President Lee can heave a mighty sigh of relief. Not only will the Kaesong Industrial Park be closed after all, but also, Chung Dong-Young, the Hankyoreh, and the usual suspects among Korea’s nationalist left can’t possibly criticize him for it without abandoning all pretense of logic.
Oh, wait ….
In any event, this is all proceeding very much like I’ve been predicting for years now, and better than I’d feared: the South Korean workers at Kaesong are being expelled rather than taken hostage, so far. You will recall that President Lee has been planning his response to a North Korean closure of Kaesong for at least a year now, but don’t ask me how.
Here’s the North Koreans’ statement:
“1. All relations with the puppet authorities will be severed.
“2. There will be neither dialogue nor contact between the authorities during (South Korean President) Lee Myung Bak’s tenure of office.
“3. The work of the Panmunjom Red Cross liaison representatives will be completely suspended.
“4. All communication links between the north and the south will be cut off.
“5. The Consultative Office for North-South Economic Cooperation in the Kaesong Industrial Zone will be frozen and dismantled and all the personnel concerned of the south side will be expelled without delay.
“6. We will start all-out counterattack against the puppet group’s ‘psychological warfare against the north.’
“7. The passage of south Korean ships and airliners through the territorial waters and air of our side will be totally banned.
“8. All the issues arising in the inter-Korean relations will be handled under a wartime law.
“There is no need to show any mercy or patience for such confrontation maniacs, sycophants and traitors and wicked warmongers as the (South Korean President) Lee Myung Bak group.” [Reuters]
The closure of Kaesong is good news for many reasons. First, it ends South Korea’s “material support for a rogue government, its nuclear ambitions, and its human rights atrocities.” Second, it removes a tremendous credibility problem from President Lee’s argument that other nations should isolate North Korea economically. Third, it crushes the dreams of billions of hippies.
Of course the Hankyoreh will find some way to blame President Lee for the North Koreans’ closure of Kaesong. I’m sure they’re writing the editorials as I write this. But what we should remember is that the North Koreans have their own reasons for shutting Kaesong down — the same reasons why they stalled the expansion of Kaesong that Roh Moo Hyun wanted so much. Kaesong workers probably never received any actual wages and depended on their ability to move South Korean consumer goods onto the black market to earn a profit. Kaesong’s fate was sealed once the North Korean generals saw the subversive power of ChocoPies, and there’s nothing any South Korean president could have done to change that.
What is it with the North Korean spy agencies’ recent proclivity for using “women of a certain age” to target horny South Korean men? First, there was Won Jong-Hwa, who seduced, inter alia, a young South Korean army captain for classified information, and possibly a lieutenant as well, assuming that both officers weren’t actually the same person.
Now, there is the story of Kim Soon-Nyeo, whose targets included a 29 year-old college student, two travel agency workers, and her grand sugardaddy, a former executive of the Seoul Subway system.
You may thank the OFK Editorial Board in the comments for the many available metaphors it deemed unfit to print, as this discussion is about to become very serious.
The spy collected “confidential” information about the subway system from Oh, information about local universities from the student, and a list of names of high-ranking police and public officials from the travel agents.
Oh maintained extramarital relations with the spy since his first encounter with her in China in May 2006, and transferred nearly 300 million won ($252,000) to “help” her cosmetics business. In June 2007, he became aware that she was a North Korean spy, but continued the relationship.
“What Oh handed over to the spy included contact information of emergency situation responses and other not-so-important internal data,” Kim Jung-hwan, a Seoul Metro spokesman, told The Korea Times, dismissing concerns that it could be used in possible acts of terrorism here by the North. Kim retired from his post in 2008. [Korea Times]
I shudder at the thought of why the North Koreans want to know these things. That is why, as much as I like Richard Halloran’s writing and analysis, I don’t think he has quite grasped the worst case scenario when he calls for the bombing of North Korea’s artillery sites. Yes, I can imagine a circumstance in which we or South Korea might face a provocation or a threat so serious that we have to do something more dramatic, in which case what Halloran calls for might have to be our first step. But I’m not there yet, because I fear that North Korea’s most dangerous weapons are already inside South Korea. Nor do I share Halloran’s confidence that North Korea’s front line troops are poorly trained, or that they would “stand down” if attacked.
On the contrary, I advocate the (admittedly also risky) gradualist approach of constricting the regime economically and subverting it politically because the last thing I want to do is force a stroke-addled tyrant to make sudden “use it or lose it” decisions. I want to create the conditions for a favorable power shift about when that tyrant goes off to his meat locker mausoleum.
By comparison, John Bolton’s recommendations seem sedate and reasonable, although the part about China supporting a One Free Korea policy is implausible until we make North Korea China’s problem. Think: nukes for Taiwan and a shiny embassy for the Dalai Lama on Connecticut Avenue (or, just to make it even more fun, exactly the opposite!). Here in Washington, we spend a great deal of thought and worry about our relationship with China, but hardly anyone ever has to worry about China’s relationship with us. Hail ants!
