Category Archives: Terrorism (NK)

Arsenal of Terror, 2d Edition: N. Korea accused of hacking into Seoul subway control center

North Korea is suspected of hacking into a Seoul subway operator last year for at least five months, a ruling party lawmaker said Monday citing a report submitted by the country’s intelligence agency.

After hacking into two operating servers of Seoul Metro, which runs Subway Lines 1 through 4, the hackers allegedly broke into more than 210 employee computers and infected 58 with malicious codes, Rep. Ha Tae-kyung of the ruling Saenuri Party said, quoting a report by the National Intelligence Service (NIS). [Yonhap]

Mr. Ha, a former left-wing activist and political prisoner under the Park Chung-Hee dictatorship, is now a Saenuri Party lawmaker and activist for human rights in North Korea. Ha speaks excellent English and is well known to most of the foreign press and activists here in the United States. I’ve known him for a decade, and I’ve never known him to say anything that wasn’t true.

Computers used by those who work at the control center and power supplier were affected, raising safety concerns that the subway lines could have been exposed to potential terror threats. [Yonhap]

The authorities say the computers hacked “were only for office use, which is unrelated to the direct operation of the trains,” and that after the hack was detected, they reformatted all of the affected computers and “reinforced” their cybersecurity. That’s reassuring, I suppose, except that I can’t imagine that Pyongyang’s master plan stopped at changing all of the email fonts to Wingdings.

Nor is this the first time North Korea has targeted the Seoul subway system. In May of 2010, South Korean authorities arrested a 36 year-old woman named Kim Soon-Nyeo, who had entered the South posing as a refugee, and had begun romantic relationships with several well-placed South Korean men, including a 52 year-old executive of the Seoul subway.

The spy collected “confidential” information about the subway system from Oh, information about local universities from the student, and a list of names of high-ranking police and public officials from the travel agents.

Oh maintained extramarital relations with the spy since his first encounter with her in China in May 2006, and transferred nearly 300 million won ($252,000) to “help” her cosmetics business. In June 2007, he became aware that she was a North Korean spy, but continued the relationship.

“What Oh handed over to the spy included contact information of emergency situation responses and other not-so-important internal data,” Kim Jung-hwan, a Seoul Metro spokesman, told The Korea Times, dismissing concerns that it could be used in possible acts of terrorism here by the North. Kim retired from his post in 2008. [Korea Times, May 23, 2010]

Foreigners will again note how selective South Koreans are in panicking about, ahem, certain perceived safety risks, provided they don’t involve North Korea. Meanwhile, here in Washington, we can only rue that the Seoul subway is still safer and more reliable than ours, despite having been hacked by North Korea.

The NIS analyzed the hacking records from March 2014 to August 2014, but the date of the first attack and who carried it out are still unclear. [Yonhap]

Three months after the hack on the subway system, Sony Pictures was hacked, and the hackers also threatened terrorist attacks against movie theaters across the country. President Obama, and the Directors of the FBI and the NSA, all attributed that cyberattack and threat to North Korean hackers, who are believed to operate more-or-less openly from Shenyang, China. Four months later, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Company announced that it had been hacked. That hack was also later attributed to North Korean hackers, also most likely operating out of Shenyang.

President Bush removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the Obama Administration’s official view is that North Korea is “not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.” Discuss among yourselves.

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Arsenal of Terror, 2d Ed.: China arrests N. Korean kidnap squad

To count as terrorism, an act must be (1) violent, (2) unlawful in the place where it’s committed, (3) carried out by clandestine agents or subnational groups, and (4) with the intent to coerce a government or a civilian population. To be international terrorism, an act of terrorism must also (5) involve the citizens or territory of more than one country. If this report is confirmed, it would appear to meet the definition:

Several North Korean agents were caught by Chinese police in March after attempting to kidnap a South Korean missionary at the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, according to a media report.

“Five to eight agents of North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) were detained in Jilin Province for trying to abduct a South Korean pastor,” the Donga Ilbo reported, citing a source familiar with the incident.

The newspaper said the North’s State Security Department (SSD) and the RGB are “competing” to abduct South Koreans helping North Korean refugees in China to show their allegiance to their young leader Kim Jong-un.

“Their rivalry has become stronger since last year and the latest kidnapping case seems to have been directed by RGB director Gen. Kim Yong-chol,” it said. [Korea Times]

President Bush removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008. The Obama Administration’s official view is that North Korea is “not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.” Discuss among yourselves.

Yet, as I wrote in “Arsenal of Terror,” the State Department has repeatedly cited attempts to kidnap or assassinate dissidents and activists, when carried out by the intelligence organizations of other governments, as the state sponsorship of terrorism:

In 1994, the U.S. State Department’s reporting on Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism cited the assassination of a dissident in Turkey, the wounding of a dissident by a letter bomb, the killing of three dissidents in Iraq, the assassination of two other dissidents in Copenhagen and Bucharest, and France’s conviction of three Iranians (including a nephew of the Ayatollah Khomeini) for the 1991 murder of a former Prime Minister and his assistant.

The U.S. State Department’s 1994 report also cited Iraq’s assassination of a dissident in Beirut, for which Lebanon implicated the Iraqi government, arrested two Iraqi diplomats, and severed diplomatic relations with Iraq. It also cited Libya’s suspected involvement in the disappearance of a dissident and human rights activist in Egypt. The U.S. State Department’s 1997 report alleged that the Libyan government executed the activist in early 1994.

The U.S. State Department’s 1995 report accused Iran of escalating “its assassination campaign against dissidents living abroad,” voicing suspicions that Iran was involved in the murders of seven dissidents in Iraq, France, and Denmark. The following year, the U.S. State Department accused Iran of “at least eight dissident assassinations outside Iran,” including the assassination in Paris of a former government official “by an Iranian resident of Germany with alleged ties to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).” Its 1996 report noted that German authorities had issued an arrest warrant for Iran’s Intelligence Minister for ordering the 1992 assassinations of four Iranian-Kurdish dissidents in a Berlin restaurant. According to the U.S. State Department’s 1997 “Country Reports,” the German court found that “the Government of Iran had followed a deliberate policy of liquidating the regime’s opponents who lived outside Iran,” and that the assassinations “had been approved at the most senior levels of the Iranian Government,” including by “the Minister of Intelligence and Security, the Foreign Minister, the President, and the Supreme Leader.” The U.S. State Department’s 1998 and 1999 reports made similar allegations.

In 2000 and 2001, the U.S. State Department accused the Iraqi Intelligence Service of collecting intelligence on, and attempting to intimidate, dissident groups abroad. Its 2002 report accused Iraqi Intelligence of assassinating another dissident in Lebanon. [Arsenal of Terror, pages 18-19, footnotes omitted]

You could call it progress that the Chinese arrested them, perhaps because this time, the targets would have been South Korean. Ordinarily, North Korean kidnap squads operate more-or-less freely on Chinese soil, at least when they target North Korean refugees.

One sees no signs of progress in our own State Department. As I noted on pages 59 through 65, North Korea has repeatedly kidnapped and assassinated third-country activists and dissidents in both China and South Korea, including the Rev. Kim Dong-Shik, a U.S. permanent resident. Yet for some reason, the State Department appears to have granted North Korea transactional immunity for its acts of terrorism. This impunity may explain why North Korea’s terrorist threats have now reached the United States itself.

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60 Minutes on the Sony Cyberattack: There is no defense, only deterrence

CBS has published video of a Sixty Minutes segment on North Korea’s 2014 cyberattack on Sony, hosted by correspondent Steve Kroft.

The conspiracy theories of a few pro-Pyongyang gasbags and assorted cranks notwithstanding, the President, the Directors of the FBI and the NSA, and our country’s best technical experts agree that Pyongyang did it. I’m certainly no technical expert myself, but I don’t have to look back from the moon to believe that the Earth is round. After all, it’s not as if President Obama needed to frame Kim Jong-Un for the Sony cyberattack and threats to have an excuse to do approximately nothing about them. Another point that should not be lost is that the attack was carried out with the material support of the Chinese government, whose dictator will soon be welcomed to the White House.

Kroft says the attack qualified as the use of force against the United States. According to cybersecurity expert James Lewis, “The significance is that a foreign power has reached out and touched an American target. The fact that the North Korean government felt that it could do something in the United States and get away with it — that’s what’s significant.” I agree that that’s very significant, but I’d argue that an even more significant implication arises from the threats that followed the cyberattack: that a foreign power carried out an act of terrorism against the U.S. civilian population — unlike The New York Times, I apply the term according to its legal definition —  to censor free expression. In 2014, Kim Jong-Un extended the long arm of his censorship to our society, a society that treasures free expression as its most important constitutional right. Successfully. And got away with it.

That is a problem, because a failure of deterrence would leave us essentially naked to the next attack. The report points out the sheer impracticality of defending any network, when even a relatively unsophisticated piece of malware, like the one used for the Sony cyberattack, can be so successful.

