Rumor: U.S., China Planning for “Upheaval” in N. Korea

The United States Thursday denied reports that it will soon have closed-door discussions with South Korea and China on plans for upheaval in North Korea.

“I have not been told we are going to have this type of meeting at this particular point,” a senior State Department official said, asking not to be named. “If we are working on that in sort of an early stage, that could be possible.” [Yonhap]

Normally, I’d be tempted to believe this because they denied it, but in this case, I’m tempted to believe it because they really didn’t deny it.

Reports said that representatives of the U.S. Pacific Command and state-run defense think tanks of South Korea and China will get together in Beijing next month to discuss control of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction and refugees in case of a coup or the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

This is one area where diplomacy with China is urgent, necessary, and maybe even promising. It’s in our interests to help Koreans realize their dream of living in one country and learning to hate each other as only neighbors and relatives can.

9 Responses

  1. Good news, I think. I just hope that Washington will take this chance to tell Beijing that they will not put any USFK bases in former DPRK territory. That alone could alleviate Chinese fears enough to get China to acquiesce to letting the DPRK regime implode in favor of a unified Korea.

  2. Our goal should be “one free Korea”, with no foreign troops and no nuclear weapons. Our diplomacy should make it clear to the Chinese that we’re not trying to gain an advantage over them. We need to make it easy for them to understand that a peaceful, prosperous neighbor enhances their own security.

  3. One Free Korea with no foreign troops and no nuclear weapons? Sorry, Glans, but in today’s geopolitical climate Korea needs at least one of those in order to remain independent and free.

    In part for reasons I’ve outlined here, I definitely prefer the presence of an allied force with a small footprint to nuclear weapons. It’s money well spent by the US on deterrence of future war, but in return South Korea needs to spend more of its capital and manpower on helping out US interests (that are also South Korea’s) around the world.

  4. As things look right now, it seems as if instability is the goal. Not that it is the fault of ROK, U.S., China or other major players. Kim Jong Il shot himself in the foot with his bone-headed decisions, and maybe all it will take is a little push to send the regime off the cliff.

    Things indeed do not look good in the DPRK, and things seem to be getting worse as the days go by. If there is some meeting or whatever to cause an upheaval, it is certainly possible at this stage of the game with the state’s flirtations with another famine and the regime’s inability to get the cash it desperately needs.

    I want to believe the stage is getting set for eventual unification by these means, but I will wait and see what does happen. And Kushibo has a good point; China is going to demand stability without USFK in an imploded North Korea, but my question is, the ROK and United States at least is simply not going to leave stuff there, right? So what kind of deal is made with China will be important.

  5. China wanted a North Korean pitbull –hungry, angry, semi-wild but biddable, and on a short leash. The puppy was never fully house-trained, and now its puppy threatens to slip its leash. The North Korean people probably won’t take well to new Chinese obedience training. I think of the Chines-Korean relationship as being like that of the Scots and the English in Braveheart. And they don’t want a William Wallace in Manchuria.

    So what does China think is feasible in the coming Great Meltdown?

    The Party still rules China: the Party still (ostensibly) rules the DPRK. The DPRK Party is unlikely to survive the death of Little Kim unless China puts starch in it. China does not want a clearly military solution with a colonel’s revolt, because that is its own internal nightmare. China wants the Party to survive in the DPRK, even if the Kims go, as they will. So China’s first interest is sustaining a totally broken down system. They won’t succeed.

    If there is a complete meltdown, with a Young Turk-style revolt, China will go down to the latitude of Hamhong, kill all prisoners in the camps, dismantle the Yongbyon complex, and then either stay (which I think will be unlikely) or withdraw under an agreement with South Korea that it will take over at its own cost, — but will not allow USFK to advance beyond the Armistice Line. The Young Turks will survive and get their country back if they kowtow, but will be exterminated, and their country will be united with South Korea, if they fight. China will reckon that South Korea will be setback economically far worse than West Germany was by taking over and resuscitating East Germany, so unification after a Great Cleanup would be OK.

    China will not leave Rason, and indeed will develop it because it has immense potential to save time and fuel on the Great Circle route to the US and Canada. It also will worry the Russians in Vladivostok no end. China’s military-industrial bankers will also condition its withdrawal on preferential mining contracts.

