Archive for “United” Nations

What will a U.N. inquiry on N. Korean human rights actually mean?

The U.N. Human Rights Council is set to approve an inquiry into human rights conditions in North Korea, conditions that a U.N. investigator says “may” be crimes against humanity:

Marzuki Darusman, an investigator for the United Nations, is expected to present a report to the council urging the creation of an international commission of inquiry to follow up on the abuses recorded in the eight years that a United Nations official has monitored human rights in the North.  [N.Y. Times]

So, what exactly would that mean?

“An inquiry mechanism could produce a more complete picture, quantify and qualify the violations in terms of international law, attribute responsibility to particular actors or perpetrators of these violations and suggest effective courses of international action,” Mr. Darusman said in the report. [N.Y. Times]

It could also presage indictments in the International Criminal Court — indictments that China would have to expend cred and capital to block.

The U.N. Human Rights Council will likely consider and approve Darusman’s recommendation in March, in a resolution to be co-sponsored by the EU and Japan in March.  South Korea’s co-sponsorship is notably absent, but at least South Korea will actively support the measure, which is a change for the better.  Here’s another change for the better:

“We are in effect ramping up international political pressure on this unparalleled, systemwide failure in respect to human rights,” Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe, the American ambassador to the Human Rights Council, said by telephone. “We’re hoping that even if it doesn’t crack the whole system that on some of these issues we might see some opening and some change because of this pressure.”  [N.Y. Times]

Robert Joseph puts this in context nicely:

“Exposing the North’s brutality toward its own citizens has not been a priority component of U.S. policy,” Robert Joseph, the top State Department disarmament diplomat in the George W. Bush administration, told a U.S. Senate hearing on Thursday.

“In fact, concerns about how such exposure might affect the prospects for engagement with the regime have worked to place human rights atrocities in a separate box which is mostly neglected if seen as complicating higher order diplomacy,” he said, in a view widely shared by the human rights community.  [Reuters]

Reading further, it’s clear that this effort by human rights lawyer Jared Genser played an important role in getting the U.N. to finally focus on this issue.  Another factor appears to be the emerging consensus that quiet diplomacy has failed to disarm North Korea or address the human rights issue.  Policymakers no longer worry that emphasizing human rights will cause North Korea to walk away from disarmament talks.  After all, they walked away from those talks five years ago.  Since then, they’ve carried out two missile tests, two nuke tests, and two major attacks on South Korea.

I’ve been as skeptical as anyone about the capacity of the U.N. to do much of anything binding, and in fact, even the Times agrees that an inquiry would be a largely symbolic gesture. Where this will really matter is in how it shapes other, more tangible debates in committee meetings, floor votes, and in the boardrooms of companies making investment decisions.

Last week, I asked whether Dennis Rodman would have played Sun City. He wouldn’t have, because at least one responsible adult of average intelligence would have warned him that it would have been career suicide.  Maybe playing Pyongyang will be prove to be career suicide for Rodman; his career is long over anyway.  But the Rodman episode does illustrate that in most households, North Korea isn’t yet the pariah it deserves to be.  When it is, that will have severe consequences for a regime that survives on foreign currency.

For a variety of reasons, the U.N. Human Rights Council doesn’t have the moral authority to pin that label on North Korea. Ironically, one good reason may be that it has it has ignored this issue for so long.  Still, such things require a steady and determined drumbeat to work.

Update:  North Korea calls the charges “faked material … invented by the hostile forces, defectors and other rabbles.” Am I a “hostile force” or an “other rabbles?”

Chinese banks host massive slush funds for Kim Jong Un despite “tough” new U.N. resolution

So over the weekend, I read U.N. Security Council Resolution 2094, and I didn’t see much that deviated from the low expectations I expressed based on the press reports.  (Since then, Marcus Noland has expressed a similarly pessimistic view).

For those nations that are interested in strict enforcement, there is useful material in this; for example, the reference to the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, which you can find on Page 13 of this document, will cause some nations to be more circumspect about letting their banks host North Korean funds.  But in the end, as with previous resolutions, the effectiveness of this one will depend on how different nations interpret vague terms like “credible evidence” and “reasonable grounds to believe,” and more specifically, how strictly China is willing to enforce it.

What’s that, you ask? A timely and relevant example that could answer the critical question in the previous paragraph, thereby providing useful guidance to policy-makers?  OK, I think I’ll go with this one:

12. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks, and also calls upon States to prohibit DPRK banks from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or this resolution;

Someone play Handel’s Messiah as we enter a new world of financial due diligence, in which the regime and its key figures can no longer keep massive slush funds in offshore banks and freely repurpose them for suspicious alloys, hollow-point ammo for the border guards, and a customized Maybach electric scooter for His Porcine Majesty to ride around the Kwangbok Area Supermarket. Right?

South Korean and U.S. authorities have found dozens of accounts presumed to belong to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in several banks in Shanghai and other parts of China. They contain hundreds of millions of dollars.

Yet for some reason the accounts were excluded from financial sanctions under the new UN Security Council Resolution 2098, which was adopted last Thursday, posing questions over the effectiveness of the measures.

A government source here said an investigation that lasted for several years led South Korea and the U.S. to the accounts. “We have located the names of the account holders and account numbers, some of them set up in the days of former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il,” the source added.

South Korean and U.S. officials urged China to include the accounts in the latest sanctions against North Korea, but Beijing apparently refused. “Following North Korea’s third nuclear test, China has demonstrated willingness to take part in sanctions against the North,” the government source said. “But Beijing is reluctant to touch North Korea’s real Achilles heel.”  [Chosun Ilbo]

Hat tip to the South Korean government Strategic Leak Wire Service.

So we can already see where this is all headed, if the past isn’t sufficient to tell you.  And in case you missed the point, China is making it clear publicly that it won’t “abandon” North Korea. We can see what China means.  China will need “help” from the U.S. Congress and Treasury Department to enforce this resolution in a minimally effective way.

