Curb Your Enthusiasm: On Change in North Korea

Over at Destination Pyongyang, Chris Green offers some useful cautions to those who have allowed themselves to become unduly aroused at the prospect of reform in North Korea based on “evidence” that is either superficial, questionable, irrelevant, or some combination of these things.  Green questions “hyperbolic” reports that North Korea will abandon its central rationing system — a system that is more responsible for North Korea’s famine and hunger than any other single factor — because that would mean ceding a key means of controlling its subjects.  He also cites evidence that North Korea is, while denying any intention of reforming, also showing some leg to hopeful observers abroad to attract foreign aid.

It’s Stephan Haggard, however, who does the best job of putting all of this into perspective in a few short paragraphs, when he says:

Let’s calibrate expectations. First, to our knowledge there is no document that actually spells out—in print—the reform measures that are getting so much Western attention. Everything we are speculating about is based on reporting from a small handful of second-hand Korean sources. This is significant not only because the reform rumors may simply be false, but because the leadership has not committed publicly to the measures that are getting so much attention.

Second, however, this is understandable because no leader of North Korea is going to stand up and embrace market-oriented polices and protection of private property rights per se. Any reform (or “improvements” [??]) must be embedded in an ideological justification that ties it to the existing regime and its historical antecedents in the Great and Dear Leaders. The document “Let Us Effect Kim Jong Il’s Patriotism and Step Up the Building of a Prosperous Country”—released to the public on July 26—is not available in English yet, although the KCNA devoted no fewer than four separate stories to it on August 3. But it is laden with efforts to tie vaguely-worded economic objectives to patriotism and Kim Jong Un’s family lineage; this is the sort of ideological engineering we would expect.

Third, it is also important to recognize that no reform in such a system is going to overthrow the state-socialist system or be big-bang in form. Given the nervousness and ambivalence of the leadership toward the market—some of it well-founded–policy changes are going to be piecemeal, experimental and modest. Moreover, their objective is going to be strengthen—not weaken—the state socialist system. “Reform” could even make things worse; think the 2009 currency conversion.

Finally, there has been a lot of loose talk suggesting that “reform” implies some sort of political change. To the contrary, economic reforms or improvements are designed to consolidate power and forestall political change, not lead it. One need look no farther than the DPRK’s northern neighbor to understand that dynamic.

My point here isn’t that North Korea’s rulers will always resist all changes to the system.  They probably know better than anyone that current trends aren’t sustainable forever, no matter how many checks China writes.  Commentators like to mock predictions of regime collapse in North Korea, but in fact, North Korea has been in a state of steady economic, political, physical, and social disintegration since 1993, and while domestic terror can delay the inevitable, it can’t prevent it.  Only North Koreans know for certain, but I suspect that outside Pyongyang, the people are deeply discontented, and all that still glues the regime’s rule together is the lack of any alternative, which still can’t quite arise because of the people’s isolation, fear, and exhaustion, and probably some residual awe and nationalism.  An internal challenge — which at this point, would have to come from within the military — could inflame North Korea and morph in a Syrian-style civil war as quickly as clandestine communications allow the news to spread.  Ironically, the only thing that could really gird it among the disillusioned masses now is the threat of some external force.  That’s about all the regime’s propaganda really has left.

My point is, however, that any changes in North Korea in the short term will be modest and cosmetic, designed to preserve the regime’s control and its essentially repressive and threatening character.  The junta will seek to eliminate marginal inefficiencies, wrest control of currency-earning enterprises from disfavored factions, and attract external aid through cryptic inducements and diplomatic scams.  North Korea’s rulers — whose record of “reform” is largely one of retrograde incompetence — will not direct significant economic reforms until they find themselves under far more immediate and severe economic and political duress than they’re feeling today.  For now, there is only sketchy evidence to suggest that this is the case, and only in isolated places beyond Pyongyang’s well-guarded gates.  North Korea still seems to be getting plenty of support from China, and I doubt that North Korea would be threatening to tie a toe tag on the 2005 Joint Statement (long a dead letter in any event) if it didn’t have some confidence about its short-term survival.