That leaves us with deterrence. Kroft quotes Lewis, who correctly says that our only real deterrent against this sort of attack is “going after the leadership, going after the revenue streams coming to the leadership.” Kroft then incorrectly says that that’s what the Obama Administration has done. In fact, the Obama Administration promised a proportional response, but delivered a sub-proportional one that former CIA Director Michael Hayden accurately described as “symbolic at best” — blocking the assets of ten low-level arms dealers, and three entities whose assets had already been blocked for years. Almost a year after the Sony attack and threat, the Obama Administration has done little of consequence to deter the next one. And although the U.S. intelligence community is saying that there have been no more North Korean attacks on the United States since then, North Korea is believed to have hacked into South Korean nuclear power plants around the same time as the Sony cyberattack, and was implicated as recently as this week for planting malware in a South Korean word processor used by military officers.

For anyone who’s paying attention, the Sony threats ought to have changed everything. There is a school of thought, after all, that says we should just ignore North Korea and let it go nuclear, which is pretty much what the Obama Administration has spent the last seven years doing. Sony exposed the fallacy of this strategy. No matter how stubbornly our government refuses to be interested in North Korea, North Korea will always be interested in us. It needs conflict with us to justify the very existence of a system that can’t provide for its people, and it shields that system behind isolation and repression. To Pyongyang, the very existence of free thought and free expression that might break through that isolation is a mortal threat to its survival. As long as Americans feel free to make movies about North Korea, to criticize North Korea, or to refuse North Korea’s extortionate demands, North Korea will be interested in us. The closer North Korea comes to credibly threatening the United States with an effective nuclear arsenal, the fewer options we will have to deter its attacks.

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Update: The South Korean President’s special security advisor in charge of cyber-defense also wonders about the sufficiency of her government’s deterrence.

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The courage of Hyeonseo Lee: “I am human also. I am scared.”

Last Wednesday, Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation hosted and moderated an event called “Confronting the Human Rights Challenge in North Korea.” Hyeonseo Lee, author of “The Girl With Seven Names,” was the keynote speaker.

Screen Shot 2015-07-20 at 6.39.54 AMLee spoke in accented, but clear English of the indoctrination she received as a child, of the revelations that broke the hold of the state’s propaganda over her, of her flight from North Korea, and of her resettlement in South Korea. (Later, we learn that Lee also speaks fluent Chinese; from this, and from her answers to questions from the audience, it’s clear that she’s a highly intelligent young woman.)

Perhaps because I’d already seen Lee’s powerful TED talk about her flight from North Korea, the part of her Heritage speech that moved me the most concerned more recent events. At 30:19, Korean-American activist Henry Song asked Lee about her fear that the regime will attack her. Those attacks might well be much more than verbal and rhetorical assaults from Kim Jong-Un’s propagandists, or addlebrained harangues from his noisy little chorus of sympathizers abroad. As I’ve documented in detail, Ms. Lee must also worry about physical violence, including assassination attempts like those directed against Park Sang-Hak, Hwang Jang-Yop, and other dissidents in exile.

Lee spoke of the report — still not carried in any English-language media — that the regime ordered its agents to “punish” 24 dissidents who had spoken at the U.N., and that she understood “punish” to mean “assassinate.” She told of learning that her best friend was arrested for spying for the regime, and of her inability to trust even fellow North Korean refugees, with whom she might make common cause. She told of having moved her residence so that fewer people would know where she lives. She still fears retribution against her family inside North Korea itself. And yet, she speaks out anyway:

Klingner was kind enough to invite me to be a panelist, alongside Param-Preet Singh of Human Rights Watch and T. Kumar of Amnesty International USA. At 1 hour and 25 minutes, I speak about the policy paralysis of the administration and within certain academic circles, the weakness of U.S. sanctions against North Korea, recent moves in Congress to address this, and how sanctions fit into a broader, people-focused engagement policy that would aim to shift the balance of power inside North Korea.

On my way home that day, and in the days since, I’ve reflected with shame and sadness on how low we’ve fallen — or perhaps “shrunken” is the word I’m grasping for — from our historical role as the haven for, and champion of, the liberal values of dissent, of heresy, of free thought. You don’t need to see this in strictly moral terms to see what we’re losing. America became a great nation — greater than nations with more land, more people, with far more advanced cultures, and even more resources — because earlier generations of heretics, dissidents, and refugees made America the world’s center of free thought, of innovation of every kind, and of global culture in the modern age. Freedom of expression hasn’t only enriched our lives incalculably, it has enriched our economy and our global power incalculably, too.

Today, the same men who threaten Hyeonseo Lee and her brave compatriots also threaten our own freedom of expression, here in our own country. The Obama Administration has answered with cowardly mendacity, refusing to even acknowledge Pyongyang’s threats against Lee and other dissidents in exile, even lying to the entire world to avoid confronting them. What was so recently the world’s greatest nation cowers. A lucky few of us look to a small woman from North Korea to show us what courage still means.

If you were in Hyeonseo Lee’s place, what message would you derive from the American government’s refusal to acknowledge Pyongyang’s threats against your life, your freedom, and your family? It isn’t so difficult to imagine her sentiments if you begin by asking yourself how you feel, as an American, that your government offers nothing resembling a credible answer to a foreign despot’s threats against your own freedom, in your own town. In doing so, our government ceases to be a champion of the oppressed; it is the oppressed — and by proxy, so are we. It chooses silence over courage and principle, in the false hope that it can trade our liberty for its security, or — to be even more brutally honest — for its own temporary political advantage. But when our government submits to terror, it submits for all of us, and the consequences of this will extend long beyond January 2017. That is the antithesis of statesmanship.

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Four federal court opinions* say N. Korea sponsors terrorism, yet the State Dep’t still denies it.

In case you missed it on my Twitter feed yesterday:

Americans are rightfully concerned about ISIS’s rampage across the Middle East. But one thing that even ISIS has not yet accomplished is what the president, the director of the FBI, and the director of the NSA all insist Kim Jong-un’s hackers did last year — suppress the release of a major motion picture by threatening terrorist attacks on movie theaters across America.

And yet, incomprehensibly—and two months overdue—the State Department’s recent Friday news dump of its annual “Country Reports on Terrorism” still clings to the tendentious, perennial boilerplate that North Korea “is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Air Lines flight in 1987.” Coming so soon after North Korean threats drove The Interview from theaters, this statement puts the world on notice that the Obama Administration is unserious about protecting Americans’ most fundamental liberties from terrorism by the world’s worst despots.

Read the rest here, at The Weekly Standard.

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* Previously said “courts,” but technically, two of the opinions are from the D.C. District.

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Friday news dump! State Dep’t releases terrorism report, and it’s the same old crap (updated)

The threats against “The Interview,” the sundry assassination and kidnapping plots against defectors and activists, the weapons shipments to Hezbollah, the U.S. and South Korean court decisions finding North Korea responsible for acts of terrorism, all go unmentioned once again. There’s not even a suggestion that North Korea is being considered for re-listing.

Overview: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. In October 2008, the United States rescinded the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that the DPRK had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the provision by the DPRK of assurances that it would not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

Four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a 1970 jet hijacking continued to live in the DPRK. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities in the 1970s and 1980s. In May 2014, the DPRK agreed to re-open its investigation into the abductions, but as of the end of 2014 had not yet provided the results of this investigation to Japan. [U.S. State Dep’t, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014]

For all of the reasons why this is legally and factually false, read my full report (opens in pdf). I will have much more to say about this, naturally, but I hope you don’t mind that I’d prefer to say it to a wider audience.

But really — for this, we waited for a report that was two months late?

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Update: On the same day State released its report, the Korean TV network MBC alleged that North Korea ordered its agents to “punish” 24 North Korean defectors, including those who testified before the United Nations about crimes against humanity in their homeland. The report is in Korean only, but hopefully, some of the British and American journalists who read this site will inquire further into the sourcing of the story.

MBC claims to have obtained documents in which staff of the North Korean Embassy in Beijing offered South Korean businessmen doing business in the North to reduce their business debts if the businessmen would obtain personal information and addresses of the targets.

The report also alleges that last month, a North Korean agent was arrested for attempting to assassinate prison camp survivor, author, journalist, and activist Kang Cheol Hwan.

Discuss among yourselves.


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“Arsenal of Terror,” 2d ed.: N. Korea paid dope dealers $40K to kill Hwang Jang Yop

South Korean prosecutors have indicted three South Korean nationals, identified only by the surnames “Bang,” “Kim,” and “Hwang,” for “bringing in methamphetamine from North Korea and attempting to assassinate” Hwang Jang-Yop, North Korea’s highest-ranking defector until his death in 2010. Let’s unpack these two criminal conspiracies one at a time, starting with the meth:

The 69-year-old, identified only by his family name Bang, and two others have been detained for producing 70 kilograms of methamphetamine at a North Korean factory in Sariwon, North Hwanghae Province, in June and July of 2000, a prosecutor at the Seoul Central Prosecutors’ Office said.

They were suspected of being contacted through another South Korean, identified by his surname Lee who died in 2004, in 1996 by a North Korean agent in China who proposed Bang and the two colleagues bring the raw materials and equipment to North Korea to produce meth.

They allegedly traveled to North Korea several times with the aid of North Korean agents and made 70 kilograms of meth there.