Plan B Watch: China’s U.N. Bait-and-Switch

We’ve seen enough of China’s past conduct when it comes to U.N. resolutions aimed at North Korean proliferation that we ought to recognize duplicity when we see it.  We should also know by now that our hapless U.N. Ambassador isn’t very good at recognizing that duplicity.  That’s why the news that China is expected to vote for another U.N. Security Council resolution this morning underwhelms me.  I even think I have a pretty good  idea what China’s game is here.

Like I said before — China has enough spyware on our computers to see that the political climate in Washington on North Korea policy has shifted.  It knows that its own stalling has put wind in the sails of people like Ed Royce, who know that the U.S. and its allies can do far more damage to North Korea through unilateral (and then multilateral) legislation than they can through the U.N.  China has done everything to enable North Korea and nothing to restrain it, but it has used the U.N. quite effectively to restrain us from restraining North Korea.

China calculates that by agreeing to tougher-looking U.N. sanctions, it might take some wind out of Royce’s sails, give State and its friends in the Senate a basis to oppose legislative sanctions, and maintain its U.N. chokehold over the enforcement of sanctions against North Korea.  In due course, when the Americans calm down, China will go right back to enforcing exactly nothing.  Don’t fall for it.  It’s a bait-and-switch:

The proposed new measures would explicitly ban the sale to Pyongyang of items coveted by North Korea’s ruling elite, such as yachts and racing cars, a council diplomat said on condition of anonymity. The draft also aims to make it more difficult for Pyongyang to move funds around the world. [Reuters]

So, six-plus years after UNSCR 1718 prohibited the sale of luxury goods to North Korea, China is getting around to clarifying that yachts and racing cars are also luxury goods.  Good to know. Maybe next year, they’ll pass a resolution for gold-plated bathroom fixtures, vicuña wool socks, and whichever designer Ri Sol Ju is wearing this week.  Compare this paltry list to the U.S. list of luxury goods in the Code of Federal Regulations (15 C.F.R. sec. 746.1 and supplement, in case you care to look it up).

If enforced — a very big “if,” that — this would be better:

She said the new sanctions would target “the illicit activities of North Korean diplomatic personnel, North Korean banking relationships, (and) illicit transfers of bulk cash.”

Or so Susan Rice said at a press conference, without providing any details.

[A] Security Council diplomat familiar with the measure, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the language may still be subject to revision, said it broke new ground with restrictions and prohibitions on North Korean banking transactions, new travel restrictions and increased monitoring of North Korean ship and air cargo.  [N.Y. Times]

Here’s a little more on the inspections authority:

The council diplomat said that once the resolution is approved, states will be obligated to expel any North Korean agent of a U.N.-blacklisted entity and will be required to inspect suspicious North Korean cargo on their territory. Such inspections of North Korean vessels are currently voluntary.

“All States shall inspect all (North Korea-linked) cargo within or transiting through their territory …. if the State concerned has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited,” the draft says. [Reuters]

Ships that refused inspection would not be permitted to dock.  Of course, you don’t have to be a lawyer to see the loopholes in “credible information” and “reasonable grounds.”  Oh, would someone please bring this to the attention of the corrections desk at the New York Times?

It would be the fourth Security Council sanctions resolution on North Korea, which has defied the previous measures with increasing belligerence. A vote was expected on Thursday.

Nope, fifth:  1695, 1718, 1874, 2087, and the next Groundhog Day, however It shall be numbered (don’t these guys check my sidebar before they write these things?).

American officials said privately that the latest resolution did not go as far as they would have liked, reflecting China’s insistence that the punitive measures remain focused on discouraging North Korea’s nuclear and missile behavior and avoid actions that could destabilize the country and lead to an economic collapse.

But the text was stronger than what some North Korean experts had anticipated, particularly the measures that could slow or frustrate the country’s banking activities and extensive dependence on cash payments in its trade with other countries.

“Going after the banking system in a broad brush way is arguably the strongest thing on this list,” said Evans J. R. Revere, a former State Department specialist in East Asian and Pacific affairs, and now senior director at the Albright Stonebridge Group, a Washington-based consulting company. “It does begin to eat into the ability of North Korea to finance many things.”  [N.Y. Times]

Whatever is in this draft, “western diplomats” sound confident that it will pass, plus-or-minus a few tweaks.  If so, I’ll probably start reading it after work, which means I probably won’t have time to digest and analyze it until this weekend.

This isn’t to say that this resolution is worse than nothing, like 2087 was.  After I read it, I’ll know, but it will never be a substitute for well-enforced U.S. and allied legislation providing for tough sanctions against non-compliant entities and nations.  A U.N. resolution will provide the impetus for tougher enabling legislation and better enforcement in Japan, Europe, and Southeast Asia.  It will not mean anything to countries like Syria and Iran. With respect to China, where implementation matters most, a new resolution will be just as unenforceable as the old ones unless Congress “helps” China — and the Chinese banks and companies that also do business with the United States — to enforce it. If Tuesday’s hearing was any indication, most members of both political parties are ready to offer that help.

Another big question is South Korea and its participation in the Kaesong Industrial Park.  I see growing international pressure for the South to either extract some real financial transparency out of Kaesong — ie., put a mechanism in place to use 100% of the proceeds to buy corn and provide commodities directly to the workers there — or shut the place down.  Park will want to resist that, right up to the moment North Korea changes her mind by doing something stupid.

As I read this resolution, I’ll be asking myself what the objective is.  Is it really to end North Korea’s nuclear program, or is it just to make it a little less convenient for North Korea to cheat for another year or so?  If your objective is the former, nothing short of putting the North Korean economy into what amounts to international receivership will do it.  If the latter, then we’re still on the same trajectory we’ve been on since at least 2006, and we can all see where that leads.  It will mean more rounds of whack-a-mole, whereby a sanctions committee receives a report on some prohibited activity, spends two months investigating it, spends another eight months fighting Chinese stalling and blocking, and finally adds a few suspect individuals and entities to some list long after they’ve moved on and folded up their booths.

