Overthrowing Kim: A Capitalist Manifesto (Part 2)

In today’s installment, I discuss the Cheonan findings and their implications, transitioning to the reasons why the North Korean system has proven so durable.

14 Responses

  1. But Kim Jong Il no longer fears the U.S. Air Force; he only fears the people of North Korea. Specifically, he fears that they’ll do to him what they did to Nicolae Ceaucescu.

    Two thumbs up, Mr. Stanton. You nailed it.

  2. But to collapse the Kim Dynasty will require a fundamental shift in how we view a crisis that can’t be managed away. It will require new thinking from a foreign policy establishment trapped in a loveless marriage with diplomacy for diplomacy’s sake, and a weary political establishment that sees the deployment of mechanized infantry as the only alternative. Instead, America must embrace its lost love of beneficent anarchy and learn to see the subjects of totalitarianism as friends we’ve overlooked for too long.

    Man, this is good. You are on fire!

  3. Exhaustion. Even when a theocracy’s cultish indoctrination loses most of its power to mesmerize, it is still exhausting to bear it as much of it as North Koreans must.

    I’ll take a quick bow for this one. 😉 Right awn, right AWN!

  4. This is the clearest thinking about North Korea I have read in a long time. Great work Joshua!

    I am eagerly waiting for part 3.

  5. You make a compelling and nuanced case for why current containment policy is ineffective in that it has not and probably will not (esp with Chinese subsidies) engender the environment for regime collapse – and at the same time does not address the issues of nuclear and missile proliferation, at least not in a manner that stops the problem at the source in terms of production capability.

    I suppose I should wait for Part 3 since you alluded to it, but I’m not entirely sure how one could reach this conclusion:

    A coordinated and well-funded program of broadcasting, smuggling, and support for a political underground could quickly overload the regime’s capacity to suppress dissent, and thus create the conditions for an opposition movement to challenge it — initially in small ways, but later, for the control of villages, factories, towns, and regions.

    You probably are the most intimate with the tenets of realism and know more than any other analyst about the challenges presented (as written in Part 2), but I’m just not sure this program meets the criterion of a reasonable chance of success.

  6. Must read for anyone concerned about the future of the Korean peninsula and North East Asia. Well done.

  7. “America must embrace its lost love of beneficent anarchy and learn to see the subjects of totalitarianism as friends we’ve overlooked for too long.”

    Let’s do it.

    Jeffery Hodges

    * * *

  8. A golden opportunity to assasinate Kim Jong-il was missed during his recent, and perhaps final, trip to China. The best chance was in Dalian where he stayed at the Furama Hotel. 2 other opportunities were in Tianjin and Dandong. (It would have been impossible to do the deed in Beijing.) In Dalian and Tianjin there were two occasions where an easily spotted Kim Jong-il was outside in public view. The last chance for romance was when Kim and his Cabinet were in the armored train going back across the Yalu on the so-called “Friendship Bridge” The US has taken out that bridge before; it would not have been too difficult for clever South Korean agents to use more modern techniques as the train approached Sinuiju’s shore.

    Now that Kim Jong-il is safely back in North Korea it would be extremely difficult to track his whereabouts on his own turf. A timely opportunity to avenge the Cheonan was lost.
    Now we can only wait for a more conventional collapse with one or more of the scenarios so thoughtfully detailed by Mr. Stanton.

  9. Hello Mike V,

    While an air strike with our new F-15K SLAM Eagles may feel good there is very little that Kim Jong Il truly cares about that we could practically destroy. He cares about his own troops less than than Stalin cared about the Russians. Their conventional gear is not really important to them any more. The terror weapons (nukes and chemical weapons, artillery aimed at Seoul) are in hardened bunkers we probably would have a hard time damaging in any meaningful way. The price of the precision guided SLAMs we would shoot at North Korean targets would exceed the value and Kim knows that.

    Attacking his overseas assets, interdicting his money are far better ways of getting revenge.

  10. I’ll admit that I have very limited understanding about the strategic and tactical stances and capabilities of the korean armed forces. I do know that there is a mandatory service period in south korea.

    I would not feel comfortable serving on a South Korean Naval vessel knowing that I am just target practice for Kim Jong Il and that my potential death would be meaningless.

    Maybe it is just a cultural difference but if someone made an unprovoked attack on an american target like pearl harbor or the WTC they have a 100% chance of catching a severe ass whooping. The price tag of munitions is not a factor when deciding how much ass to whoop, admittedly that has caused some other problems america is facing right now though.

  11. Mike V, I don’t think cultural differences are so important as concerns of military and geography. Unlike Seoul, Washington is not within the range of entrenched enemy artillery, nor is it home to as many millions of people nor the share of the nation’s population that Seoul is.

    And moreover, let’s not forget that the US did in fact take its time to react militarily to the events of 9/11. Washington tried to negotiate with the Taliban for custody of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, and it was only after they refused that the US went to war to oust the Taliban from power. That took nearly a month, putting us into October.

    In other words, even by the standard you presented, it is still too early to say South Korea has done nothing or that the ROK Navy is merely target practice.

    Two months ago, I asked what should be done if we got to the point where we are today, but I liked GI Korea’s response best:

    • Take any reopening of the Geumgang Resort off the table.
    • Officially close the Kaesong Complex and withdraw all South Korean workers.
    • Lobby to have North Korea re-added to the US State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
    • Stop all aid of any kind to North Korea until an apology is issued from Kim Jong-il.
    • Provide increased government support through non-government organizations (NGO’s) to support the human rights balloon launches into North Korea as well as supporting NGO activities to spread subversive media into North Korea.
    • If apology is not issued South Korea should lobby to have the UN issue a resolution condemning North Korea.
    • If the North Koreans still refuse to apologize and accept responsibility for sinking the ship than South Korea should seriously consider enforcing the PSI.

    I quite like the measured and stern response he proposes, particularly if it includes the final point, though that raises the possibility of further escalation, simply because each time a North Korean vessel is boarded it raises the possibility of a shooting match or other attack. That shouldn’t be something to deter the ROK govt, just prepare it.

    If I understand it correctly, this would hurt DPRK trade activities (legal and illegal) and deter future acts because of the humiliation of underscoring North Korea’s weakness outside its safe zone.

    South Korea probably already foiled the plans of whomever launched this attack simply by not playing into their hands with a quick response before it was clear who had done the attack (when there would still be deniability and such a ROK reaction could be seen as rash), and this would further muck things up for whatever person or faction that was.

  12. Every vestige of the disastrous Sunshine Policy should be shredded immediately. Close Kaesong Industrial Complex NOW and consider the real impact of cutting off humanitarian assistance that is probably not helping the right humans.

    Anything short of this is projecting not just weakness, but cowardice. The ROK/US Alliance has missiles too, and they are ready to turn Pyongyang into (KJI’s words) a sea of fire.