Two weeks ago, I surveyed the evidence of China’s compliance with new U.N. sanctions and found “mixed, yet hopeful signs.” One area in which the signs has seemed especially hopeful was the enforcement of shipping sanctions. The Philippines had already seized one designated ship, the Sierra Leone-flagged M/V Jin Teng, and detained another, the non-designated, North Korean-crewed, Tuvalu-flagged tanker M/V Theresa Begonia. There was also some evidence that Chinese ports were complying, but we’ll get to that later.
Under the resolutions, all member states are required to seize designated ships, like the Jin Teng, but the reasons for the detention of the Theresa Begonia aren’t clear. A report that an unnamed U.N. member state had cancelled its registrations of North Korean ships could be a clue. If the state in question is Tuvalu, the ship might have arrived in port without a valid registration. North Korea’s reflaggers of choice have been Mongolia, Cambodia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tuvalu, and Kiribati.
Since then, however, China has pushed the U.S. into supporting the removal by the U.N. of four ships’ designations — the Jin Teng and three other North Korean ships — on the basis that China “discovered” that they were not owned or controlled by U.N.-designated Ocean Maritime Management Company at all. It’s worrying that this decision doesn’t appear to be based on any finding of the Panel of Experts, but on a unilateral conclusion by the Chinese, who pressured the U.S. to accede.
The U.S. did not accede easily. Reuters obtained several diplomatic messages between U.S. and Chinese diplomats, revealing that China threatened to hold up reauthorization of the U.N. Panel of Experts unless the U.S. agreed to removing the designations. This led to what Reuters called a “frustrated back and forth between Washington and Beijing,” in which Samantha Power accused the Chinese of “blackmail.”
The removal of the Jin Teng‘s designation presumably means that Filipino authorities will allow the ship to depart with its crew after the mandatory inspections are completed. Reuters had previously reported that a U.N. inspection team was on the way to the Philippines to inspect the Jin Teng.
It bears careful watching just how often the U.S. will be willing to cave to Chinese demands like these. On balance, it’s probably better to recognize and adjudicate exemptions, designations, and removals of designations than to just go back to what we all used to do — ignore China’s cheating. But there is also a great deal of confusion over how Chinese ports are enforcing shipping sanctions. According to a detailed report in the Asahi Shimbun, the ports of Tainjin, Yingkou, Rizhao, Penglai, Weifang, and Nantong have all barred North Korean ships from entering.
Sources close to Chinese port authorities and trading firms said the port authority in Yingkou, Liaoning province, initially prohibited the entry of all North Korean vessels to Yingkou port based on verbal instructions from the nation’s maritime affairs authority on March 16.
In addition, local port authorities had imposed a ban on entry by North Korean ships at the ports of Rizhao, Penglai and Weifang in Shandong province as well as Nantong port in Jiangsu province and Tianjin port as of March 21.
The five newly-added ports are all major gateways for China’s imports of natural resources from North Korea, while Yingkou port serves as a major hub for coal imports from the belligerent neighbor.
Port authority sources at Penglai and Weifang ports acknowledged that entry by North Korean vessels is prohibited.
“We received a verbal order out of the blue from the customs authority on March 19, and all North Korean vessels are anchored outside the port awaiting permission to enter,” said an official of the Penglai port authority on March 21. [Asahi Shimbun]
Note well that the sources quoted are all local port authorities and traders, rather than national authorities.
According to officials at trading firms involved in China-North Korea commerce, China’s maritime affairs authority has demanded that the operators of North Korean freighters stranded outside the six ports resubmit documents that are required for a port entry application. [Asahi Shimbun]
As a result, North Korean freighters are reportedly hovering offshore, waiting for the Chinese port authorities to review their documents. If the documents check out, they may be allowed to dock. The delays alone will be disruptive to Pyongyang’s finances. Increased inspections could also have a strong impact on North Korea’s lucrative counterfeit cigarette smuggling industry. NK News adds:
While NK News was unable to get confirmation from port authorities at the time of writing, live shipping data shows irregular groupings of North Korean vessels in anchorage off and in close proximity to the listed ports, a possible indicator that the measures are being implemented.