To be effective, sanctions have to be (1) comprehensive enough to cover all sources of North Korean funds that could be used for prohibited purposes, (2) flexible enough to catch fly-by-night operators, (3) burden-shifting, such that the burden is on North Korea to prove the permissible use of the funds.

Correction:  Sung Yoon Lee reminds me of another resolution from way back in 1993.  So the actual number is now six.

Park Geun Hye will back human rights probe of North Korea

You don’t need a Ph.D. to see that North Korea is gearing up to test Park Geun-Hye. The nice people at the quasi-official, Japan-based Chosun Sinbo reacted to Park’s inauguration speech, in which she called on North Korea to disarm, by saying they were “unable to hide our rage.”  Domestically, the North has launched another series of exhausting war exercises, with soldiers forced to live days on end in tunnels, or standing guard and catching frostbite outdoors.

All of this is a reaction to Park’s attempt to offer the North aid, as long as Kim Jong Un quits biting the hand that feeds his subjects.

“As part of trust-building efforts, we will first start humanitarian assistance,” the official said. “Besides the aid, we are also considering what else we can do.”

The government’s policy on North Korea revolves around a “two-track strategy” – supporting UN sanctions against Pyongyang’s provocations while pursuing trust-building policies at the same time, the official said.

“Rather than a strategy of ‘sanctions first and aid later,’ we’re going to participate in the international push for sanctions on the regime as chair of the UN Security Council, but we’ll also make moves based on mutual trust with North Korea,” the official added. [Joongang Ilbo]

Separately, the Joongang Ilbo piece adds the interesting detail that under Park’s predecessor, “the volume of inter-Korean trade … dropped from 289.2 billion won ($267 million) in 2007 to 14.1 billion won in 2012,” despite regular reports that trade at Kaesong has continued to rise.  Park suggests that this trend could be reversed, but also threatens that “[i]f North Korea stages further provocations, that would prompt stronger sanctions, which would pose a grave threat to the future of the Korean people.”

It all sounds sensible enough, even if it’s a little unrealistic.  But while we were all distracted by Dennis Rodman, Park made one decision that really deserves some applause.  Early in her administration, when most presidents would have shied away from controversial decisions, Park gave her government’s active support to a long-overdue U.N. human rights inquiry, after years of South Korean silence:

South Korea’s pledge Wednesday to give “active” support to the investigation comes just two days after the inauguration of President Park Geun-hye and is likely to infuriate the North, which views discussion of its human rights as a “grave violation.” Seoul struggled with the decision, which forced a choice between two key goals: restoring civil relations with Pyongyang and pressing its government to improve treatment of its 24 million people.

The South’s commitment, announced by Seoul’s deputy foreign minister for global affairs at a U.N. Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva, is significant because the South holds influence over global policymaking regarding North Korea. With South Korea’s support, the investigation is all but assured of passage when the resolution is put up for a vote this month among member states of the Human Rights Council, rights advocates say. [....]

The new U.N. inquiry would establish a panel of experts who would interview witnesses, document abuses and help formally establish whether the North’s government is committing crimes against humanity. In January, Navi Pillay, the U.N. human rights chief, said in a statement that such an investigation was “long overdue,” particularly because there was no sign of improvement under third-generation leader Kim Jong Eun.  [Washington Post, Chico Harlan]

Separately, Yonhap notes that North Korea appears to be reducing the prisoner population in its gulag to between 80,000 and 120,000, but that this does not suggest an improvement in human rights conditions there.  Unfortunately, the paywall prevents me from seeing (1) Yonhap’s source for that estimate, (2) the basis for the source’s conclusion, and (3) the all-important follow-up question:  so what happened to the prisoners?  If anyone has a subscription, I’d be much obliged for the rest of the story.

Even before Park made this fateful decision, the North had already begun the process of making her into its next Goldstein.  Park will soon learn that the North doesn’t do give-and-take.  North Korea is a society of absolute authority and manichean struggle.  If you’re in charge, you demand tribute.  If you’re not, you pay it.

U.N. may investigate N. Korean officials for crimes against humanity

I don’t know what’s gotten into the U.N. lately, but this would be a pretty big deal:

North Korea’s leaders are likely to be the target of a U.N. investigation into their personal responsibility for rapes, torture, executions, arbitrary arrests and abductions, following an expert report published on Tuesday.

The report by Marzuki Darusman, an Indonesian lawyer who is the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, said North Korea’s “grave, systematic and widespread” human rights violations ought to be laid bare before the U.N. Human Rights Council and the U.N. General Assembly.

“The inquiry should examine the issues of institutional and personal accountability for such violations, in particular where they amount to crimes against humanity, and make appropriate recommendations to the authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and international community for further action,” said Darusman’s report.  [Reuters]

Sure, China will block it and it’s all non-binding, but steps like these would matter for public awareness and to help get third countries to cooperate with sanctions.  It would also matter in smaller ways.  For example, it might make a few “liberal”-minded tourists think twice about taking overpriced guided tours of Pyongyang that subsidize a regime that treats people this way.  I mean, Sun City, anyone?

 

Why Susan Rice’s new Security Council resolution is a great victory … for China and North Korea

The Obama Administration spin on the long-stalled U.N. Security Council Resolution 2087 is that it “tightened” U.N. sanctions against North Korea, and that securing China’s vote for that resolution represents some sort of diplomatic accomplishment for the U.S. and Susan Rice.