“It is the first time North Korean agents were found to have been involved in the production of methamphetamine, although there have been rumors North Korea tried to get foreign currency by selling meth,” the prosecutor said, asking for anonymity.

Bang and his colleagues were given 35 kilograms of meth by the North, prosecutors said, but added they have not yet found evidence the meth was distributed in South Korea. [Yonhap]

The prosecution believes the men transported “the raw materials and manufacturing equipment required for producing methamphetamine to North Korea via China in July 2000,” including “a cooling system and other goods.” There’s no way three South Koreans could have ferried this kind of gear into North Korea, much less been present at a meth factory there, without the knowledge and consent of the North Korean government. Indeed, the indictment suggests that North Korean agents were directly involved in the entire conspiracy, from beginning to end, and had the financial backing of the state.

That stands in contrast to the November 2013 indictment of a sordid group of bikers and killers for conspiring to import highly pure North Korean meth into New York. That indictment did not directly link the transaction to the North Korean government, but was arguably consistent with Sheena Chestnut Greitens’ conclusion that North Korea had opted to privatize and tax its drug manufacturing business, and outsource the transportation. The activities alleged in the indictment of “Bang,” “Kim,” and “Hwang” spanned a time period between 1998 and 2010, and may call for a reconsideration of that conclusion.

Now, let’s turn to the plot to kill Hwang Jang-Yop. Reports quoting the indictment claim that “Bang” collaborated with North Korean agents who were plotting to assassinate Hwang. The dope-dealers worked with North Korean agents on the plot for about a year, which seems like a leisurely pace for whacking a guy who’s already 86.

Seoul prosecutors said the 62-year-old South Korean initially came into contact with a North Korean spy in September 2009 in Beijing and continued to meet that agent on 10 more occasions to discuss the homicide plan. [….]

To prepare for the assassination, the 62-year-old is suspected to have handed over photographs he or she took of Hwang’s residence in Gangnam District, southern Seoul, to the North Korean spy. The person is also thought to have tried to hire criminal gang members for the actual murder. [Joongang Ilbo]

Hwang died in 2010, at age 87. Of natural causes, so they say.

In case you’re keeping count, this would be either the second or the third plot to kill Hwang that has been reported in the press, depending on whether the name of the North Korean agent “Bang,” “Kim,” and “Hwang” worked with was Ri Dong Sam.

As I noted in “Arsenal of Terror,” in June of 2010, Major Kim Myong-Ho and Major Dong Myong-Gwan of the Reconnaissance General Bureau pled guilty to a plot to assassinate Hwang Jang-Yop in a South Korean court, which sentenced each defendant to ten years in prison. The defendants told prosecutors that Lt. Gen. Kim Yong-Chol, the head of the RGB, personally assigned them to the assassination mission in November of 2009.

KBS adds the very interesting detail that defendant “Hwang” “allegedly received an order from North Korean agents in 2004 in China to assassinate a German human rights activist.” I can’t imagine who else that could possibly be but Norbert Vollertsen, who was then at the peak of his prominence.

In “Arsenal of Terror,” I examined the legal definitions of “support” and “international terrorism,” along with the history of what acts the State Department had previously cited as support for international terrorism. I found that attempts to assassinate defectors, dissidents, and activists abroad fit the legal standard. If the North Koreans plotted to kill Vollertsen, it would be the first case I’m aware of in which they targeted a third-country human rights activist for assassination.

President Bush removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008. The Obama Administration’s official view is that North Korea is “not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.” Discuss among yourselves.

The three defendants also engaged in some other forms of peace activism as well:

The three are also suspected of handing over military information from 2009 to 2013 to the North’s agents. 62-year-old Kim allegedly provided information on where gas storage tanks and combined heat and power plants are located and gave a North Korean agent a 2013 arms almanac from the South. Another member, Hwang, was revealed to have traveled in and out of North Korea via China in 2004 in order to kill a German human rights activist. [Daily NK]

According to The Daily NK, the charges include “manufacturing and trading narcotics” and violations of the National Security Law. It’s a reminder that while the National Security Law is certainly overbroad when used to punish non-violent speech, it also has other, more necessary provisions to punish espionage and violent crimes. Full repeal and the status quo are both the wrong answer. The law should be amended.

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2016 Defense Authorization Act would define N. Korea as state sponsor of terrorism

On Sunday, I spotted this interesting Yonhap headline: “U.S. defense bill calls N. Korea terror sponsor.” Given my own recent work on this subject, I was curious about the effect of this provision, so I pulled up the text of the bill, H.R. 1735, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. The versions on Thomas and don’t yet reflect the amendment, but clues from the Yonhap piece led me to the amendment in question, offered by Rep. Duncan Hunter (R, Cal.). The “almost identical” language of H.R. 1498 yields the amendment’s operative text.

No, the amendment would not re-list North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, or invoke any of the sanctions that an SSOT listing would bring; only the Secretary of State can do that. Instead, the bill creates an “Interagency Hostage Coordinator” to lead a federal interagency task force, and “coordinate and direct all activities of the Federal Government” to “secure the release of United States citizens who are hostages of hostile groups or state sponsors of terrorism.” The legislation does not define the term “hostage,” but does define “state sponsor of terrorism.” Here’s what got Yonhap’s attention:

(3) STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM.—The term “state sponsor of terrorism”—

(A) means a country the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other provision of law, to be a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; and

(B) includes North Korea.

The Hunter amendment isn’t non-binding “sense of Congress” language; it does something. That something, however, is to change the staffing of our hostage negotiation team by putting those negotiations under the control of a new coordinator. The amendment does not invoke any sanctions against these SSOTs, but Congress is clearly making a symbolic point here. It’s concerned about the detentions of Merrill Newman, Jeffrey Fowle, Matthew Todd Miller, Kenneth Bae, Laura Ling, Euna Lee, Aijalon Gomes, Robert Park, and others (we’ll call them “the detainees”). It wants Pyongyang to know that the unjust detentions of Americans will carry consequences. It’s fair to assume that Congress is also sending a message to the State Department that North Korea should go back on the SSOT list. All of that is good. Congress is correct about all of these things, including the fact that North Korea has repeatedly sponsored acts of international terrorism.

In another sense, however, these detentions may not be the best vehicle for pressuring State to put North Korea back on the list, especially when so many more deserving vehicles are whizzing past us. For example, the threats that drove “The Interview” from theaters across America meet the legal definitions of “support” and “international terrorism,” and would be a far better reason to re-list North Korea.

I considered, but ultimately decided against, discussing the detentions of Bae, Miller, Newman, and others in “Arsenal of Terror.” In the report, one theme I discuss extensively is the lack of a single coherent definition of “international terrorism,” although it is possible to assemble a lowest common denominator definition from three separate statutes, informed by State Department “Country Reports on Terrorism,” to the extent those reports are consistent with the statutory language. At page 96, I proposed a codified definition of “international terrorism,” ready to be inserted into the Export Administration Act, that consists of five elements.

(9) the term “international terrorism” means any act that—

(A) is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed;

(B) involves a violent act; an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; or a threat of such an act;

(C) involves the citizens or the territory of more than one country;

(D) is perpetrated by a subnational group or clandestine agent against a noncombatant target; and

(E) appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government.

To call these detentions “terrorism” seems iffy under two elements of this definition. First, in a place where everything that is not absolutely compulsory is absolutely forbidden,* just about any idle expression of thought is unlawful, and is a basis for arrest under “the laws of the place where it is committed.” The correct answer to this problem is not to expand the definition of terrorism in ways that will lead to perverse results in other contexts; the correct answer is to keep Americans out of North Korea (but more on that in a moment). Second, I don’t see clear evidence that North Korea’s conduct meets the intent element of (9)(E). Yes, Pyongyang was probably using the detainees as “hostages” to some degree, and I’m not alone in speculating that it was, but speculation without more isn’t evidence. Evidence might include statements by North Korea demanding specific financial or political benefits in exchange for the detainees’ release. I haven’t seen that evidence.

In pushing State to re-list North Korea, of course, Congress gets the greater truth right, which State has been getting wrong for a decade or more. As a matter of fact, law, and policy, North Korea should be back on the list, and sanctions for SSOTs should be stronger. There is also an important symbolic value in treating North Korea like a state sponsor of terrorism. Having said that, however, I’m not sure how this provision will make our negotiations more successful if it doesn’t give our diplomats more leverage. Not that anyone asked me, but I can think of another way to do that.

Under Section 203(b)(4) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the President lacks the authority to ban transactions incident to tourist travel to a targeted jurisdiction. This doesn’t mean it can’t be done, however. There are tourist travel sanctions against Cuba because Congress passed special legislation to do that. If Congress really wants to put teeth into this particular provision, it could give the Hostage Coordinator the authority to recommend, and for the Secretary of State to find, that a state is uncooperative in releasing U.S. hostages detained without proper legal justification, that travel to that state presents an undue safety risk to U.S. citizens, and that a similar travel ban should apply to that jurisdiction until the hostage situation resolves.