Of course, there’s always the possibility of a mutiny or a coup by some disgruntled general, but it’s impossible to assess the likelihood of such a development.  That possibility has lurked, unconsummated, for a long time now.

In the medium term, however, the sort of distress that would force significant economic (and then, political) change is starting to look more and more likely.  Why?  For the same reasons that toppled Communist regimes from Kabul to Berlin in the five-year period starting in 1989, and transformed almost every other nominally Communist regime that still stood at the end of that period — the loss of great-power sponsorship.  Almost alone, North Korea barely survived that period by finding itself a new sugar daddy.  But within the next two years, and probably much sooner, China will begin to feel the full economic and political impact of the bursting of its real estate bubble.  Next will come a threat to its banks, many of them laden with bad state-directed debts.  Already, we’re seeing the first small signs of capital flight.  Today, China’s behavior resembles the manic cycle of like a 19 year-old meth addict whose high has just peaked.  China’s crash will be a very bad thing for the U.S. economy, too, of course, and it will be a time of extreme geopolitical danger.

The bright side to that dark cloud is that China will be seeking a lot of economic indulgences — on trade, exchange rates, intellectual property, market accessibility, and interest rates — from its most important trading partner, which will put us in a relatively stronger position to ask for other things in return. If we’re foresighted enough, the end of China’s sponsorship of North Korea will be one of those demands.  Even if we’re not, China might independently decide that North Korea is an expense it can’t afford.  That will force North Korea to make significant concessions to its neighbors, to its own people, to a new economic reality, and to us.  But once that juggernaut starts rolling downhill, there will be no controlling its speed or direction.

Update:  I also recommend this guest post by Gene Choi at Witness to Transformation.  Again, the change at all levels of society comes from the bottom up, not from the top down.

9 Responses

  1. Carl, stop assuming that I AGREE or DISAGREE with something that neither you nor I have even read.

  2. Eric,

    You are always saying that this blog can’t bring about real change, but you are waaaaay off and you know it. It was this blog that brought about the change in leadership after they saw the true that was coming out. So think about that before you run off at the mouth. We haven’t changed anything ?! BS. There has been a huge change in my pants. Sweet dreams, son. Think about that as you dream of skinny, malnourished North Korean women, you ass.

  3. By the way, Eric, you say Josh doesn’t know what he’s talking about ? He fucking served on the DMZ and stared the North Korean army down, eyeball to eyeball ! He’s a motherfucking hero as far as I’m concerned. What have you done ? Bash him and then whack off to Maxim ?! Nice. You should go to the DMZ like Josh did and you’ll see what it is really like in North Korea !!

  4. By the way, Eric, you say Josh doesn’t know what he’s talking about ? He served on the DMZ and stared the North Korean army down, eyeball to eyeball ! He’s a damn hero as far as I’m concerned. What have you done ? Bash him and then whack off to Maxim ?! Nice. You should go to the DMZ like Josh did and you’ll see what it is really like in North Korea !!

  5. Eric, you wish your own blog was half as good as this. You just repost new articles with your own stupid thoughts as if you know something about the news in Korea. I will give you credit for posting those racy photos, but all you are really doing is taking other peoples posts from the web and claiming them as your own. In my book you are just as bad as the North Koreans you seem to support.

  6. Are you saying that guy stared down the norks? What did the norks do, when they say him staring at them? Did they train their cameras on him and identify who he was and what he did? They DID? He DID?

    My blog is my blog and nobody will run my blog but me, the greatest blogger about whatever it is I choose to blog about. That’s REAL freedom, Carl — independent minds doing things independently unlike corporations who are all corporationy. It’s a Zerof thing, you just wouldn’t understand.

  7. I’ll tell you what they did, Eric, nothing. The did absolutely nothing because they knew if they did do something, they’d have to account for it later on-line. They are in fear of this blog because it tells the truth, unlike your drivel that just reposts crappy news stories about North Korea from around the globe. You want to talk about corporations acting all corporationy ? Look in the mirror. What about the corporations that advertise on your blog. How many of them support murder, rape, and oppression in North Korea by their silence? Huh ? You can’t answer that because you don’t know, do you Jergoff ?! Nice way to run a blog, lilac !