Despite China’s rejection of proposals by the United States to add new sanctions, the Obama administration sought to characterize the vote as a tough response. “This resolution demonstrates to North Korea that there are unanimous and significant consequences for its flagrant violation of its obligations under previous resolutions,” said Susan E. Rice, the American ambassador to the United Nations.  [N.Y. Times]

I wish the reporters who repeated that spin, often unskeptically, would have bothered to read the resolution and compare it to UNSCR 1718, the John Bolton-authored resolution on which it largely leans.  Had they done so, they would have seen that by specifically naming a few long-sanctioned entities, individuals, and small fry, it implicitly narrows the potential breadth of its predecessor resolutions.

Because they didn’t, I did, and I’m about to walk you through it.  As you consider the language in these resolutions, you need to keep a few things in mind.  First, the key to making sanctions work is to build enough financial pressure against the regime that it has to choose between its weapons programs and its ability to pay its military and its party elite.  Playing whack-a-mole (as Marcus Noland call it) with just a few North Korean banks and trading companies is futile, because those North Korean banks and trading companies can change names, switch individual representatives, and shift assets to other entities faster than we can sanction them.  Second, we’ll never be able to interdict North Korea’s illicit arms trade as long as China knowingly gives that trade the sanctuary of Chinese airspace, or as long as China’s state-owned enterprises keep selling North Korea missile technology.  Third, sanctions can only work if the unethical third-country banks, investors, and trading companies that provide Pyongyang regime-sustaining hard currency are deterred from doing so.  That strategy can only work if resolutions are read broadly and applied flexibly to those entities that are known to have helped North Korea proliferate — entities like state-owned China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, which sold North Korea the chassis for missile transporters that now carry a new type of North Korean ballistic missile, one that some analysts had recently dismissed as fakes, but which now have the U.S. intelligence community and Secretary of Defense sounding very worried.

How will this new resolution influence the behavior of companies like CASIC?  For the answer, we turn to the resolution itself.  Paragraph 5(a) of UNSCR 2087 says that “[t]he measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II, and the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the individuals listed in Annex I . . . .” Annex I consists exclusively of North Korean entities that had already been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department, and Annex II is also all North Korean, except for one solitary Hong Kong-based trading company.

The original language of UNSCR 1718, however, was much broader than this. Paragraph 8, which contains its key financial provisions, says:

(d) all Member States shall, in accordance with their respective legal processes, freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the persons or entities designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being engaged in or providing support for, including through other illicit means, DPRK’s nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programmes, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities;

(e) all Member States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, DPRK policies in relation to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, together with their family members, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a state to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

Emphasis mine.  Of course, effective enforcement always depended on a robust and decisive sanctions committee, something that clearly wasn’t going to happen after North Korea signed up for Agreed Framework II and Chris Hill’s faction got the U.S. government to stop enforcing its most flagrant violations.  After that, China effectively blocked and stalled the sanctions committee’s reports, which implicated China in repeated violations of 1718 and 1874, which followed in 2009.

By specifying a short list of mostly North Korean entities, however, 2087 effectively tells the myriad of Chinese banks and companies that were and are flagrantly violating 1718 — and 1874, and 1695 — that, by implication, they are home free.  This isn’t quite a grant of prosecutorial immunity to all of those other entities (North Korean, Chinese, and other) that continue to violate U.N. sanctions, but given the lilliputian paralysis of the U.N. Sanctions Committee, it’s pretty close.  This is, effectively, a huge victory for Chinese proliferation, and for North Korea.

As far as North Korea’s weapons trade goes, 2087 does nothing that UNSCR 1874 and 1718 had not done years ago, notwithstanding the triumphalism of The Guardian.

I have maintained that no enforcement action that relies on the consent and good faith of the Chinese government has any chance of success, but that multilateral actions to combat North Korean proliferation and money laundering can force Chinese entities to isolate North Korea, despite the opposition of the Chinese government.  This has been done effectively through the partnership of the U.S. Treasury Department and the Financial Action Task Force, a quietly effective global alliance of finance ministries.  Unfortunately, Treasury’s follow-on announcement of sanctions against three “usual suspects” under Executive Order 13,382 only reinforces that Treasury will do nothing to enforce those resolutions independently, because it sanctions just two individual North Korean representatives of a long-sanctioned North Korean bank, and one Hong Kong-based small-fish trading company that China itself was willing to sanction in 2087.  Does anyone suppose that Leader Trading Company had not long since liquidated and hidden its assets?

This isn’t to say that sanctions against small entities can’t work, too, provided that bigger entities also worry they might be next.  I’ve written frequently about how in 2005, sanctions against a small Macau-based bank, Banco Delta Asia (BDA), has a disproportionate impact on multiple sources of North Korean finance, whether illicit, comingled with “legitimate” trade, or indistinguishable.

in 2005 and 2006, the Asian Wall Street Journal, the South China Morning Post, and the Chosun Ilbo printed allegations that the Bank of China and one of its Hong Kong subsidiaries were under the scrutiny of U.S. authorities for possible links to North Korean laundering of illegally derived funds.  The Bank of China denied any involvement in laundering North Korean money, but in 2007, it was so terrified by the alleged association with illicit North Korean funds that it balked at moving $25 million in blocked North Korean funds from BDA to the New York Federal Reserve, at the request of both the U.S. and Chinese governments, to facilitate Agreed Framework II.

Similarly flexible sanctions could work now, but the Obama Administration won’t apply them.  I don’t know whether to attribute that to a spineless reliance on a U.N. Security Council that’s long been a hostage of Chinese duplicity, the incompetence of Susan Rice, the stultifying influence of John Kerry, or a simple aversion to any policy more decisive than trying to “manage North Korea out of the headlines,” but this resolution — if that is indeed our final response to North Korea’s last missile test — was much, much worse than no resolution at all.

What comes next isn’t hard to predict.