I recently noted North Korea’s tendency to give its spies on the job training in China, whose government allows North Korean spies to operate as they hunt down defectors and send them back to the gulag (or a firing squad).
Someone remind me again why human rights is a distraction from the bigger issues.
So no sooner do I publish my Capitalist Manifesto than I read that the Anjeonbu, notorious for operating all of North Korea’s large kwan-li-soprison camps except Camp 18, has been sent out among the provinces as a counter-subversion force:
According to sources, special police squads have been formed in each province under the People’s Safety Ministry (PSM) to take action to block out information on foreign countries and root out anti-regime suspects.
A source from Shinuiju reported on Tuesday, “The special police squads consist of some 300 agents in each provincial office of the Peoples’ Safety Ministry. Their purpose is to crack down on offenders against the regime and its system. [....]
The Shinuiju source said, “Pyongyang is trying to enhance the position of the People’s Safety Ministry. They will now deal with usage of cell phones in the border region, circulation of foreign video clips, spreading of leaflets, denouncements of the authorities and other anti-regime offenses.
Bearing in mind the Cheonan incident, there is a possibility that the North Korean authorities are preparing for confrontation following the impending re-launch of South Korean psychological warfare. North Korea has already said it will attack the broadcasting facilities if South Korea follows through on its promise to restart the broadcasts. [Daily NK]
There is no greater evidence that what I propose is a potential threat to the regime than the fact that the regime appears to agree with me.
While most of the reporting has focused on the rather futile gesture of blaring propaganda from loudspeakers, it seems that South Korea is doing something else that’s more likely to reach a wider North Korean audience:
South Korea’s military resumed radio broadcasts airing Western music, news and comparisons between the South and North Korean political and economic situations late Monday, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The military also planned to launch propaganda leaflets by balloon and other methods Tuesday to inform North Koreans about the ship sinking. [AP]
The leaflets may or may not reach a lot of people, but if the South Koreans send enough of them, they’ll put a significant strain on the morale and maintenance of any units sent out to comb the countryside for them. It should be an explicit goal of South Korean psyops not just to propagate information, but to overload the security forces’ capacity to suppress it.
If they’re willing to drop leaflets, why not radios, cell phones, MP4 players, and crank chargers? If they’re willing to broadcast a radio broadcast signal, why not a cell phone signal? Here’s hoping that’s the next step. North Koreans do need information, but what they need most is for their isolation to be broken down.
I remain disappointed that Lee hasn’t yet made the decision to close down Kaesong, but his decision to restart psyops and information operations against North Korea is more consequential than any other response to the sinking of the Cheonan.
In the final installment for the foreseeable future, I discuss what we, and a North Korean underground, could hope to accomplish against the world’s most totalitarian state with a standing army of more than a million men.
We have always tolerated North Korea’s brutality, time and again. We did so because we have always had a genuine longing for peace on the Korean peninsula…. But now things are different. North Korea will pay a price corresponding to its provocative acts,” he said. “I will continue to take stern measures to hold the North accountable. — President Lee Myung Bak
After this, President Lee explained that his government will adopt the followingmeasures as a response to North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan:
1. Take North Korea to the U.N. Security Council and spend a lot of diplomatic capital to get China to abstain from our draft of a “very angry letter” that China will just ignore anyway. Insert mandatory clip:
Now, I suppose it’s possible that the resolution to come may include some really tough enforcement provisions — such as authorization to board ships on the high seas, or a ban on mineral exports — that will be even harder for China to circumvent, but China has hardly slowed its support for Kim Jong Il and its facilitation of his proliferation activities since UNSCR 1874 passed. If South Korea and the United States are really serious about getting China’s attention, they’re going to have to get serious about things that China cares about more than any U.N. resolution: imposing trade barriers on Chinese imports, freezing the assets of Chinese companies and banks that funnel aid to North Korea, helping Taiwan to nuke up, and beginning talks on the establishment of a regional missile defense shield that would include Taiwan, and destabilizing North Korea. China can’t have it both ways forever.
2. Halt all trade with North Korea, but with the exception of the Kaesong Industrial Park, an exception that swallows the rule.
“North Korea’s trade with the South has accounted for up to 38 percent of its total trade volume and makes up 13 percent of its gross domestic product. With the dollars obtained through inter-Korean trade, the North has expanded its businesses with China. It (the trade with the South) also helped Pyongyang to cushion any negative external risks such as sanctions by Japan, while acquiring dollars needed to govern the country,” the report said.
“If we push for a measure to suspend the trade, it could translate into a decline in its trade with China and make it tough to find other business partners as a result, dealing a direct blow to its regime by blocking it from obtaining dollars,” it added. The report noted that a trade ban by the Seoul government would have a maximum level of impact if China follows suit, which it expects could place Pyongyang under a situation where “it has to think about its life or death.” [Yonhap]
The author then paused to exhale the lungful of smoke he’d been holding as he wrote that entire passage.