The blocking of financial transactions incident to tourist travel would be a powerful deterrent, and strong diplomatic leverage. The language would not only cover all tourist travel by Americans, but it would also cover all tourism-related transactions denominated in dollars by anyone, regardless of nationality.

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* Credit to the late Christopher Hitchens.

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Contradiction isn’t argument: A response to Doug Bandow on N. Korea and terrorism

In the years after my return from four years with the Army in Korea, I found much to agree with in Doug Bandow’s writing — up to a point. Bandow is best known — at least in the context of Korea — for arguing that South Korea can and should pay for its own defense, and that U.S. Forces Korea should withdraw. A supporter of the isolationist and semi-retired cult figure, Ron Paul, Bandow favors the withdrawal of all 28,500 U.S. military personnel from South Korea. But if we’ve learned anything in the last dozen years, it’s that ill-advised invasions and sudden disengagements can both create dangerous power vacuums. Yes, South Korea can and should pay for its own defense. U.S. ground forces could leave on a five-to-ten-year timetable and leave behind some pre-positioned equipment, and the U.S.-Korea alliance could evolve into something like our alliances with Jordan, Turkey, or Israel. That would serve the interests of both countries.

This is decidedly not Bandow’s direction. He views the total withdrawal of USFK as mood music for “initiating negotiations” with Pyongyang to improve relations. The premise of his unified theory of Korea policy, expressed in a November 2014 op-ed, is that economic engagement can still transform (rather than merely perpetuate) a state that has built its survival strategy on isolation and xenophobic hostility. In the 1990s, this idea was once the received conventional wisdom, before it failed so conclusively that it was abandoned and replaced by policy paralysis that prefers to be called “strategic patience.” At the cost of a mere $9 billion — also indirectly paid by U.S. taxpayers — the legacy of “engagement” includes no signs of political reform, but a North Korea that’s as menacing as ever, only with an effective nuclear arsenal. Bandow wanted President Obama to “talk” to North Korea, but talk about what? Since 2008, Pyongyang has refused to talk about denuclearization.

Then, twenty days after Bandow published that, this happened:

President Obama said on Friday that the United States “will respond proportionally” against North Korea for its destructive cyberattacks on Sony Pictures, but he criticized the Hollywood studio for giving in to intimidation when it withdrew “The Interview,” the satirical movie that provoked the attacks, before it opened. [N.Y. Times]

In my recent report on North Korea’s sponsorship of international terrorism, I carefully distinguished the hacking of Sony, which wasn’t a violent act and therefore not terrorism, from this:


We will clearly show it to you at the very time and places “The Interview” be shown, including the premiere, how bitter fate those who seek fun in terror should be doomed to.

Soon all the world will see what an awful movie Sony Pictures Entertainment has made.

The world will be full of fear.

Remember the 11th of September 2001.

We recommend you to keep yourself distant from the places at that time.

(If your house is nearby, you’d better leave.)

Whatever comes in the coming days is called by the greed of Sony Pictures Entertainment.

All the world will denounce the SONY.

More to come…

To argue that this isn’t an act of terrorism against the United States defies both the law and common sense. It would be inconsistent with the State Department’s own citation of threats of violent acts, cited in years of previous country reports (page 16). To offer no credible response to the most effective foreign attack on free expression in American history will assuredly invite more attempts to censor us.

Writing in The National Interest, however, Bandow not only argues against an SSOT re-listing on policy grounds, he insists that North Korea has not supported international terrorism, period:

Stanton does a lawyerly job of offering evidence that the DPRK government is a nasty piece of work. Over the last decade or so it has kidnapped and assassinated opponents, supported groups and governments opposed by the U.S. government, attacked South Korea, launched cyber-attacks, sold nuclear technology, and conducted missile and nuclear tests. What Pyongyang apparently has not done since 1987 is initiate a terrorist attack against anyone, let alone America. North Korea is an evil state, not a terrorist state. [Doug Bandow, The National Interest]

This is like telling your rabbi that you eat bacon, pepperoni, gummi bears, chitterlings, Chee-tos, meatloaf, elderberries, and scrapple … but never pork. Fortunately, my report does a better job of distinguishing which of these acts are support for international terrorism, and which ones aren’t.

To his credit, Bandow doesn’t entertain conspiracy theories or deny that North Korea was behind the “Guardians of Peace” threat. Less to his credit, he seems to have read the Cliff’s Notes instead of the full report. He offers no argument against the federal court decisions holding that North Korea abducted a U.S. resident, sold weapons and technical assistance to Hezbollah, or helped the Japanese Red Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine carry out the Lod Airport massacre. He doesn’t deny the evidence that South Korean courts relied on to convict a kidnapper of Rev. Kim Dong Shik, or the unsuccessful assassins of Hwang Jang Yop and Park Sang Hak. He doesn’t deny the multiple shipments of arms from North Korea to Hezbollah. He doesn’t deny that North Korean clandestine agents are running around China and South Korea, jabbing poison needles into human rights activists.

Bandow doesn’t exactly argue that these things fall outside the legal definition of international terrorism, either; he just says they do. This might force us into a difficult choice between the legal analysis of three federal district court judges and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C Circuit (on one hand) and Doug Bandow (on the other hand), except that as Michael Palin taught us, contradiction is not the same thing as argument.

If none of those things counts as the sponsorship of international terrorism, what does? It’s important to note that most of this conduct happened after President Bush agreed to remove North Korea from the LSSOT, and after President Bush certified that North Korea has agreed not to support acts of terrorism in the future.

Washington should not stretch the definition of terrorism past the breaking point to cover all manner of activities that are not by any normal understanding considered to be terrorism. Especially since the designation has had no practical impact on the North.

The opposite seems closer to the truth — Bandow’s definition of international terrorism is so narrow and cramped as to evade perception entirely. In my report, I noted multiple cases of Pyongyang’s nasty conduct that didn’t meet the definition, including conventional military attacks on and threats against South Korea. The proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons technology may not fit the narrowest plausible legal definition of terrorism, but that still leaves us with the State Department’s history of citing it in its Country Reports on Iran, Syria, and other countries.

This vagueness is why I call on Congress to clarify the legal standards for an SSOT listing. To that end, I offer suggested language that is the lowest common denominator of the three statutes that define “international terrorism” and “terrorist activity.” A clearer definition should be informed by years of State Department precedent, but only where that precedent is consistent with the statutes’ language. Bandow writes that “even” I agree that the standards are vague. “Especially” would have been better. I want the law to be clear, because I’m tired of watching the State Department make a muddle of it. A deterrent is useless without clear notice to potential sponsors.

Bandow argues that a SSOT listing isn’t a very strong deterrent anyway. I agree that it isn’t nearly strong enough, but if you understand how weak U.S. sanctions against North Korea really are, you will understand that putting North Korea back on the LSSOT and triggering just the transaction licensing provisions of 31 C.F.R. Part 596 would close an important loophole in those sanctions. On pages 26 to 28, I explained which consequences of a SSOT listing would matter, and which wouldn’t. On page 99, I recommended adding to the list of options available to the Secretary of State to deter the sponsorship of terrorism more effectively, including the sort of tougher secondary financial sanctions that devastated Pyongyang’s palace economy in 2005. 

Another consequence I referred to in the recommendations, but ought to have explained in greater detail in the body of the report, is a policy under which the Securities and Exchange Commission requires securities issuers to disclose their investments in states that sponsor terrorism and abuse human rights. Of course, the latter basis is more than enough to justify imposing a requirement to report investments in North Korea, with or without an SSOT re-listing. A disclosure requirement would open investors in North Korea, including foreign corporations that issue securities in the U.S. market, to reputational harm, protests, and boycotts until Pyongyang ceases its crimes against humanity.

Bandow also frets that re-listing North Korea as a SSOT could upset the North Koreans and provoke a violent reaction.

Nor would Pyongyang necessarily remain quiescent in response to what it would see as another U.S. attack. Warned CRS, the DPRK could “respond to a redesignation by taking additional provocative actions, such as more nuclear-weapon or long-range-missile tests [8].”

I’m sure a lot of things upset the North Koreans, including (in no particular order) any level of defense relationship with South Korea or Japan; the existence of South Korean villages or warships in disputed waters; U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions, and governments that enforce them; the granting of asylum to North Korean refugees; the making and showing of films critical of Kim Jong Un in the United States, Germany, or Myanmar; academic conferences in downtown Washington; and my report. To discard even non-kinetic policy responses because of the risk of a violent reaction may or may not be a complete preemptive surrender of all policy options. It’s for Bandow, not me, to explain what options remain, and where he would draw the line. Sanctions don’t seem to be among the options Bandow favors, either:

In January, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced legislation to effectively reimpose the terrorism designation. Last year, the House approved Rep. Ed Royce’s H.R. 1771 [5], which proposed unilateral measures to enforce multilateral sanctions. Ros-Lehtinen’s H.R. 204 [6] is substantially more punitive. The bill’s “findings” are a veritable kitchen sink of complaints of DPRK misbehavior including “duplicity in its negotiations with the United States” and defiance of “the international community.” The measure urges the administration to relist the North as a SSOT, imposes the penalties for being listed as a SSOT, and sets numerous impossible conditions (opening North Korean prison camps to international inspection, for instance) for lifting sanctions. Almost as an afterthought, the bill bars any expenditure to open diplomatic relations. [Bandow]

But Bandow misreads H.R. 1771 (since updated and reintroduced as H.R. 757) and misunderstands its relationship to U.N. sanctions. The U.N. relies on member states to enforce sanctions with their national laws. H.R. 757’s “unilateral” sanctions are intended, in large part, to make multilateral sanctions (which are failing now) work. As I argued in detail here, both U.S. national sanctions and U.N. Security Council sanctions are essential and complementary elements of an effective sanctions program. That’s why Section 202 calls on the State Department to work with other member states to enforce U.N. sanctions consistently, Section 104 provides for secondary sanctions against member states that knowingly violate them, and Sections 401 and 402 recognize the core interests of our allies by making the return of abductees and North Korea’s nuclear disarmament prerequisites for lifting the sanctions. 

