the possibilities that — when collapse does come — the government will be able to react as effectively as possible to whatever happens.

    But, I get the feeling that isn’t happening.

    What we need is for all the major players to get together to at least tentatively map out broad agreements on what and how much each is willing to offer to help achieve stability when collapse comes and how much they are willing to compromise to ensure a joint effort to dealing with it.

    But that ain’t gonna happen. As KimcheeGI pointed out, even the US and South Korea have been unable to work together on a main plan during these years of Sunshine Policy in South Korea.

    Add to that the fact South Korea and much of Asia still has a deep and angry distrust of Japan because of its 20th century colonial effort. Japan is one of the rich nations the UN and others will have to tap to help stabilize NK, but how much can be asked of Japan when the distrust runs so deep? in fact, given the level of distrust, how much or little will South Korea and China even ask Japan to do despite how badly the region will need to pump funds and material into the North post-collapse?

    I think instead of trying to tackle an impossible problem with heavy pre-planning among the key players, the powers that be are consciously or subconsciously resting on the idea that the key players involved will not allow regime collapse to happen — that North Korea will find a way to struggle on indefinitely, so trying to over prepare for regime collapse is too much a waste of time and too touchy a subject to address with the other key players.

  14. I’m a China specialist and have not been monitoring Korea over the last 10 years. You can thank Laura and Euna for my sudden keen interest in seeing One Free Korea happen soon. I simply assumed South Korea would have considered this scenario long ago and had a comprehensive plan ready for immediate implementation if circumstances suddenly make it necessary. That’s why I ‘m so amazed that only struck President Lee last week.
    The possibility of PLA troops crossing the Tumen and Yalu rivers into a collapsed North Korea should set the South Korean president’s pants on fire. He needs to sit down and make his own plan because this crisis is most likely going to happen on his watch.
    I don’t see China “coordinating closely with the U.N.” on any endeavor in North Korea.
    China doesn’t cooperate in enforcing U.N. sanctions now (and doesn’t help with refugees either) so who would expect them to take any orders after North Korea’s collapse?

  15. so who would expect them to take any orders after North Korea’s collapse?

    Which likely means it will be China’s show post-collapse until it has sunk so many resources into the resulting blackhole, it pulls its troops out and asks for our help.

    South Korea has no experience or mindset to take the lead. Spelunker, you might want to check out the issue of handing over “operational control” from US military hands to South Korea’s. It’s a prime example and proof of that last sentence.

    SK will expect and wait for the United States to formulate the plans and expect those plans to include the US carrying most of the weight – including use of military troops – and I have a hard time believing that is ever going to happen. I can’t picture the US sending troops into North Korea as Chinese troops stream across the border as NK collapses. I can only picture it if part of the collapse includes NK staging battles with South Korean and US forces south of the DMZ.

    Which seems to mean — China will have the chance to handle NK as it wishes post-collapse – until it fails at the job.

  16. Difficult potential situation indeed. The best thing for North Korea, I think, would be for the U.S. and South Korea and other allies to invade and have them fall into our hands. China, because they have an oppressive government too, shouldn’t be allowed to have any control in North Korea. It shouldn’t matter what China thinks, their government needs to fall and China needs to have freedom too. South Korea’s role, should be miitary help and humantarian aid to help make sure North Korea is free and gets back on their feet.

  17. I don’t know if Beijing realizes this — and I hope they do — but if they were to turn Chosŏn into a province, autonomous region, or even a protectorate with nominal independence, it would be like they inherited 20 million Uighurs, with all the animosity, fury, and willingness to do violence to the authorities.

  19. The current thought is a fast Chinese invasion of North Korea (practiced in Russian-Chinese war games in 2005) to “support” the people North Korea. In fact, intervention mainly would prevent a flood of refugees. They would overcome some de-facto North Korea leaders who would rather go down fighting that give up what they have. They would quickly put in place a pro-Chinese government and then withdrawal (slowly like the U.S. in Iraq), on the condition; all U.S. troops were removed from South Korea. This would be a win/win for all parties. 1) China wins because it removes U.S. troops from South Korea. 2) This a win for the U.S. as it removes an anti U.S. government at zero cost (no U.S. troops, funds or public “policy confusion”). South Korea wins because it desires reunification (Sunshine Policy of the last decade) and with U.S. troops (reduced in recent years) finally gone it would be free of being a cold war hold over (it would dominate the north economically, though it would take a difficult decade to pay for reunification, like Germany) North Korea wins because it would be able to join the world and not “be at war” with the U.S.
    Final post 10 year result? Stronger (in manufacturing from cheaper northern labor) United Korea, but with strong economic ties to China. A East/West neutral government (w/ standard political cyclic “leans” giving +/-10% regional relation variable. The mix of Chinese influence vs. American cultural “Soft Power” make United Korea a interesting tourist location and perhaps a possible future glance at a American/Chinese world that is stable and peaceful. (For awhile 🙂
    Future concerns/downsides might be: United Korea becoming too “pro-Chinese”. Japan seeing the U.S. pulling back, and that it can beneficial to leave the U.S. protectorate, rearms in a concerning arms race with China that worries Washington about being pulled into a war (much like the Taiwan situation now).