Xi Jinping Outsources Meeting With Park Geun-Hye to His Food Taster

food tasterChina’s unhelpful behavior in the Security Council would have been reason enough for Park Geun Hye to follow the example of Shinzo Abe,* who deferred meeting with Chinese officials and instead met with the leaders of “countries sharing the same values, such as democracy and the rule of law.”  In retrospect, that might have been best:

In her meeting with China’s Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun yesterday, President-elect Park Geun-hye said North Korea’s nuclear weapons development cannot be tolerated and that Seoul will take stern measures against Pyongyang’s additional provocations, according to her spokeswoman.  [Joongang Ilbo]

So the Chinese had a Vice Foreign Minister – not even the Foreign Minister, but the Vice Foreign Minister — greet the President-Elect of South Korea and hand her a letter from Xi Jingping?  How many of you can even name a Deputy Secretary of State without googling? Would this be another case of that patient diplomatic sagacity Tom Friedman has been touting?

The incoming president, however, said that doors will be open for dialogue and cooperation through a “trust-building process.”

“North Korea’s nuclear development can never be tolerated,” Park was quoted as saying by spokeswoman Cho Yoon-sun. “South Korea will respond sternly to any provocations by the North.”

Cho said that Park, at the same time, said she will leave open the windows for dialogue and cooperation, including humanitarian aid.

It’s all so rational, it can’t possibly work.  I’ll say it again: when Park Geun Hye talks about North Korea, she sounds a lot like Lee Myung Bak – and Barack Obama — sounded before Kim Jong Il tested a missile and a nuke, murdered Park Wang-Ja at Kumgang, renounced the armistice, sank the Cheonan, and shelled Yeongpyeong.

One person who definitely isn’t planning to offer North Korea any of that hippie dialogue and cooperation crap? Shinzo Abe.

It may be best that Xi himself didn’t show up, given his previously expressed views that the Korean War was, from the Commie perspective, ”a great and just war for safeguarding peace and resisting aggression” that was imposed on China by ”imperialist invaders” and resulted in “a great victory in the pursuit of world peace and human progress.”  Xi added that, to quote the Chosun Ilbo’s translation, “the Chinese people have not forgotten their great friendship with North Korea.  Yes, Melanie Kirkpatrick has written all about how the Chinese people show their friendship to North Koreans, which can sound a lot like the “friendship” that Japanese soldiers showed to the Korean comfort women of their time. Xi Jinping apparently has equally chilling concepts of world peace and human progress.  Yes, friendly guys, those ChiComs.  I’m sure the people of North Korea will remember that friendship for a long time.

It it just me, or has Asia suddenly become a prolific producer of especially zany heads of state? I’d begun to wonder if North Korea’s condition was contagious when Aidan Foster-Carter steered me to this story on how Chinese neo-Maoists have turned North Korea into a place of pilgrimage.

Meanwhile, Kurt Campbell just led a U.S. delegation to Seoul to meet with Park Geun-Hye’s transition team, while the awful Glyn Davies is leading another delegation to Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing, just to maximize the potential for inconsistency.  Campbell has traditionally been one of the most solid members of Obama’s foreign policy team, which is why it’s a pity that he’s leaving it.  Campbell used the occasion to deliver a strong hint that North Korea should not test a nuke, something the North Koreans have reportedly told China they intend to do soon.

I’m sure that as before, the Chinese are exerting all their considerable influence to prevent that.

Campbell also said that the U.S. continues to push for sanctions at the Security Council, something our U.N. Ambassador, Susan Rice, hasn’t managed to get through the Great Wall of China since 2009.

John Bolton was unavailable for comment.

*  On the other hand, whoever advised Abe that Asian nations would line up like Apple fanboys to join an “arc of freedom and prosperity” really should find a new line of work. It doesn’t do to remind people of your own imperial misadventures when you’re trying to convince people — correctly in my view — that China’s imperial ambitions are the greater danger now. This kind of Japanese bumbling only helps China to confuse the present danger by helping it change the subject to the distant past. Even I find myself in rare agreement with KNCA, at least about the optics of it.

Correction:  A reader points out that the Park-Zhang meeting occurred in Seoul, not Beijing.  I apologize for the error and have corrected it.

Ya Think? U.N. human rights chief suspects “crimes against humanity” in prison camp called “North Korea”

Nearly seven years after Jared Genser’s Failure to Protect and nearly nine years after David Hawk’s The Hidden Gulag, a senior U.N. official has gotten around to calling for “an in depth investigation” of what “may amount to crimes against humanity” in North Korea’s prison camps, and elsewhere in the larger prison sometimes called “The Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea:”

U.N. human rights chief Navi Pillay called on Monday for an international investigation into what she said may be crimes against humanity in North Korea, including torture and executions of political prisoners held in shadowy camps.

She voiced regret that there had been no improvement since Kim Jong-un took power a year ago, succeeding his late father, and said it was time for world powers to help bring about change for the “beleaguered, subjugated population” after decades of abuse.  [Reuters, Stephanie Nebahay]

No improvement?  That seems a little bit unfair to a leader who has given his people a dolphinarium, dancers in Mickey Mouse costumes, an ICBM, and a state-of-the art fitness center to protect them from Asia’s growing obesity epidemic (and successfully! … with one notable exception).

“Because of the enduring gravity of the situation, I believe an in-depth inquiry into one of the worst – but least understood and reported – human rights situations in the world is not only fully justified, but long overdue,” Pillay said in a rare statement on North Korea.

Really, now — it seems like just nine short years ago that the world heard about this.  In the meantime, the U.N. has been very busy not visiting North Korean refugees in China, informing us that North Korea’s health care system is the envy of third-world nations everywhere, barely monitoring the distribution of its food aid, and helping Kim Jong Il move his supernotes to a safe at U.N. Headquarters.

The reclusive country’s network of political prison camps are believed to contain 200,000 people or more and have been the scene of rampant violations including rapes, torture, executions and slave labor, according to Pillay, a former judge at the International Criminal Court.

These “may amount to crimes against humanity”, she said.

Living conditions in the camps are reported to be “atrocious” with insufficient food, little or no medical care and inadequate clothing for inmates, she said.

