Obama Administration Says First Words About Human Rights in North Korea

Eight months, a missile test, and a nuclear test after President Obama’s inauguration, he has finally gotten around to nominating Bob King to be Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea, a move mandated by the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 and the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008.

The United States said Friday it was “very concerned” about human rights violations in North Korea, as President Barack Obama named an envoy to focus on the issue.

“We’re deeply concerned about the situation in North Korea, particularly the plight of North Korean refugees, and human rights in general,” State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said. [….]

If confirmed by the Senate, King will work as part of US special representative for North Korea Stephen Bosworth’s team and cooperate with other top State Department officials involved in Washington’s policy toward Pyongyang, according to Kelly.

He will also serve as the liaison with human rights groups and other non-governmental organizations “to try and highlight the problem of North Korean human rights and trying to promote a more transparent political system in North Korea,” said Kelly. [AFP]

That means that for the last eight months, North Korea has managed to misdirect our focus on its calculated and calibrated provocations and away from the pathology in which they originate.

The AFP story, apparently written by a reporter untrained in the use of Google, goes on to report that “[s]cores of North Koreans are believed” to flee North Korea each year, to escape “extreme poverty and malnutrition.” This manages to fit two inaccuracies into a single sentence. In fact, the number of North Koreans arriving in the South — almost certainly a pale shadow of the number fleeing the North — has been more than 1,000 a year since 2002 (page 54). At the end of 2004, there were 7,688 North Korean defectors in the South (page 53). Today, more than 3,000 arrive every year, and the total number of North Korean defectors in the South has more than doubled to more than 16,000.

To say that North Koreans are fleeing their homeland because of hunger and poverty is no more true than saying that Anne Frank died of natural causes. Many North Koreans are starving, and a few are riding in Mercedez sedans and yachts, or wearing Omega watches. When that happens in the world’s most centrally planned economy, it means that someone’s corn ration was written out of the central plan. Often, those written out of the plan were born into the lower regions of a system of hereditary political castes known as songbun and written off as expendable. In North Korea, your songbun is your destiny:

Getting a job in North Korea requires a certain family background and lobbying skills rather than desire and talent.

North Korean middle school graduates (high school in South Korea) have three choices for career after graduating 11 years of compulsory education. These are: to go to the army or college, or get a job. Only ten percent with background by birth can get to college and the rest must either enter the army or get jobs. Those without college or army entrance were transferred to labor department of Administration Committee, and they are assigned jobs. The problem is that the job assignments are decided without regards to an individual’s wish or talents. By so called “Ëœgroup assignment’, hundreds of graduates are assigned to one job location.

Therefore, middle school students who are about to graduate start lobbying in the labor department of Administration Committee with bribes and using connections. Those without any means have no choice but to go to coal mines or construction companies and end up with physical labor jobs that nobody desires. [
Open News]

Those state industries, however, are vulnerable places to be. When they shut down, the workers are effectively cut out of the rationing system and left with no means of survival. Even after the work, rations, and pay stop, workers must still report to “work” or be sent to a labor camp.

(For all of its faults, AFP’s article at least covers the story, and features what sounds a lot like the administration backtracking on bilateral talks, a subject about which I’m ambivalent.)

I don’t have strong feelings about Bob King because I know almost nothing about him. Few of those who have followed this issue closely do, either, including some of the most prominent activists working on this issue. It’s a plus that he worked for Tom Lantos, and his background is probably better than Jay Lefkowitz‘s was coming into the job (though to be fair, Lefkowitz was a quick study). On the other hand, King’s lack of an established reputation puts him at a disadvantage to other rumored candidates, including Jared Genser and my good friend David Hawk. Stephen Solarz was my personal dark horse favorite because of his political stature and connections. King may be an easier figure to dismiss, as was the case with Lefkowitz.

The next question is whether Bob King will be more relevant to the Obama Administration’s North Korea policy than Jay Lefkowitz was to Bush’s. I challenge anyone to untangle all of the layers of vagueness in the State Department’s canned response, offered by Spokesman James Kelly:

In terms of what his role will be, he will be part of Ambassador Bosworth’s team in the Office of the Special Representative for North Korea Policy. He’ll work closely with bureaus within the State Department here, our human rights bureau ““ Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ““ and of course, with the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. And of course, he’ll coordinate with his colleagues in the Korean office with Ambassador Kim and Ambassador Goldberg.