I can’t speak to the intent behind H.R. 204, but the fact that Ms. Ros-Lehtinen had a “kitchen sink” to throw in doesn’t refute a single item in her bill of particulars. Bandow also calls the opening of North Korea’s prison camps an “impossible” condition, an implicit argument for tolerating the use of our financial system to sustain the regime that runs those camps.

I actually thought Bandow’s most compelling argument was one he seems to have offered as a reductio ad absurdum:

Only Iran, Sudan, Syria, and departing Cuba currently are on the list, and none has engaged in terrorism against America, at least within normal memory. If terrorism is the actual concern, why aren’t Pakistan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia on the list? 

Bandow doesn’t seem to be any better informed about Iran than he is about North Korea. With respect to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, however, I’d agree that both have supported (or tolerated support for) the Al-Nusra Front and ISIS. I can’t imagine that even Bandow would deny that both groups are security threats to the United States. He just holds up the law as mandating a procrustean amputation of ties with two states with which we’ve long had strong (if strained) ties, rather than offering Riyadh and Doha the same nuanced diplomacy he would have us extend to Pyongyang. Just as we exhausted diplomatic options to end North Korea’s sponsorship of terrorism, we should exhaust our diplomatic options to cut off Qatari and Saudi support for terrorists. If talks alone can’t achieve that result, page 99 of the report offers a series of “one or more the following” sanctions proposals, under which a reformed LSSOT framework would give the Secretary of State the flexibility to tailor sanctions options to the different exposures, vulnerabilities, and levels of culpability of different governments. It’s fair to say that as currently written, the law is procrustean. That’s not an argument against reforming it into something more useful.

Eventually, Bandow gets around to where he should have begun and ended — that as a policy matter, the LSSOT shouldn’t exist at all. If Bandow can offer better suggestions to fill the policy gap that would leave, I’m ready to hear them. International terrorism is the greatest security threat the U.S. faces today, and it’s a far greater threat when states arm and employ the terrorists. States are more likely to arm and employ terrorists when given effective impunity for doing so. The idea of deterring states from sponsoring terrorism is as absurd as you want to make it. By sticking to that policy argument, Bandow would have freed himself from the burden not shouldered, to argue against the inconvenient evidence of Pyongyang’s sponsorship of terrorism. That evidence was sufficient for multiple competent courts of law, and it ought to be good enough for our State Department, too.

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N. Korea denounces my report on its sponsorship of terrorism: a “sinister,” “plot-breeding,” “unpardonable … provocation.”

For days, since the launch of the report I wrote for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, laying out the case for re-listing North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, I’d been watching KCNA, hoping I wouldn’t be snubbed. That’s why this 884-word May Day denunciation is a very special, emotional moment for me — the pinnacle of years of sinister plot-breeding, of careful research and delicately crafted Madonna analogies. I will go so far as to say that the prospect of this denunciation drove me onward, as I wrote the report.

Since its appearance, [HNRK] has insisted on linking the food shortage in the DPRK with “lack of elementary human rights” and compiled all nonsensical talks about its social system to meet the political interests of the U.S. conservative forces before floating wild rumors.

Such a plot-breeding body produced a conspiratorial document as part of its desperate campaign to label the DPRK a “sponsor of terrorism.” This is no more than the last-ditch effort of those hell-bent on the smear campaign against the DPRK.

Explicitly speaking, the above-said story about “the DPRK’s sponsoring of terrorism” is another unpardonable politically-motivated provocation against the DPRK. [KCNA]

Offhand, I can’t recall another case in which a report so likely caused an equal degree of upset within the North Korean government and the U.S. State Department, whose annual Country Reports on Terrorism is now overdue. You can read the full denunciation below the fold. Somewhere in there is the perfect quotation for my masthead.

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Update: Not surprisingly, the North Koreans didn’t read the report very carefully. I concluded that the Sony cyberattack was not a “violent” act, and therefore did not meet the legal definition of sponsoring international terrorism, but that the “Guardians of Peace” threat against theaters and moviegoers did.

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Why North Korea should be re-listed as a state sponsor of terrorism

Read the full report, here.

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Many, many thanks to Greg Scarlatoiu, Suzanne Scholte, Nick Eberstadt, and Marcus Noland for their kind comments at yesterday’s launch event, and to everyone who showed up at 6:00 on a Monday night. Special thanks to the HRNK interns who made it all possible — especially to Rosa and to Raymond, who meticulously checked every last cite and footnote.

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Update, 1 May 2015: Here’s video of the launch event.

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RFA: North Korea tells overseas workers to attack journalists

Ever since the U.N. Commission of Inquiry issued its report last year, North Korea has been particularly sensitive to accusations of human rights violations. It shouldn’t surprise us that this sensitivity is especially keen when the scrutiny threatens to cut off a growing source of hard currency — its export of what amounts to slave labor to places like Russia, Malaysia, and Qatar. Press reports on the working conditions of these workers, and the regime’s spotty history of paying their (paltry) wages, have embarrassed the regime, embarrassed companies and governments that use North Korean labor, and sometimes, disrupted those arrangements.

Now, according to a new report from Radio Free Asia, Pyongyang is reacting to renewed media scrutiny of overseas North Korean laborers about like you’d expect Pyongyang to react to that:

“Particularly, when a foreign reporter or human rights activists tries to take a picture or film you, take the camera, camcorder or cell phone from them and smash it,” the document said, according to Do.

“They [North Korean workers] must physically smash them, but also they must pull out internal memory cards such as SD cards and then return the broken cameras or camcorders to their owners,” he said.

Workers are also directed to physically attack the journalists and investigators:

The action guide also instructs workers not to hesitate to respond with violence and to gang up on those trying to video or photograph them, he said.

“The action guide even includes a series of details: Do not kill, but inflict a blow or fracture until the person’s body is physically damaged,” Do said.

If a person apologizes while a North Korean is beating him, the North Korean must record his words with a video camera or cellphone and give the recording to the supervisor or manager of the work unit to which they belong, Do said.

“If North Korean workers block activities by preventing or beating a South Korean who is reporter or human rights activist, they will be evaluated according to their actions,” he said. “But if they don’t [follow the guidelines] and pictures or videos appear on the Internet or TV, they’ll be punished.” [RFA]

A caution is in order on the sourcing of the story: it’s attributed to an NGO, the Citizens’ Coalition for Human Rights of Abductees and North Korean Refugees (CHNK), citing “sources inside North Korea.” Although CHNK itself is a respected NGO, we’re in no position to evaluate the reliability and basis of knowledge of CHNK’s own anonymous sources.

If the report can be confirmed, it could have significant policy implications. It would amount to an order by the North Korean government to subnational groups to commit politically motivated violence against non-combatant citizens of other nations on foreign soil. In this case, Pyongyang’s political motivation is to suppress the work of journalists and NGOs, and to preempt policy discussions among governments. It’s far from the most egregious example of North Korean sponsorship of international terrorism — the direction to refrain from murder may even count as progress — but if these orders are attempted or carried out, they could meet the legal standard for the hate that dare not speak its name (at least in Foggy Bottom).

President Bush removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008. The Obama Administration’s official view is that North Korea is “not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.” Discuss among yourselves.

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Update: New Focus also reports that the regime has tightened controls on its expat workers in China:

As a basic rule, it is understood that all workers must move in groups of at least fifteen people. But furthermore, television viewing is strictly prohibited. This is because South Korean dramas play regularly on Chinese broadcasts. If any labourer is caught moving out of bounds, away from the workplace and watching television, they will be sent straight back to North Korea the next day.

Previously, North Korean overseas labourers were allowed some degree of freedom, even being able to leave the workplace, provided that they moved in groups of two or three. However, during the lead up to Kim Il Sung’s birthday celebrations, the rules have changed and controls have tightened significantly.

To conclude, it can be observed that the North Korean government, in an effort to raise hard currency, is increasing its export labour, and, in addition, tightening its grip on them, especially in light of foreign influences such as Hallyu (the Korean Wave). The North Korean government has clearly shown, once again, its concerns and fears regarding the threat of exposure to Western cultural influences.

Or, I would add, its fears regarding the threat of Western exposure to how North Korea treats its people.