“The death penalty seems to be often applied for minor offences and after wholly inadequate judicial processes, or sometimes without any judicial process at all,” Pillay said.

“People who try to escape and are either caught or sent back face terrible reprisals including execution, torture and incarceration, often with their entire extended family.”

Pillai’s call coincides with the beginning of two-year non-permanent terms on the Security Council for South Korea and Australia, which, despite North Korea’s recent opening of an embassy in Canberra, had been lobbying for more pressure against the atrocities in the North. Writing at Korea Real Time, Alastair Gale contrasts that approach with South Korea’s:

For outsiders, one puzzling question is why South Korea doesn’t apply more pressure on North Korea over human rights, including those of South Korean nationals held in the North. Legislation addressing the problem occasionally gets submitted to parliament but is routinely blocked by left-of-center parties over concerns it will upset the North. There was no substantial debate over human rights in North Korea during the race for South Korea’s presidency last year.

This position is all the harder to understand — and will be all the harder for future generations to explain — in light of the fact that South Korea is pushing for strong U.N. action over North Korea’s missile test.

For the record, the reaction of North Korea’s U.N. Ambassador was to “totally reject” Pillai’s allegations, to deny that “such kind of crimes” occur in North Korea, and call for an investigation of the ”king of human rights abuses, the United States.”  As persuasive as that may be, it doesn’t approach the level of this KCNA classic, talking about the Saenuri Party’s effort to finally pass a North Korean human rights law:

There has never been and can never exist the enemy-touted “human rights issue” in the DPRK under popular masses-centered socialism.

All the people enjoy genuine freedom and exercise their rights as the masters of the state and society as the independent rights and creative activities of human beings are guaranteed institutionally.

South Koreans admired the true picture of the DPRK where human rights are fully respected and guaranteed.

U.N. General Secretary Ban Ki Moon, who is of unknown origin, has yet to comment on the allegations of crimes against humanity on his watch, either in his current position or as South Korean Foreign Minister at the height of the Sunshine Policy.  When asked about Pillai’s statement, Ban simply looked up from Xi Jinping’s lap, smiled, and wagged his fluffy white tail.

 

Obama Administration’s N. Korea policy evolves from the 90s to the 60s.

Not surprisingly, North Korea’s missile test is bringing out a lot of criticism of President Obama’s North Korea policy, but sometimes, that criticism writes itself.  Writing at The Cable, Josh Rogin tells us that just as Kim Jong Un was counting down the launch sequence between drags on a smuggled Marlboro, Wendy Sherman and the State Department’s crack team of Asia experts were relaxing at a cocktail party in honor of — smack your forehead now — the Emperor of Japan, while silently thanking Kim Jong Un for not ruining their holidays:

But several attendees at the Japanese emperor’s birthday celebration told The Cable that the fact so many Asia officials were not at their desks illustrated how surprised the administration was about the timing of the launch.

“Everybody stood down. Nobody thought they were going to do it this week. It was a real head fake by the North Koreans,” another top Asia expert and party attendee said. “DOD, State, and the White House were just stunned by it. They were shocked.”

There were varying explanations as to why the Obama administration was caught off guard. North Korea said Dec. 10 said that “technical issues” were forcing it to push back the launch window. Previously, North Korea had said the launch would come by Dec. 22, and the new window was supposed to end Dec. 29. News reports Dec. 9 and 10 also said the missile was being removed from the launch pad. Those reports turned out to be wrong.

It may be that Sherman and the East Asia Bureau types took too much comfort in Joel Wit’s widely circulated — and spectacularly ill-timed – prediction that snow would delay the launch.  Wit may be the most chronic schlimazel of all North Korea watchers who is still taken seriously by most people, but I think Rogin’s post was a little too unkind to him.  Satellite imagery is subject to different interpretations, and I’ve probably made my own share of wrong guesses.  It’s when Wit stubbornly ignores the evidence that is there that he really invites mockery.  Among other treats, Wit insists that North Korea really does abide by its agreements, it really is reforming and opening its economy, and really isn’t to blame for this launch (South Korea’s decision to extend the range of its own missile gave the North no choice). Off-hand, I can think of roughly three people in Washington who still believe this since the D.C.’s Finest cleaned out the Occupy camp.  So the next time Wit tugs at your heart strings to advocate unmonitored food aid, just remember:
Based on the North Korean government’s own calculation of daily need, the money spent on yesterday’s launch could buy 5.8 million tons of corn, enough to feed a population of 20 million for 19 months.  [Daily NK]
Some of the criticism is what you’d expect from people with partisan and ideological reasons to oppose this president, but I’ve tried to pick out the more serious and credible examples.  John Bolton, for example, became a fierce critic of the Republican president who appointed him, and isn’t an inflexible critic of his Democratic successor:

John Bolton:  In 2009, the Obama administration’s approach to Pyongyang appeared unexpectedly realistic. The White House initially seemed to abandon the Clinton-Bush obsession with making deals involving tangible economic and political concessions to North Korea in exchange for yet more promises to terminate its nuclear weapons program. Mr. Obama rightly believed that avidly pursuing such negotiations, offering one “compromise” after another, simply reinforced the North’s craving for attention without producing results.  [....]

But Mr. Obama’s reluctance to engage the North, simply abandoning the misguided Clinton-Bush diplomacy, is nothing to write home about. Not making unforced concessions that have the political or economic effect of propping up the regime, which repeatedly promises to give up its nuclear program but never does, avoids one erroneous path but follows another. In fact, administration passivity simply permitted the North to proceed essentially unimpeded.

The problem, in other words, is that our policy hasn’t caught up with the long-overdue consensus that North Korea isn’t going to disarm or cease to be a menace for any price, and won’t allow us to just ignore it.  Talks have failed, deterrence is failing, and trying to wait North Korea out has failed because China keeps it afloat no matter what it does.  North Korea is forcing a confrontation.  We’ll eventually have to face that, but it’s also important to make China pay for the behavior it enables.