He’ll also have a very important role of being the liaison with the human rights community, with the NGO community, and will also engage with international human rights organizations in his efforts to try and highlight the problem of North Korean human rights and trying to promote a more transparent political system in North Korea. As you know, we are ““ we’re deeply concerned about the situation in North Korea, particularly the plight of North Korean refugees. And human rights, in general, for the State Department are a big priority, and this is another indication of that.

QUESTION: Will Bob King also participate in the possible U.S.-North Korea bilateral meeting? Because he is on the team of Ambassador Bosworth.

MR. KELLY: Well, I think first we have to make the decision we’re going to actually have the bilateral talks, and then we’ll see who actually participates in it. Yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION: Do you intend to be talking with North Korea specifically about human rights during these meetings that are often more geared towards the nuclear program, the Six-Party Talks?

MR. KELLY: Do we talk about human rights when we ““

QUESTION: Will you be ““ I mean, before, you separated human rights out from the Six-Party Talks.

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: Will you be now bringing human rights back in to the Six-Party —

MR. KELLY: Yeah. You’re asking me to speculate on how ““ what the framework of the talks will be. I mean, human rights is in the center of all of our bilateral discussions, and I’m sure ““ although our priority, of course, is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, human rights always plays an important role in our bilateral relations. [State Dep’t. Daily Press Briefing, Sept. 25, 2009]

When Lefkowitz had the temerity to link North Korea’s oppressive system to its then-unfolding renunciation of its last set of promises to disarm, Condi Rice publicly humiliated Lefkowitz in a manner that would have drawn a very public resignation from a man of greater pride, stature, and sense of mission. History has established, I think, that the Bush Administration’s talk about human rights in the North was just that, and in the end, it was Bush and Rice — with plenty of help from Christopher Hill — who ended up proving (again) the futility of appeasing North Korea.

If we have learned anything from this, it should be that North Korea’s pathology cannot be compartmentalized away from its diplomatic mendacity. Yet a diminishing few still believe that Kim Jong Il wants better relations and free commerce with Earth. These people either don’t understand, or haven’t grasped the significance of, North Korea’s domestic propaganda about how it games and extorts America. North Korea has hostility, isolation, xenophobia, and secrecy in its genes. It can’t exist without them and can’t be cajoled or forced into abandoning them. Richardson calls the diplomatic aspect of North Korea’s pathology “strategic disengagement.” The central idea of it is that sustaining a state of hostility with the outside world is an essential element of what makes North Korea what it is. Its removal necessarily means transforming North Korea into a place that would turn on Kim Jong Il faster than a centrifuge. The implications of those realities are unpleasant, which may be why so many people refuse to recognize them. But not to recognize them requires one to disregard decades of experience, including North Korea’s eventual renunciation of every diplomatic commitment it has ever made.

Oddly enough, these people have managed to get the news media to call them “realists.”

Consider all of the logical chasms one must cross to believe in the verifiable diplomatic disarmament of North Korea today. How can we believe in the verification of disarmament when we can’t even verify that our food aid is going to those in need, and where brief and closely-monitored meetings between elderly siblings are considered a newsworthy diplomatic accomplishment? How can we expect North Korea to meet internationally accepted verification standards when it demands to be excused from every other norm of humanity, civilization, and transparency? How can we expect its scientists and technicians to be truthful with us when they live in a society so opaque, so controlling, and so vindictive — not only against those perceived as even minimally disloyal, but against their parents, spouses, and their children? Who believes that North Korea shares our interests in peace and security — interests that are rooted in moral, humanitarian, and economic values — when its mass culling of its own people through famine, concentration camps, and public executions shows utter malice for the value of human life?

More specifically, recent reports from defectors suggest that North Korea’s underground nuclear test site was built by prisoners from Camp 16, which is adjacent to the test site’s eastern perimeter. The prisoners, it is said, never leave that tunnel alive. Who will ever give us a full accounting of North Korea’s nuclear test activities if the North isn’t prepared to let our inspectors go to Mount Mantap and hear the candid observations of its scientists and technicians? If there is one thing that unites North Koreans more than their hatred of us, it is the fear of some dark fate if they compromise betray the state that made the arsenal of terror. Let there be no mistake that North Korea’s disregard for human life means that it would not hesitate to arm terrorists with any weapon it has the capacity to make.