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60 Minutes on the Sony attacks

Gone were the inside-job theories, except that one expert, when asked, allows the bare possibility that an insider might have made the North Koreans’ work easier. Like the heads of the FBI and the NSA, all the experts 60 Minutes interviewed are convinced that North Korea was behind the attack.

Worse, the attack itself was not all that sophisticated, when compared to what the U.S. and other governments are capable of today. An equally unsophisticated attack would have taken out 80% of corporate networks. All it takes is for one user in the network to click on the wrong attachment or fake update. Only then will most companies realize how dependent they are on their networks.

The IT security experts acknowledge that hacking North Korea is futility itself. The only real deterrent is to go after the leadership and its revenue streams. The Obama administration has only pretended to do that.

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Justice for Rev. Kim Dong Shik: Court orders N. Korea to pay $330M in damages

Asher Perlin, the lawyer who argued and won the case against North Korea at the Court of Appeals on behalf of Rev. Kim Dong Shik’s family, writes in to direct me to this news:

An Israeli NGO announced on Monday that a US federal court in Washington, DC has granted it a historic $330 million default award judgment against North Korea in a civil damages trial for wrongful death, torture and kidnapping.

The judgment, only announced Monday, but written on April 9, included $15 million dollars each to the son and brother of Reverend Dong Shik Kim, presumed dead, as well as $300 million in punitive damages. [Jerusalem Post]

In 2000, Rev. Kim was in China helping North Korean refugees who had escaped from their homeland. North Korean agents kidnapped Rev. Kim and dragged him across the border. He’s believed to have died of starvation at a North Korean military base near Pyongyang. In 2005, the South Koreans caught one of the kidnappers, charged him with Rev. Kim’s kidnapping, and convicted him of the crime.

In August 2013, a District Court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that North Korea killed Rev. Kim after the North Koreans hustled him over the border (undoubtedly, under the noses of Chinese border guards) and dismissed the case. Kim’s family appealed, and last December, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court.

Shurat Hadin Director Nitzana Darshan-Leitner said, “The district court was holding us to a standard that no family, who had a loved one kidnapped and murdered by an outlaw regime like North Korea could ever satisfy.”

“Virtually no one has ever returned from the camps and been able to testify about the fate of individual Korean prisoners. This is an important human rights decision that will be utilized in all political abduction cases going forward. We are proud that an Israeli NGO was able to assist this family of a Korean priest living in the US … during this holiday season.” 

The NGO also said that the US should re-add North Korea to the US State Department’s watch list, from which North Korea was removed in 2008 during a period of warming of relations.

Perlin said the court “sent a message that repressive regimes cannot exploit their repression to gain advantage in US courts.”

He added that “the fact that all witnesses were either murdered, imprisoned or are in grave fear of retaliation by the DPRK regime should not immunize North Korea from liability.”  [Jerusalem Post]

President Bush removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008. The Obama Administration’s official view is that North Korea is “not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.” Discuss among yourselves.

Rev. Kim’s kidnapping is just one example of North Korea’s sponsorship of terrorism, along with multiple assassination attempts directed at defectors and dissidents, several shipments of weapons to Hamas and Hezbollah, threats against American moviegoers, and an attempt by North Korean hackers to cause malfunctions in the reactors of South Korean nuclear power plants.

The $330 million judgment now sits alongside $378 million awarded to the victims of the 1972 Lod Airport massacre (and their children), and $69 million to survivors of the U.S.S. Pueblo. That’s a total, so far, of $777 million in compensatory and punitive damages, but it’s not a grand total.

Last July, U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth found North Korea provided training, technical assistance, and rocket components to Hezbollah, and held that the North Korean government was liable for the attacks. A Special Master is deciding and apportioning the damages North Korea owes to each plaintiff.

Now, the hunt begins for North Korean assets to levy to satisfy the judgment, which may be the more challenging part of the Kim family’s pursuit of justice. I wish Mr. Perlin good hunting.

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With Sony in mind, Obama signs new cyberwar E.O., but will he enforce it?

On Wednesday, the President signed a new executive order authorizing sanctions against anyone the State and Treasury Departments decide has engaged in conduct we’d colloquially call cyberespionage, cyberwarfare, or cyberterrorism. The new categories of sanctionable conduct include —

(A) harming, or otherwise significantly compromising the provision of services by, a computer or network of computers that support one or more entities in a critical infrastructure sector;

(B) significantly compromising the provision of services by one or more entities in a critical infrastructure sector;

(C) causing a significant disruption to the availability of a computer or network of computers; or

(D) causing a significant misappropriation of funds or economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain. [link]

The E.O. also targets the theft of trade secrets and intellectual property, and in a novel provision, also authorizes the blocking of property of those who profit from those crimes. Deep breath now:

(A) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, the receipt or use for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain, or by a commercial entity, outside the United States of trade secrets misappropriated through cyber-enabled means, knowing they have been misappropriated, where the misappropriation of such trade secrets is reasonably likely to result in, or has materially contributed to, a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States; [link]

The order also contains standard (but crucial) clauses authorizing sanctions for assisting, sponsoring, facilitating, or attempting to commit those crimes. In a significant omission, it does not authorize sanctions against those who threaten to commit them.

For the most part, however, the new E.O. follows a well-worn path. It essentially does to certain cybercriminals and their enablers what Executive Order 13,224 does to terrorists and their enablers, or what Executive Order 13,382 does to proliferators and their enablers. The main substantive differences are the targeting of those who profit from the crimes, and a provision for the exclusion of aliens who are designated under the new order (something that Section 206 of the NKSEA would also do to enablers of North Korea’s illicit, prohibited, or sanctionable activities, including cyberwarfare).

In an accompanying Q&A and blog post, the White House names China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as being responsible for the conduct the E.O. is meant to target. And yet the Obama Administration hasn’t designated anyone under this new executive order yet.

The program’s effectiveness will depend on its implementation, said Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation. On North Korea, for instance, he said that the administration “has pursued a policy of timid incrementalism — of talking a tough game, but not following through on its rhetoric.” [Washington Post, Ellen Nakashima]

And crucially, the Sony hackers operated more-or-less openly from Chinese soil, to no less an extent than the Taliban allowed Al Qaeda to operate from Afghan soil. What the law enforcement people will tell you is that to shut down that kind of behavior, you have to show the hosts and sponsors that you’re willing (even eager) to go after them, too.

But James A. Lewis, a cyberpolicy expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the new program is promising — especially as a tool to combat one of the nation’s top cyberthreats: economic espionage by China.

“You have to create a process to change the behavior of people who do cyber-economic espionage,” he said. “Some of that is to create a way to say it’s not penalty free. This is an effective penalty. So it moves them in the right direction.” [WaPo]

Both Klingner and Lewis are correct, but the early signs aren’t encouraging. The new E.O. does fill key gaps in our authorities against cyberespionage and the theft of intellectual property, and those things are doing great damage to our economy and our national security. But the absence of designations suggests that like E.O. 13,687, this may turn out to be another empty threat, at least until we have a president who’s tough-minded enough to protect our interests and our most fundamental freedoms from foreign threats.

In the case of Sony, for example, the Administration already had sufficient tools to sanction those responsible. The threats against “The Interview” moviegoers were clearly terrorism, and the administration could just as well have designated those responsible under Executive Order 13,224, or even charged them criminally under Chapter 113B of Title 18. So why didn’t it? Probably because that would have undermined the State Department’s flat-earth dogma that North Korea hasn’t sponsored an act of terrorism since 1987. North Korea’s December 2014 attacks against South Korean nuclear power plants, which were reportedly meant to cause a reactor malfunction, could also have been designated under E.O. 13,224, and if the evidence was strong enough, should have been.

It may be that the administration is as worried about Congress as it is about the North Koreans, and is trying to stay ahead of it and protect its own role. For example, the new Congress recently passed discretionary sanctions authorities against cyberespionage in Section 1637 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015. Section 104(a) of the NKSEA will also provide for mandatory sanctions against North Korean hackers, and Section 104(b) will provide for discretionary sanctions against their enablers.

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Kim Jong Un’s censorship knows no limits or borders. To submit to it is to forfeit freedom.

If Kim Jong Un is weighing whether to answer leaflets from South Korea with artillery, it won’t discourage him that many on South Korea’s illiberal left have already begun to excuse him for it. Within this confused, transpatriated constituency, there is much “anxiety” lately about “inter-Korean tensions.” Those tensions have risen since North Korea has begun threatening to shell the North Korean defectors who send leaflets critical of Kim’s misrule across the DMZ. But then, any rational mind can see who is at fault when the object of non-violent criticism answers his critic’s threats with violence. Right?


[The Park Police should check those blankets for wet spots.]

I don’t suppose it occurred to these people to take their grievances and anxieties to the ones who are threatening war over non-violent expression. That would be the logical reaction if these people were really as concerned about “tension” as they were about acting as Kim Jong Un’s proxy censors. Their undisguised demand is that Seoul should censor — and that Washington should abstain from supporting — free expression, for the very reason that Pyongyang is threatening to shell civilian villages in response to it.

Dismiss this as the view of a lunatic fringe if you will, but not all of this lunacy is on the fringe.