Stephen Yates:  China should be named and shamed for its role in enabling North Korea to remain and grow as a threat. North Korea is one of the most sanctioned countries on the planet, but Beijing (with only brief exceptions) has effectively watered down and otherwise dulled the impact of international sanctions on North Korean “stability.”

Beijing no doubt would be horrified by the prospect of an international review of the many ways North Korea’s illicit activities involve Chinese institutions, territory, and personnel, but such a comprehensive audit would be entirely appropriate.

Well, yeah, except that everyone who doesn’t already know what China’s game is, is simply denying the overwhelming evidence of its deliberate bad faith.  It’s a small beginning that Susan Rice, who has taken herself out of the running for Secretary of State, is at least trying to be our U.N. Ambassador by pushing her Chinese counterpart past the limits of polite decorum.  Good luck getting her government to reign Kim Jong Un in unless we do things to make him China’s problem, too.  Like sanctioning the Chinese banks and mining companies that finance Kim Jong Un, and threatening to seed the Tumen River valley with more guns per square meter than Waziristan.

Ed Royce:  ”I’ve been calling for a North Korea policy with energy, creativity and focus. Instead, the Obama Administration’s approach continues to be unimaginative and moribund. We can either take a different approach, or watch as the North Korean threat to the region and the U.S. grows.”

Royce, who had advocated the global pursuit and freezing of North Korean assets by the Treasury Department, beyond the constraints of a moribund U.N. Sanctions Committee, knows that this strategy worked with devastating effect in 2005 and 2006.  To be fair, the administration has dropped a few hints that it’s considering this:

Even if the Security Council fails to pass sanctions, the United States and other nations could impose unilateral measures, as they have with Iran, the senior administration officials said.  [CNN]

But my guess is they’re more serious when they also say they’ll ask the U.N. for a new (unenforced) resolution, send a few ships to do port calls in Chinhae and Incheon, and stop the long-overdue removal of U.S. ground forces from Korea.

Beijing’s biggest fear has always been destabilizing North Korea, and setting off a collapse that could put South Korean forces, and perhaps their American allies, on China’s border.  [N.Y. Times, David E. Sanger and William J. Broad]

Yeah.  It sure is too bad we have no conceivable means of pressuring China whatsoever.  Any ideas?  Nothing?  In that case, what do you suppose McNamara and Rusk would have done?

But the essence of the American strategy, as described Wednesday by administration officials, was to force the Chinese into an uncomfortable choice.

“The kinds of things we would do to enhance the region’s security against a North Korean nuclear missile capability,” one senior administration official said in an interview, “are indistinguishable from the things the Chinese would view as a containment strategy” aimed at Beijing.

They would include increased patrols in waters the Chinese are trying to claim as part of their exclusive zone, along with military exercises with allies in the region. “It’s the right approach, but whether it works is another matter,” said Christopher R. Hill, who was the chief negotiator with North Korea during President George W. Bush’s second term, and is now dean of the Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, on Wednesday. “The approach of thickening up the antimissile effort is something that would get China’s attention.”

Notwithstanding the poor credibility of the Times’s source, I agree that there are some good ideas here, including a regional anti-missile shield, an East Asian analogue of NATO, and an open effort to contain a China whose belligerent territorial claims have scared the bejeezus out of Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, and have even given rise to a budding alliance with Vietnam.  This much is to our strategic benefit.  It concerns me that we won’t really go through with this, but it concerns me more that we’ll “send American boys 9 or 10 thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.”  Increased U.S. involvement should focus on command, control, intelligence, and diplomatic relationships, and controlled sales of the best defensive weapons systems.  It should not focus on putting a heavier U.S. footprint in the region.

I’m sure plenty of Japanese and Koreans sleep more soundly knowing that every Saturday, Itaewon and Pyongtaek are filled with Americans — the likely majority of them civilians — shopping for mink blankets and soju kettles.  They might even feel safe enough to vote for imperialist-America-bashing candidates who promise to cut defense spending and send the difference to Kim Jong Un.  Of course, those soldiers didn’t stop North Korea from sinking the Cheonan, shelling Yeongpyeong, or kidnapping God-knows-how-many Japanese.  In fact, they probably gave the Pentagon enough leverage to prevent South Korea from taking out the North Korean units responsible for the 2010 attacks.  I wonder if any North Korean soldiers know enough to thank Kim Il Sung’s eternal spirit that American G.I.’s keep them safe and well-fed.

North Korea’s missile test will be Susan Rice’s big chance to be effective (for a change). Update: They did it.

As North Korea completes preparations for its latest ICBM test, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are trying to deter it with state-of-the art, laser-guided words.  Success, while unlikely, isn’t completely out of the question; after all, Kim Jong Un seemed to be preparing to conduct a nuke test several months ago, but never went through with it.  If Kim Jong Un really did defer a nuke test, I have no idea why, but it probably wasn’t because he wants a fresh start in his relations with Earth.

So far, the public face of U.S. deterrence has been to threaten what has never worked before – to take North Korea to the Security Council.  Our diplomats aren’t specifying what measures we’ll take against Kim Jong Un’s regime, but they’re hinting at more sanctions:

A senior security aide to President Barack Obama said Monday the U.S. is concentrating efforts in cooperation with South Korea, China, Russia and Japan to dissuade North Korea from pressing ahead with another rocket launch.

Gary Samore emphasized that if the launch takes place Washington will take “appropriate actions.”