So far, the Obama Administration has demonstrated surprising strength in responding to Kim Jong Il’s nuclear and missile tests. The passage of UNSCR 1874, despite its flaws, has spurred international cooperation with sanctions. This has been useful, but Obama’s empowering of the Treasury Department to attack Kim Jong Il’s palace economy has probably done far more. After all, without the ability to engage in financial transactions, Kim Jong Il has no efficient means of recouping his profits from arms sales, drug dealing, insurance fraud, cigarette or pharmaceutical counterfeiting, or any other means he uses to support his regime. It’s likely that his cash reserves are declining.

But to what end? For Kim Jong Il, nuclear weapons are central to his national security and personal survival. They are a substitute for a massive conventional military whose equipment is degraded and whose troops are withering away physically. They are one of the last remaining sources of national pride for an otherwise miserable and discontented population. There are even reports that Kim has threatened his own military with nuclear force if it rebels against him. Finally, as Kim Jong Il’s health visibly declines what else can he claim for a legacy? His transformation of his cities into vast cemeteries? These factors, combined with two decades of failed diplomacy, all suggest that Kim Jong Il will never disarm voluntarily. For now, Kim Jong Il probably concludes that he can break sanctions by appearing to our fear and our gullibility, and that of other nations in the region. Financial sanctions may be building real pressure on Kim Jong Il’s regime and retarding the expansion of his arsenal, but they any agreement they secure will be illusory.

President Obama now offers Kim a “grand bargain,” but The Big Deal comes with an impossible condition — nuclear disarmament first. This offer will not sit on the table for long. Eventually — absent Kim Jong Il’s sudden death from natural or not-entirely-natural causes — North Korean provocations will force President Obama to either accept North Korea as a nuclear power or escalate the confrontation, either through more robust containment or by opting for constricting and subverting of the regime itself. Acceptance may take the form of taking North Korea’s word to verify complete disarmament at some future date, but no one could possibly take any such promises seriously now. And a nuclear North Korea is an unacceptable condition for U.S. national security. Within the next two years, we will know which path President Obama chooses.

Below the fold, an excerpt from Friday’s State Department press briefing.

QUESTION: On North Korea?

MR. KELLY: North Korea? Okay.

QUESTION: Yes. South Korea President Lee Myung-bak again suggested grand bargain with North Korea at the UN General Assembly. So what is U.S. Government’s position on this specific suggestion ““ grand bargain?

MR. KELLY: Well, we are, of course, in very close agreement and close coordination with all of our partners, with our five partners, and we all agree on the ultimate goal. And the ultimate goal, of course, is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We’re looking at a number of ways to get North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks, and we’ve already said that one of the ways that we’re willing to do that is through bilateral talks. And this has been something that’s been closely coordinated with our partners. No decision has been made to have these bilateral talks.

In addition, we’ve said all along that if North Korea took irreversible and verifiable steps towards the complete denuclearization of North Korea, that we would be willing to reciprocate in some positive manner. Now, you can call that approach anything that you want, but this is something that we all agree on. I don’t know ““ I mean, this is the ““ calling it a grand bargain is something that the South Korean president has chosen to call it, but I think that we all share the goal of getting to a comprehensive agreement that would lead to the goal of all of our five partners, and that’s the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Yeah, in the back. Go ahead.

QUESTION: Do you have any readout for the South Korean negotiator Wi Sung-lac’s meetings with Sung Kim?

MR. KELLY: Yeah, actually, I do, but I’ll have to ““ I will have to ““ I mean, I don’t have it right here. So we’ll send it to you by —

QUESTION: Why has he been meeting so often with Sung Kim? I mean, he met with him yesterday and the day before, or two days before and —

MR. KELLY: I’m not sure how often he met with him.

QUESTION: It’s been a lot this week, so —

MR. KELLY: Yeah. I mean, it’s entirely natural. I think that Ambassador Kim’s South Korean counterpart came with the South Korean president. As I say, they are counterparts, so it’s entirely natural that they would have consultations and even frequent consultations while he’s here.

Yeah.

QUESTION: So as far as bilateral talks with North Korea, I think this government has already obtained green sign from Japan and China and South Korea in highest level already, through meeting with his counterpart this week. So why you don’t make a final decision to go ahead? Or is there any obstacle for you to make it clear before the final decision at this point?