For example, today is the fifth anniversary of North Korea’s premeditated and unprovoked sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, an act of war that killed 46 South Korean sailors. An international investigation team found that a torpedo fired from a North Korean submarine sank the Cheonan. Yet only yesterday, the head of the left-opposition New Politics Alliance for Democracy finally acknowledged that the North did it. For five years, conspiracy kooks and appeasers had enough influence within the NPAD to prevent it from giving the first small comfort of this acknowledgement to the souls of the dead and the hearts of the bereaved. The NPAD’s long, reprehensible silence speaks more loudly than its words.

And now, here is Jeong Se-Hyun, who headed the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland Reunification Ministry under Kim Jong Il Roh Moo Hyun:

“The (South Korean) government claims the leaflet scattering is a matter of free expression, but such a slander on (North Korean leader) Kim Jong-un is something fatal to the North,” the former point man on the North said in a local symposium.

“If the Park Geun-hye administration wants to hold a meaningful inter-Korean dialogue during its term, it should send a sincere message that (Seoul) will acknowledge and respect (Pyongyang),” he noted. [Yonhap]

I could not answer this better than Shirley Lee did, in a series of three profound and cogent tweets:

With all this and more, it is laughably tragic that we who are free to think continue to think only within frames set by such a system.

Where each of its subjects living beyond its narrative must be despised and scorned, and those submitting to its frame to be praised.

We side with a brutal, inhumane, zero-sum system merely by siding with its frames, by not calling it out, forging and articulating our own.

Also, Jeong reveals too much here. If he really thinks that non-violent expression is “fatal,” he must believe that a few scattered scraps of paper have the potential to inspire the North Korean people to risk their lives to overthrow His Porcine Majesty. That, given half a chance, they’d hang him from a lamppost (and they should be sure it’s a very sturdy one). Jeong is a closet collapsist! Perhaps he could write me a guest post expanding on this.

Park Sang Hak – Hacking North Korea’s… by NORTHKOREATV

This week, Pyongyang’s proxy censors are especially afraid of Park Sang-Hak. Park is obviously under great pressure from both Korean governments, including the one that hasn’t yet tried to assassinate him. Just this week, Park has said that he would abstain from sending leaflets “for now,” and also vowed to send them “next week” despite the North’s threats.

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[This is a syringe, loaded with the poison neostigmine bromide. Agents of North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau use them to assassinate dissidents and activists. One of them tried to kill Park Sang-Hak with this one.]

Incidentally — and please, stop me if you’ve read this somewhere — President George W. Bush removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008. The Obama Administration’s official view is that North Korea is “not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.” Discuss among yourselves.

South Korea’s National Human Rights Commission has opined that Park’s activities are guaranteed under Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It might also have said that they’re protected under Article 21 of the South Korean Constitution. There is another party whose rights we shouldn’t forget, either. The North Korean people also have a right to receive information from across the no-smile line:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. [Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19]

Writing in The New York Times before the Sony attack and threat, Professor Lee and I took the moderate view that the South Korean government must honor these rights, but could still impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner in which Park sends his leaflets. After all, North Korea clearly has no regard for the lives of South or North Koreans. Perhaps, then, we should concede the prudence of asking the activists to send their leaflets from less populated areas, for the sake of those who live nearby. But then, this recent story caused me to wonder if we had conceded too much:

North Korea on Tuesday threatened to mercilessly punish South Korean activists for allegedly hurting the dignity of its young leader Kim Jong-un during a public demonstration, the latest in a series of harsh rhetoric against rival South Korea.

The latest threat came days after a conservative activist in Seoul trampled a photo of Kim and slashed it with a knife during a rally as others burned printed replicas of North Korean flags. [Yonhap]

In other words, North Korea is now threatening free assembly and expression in downtown Seoul. When you consider that Pyongyang has sent multiple assassins to Seoul and to China to murder dissidents there, no dissident should see this as an idle threat. It has also repeatedly threatened and cyber-attacked South Korean newspapers and broadcasters. It’s not as if Pyongyang has the standing to demand that anyone respect its (unconscionable, soul-crushing) laws when it shows such contempt for the South’s society and laws. No government that submits to such threats can call itself a democracy. The only appropriate response to this is unprintable on a blog with a PG-13 rating, and for most people, would be anatomically impossible.

Aside from the desire to police thought on the streets of Seoul, what other principled grievance might Pyongyang have? Might it have a principled objection to cross-border propaganda leafleting, based on some idea of mutual non-interference? Umm, no:

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In 1998, just after morning formation one day, a soldier friend found this outside the fence around Yongsan Garrison in Seoul and gave it to me. The Army told us to drop these things into special leaflet collection boxes, but who needs one of those cheap gift pens the ROK Defense Ministry hands out every year when you could have a souvenir like this? (Sorry for the wrinkles. Sweaty PT uniforms do that.)

Is it North Korea’s principled position that it’s an act of war to fly physical objects across the DMZ? I doubt that, too.

In any event, if the objection to balloons is that they’re a physical intrusion — notwithstanding their obvious non-violence — then the South Korean and U.S. governments should expand their support for Radio Free North Korea and Open Radio. South Korea should also let them broadcast on medium wave. Pyongyang and Seoul both broadcast to each other now, although on a limited scale.

~   ~   ~

The odds are greater than ever that someone who shares Jeong’s world view will be the next President of South Korea. In fact, given the healthy tendency of voters to tire of any extended rule by a single party, I’d assess them slightly higher than that. If Jeong speaks for a majority of South Koreans, South Korea won’t remain a free and open society for long. It was barely a free and open society when Roh Moo-Hyun was in charge. Let’s not forget that last year, the NPAD proposed to regulate (read: ban) cross-border leafleting. Does anyone expect North Korea to be more respectful of free expression in the South now that it’s at the verge of nuclear breakout? It wouldn’t be unprecedented for an appeasement-minded government in Seoul to add the in terrorem effect of arrests and tax audits to this.

The question here is nothing less than whether South Korea has the courage and reason to remain a free society. If it does, we should give South Korea our support. If not, just remember that Pyongyang’s demands have no borders or limits. Accede to one and there will be another. As a wise man said,

“We cannot have a society in which some dictator someplace can start imposing censorship here in the United States. If somebody is able to intimidate folks out of releasing a satirical movie, imagine what they start doing when they see a documentary they don’t like, or news reports they don’t like.”

Last year, Kim Jong Un effectively extended the reach of his censorship to the United States, not only by preventing theaters from screening a film critical of him, but also by preventing Hollywood studios from making any more of them. By my count, in the last year, Pyongyang has attempted to extent the writ of its censorship — with some success — to Seoul, Tokyo, Berlin, London, Rangoon, Paris, and an academic conference in downtown Washington, D.C. It is also suspected of a cyberattack against The Washington Post. Several years ago, someone hacked this very site.

Of course, South Korea doesn’t have to remain a free society, any more than the United States has to keep 28,500 soldiers and airmen there. Regardless of what kind of society South Korea chooses to be, the United States would still have interests in maintaining friendly relations and trade with it. It’s just that the world is descending into madness at the moment, and we’ve become more particular about who and what we’re willing to die for.

There are two possible lessons here, depending on the path taken in Seoul, Washington, and the world’s other capitals.

The first is that terrorism works when governments are more willing to yield to it than to stand up to it and protect free expression.

The second may not be the one that Pyongyang hoped for: that Pyongyang sounds as afraid of free expression as it is of sanctions. Something here has nipped an especially sensitive nerve in the tender man-bosoms of His Porcine Majesty. Where there is upset, there is also a deterrent. Perhaps Pentagon planners should explore the “soft” power of free expression, not only as a tool to transform North Korean society, but to deter North Korean provocations. An extended deployment of Commando Solo may be just the thing to deter a fourth nuclear test. Perhaps free speech isn’t the problem at all. Perhaps it’s an important part of the solution.

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How Barack Obama let Kim Jong Un get away with censoring and terrorizing America (updated)

Last December, after the FBI and the National Security Agency  concluded that North Korea’s Unit 121 had hacked Sony Pictures and threatened the Americans who wanted to see “The Interview,” President Obama publicly accused North Korea of the cyberattack and threat, and promised a “proportional response” to it. On January 2nd, the President signed a new executive order whose potential was sweeping, but whose actual effect was “symbolic at best.” In practice, the designations under the new executive order amounted to whack-a-mole sanctions against ten small-time arms dealers, who were probably replaced by ten other small-time arms dealers within weeks.

Is that all? Maybe not. If you believe Rep. Michael McCaul, the President also directed the intelligence community to take down North Korea’s internet for a few days. The Director of the CIA, who seems rather desperately to want to deny the story, nevertheless stuck to the CIA’s customary neither-confirm-nor-deny line — sometimes called a “Glomar” response — which will be read in most places, including Pyongyang, as, “So they did it.”