3. Expand South Korea’s participation in John Bolton’s Proliferation Security Initiative, though the details of that cooperation remain to be seen.
4. Conduct joint anti-submarine drills with the U.S. Navy. Horse, barn, door.
5. Close the Jeju Strait to North Korean shipping, meaning that North Korean ships will have a slightly longer trip between the east and west coasts.
6. Turn on the loudspeakers at the DMZ, a conspicuously stoopid idea. Ditto the large electronic sign boards. This isn’t 1970, and the small number of North Korean troops at the DMZ who will hear or see those messages are the best trained, most disciplined soldiers in the North Korean army. Sure, a few have defected in recent years, but why just poke Kim Jong Il in the eye absent a prospect of having any real subversive effect? Technology provides the means to reach far more North Koreans to far greater effect today. For example, South Korea could put up a tall antenna just south of the DMZ, broadcast a cell phone signal to North Korea, and then dump tens of thousands of cheap phones on the North. Bye-bye information blockade. And we haven’t begun to talk about flooding the North with radios, MP4 players, and cash to stimulate markets and smuggling. For its part, North Korea says it will shoot at the loudspeakers:
“If the group of traitors challenges the just reaction of (North Korea), this will be followed by stronger physical strike to eliminate the root cause of the provocations,” he said, arguing his troops are enraged by the sight of South Korean equipment.
President Bush removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008. On February 2, 2010, President Obama decided not to restore North Korea to the list. Discuss among yourselves.
On a slightly more promising note, the South is also saying it will also send leaflets to the North by balloon detailing the result of the Cheonan investigation. I’m not sure this is going to cause much grief or outrage among the North Koreans who read the leaflets. Still, it’s good to see South Korea finally dip its toe back into the information operations business again. There are so many more promising things the South can do if it really gets serious about this.
If this is all that President Lee intends to do, North Korea will have gotten away with murder, and Lee’s warning that “[f]rom now on, the Republic of Korea will not tolerate any provocative act by the North and will maintain a principle of proactive deterrence,” will fail to reestablish deterrence. Frankly, it’s difficult to see what good Kaesong is really doing for South Korea today. Clearly, it’s not going to attract substantial new investment or become a manufacturing center for exports. I can understand that President Lee wouldn’t want to shut the place down while there are still potential hostages up there, but you’d think that if Lee intended to shut the place down, he’d have made those arrangements before this announcement.
Fortunately, this doesn’t appear to be a complete list yet. Lee is sending his diplomats out to push as hard as they can for diplomatic support from China, Russia, and a whole cast of characters. But as long as South Korean money continues flowing into Pyongyang, it’s going to be difficult to ask other countries to do what’s really going to hurt Kim Jong Il’s regime and constrict its finances sufficiently that it will be unable to feed its army and pay its bureaucracy.
For its part, the Obama Administration is reviewing “existing authorities and policies” with respect to North Korea, which has to mean, at a minimum, that North Korea goes back on the terror list, although this would hardly be a complete response by itself. Unfortunately, Secretary of State Clinton is already talking like the United States will slow down the transfer of operation wartime control to ROK forces. And while I agree that this probably isn’t an especially good time to signal withdrawal or disengagement from Korea, one lesson we’ve learned from the Cheonan incident is that South Korean military dependence is more conducive to complacency that it is to a capable and vigilant defense. The United States can provide better support to the South from the air and sea than with vulnerable, forward-deployed ground forces. Above all, we can help South Korea improve its own self-defense capabilities, capabilities that were allowed to deteriorate under ten years of leftist rule.
Don Kirk concludes that negotiating with Kim Jong Il is a waste of time and lives, and that regime change is the only way the world’s many problems with the Kim Jong Il regime will ever be solved. I’ll let you read it on your own, although I doubt that the Kim Dynasty will be brought to a close the same way Pol Pot’s was.
I’m going to spend the next few days focusing most of my attention on the Cheonan incident and how we ought to respond to it, here are some links on the Ling sisters and their book promotion. You already know my ambivalence about this whole story, but to her credit, Laura Ling hasn’t forgotten why she went to the Tumen River to begin with, and I suppose more people will now hear that story on the Today Show than they might have on Current TV:
All of which makes any State Department apology to China about one U.S. state’s immigration policy all the more ridiculous, and that’s all I’m going to say about that.
In Part 3, I discuss harnessing the power of the jangmadang, how to destroy North Korea’s information blockade, the logistics of contraband, and how to attrit the capabilities of North Korea’s security forces before the people even begin to oppose the regime.
What is it with the North Korean spy agencies’ recent proclivity for using “women of a certain age” to target horny South Korean men? First, there was 