MR. KELLY: Well, as I say, we have decided that if such a meeting would lead to our shared goal, the goal that we share with our five partners, of getting North Korea to return to some kind of meaningful talks within the Six-Party context, that we’re willing to consider this. We’re still considering it, and we simply have nothing to announce at this time.

Yes.

QUESTION: Iran?

MR. KELLY: Iran.

QUESTION: Iran. How long ““ I know this is probably getting into intelligence matters, but if you could tell us how long the United States has been kind of investigating this secret facility in Qon ““ Qon? And maybe if you could talk about the timing? Is this designed to create pressure on Iran to kind of come fully prepared to negotiations? If you have anything to add to the Secretary’s statements that she made this morning?

MR. KELLY: I don’t have much to add. I think that as you point out, we are getting into intelligence information. I think it’s fair to say that we’ve been carefully watching and analyzing this facility for several years. But beyond that, I don’t want to go into too much more details. In terms of the timing of it, I mean, I think you saw the statements of the three presidents[1] and then of Secretary Clinton.

I think the ““ it has nothing to do with the October 1st meeting. I think we ““ one reason we decided on ““ in doing it now was we just learned that Iran had sent a letter to the IAEA, and we thought it was a good time to get the facts out on the table after this letter from Iran. But like I said, I don’t want to go into too much more detail about what we knew and when we knew it.

QUESTION: And so just to follow up, were they actually ““ I know that there was a statement sometime back that Iran had actually halted its ““ halted processing of uranium in 2003. Does this reverse that? Has ““ was Iran actually processing any uranium at this site?

MR. KELLY: Well, I think what you’re referring to is the National Intelligence Estimate of a couple years ago. Well, again, this is obviously intelligence information, but I understand that in and of itself, the information that we announce today does not contradict the assessment that we made in the NIE in 2007.

Anything else on Iran? (No response.) Okay. Yes, go ahead.

QUESTION: Can I go back to North Korea?

MR. KELLY: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: The White House yesterday nominated Robert King as a special envoy for North Korea human right. So how will his role different from the previous human rights special envoy? And how will he work on this current North Korea situation?

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: How will it contribute in this —

MR. KELLY: Yeah, yeah. Well, let me just tell you a little bit about the person that the White House announced that they intended to nominate. His name, of course, is Bob King. He has extensive experience working on human rights. He was staff director for the House Foreign Affairs Committee under Congressman Tom Lantos and also under Congressman Berman. He traveled with Congressman Lantos to North Korea in, I think, 2004 and also played a key role in the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act. He has a Ph.D. in international relations from Tufts, and has authored five books.

In terms of what his role will be, he will be part of Ambassador Bosworth’s team in the Office of the Special Representative for North Korea Policy. He’ll work closely with bureaus within the State Department here, our human rights bureau ““ Democracy, Human Rights and Labor ““ and of course, with the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. And of course, he’ll coordinate with his colleagues in the Korean office with Ambassador Kim and Ambassador Goldberg.

He’ll also have a very important role of being the liaison with the human rights community, with the NGO community, and will also engage with international human rights organizations in his efforts to try and highlight the problem of North Korean human rights and trying to promote a more transparent political system in North Korea.

As you know, we are ““ we’re deeply concerned about the situation in North Korea, particularly the plight of North Korean refugees. And human rights, in general, for the State Department are a big priority, and this is another indication of that.

QUESTION: Will Bob King also participate in the possible U.S.-North Korea bilateral meeting? Because he is on the team of Ambassador Bosworth.

MR. KELLY: Well, I think first we have to make the decision we’re going to actually have the bilateral talks, and then we’ll see who actually participates in it.

Yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION: Do you intend to be talking with North Korea specifically about human rights during these meetings that are often more geared towards the nuclear program, the Six-Party Talks?

MR. KELLY: Do we talk about human rights when we ““

QUESTION: Will you be ““ I mean, before, you separated human rights out from the Six-Party Talks.

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: Will you be now bringing human rights back in to the Six-Party —

MR. KELLY: Yeah. You’re asking me to speculate on how ““ what the framework of the talks will be. I mean, human rights is in the center of all of our bilateral discussions, and I’m sure ““ although our priority, of course, is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, human rights always plays an important role in our bilateral relations.