Had this been the act of a band of angry nerds in Guy Fawkes masks (and by the way, about those masks), most people would have applauded it. I still hope that it was. As the act of a great power that once treasured and defended the free expression of its people with all of its might, no word would describe this better than “chickenshit.” It suggests that angry nerds in Guy Fawkes masks have been put in charge of defending the lives, liberty, and security of the world’s greatest power with a mighty arsenal of college pranks. What’s next, flaming dog poop on the doorstep of North Korea’s U.N. mission? It’s hard to see how this will deter future North Korean attacks; after all, the internet is about as vital to North Korea as a subway system is to North Dakota.

In the United States, freedom of expression is not only the foundation of our system of government — of what makes us America — it is also the foundation of what those who shrink from the use of hard power call “soft power.” It is difficult to measure the damage our freedom of expression has suffered in just the last three months alone, but the cyberattack caused Sony Pictures to cancel the release of a major film just before the holidays, and a second studio, New Regency, also announced that it would scrap a second film about North Korea.

In a very real way, the world’s most oppressive system of government has extended the reach of its censorship to our society, and our government acts as if it is impotent to react to this. When one considers the very real legal and safety risks attendant to engaging in what the most extreme adherents of Islam call “blasphemy” today, one strains to argue that the United States is as free today as it was five years ago. If only there were a man whose duties and authorities consisted of preserving, protecting, and defending the Constitution of the United States.

~   ~   ~

Knowing, as history has taught us, that finance is the only North Korean vulnerability the United States has ever exploited successfully, smarter people are following the money. No one should be following North Korea’s money more closely than Adam Szubin, the head of the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (Szubin is also the Acting Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence because his predecessor, David Cohen, has been picked to be the new CIA Director. That should tell you everything about the importance of financial intelligence in U.S. foreign policy today.) This week, Szubin delivered a speech to a trade group in Florida, where he talked about the Obama Administration’s sanctions enforcement priorities:

We are imposing costs on Russia for its brazen violation of core international principles.  We are working to deprive ISIL of the financial means to terrorize the people of Iraq and Syria and spread its warped ideology.  We are keeping up the pressure on Iran while we seek a diplomatic means of ensuring that it will not acquire a nuclear weapon. [Treasury Dep’t Press Release]

By now, you’ve noticed a glaring omission from the list — the only state counterfeiter of the U.S. dollar. One of two nations (Iran being the other) singled out for countermeasures by the Financial Action Task Force. The only nation to have successfully suppressed freedom of expression in the United States by directing its clandestine agents to make a terrorist threat against the American people, in their own country. And as of this week, the only nation to have sponsored a cyberattack against multiple nuclear power plants, an attack that the South Korean government claims was intended to cause a reactor malfunction.

Where it matters — on the financial front — North Korea is a blind spot for the Obama Administration. You can see this manifested in a variety of ways. In this paper, I explained the general weakness of the sanctions authorities in place against North Korea, the relatively small number of North Korean entities designated for the blocking of their dollar-denominated assets, and the relatively low level of the entities designated. This matters, because as the U.N. Panel of Experts recently confirmed, North Korea still relies heavily on the dollar system to violate U.N. Security Council sanctions. Yet you’ll have to search far and wide for any evidence that Treasury has enforced even those sanctions against the banks that help North Korea finance itself, violate U.N. Security Council resolutions, break our laws, and suppress our fundamental freedoms, all by using our own financial institutions.

Last year, for example, the Treasury Department entered into the largest settlement of a potential sanctions penalty in its history, when the French parastatal bank BNP Paribas agreed to pay nearly $1 billion for stripping data out of records of transactions to evade sanctions. Sanctions against whom, you ask?

For instance, a Sudanese bank seeking to move U.S. dollars out of Sudan transferred funds internally within a BNP satellite bank, which then transferred the money to the Sudanese bank’s “intended beneficiary” without reference to the Sudanese bank.

BNP Paribas agreed with sanctioned entities “not to mention their names in U.S. dollar transactions,” and included explicit instructions to bank personnel, such as “! Payment in $ to [French Bank 1] without mentioning Sudan to N.Y.!!!” [….]

According to New York regulators, the scope of the violations was much larger. DFS said from 2002 to 2012, BNP Paribas provided more than $190 billion of dollar-clearing services for Sudanese, Iranian and Cuban parties.

Under orders from “high levels of the Bank’s group management,” BNP Paribas engaged in a “systematic practice…of removing or omitting Sudanese, Iranian or Cuban information” from U.S. dollar-denominated transactions with the purpose of avoiding disclosure “to any potential investigatory authorities,” according to the DFS document. [Wall Street Journal]

Once again, North Korea is absent from the list. Even after the BNP Paribas settlement, Treasury continued to investigate “at least six banks in Germany, France, Italy or Japan” for violating sanctions against “Iran, Sudan, Cuba or other nations hit with U.S. sanctions.” Although North Korea wasn’t one of the principal targets of that investigation, the article gave reason to hope that there would be at least one enforcement action against a bank this year. It linked to this 2014 report by Germany’s Commerzbank, revealing that the bank was under investigation for possible sanctions violations involving North Korea. That probably means that Commerzbank was suspected of dealing with the Foreign Trade Bank or Daedong Credit Bank, the only two North Korean banks of significance that have been designated by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Months passed with no word of any enforcement action against Commerzbank. Then, last week, Treasury issued a press statement confirming the outcome of its investigation: Commerzbank signed a settlement with OFAC, agreeing to pay $258,660,796 for “apparent” violations of sanctions on Iran, Sudan, Burma, Cuba. What about North Korea? To be fair, OFAC also suspected Commerzbank of violating Executive Order 13,382, “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” which is the authority for approximately half of the North Korean designations. Yet no North Korean entities are mentioned in the settlement agreement, which explains Commerzbank’s alleged violations in detail. Here’s Treasury’s summary of how Commerzbank did it:

Those practices included deleting or omitting references to Iranian financial institutions and replacing the originating bank information with Commerzbank’s name from payment messages sent to U.S. financial institutions.  Commerzbank also created a process to route payments involving Iranian counterparties to a payment queue requiring manual processing by bank employees rather than routine, automated processing.  Commerzbank utilized these practices in 1,596 financial transactions routed to or through banks in the United States between 2005 and 2010….

As is customary, Commerzbank denied any wrongdoing in the settlement agreement. The report does have one bright spot — It also notes that “Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest bank, has said it stopped doing new business with Iran, Syria, Sudan and North Korea in 2007.”

It’s worth clarifying that the Treasury Department isn’t the problem here. Szubin is regarded by congressional staffers of both parties as a highly competent bureaucrat and technocrat. The problem is that his remarks reflect the priorities of the president he serves. For the same reasons, the OFAC staff aren’t the problem, either; when sufficiently resourced, they do their jobs very well. The problem is at the top — the President hasn’t made it a priority or dedicated sufficient resources to the problem, most likely because the State Department has persuaded the President to slow-walk sanctions enforcement. The result is that the President keeps the sweep of the sanctions narrow, barely enforces the sanctions that are in effect, and pays token attention to violations and offenses he absolutely can’t ignore.

That abstention from responsibility is now threatening the most fundamental freedoms of the American people, the safety of the South Korean people, the integrity of the U.N. Security Council’s sanctions, and the entire global nonproliferation system. North Korea has made it clear that its system of government and ours cannot coexist. The very least we should do is less of what we’re doing now to help North Korean fascism to continue to exist.

~   ~   ~

If you believe the anonymous U.S. government sources who talked to the Daily Beast, we didn’t knock KCNA down, but we did something else. The sources won’t say what, and more importantly, it’s hard to tell if these sources are high enough in their own organizations to understand the full picture of what various other agencies were up to.

On Tuesday, the online news outlet Daily Beast cited unidentified sources with knowledge of the U.S. government cyber-operations against North as saying that the operations were “designed to send a message that North Korean officials weren’t beyond the reach of the American government.”

The U.S. operations took place before the blackout, but the takedown itself was not the result of those operations, the sources were quoted as saying. The report also said independent hackers have claimed they are the ones that took the North offline.

Former U.S. intelligence officials were also quoted as saying that the American government would hesitate to take down the North’s entire network because it would cut intelligence agencies off from the cyber-spying they were doing inside North Korea. [Yonhap]

You can read the Daily Beast report here.

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Investigators: N. Korean hackers tried to cause reactor malfunction

Earlier this week, I posted on South Korean investigators’ conclusion that North Korea was behind the hacking of several South Korean nuclear power plants, but that the attacks caused no operational impact. Evidently, that wasn’t for lack of effort:

The team of South Koreans investigating the incident says the hackers tried to cause a malfunction at the reactors, which supply around 30% of the country’s electricity, but failed to break through the control systems. [Sky News]

See also this report from AFP.

The Unification Ministry called the attack “cyber-terror” and accused Pyongyang of “taking the life and safety of our people as a hostage.” And if what the investigators say is true, this would be the first serious attempt at nuclear terrorism that I’m aware of.

Honestly, I can’t believe this isn’t a much, much bigger story than it is. It should be as big a story as any of the attacks in 2010. Either someone at the Unification Ministry is hyping this (and I really don’t see the incentive for that) or someone else in the Korean government is downplaying the scope of the attack to avoid political responsibility for lax nuclear security (and if you still remember the Sewol Ferry, you can certainly see the incentive for that).

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