“We’ve made it very clear that we consider this to be a very unfortunate provocative event, which is not going help North Korea nor the people of North Korea,” Samore told Yonhap News Agency.  [Yonhap]

Ed Royce calls the missile test a “wake-up call” that the administration’s policy toward North Korea has been ineffective, which is my first cue to link to my list of unused sanctions options and how those options fit into a more effective North Korea policy – one that could force even China to engage in good-faith efforts to disarm North Korea.  The Daily NK interviews other experts who also see the need for a more comprehensive sanctions effort:

Cho Bong Hyun, a researcher with the Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK) Economic Research Institute told Daily NK, “If we do not cut off North Korea’s lines of credit then sanctions cannot be effective. Therefore, they will try to strengthen economic sanctions. The trade that is currently going normally could be faced with more difficult conditions, and humanitarian assistance could be stopped, too.”

Cho added, “In addition, it looks like a number more individuals and institutions will be added to the UN Security Council sanction list.”

Another anonymous researcher commented, “The best thing would be to apply financial sanctions in order to freeze North Korean funds, as was done with Banco Delta Asia (BDA). The BDA issue created fresh resistance in North Korea; however, freezing North Korean funds can still inflict a huge blow on their money channels.”

Some voices have suggested that the role of the UN North Korea Sanctions Committee should be improved, with disciplinary actions for those who fail to support it.

Baek Seung Joo of Korea Institute for Defense Analyses said, “Currently, sanctions against North Korea have been implemented across multi-faceted areas, but the problem is whether or not the sanctions are being implemented correctly. There need to be measures to warn those countries who are not actively taking part in the sanctions, and more monitoring of those countries which must apply them.”  [Daily NK]

These are good ideas; it’s too bad we won’t make use of them.  But at least Susan Rice will get a chance not to be our worst U.N. Ambassador since “Kim Jong Bill” Richardson.

I suppose I should explain.  The first rule of deterrence is progressive discipline — the principle that each similar misdeed will be met with more (not less) severe punishment.  Yet when North Korea launched its first missile of the Obama Administration in 2009, Rice did no better at the Security Council than a weak Presidential Statement.  The resolution she obtained after North Korea’s 2009 nuke test, UNSCR 1874, was little more than a warmed-over version of John Bolton’s UNSCR 1718, and was no better enforced (links to both resolutions in the sidebar).  When North Korea sank the ROKS Cheonan, the best Rice could get was another non-binding Presidential Statement that didn’t even name North Korea.  When North Korea later shelled Yeongpyeong Island and killed four civilians, the Security Council did bupkes.  Ditto with respect to North Korea’s brazen nuclear proliferation during Rice’s tenure.  And when North Korea launched a missile earlier this year, the Administration quickly decided not to seek further Security Council action after China made clear its intent to block it.  Rice got eaten by the Chinese every time (sorry).

Depending on your perspective, you might also think that Rice disqualified herself from higher office for responding to a premeditated Al Qaeda attack by scapegoating one man’s exercise of his right to free speech.  Rice’s statements weren’t true, but they would be just as objectionable if they were.  Non-violent speech is never a defense to the culpability of those who practice violence.  It does not explain it, and it does not mitigate it.

Yet with all this having said, I could more easily abide a weakened and timid Susan Rice than the arrogant incompetence of John Kerry.  All of which is sad, because off-hand, I can think of several prominent Democrats and members of this administration who would be great for Secretary of State, starting with Samore.  Lieberman, you say?  No, that would be asking too much.

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Update, Dec. 12, 2012:  Reuters is reporting that North Korea launched it, and there seems to be a general consensus that the missile reached orbit.

“The satellite has entered the planned orbit,” a North Korean television news reader clad in traditional Korean garb announced, after which the station played patriotic songs with the lyrics “Chosun (Korea) does what it says”.

The rocket was launched just before 10 a.m. (0100 GMT), according to defense officials in South Korea and Japan, and was more successful than a rocket launched in April that flew for less than two minutes.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) said that it “deployed an object that appeared to achieve orbit”, the first time an independent body has verified North Korean claims.

The North claims that the rocket boosted a weather satellite into orbit.

Foreign observers are suggesting that this will boost Kim Jong Un’s domestic legitimacy inside North Korea, but I’m wary of these counterfactual analyses.  It will probably increase North Koreans’ sense of awe of their overlords, and cause them (and us) to grudgingly acknowledge their competence at matters they deem to be state priorities.  On the other hand, it could also serve to highlight the state’s comparative failure to feed the people ahead of a cold winter and a hungry spring.

Although the launch has probably helped the political right win election in Japan, my best guess is that a provocation that primarily threatens the United States will be popular among many South Koreans who harbor intense but latent anti-Americanism and pan-Korean nationalism.  To this extent this has a significant effect on the South Korean election, it’s more likely to help the political left, which supports appeasing North Korea.

North Korea’s technical success may mean that Americans will start to take North Korea seriously as a threat again. With Richard Lugar now out of the way, John McCain is getting a seat in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where for years, Republicans had effectively abstained from the policy debate about North Korea. With Ed Royce and John McCain soon to be the most prominent Republican voices on foreign policy in Congress, maybe we’ll finally have a debate about whether appeasement, payoffs, unenforced U.N. resolutions, overlooking China’s duplicity, and Agreed Framework III are really the best way to deal with this problem.  For his part, Royce is saying the right thing — that we ought to scour the world’s moldiest corners for North Korean assets to freeze.

What would be a novel and serious way to respond to this?  First, we’d publicly announce that we’re not seeking any new resolutions at the U.N., and follow that with some off-the-record comments that the resolutions themselves are fine — the problem is that China willfully facilitates the violation of those resolutions.  Second, we’d make it clear that instead of wasting our energy with the U.N. and its weak (pro-appeasement South Korean) General Secretary, we’ll work with our allies and trading partners to isolate North Korea economically in the same way our Treasury Department did with the Banco Delta Asia sanctions of 2006, only much more comprehensively.  Third and most critically, we must use those sanctions to target and freeze the assets of North Korea’s foreign trading partners, including those in China and South Korea.

Given the North Korean regime’s dependency on foreign hard currency, if we pursued and enforced a policy like that, I doubt there would even be a North Korea two years from now.  So much the better for all of humanity.