Using the law to break Africa’s addiction to North Korean weapons

When Africa binges on North Korean weapons, it doesn’t just deprive Africa of resources its people need for development; it fuels conflict and human rights abuses by some of the world’s most despotic governments. It also finances and encourages Pyongyang’s militarist reunification drive, and helps it buy more weapons for its generals to point at and terrorize South Korean cities. As with arms purchases by Syria, arms sales to Africa are a major hole in our sanctions that the Trump administration hasn’t applied much force or imagination to solving. Cutting off that trade and closing that hole will be necessary to convince a critical mass of generals and officials in Pyongyang that Kim Jong-un’s policies are leading them to ruin. Unfortunately, the latest report from the U.N. Panel of Experts shows only mixed progress at a time when rapid progress is essential to strengthening our hand in the long and difficult negotiations to come.

Starting with the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 in 2006, North Korea has been subject to an arms embargo. Over the years, resolution by resolution, that embargo has expanded to include all imports or exports of “arms and related materiel,” a broad term that includes a long list of military and dual-use goods, materials, equipment, technology, and services. More recent resolutions have also banned the purchase of slave labor (UNSCR 2397, para. 8) and statues (UNSCR 2321, para. 29) from North Korea, which feature in African despots’ self-aggrandizing political monuments, but whose inflated prices suggest that they may also be used to launder payments for weapons.

[via The Namibia Sun]

Most of the reports on North Korean activities in Africa involve three entities: the Mansudae Overseas Projects Group (which does construction, including the construction of monuments and statues), Green Pine (an arms dealer), Korea Haegumgang Trading (designated by Treasury for being a North Korean government entity, but a known arms dealer) and especially KOMID, the Korean Mining and Industrial Development Corporation. KOMID is North Korea’s most infamous arms-dealing firm, whose wares include missiles and missile parts. It has been designated by the Treasury Department since 2005 and by the U.N. since 2009. The other entities are also designated by Treasury and the U.N., except for Haegumgang, which is not designated by the U.N. One Haegumgang representative, a diplomat based in South Africa, is also under European Union and United Kingdom sanctions. (Update: This is a great use for C4ADS’s new Sanctions Explorer.)

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Angola, a long-standing North Korean arms client, has begun to flip, and has kicked out 152 North Koreans working for Mansudae. Luanda also handed over “detailed information on Mansudae’s activities as well as supporting documents of the expulsion of DPRK nationals from Angola” to the Panel. Still in Angola are 80 North Korean military advisors, and possibly a contingent from Green Pine. According to previous Panel reports, Angola bought patrol boat engines and training for its presidential guard from North Korea.

After years of ignoring the Panel’s questions, Namibia (previous posts here, here, here, and here) finally provided some answers, claiming that “all” North Korean workers (apparently 242 of them) had left the country, and that all contracts with North Korean companies have been cancelled. Prior reports suggest that Namibia’s dealings with North Korea involved both construction projects with Mansudae and an arms factory with KOMID. Although at least one Namibian bank claims to have terminated its relationships with some North Korean entities, the Namibian government became suspiciously quiet when asked if it had paid the North Koreans or frozen their accounts (as is required for all U.N.-designated entities).

The Panel couldn’t confirm reports that Sudan had stopped buying weapons from North Korea, or Khartoum’s claim that it “completely cut off its military cooperation with North Korea.” According to a previous Panel report, Sudan bought multiple-launch rocket artillery from Pyongyang. If Khartoum has flipped, it hasn’t flipped decisively enough to cooperate with the Panel’s investigation. That cooperation may be just as important as the cessation of the business relationship with North Korea — first, because it allows us to verify the cessation itself; and second, because that cooperation will yield intelligence (names, passport numbers, bank account numbers) to help us identify and shut down other North Korean arms deals. There is also evidence of recent dealings by Sudan with North Korean arms dealer KOMID and a suspected North Korean front called “NPN Electronics Company.”

Last September, the government of Uganda (previous posts here) told the Panel that all of its military cooperation with North Korea had ended — except that in December, it told the Panel that in October, it had kicked out two more previously undisclosed diplomats who were peddling arms for KOMID. It turned some information over to the Panel about its air force training contracts, but not about KOMID representatives working in Uganda. One can’t help wondering what Kampala is still hiding.

Eritrea still isn’t cooperating with the Panel’s investigation into Glocom, an arms manufacturer operating from Malaysia, Singapore, and China, and controlled by the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Eritrea’s government is also one of the world’s worst human rights abusers, and is suspected of having supported the Al Qaeda-affiliate Al-Shabab. If we’re going to set an example to get the attention of other African states that violations have consequences, Eritrea is a strong candidate.

There are new revelations about North Korea’s dealings with Zimbabwe, which I wrote about here, shortly after the overthrow of Robert Mugabe by his Defense Minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa, a/k/a “The Crocodile.” The Crocodile’s North Korean links run deep. Most infamously, he employed the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade to massacre tens of thousands of members of the minority Ndebele tribe in the 1980s. This is the Panel’s first explanation of just how extensive those links appear to be:

144. The Panel is investigating the reported presence of the Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies122 and individuals working on behalf of the Green Pine Associated Corporation and the Reconnaissance General Bureau in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe provided information on two Mansudae companies, “Mansudae Ordinance Supplies” and “Mansudae Boka Design Company”, stating that the latter is “not a subsidiary of Mansudae Overseas Project or Mansudae Art Studio”. It further stated that Mansudae Ordinance Supplies “is dormant” and that the Mansudae Boka Design Company “focused on gold and precious metals”, initially as a “jewelry design company” and is now a “manufacturer for jewelry”.123 However, the Panel notes that two of the three directors of the Mansudae Boka Design Company, Yun Kyong Chol and Kim Kyong Ryop, are nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Zimbabwe informed the Panel that the company was being dissolved. In response to the Panel’s letter requesting immigration information on 83 nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and their activities on behalf of designated entities,124 Zimbabwe informed the Panel that Ri Hak Chol had travelled to Zimbabwe via air on 18 August 2017 and departed on 23 August 2017. Kim Yong Nam travelled to Zimbabwe at least two times in 2017 (15 to 23 February and 21 June to 23 August). 125 Ri Hak Chol is the president of Saeing P’il Corporation and has travelled to Angola, Egypt and the Islamic Republic of Iran, 126 where arms-related activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have been reported. 127 Kim Yong Nam is reportedly an officer of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, a designated entity that oversees the activities of the Green Pine Associated Corporation. The Panel is continuing its investigation into the activities of these individuals in Zimbabwe.

As I noted in my previous post, the Crocodile won’t part with his North Korean links easily, but right now, he needs to get international sanctions lifted to improve Zimbabwe’s economy (not to mention his personal finances). Zimbabwe may want to turn a new page in its relations with the world and get sanctions against him and his government lifted. That gives us leverage. The right combination of subtle threats and inducements might sway the Crocodile to expel the North Koreans and share his intelligence about their activities there. If he turned on Mugabe, he can be persuaded to turn on Kim Jong-un.

Tanzania has contracted with Haegumgang Trading Company, whose head is based in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to upgrade some surface-to-air missile systems (according to a previous POE report, North Koreans also trained DR Congo’s presidential guard). Tanzania said it terminated the contract in 2014, except that according to “a member state,” in 2016, Tanzania sent the North Koreans a 40 percent down payment and resumed the arrangements. The Panel then asked Tanzania to prove that the contracts had been canceled, but Tanzania never responded. Tanzania has also been noncompliant on shipping sanctions. Its record of mendacity makes it another strong candidate for mandatory sanctions under section 104(a) of the NKSPEA.

Last year’s POE reports first revealed evidence that North Korea had turned Mozambique into a major KOMID arms client, a revelation that drew much interest and hints of possible corruption from local media. For example, this story claims that the arms were paid for with “hidden loans” to government corporations from Credit Suisse and VTB Bank of Russia. Those banks would have been obligated — both to regulators, and to their shareholders — to ask their borrowers how they planned on spending that money.

We now learn that Mozambique is also a Mansudae statue client and a haven for circumventing the seafood export ban via Haegumgang (see this report for more on that). Mozambique also has purchased arms from Haegumgang, which dispatched technicians based in Nyumbu, near Daar-as-Salam, Tanzania to service Mozambique’s inventory of SAMs and radars. According to the EU, Choe Kwang-su, the South Africa-based diplomat and Haegumgang representative I referred to previously, signed a contract for an arms deal with a company controlled by the government of Mozambique. Any dollar transactions used for the associated loans or payments would likely constitute IEEPA violations and money laundering, and subject those involved to mandatory sanctions (if not indictments).

There’s a temptation to temper our expectations of a country with an AK-47 on its flag, but fortunately, the Panel reports that Mozambique “started working closely with the Panel in October 2017,” which hopefully means that this budding relationship has been nipped. Also, Mozambique claims that there is no longer a North Korean embassy in Maputo. As long as that cooperation continues, we can avoid any further unpleasantness.

More on North Korea’s arms deals in Africa here and here.

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The Panel’s report suggests that a combination of its own investigations and quiet diplomatic pressure from member states has made some progress in reducing the size and scope of North Korea’s activities in Africa, but it has also been a case of “two steps forward, one step back.” Some African governments seem not to know what the resolutions say or don’t care. My guess is that Africa’s fence-sitters have already been talked out of their arms deals with North Korea. Most of those that continue to buy Pyongyang’s weapons — and statues, and slave labor — have longstanding ideological, military, and commercial relationships with North Korea. Our challenge now is to make them care. The first step is to name and shame the offending states.

But some of these states are shameless, so further steps may be necessary. Not all of these cases necessarily call for equal responses, of course. Take the case of Egypt, which has become one of North Korea’s most important arms clients in Africa. In September, it said it had cut military ties with North Korea, but as you undoubtedly noticed in the blockquote above, a North Korean arms dealer was also in Egypt last year. So this year, in its most recent appropriations act, Congress put an additional condition on military aid to Egypt. Congress has withheld that aid unless the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking specific steps to improve human rights, but created a broad national security waiver. To invoke that waiver, however, State now needs to jump through an additional hoop by reporting back to Congress on Egypt’s compliance with North Korea sanctions (see Division K, section 7041). Maybe that additional pressure will suffice.

There are stricter limitations on aid to other governments in section 7043. Burma’s government is ineligible for economic aid unless it “has terminated military cooperation with North Korea,” and Cambodia’s eligibility is also judged on its compliance with North Korea sanctions. Governments that “engage[] in significant transactions contributing materially to the malicious cyber-intrusion capabilities of the Government of North Korea” are also ineligible, unless State invokes a national interest waiver provision. There are other, similar conditions on aid in the NKSPEA:

The CAATSA (Title III of which is the KIMS Act) later amended and strengthened this provision to read as follows:

And for those that still don’t cooperate, we have stronger medicine.

The NKSPEA has been in effect for just over two years now. Congress should be reasonably patient with the administration as it tries quiet diplomacy and gentle persuasion. But the time for patience is coming to an end. The key word in section 104(a) that the administration must understand is “shall.” At some point, for words to have their intended effects, they must mean something.