A group of 10 North Korean flagged ships is clustered around Longkou harbour, which is only 40km from Penglai, with a further five North Korean affiliated ships among them. The North Korean flagged Tong Chon is also in close proximity and is around 9km from the port of Penglai.
Four North Korean flagged vessels are also near Bayuqaun, which is within 50km of Yingkou, and are joined by a further eight North Korean affiliated vessels sailing under foreign flags of convenience.
According to the website of China’s Maritime Safety Administration, Yingkou’s port authority also has jurisdiction over Bayuquan port.
“There are an unusually large number of North Korea linked ships near Bayuquan and Longkou, which indicates they could have been rerouted from other ports,” Leo Byrne, Director of Data and Analytics at NK News said.
Another grouping of five DPRK flagged vessels has been seen near the port of Lanshan within the last 24 hours. Lanshan is 35km from the port of Rizaho, which is also on the alleged list of ports banning North Korean vessels from entering. Several of the North Korean flagged ships have since headed away from the anchorages of Lanshan and Rizaho.
“It’s worth noting that if accurate, the Chinese embargo would go well beyond what’s required in Resolution 2270,” Byrne said.
“But questions remain, it’s unclear why North Korean ships would be barred from those ports, yet not Dalian – the most visited port of call for North Korean ships in the area.” [NK News, Hamish Macdonald]
So what do the national authorities say? Beijing has denied implementing “a blanket ban” on North Korean ships, saying, “The reports have no truth,” and that the media should “not invent stories.”
The accusation is preposterous, typical of China’s hostility toward foreign media, and revealing of the pressure China is feeling. The Asahi and NK News reports are well supported and credible. They aren’t inventions, but they are inconsistent with other reports. Last week, for example, Reuters reported that China had banned only U.N. designated ships, and Yonhap reported that the port of Dandong had turned away a North Korean ship “as part of a broader ban on North Korean ships.” Adding to the confusion is the fact that North Korean ships have been turning off their transponders while at sea to avoid tracking.
As I’ve noted before, a complete embargo is more than either U.N. or U.S. sanctions require. U.N. sanctions bar coal imports except for “livelihood” reasons (whatever that means in practice) and require member states to seize ships owned or controlled by designated entities, such as Ocean Maritime Management and the Reconnaissance General Bureau.
U.S. sanctions authorize U.S. Customs and Border Protection to raise inspection requirements for cargo coming from ports and airports where “inspections of ships, aircraft, and conveyances originating in North Korea, carrying North Korean property, or operated by the Government of North Korea are not sufficient to effectively prevent the facilitation of any of the activities described in section 104(a).” Those activities include arms smuggling and WMD proliferation. They also mandate secondary sanctions against Chinese buyers of North Korean coal and other minerals.
In other words, U.N. and (especially) U.S. sanctions directly threaten the interests of local Chinese ports and traders, which is to maintain unfettered access to U.S. markets and the dollar system. Given the choice of trading with North Korea and trading with the U.S., some ports and shippers may — I stress, may — be choosing the latter. That represents a sharp divergence of the ports’ interests from those of Beijing, which is expending diplomatic capital to limit the harm sanctions do to Pyongyang.
This isn’t the only possibility here. The simplest is that Chinese ports and shippers are themselves getting conflicting and confusing instructions from Beijing. There is also some evidence that undercuts this theory. As recently as last week, some Chinese buyers were still accepting North Korean coal, perhaps believing that the “livelihood” loophole applied to their purchases (but see this). And the reported enforcement of cargo inspections at land border crossing almost certainly was based on instructions from Beijing.
If Beijing is now in a contest with Washington to influence the conduct of ports in northeastern China, then Kim Jong-un has indeed become a serious “strategic liability” for Beijing, just as its economy is slowing. It shows. For example, I’ve never seen the nationalist, anti-American Global Times show so much irritation and pessimism about North Korea. Read that last link. It’s precisely the kind of sentiment the U.S. should be encouraging in China. When North Korea becomes enough of a liability for China, China will rethink its interests, and maybe diplomacy will stand a chance.