    China’s ultimate interest is a reasonably dynamic united Korea with no USFK, and a common hatred of Japan. But it would prefer a sluggish Korea to a dynamic one, and it wants a non-nuclear one if the Kims go. Beijing is a lot closer to a Korean nuke than Washington is. China is surrounded by bad neighbors (made bad by rotten Chinese policies) –Japan, Vietnam, the claimants to the Paracels, Taiwan, Tibet, the Uighurs of the Taklamakan and Mongolia, the Russians of Siberia, us in the USFK. A new Korea could actually be a friend, if it were nuclearly disarmed and separated from the US.

    Such a quasi-peaceful unification as this never happen if the DPRK and some part of its fifteen divisions of loyal Special Forces, in a desperate roll of the dice, secretly transport three nukes down to each of Seoul, Pusan and say Taejon, and then disclose them to demand successively withdrawal of USFK, disarmament of the ROK Army and unification under the North — or unilateral destruction. China has as much interest in stopping that as we, but short of a Chinese pre-emptive invasion based on good intelligence, there is no way to do so. That’s the problem with making a pitbull mad.

  6. david woolley, I am not that familiar with Chinese politics, and that post gave some interesting insights. Thanks.

  7. 1. There are talks going on with the US and the ROK, in the light of day, no rumors necessary. The talks center around a menu of scenarios with regime collapse being the most plausible at this time.

    2. The ideological vacuum caused by the failure of Jucheism will be filled by something that attracts dissidents, appeals to Kim-haters, promises capitalism free markets, and delivers hope. China has none of the above. The ROK has it in spades, speaks the same language, has the historical edge, and ______________. Ideology will matter to a people who have been bludgeoned into a “one ideology” creed for 60 years. The ROK missionaries will win thousands of converts and link up with the half-million underground believers in the DPRK.

    3. The racist Norks will also reject a PRC occupation (witness what happens to NK women who are sent back from China pregnant) unless force fed it with a million Chinese occupation forces which may provoke a war with the PRC. A Sino-United Nations Command (UNC) confrontation will not be favorable to the ChiComs. There is no USSR now, no united world-wide socialist movement (as there was in 1950), no impetus for a massive industrial age war between the PRC and the UNC, and so no marked advantage for the PRC to initiate a war.

    4. The side with the best stability plan and quickest maneuver will enter and stabilize the collapsed Pyongyang first. The side that hesitates will probably have to stay on the sidelines and help from remote. Right now, my money is on the UNC.

    5. If the rumors/reports/speculations that there are collaborative planning sessions underway with participation from all 6-party talks members, then the forecast is bright as far as avoiding another industrial age full-tilt shooting war.

    Most planners fail to factor in the psychological, moral and spiritual malaise that is sure to follow the collapse of Pyongyang’s Juche cult. Whatever becomes of the DPRK after a coup or civil uprising or collapse, buy-in by the Norks will be necessary and after they have been fed regularly for a while, they will want to assert their political will while they can. Between the Japanese occupation (1910-1945) and the coercion of the Juche cult, most Norks will realize this is the chance that comes round once in a century and will not want to waste it.

    Before Baghdad fell in 2003, Iraq was a closed society with no internet, satellite dishes or international media feeds. Within days of Baghdad’s collapse, thousands of satellite dishes appeared on urban rooftops seemingly out of nowhere like dandelions popping up on a June morning. Iraqis were immediately connected with the outside world they had been hungering for and multiple free media outlets sprung up simultaneously. The impact of outside information was felt immediately and shaped post-Saddam Iraq in significant ways. If anything similar happens in North Korea, the loudest opinion making voice that will be heard in post-Juche North Korea will be that of the ROK missionaries and enterpreneurs. The Chinese will not have a weapon to combat that. No matter where the political lines are drawn and who draws them, the cultural unification of Korea is a fait accompli. It will be ugly, messy, acrimonious, contested, violent, emotional, embarrasing, but it will be Korean. That more than any other factor gives me hope.

  8. Very sound and most plausible analysis I’ve read regarding NK.
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    I know a LOT of SMB’s that expect to make a lot of money assisting in the development of NK once unification (or at least, openness) is achieved. The north has no infrastructure and as such, there will be a lot of opportunities for entrepreneurs to go in and make money while contributing to introducing NK’s to the open market concept.

  9. I suspect the ChiComs and the U.S. have been discussing a meltdown scenario for quite awhile now. It’s only recently, that someone leaked it to the public/media.

    Koreans can only hope the U.S. and China won’t let a post-Korean War fiasco (which, led to this whole mess in the first place) reoccur.