Gates recalls a November 2007 meeting in Seoul with the liberal-minded president, whose diplomatic and security policy is still being debated. He calls Roh “anti-American and probably a little crazy.”
Roh was quoted as telling Gates that “the biggest security threats in Asia were the United States and Japan.” [Yonhap]
He said that to the U.S. SecDef’s face, and the SecDef thinks he’s a little crazy? If anything, Gates was too kind. I’m tempted to make the case that Roh’s policies were detached from reality, but I did enough of that when Roh was alive, and besides which, there’s someone willing to argue that about every politician.
Instead, evaluate Gates’s description on its literal, medical merits. If you must, pick some less pejorative adjective, like “unbalanced.” A retrospective examination of Roh’s public statements while in office, which clearly foretold his cause of death, could have been grounds to commit him to an institution for his own safety. Not only did Roh seem to lack the will to govern, I often sensed (correctly, as it turned out) that his suicidal ideations didn’t have an exclusively political character.
I worried more that Roh was projecting those ideations onto his entire country.
Gates also confirms that Lee Myung Bak had intended to carry out a “disproportional” response using “both aircraft and artillery” after North Korea’s attacks of 2010, but that the Obama Administration forced Lee to call off the strikes.
WERE THE 2010 ATTACKS North Korea’s way of making good on extortion? Stephan Haggard, not widely know for his hard-line views, cites an article in the Chosun Ilbo revealing that Kim Jong Il wanted a summit with Lee Myung Bak, but at a price.
The sticking point was money. How much? According to the Chosun Ilbo, $500-600 million in rice and fertilizer aid, which had effectively been cut from the first of the year, and perhaps some cash too; that was about the price that Kim Dae Jung paid for the first summit. Negotiations continued through November at Kaesong, when the North Korean delegation even presented a draft summit declaration including a resumption of aid. [Stephan Haggard, Witness to Transformation]
The Chosun Ilbo story adds this important piece of evidence:
In January 2010, after the secret contacts ended and North Korea realized that it was impossible to extract any aid from Seoul, it vowed to launch a “holy retaliatory war” against the South and fired multiple artillery rounds at the Northern Limit Line, a de facto maritime border on the West Sea. [Chosun Ilbo]
Haggard makes a compelling (if circumstantial) argument that the attacks were meant to demonstrate that North Korea’s extortion should be taken seriously. We now know that two months after Lee refused to pay up, North Korea sank the Cheonan.
Wondering if I could make this case a bit less circumstantial, I decided to consult my archives and see what else North Korea said and did in the months between Lee’s refusal to pay and the Cheonan attack. I didn’t find what I expected. Although there were certainly some menacing acts and words by North Korea, the threats were nowhere near as extravagant or as frequent as those issued in early 2009, after President Lee cut off aid, and as President Obama warmed up his chair. What’s interesting, however, is that in early 2010, North Korea was facing a severe popular backlash against The Great Confiscation.
In November, of course, North Korea followed up with the Yeonpyeong attack.
Let me take Haggard’s point a step further: if he’s correct in his inference, this course of conduct would be a good fit for the legal definition of “international terrorism.” Some commenters have suggested that the 2010 attacks — particularly the Cheonan attack — are not a basis (not that another is needed) to re-list North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, but fresh evidence of a motive to extort merits reconsideration. The key element is that the violent act must have been intended to influence South Korean government policy, and some of North Korea’s statements from 2009 provide additional evidence of North Korea’s intent. The evidence is circumstantial, but somewhere in North Korea are people with direct evidence, and one of them is probably thinking about defecting.
“The planned firing drill is part of the usual exercises conducted by our troops based on Yeonpyeong Island. The drill can be justifiable, as it will occur within our territorial waters,” said the JCS official. “We won’t take into consideration North Korean threats and diplomatic situations before holding the live-fire drill. If weather permits, it will be held as scheduled.”
The test will take place on the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, which North Korean forces shelled last month in what appears to be an effort to effectively redefine border territory in the Yellow Sea off the countries’ west coast. The shelling killed four South Koreans, two of them civilians. With the test, South Korea is walking a tightrope by trying to defend waters it has controlled since the Korean War of the 1950s in a way that doesn’t escalate into more fighting, which would threaten the safety of its 50 million people and the vibrancy of its economy, the world’s 15th-biggest.
In a statement, North Korea’s foreign ministry spokesman said: “We will be sure to settle scores with the U.S. for the extreme situation on the Korean peninsula. Our military does not speak empty words.”
Uriminzokkiri, the communist state’s official Web site, also said in a commentary that war on the Korean Peninsula is only a matter of time, stoking already high tensions after the North shelled a western South Korean island on Nov. 23 and killed four people. “If war breaks out, it will lead to nuclear warfare and not be limited to the Korean Peninsula,” it said.
It is also calling about 20 American military personnel who will participate in the exercises “human shields.”
I think it should be obvious whose fault all of this is: Bill Richardson! But to be completely serious, his visit shows no evidence of accomplishing the stated objective of reducing tensions. If anything, Richardson has given the North Koreans a louder media megaphone for its threats and encouraged its extortionate bombast. He also reminds us why we call him “Kim Jong Bill”:
“I hope that the U.N. Security Council will pass a strong resolution calling for self-restraint from all sides in order to seek peaceful means to resolve this dispute,” the statement read. “A U.N. resolution could provide cover for all sides that prevents aggressive military action.”
Substantively, this is indistinguishable from what the ChiCom Foreign Ministry is saying, and just as dangerously illogical. Let’s begin with the fact that North Korea specifically ceded four Yellow Sea islands to South Korea in the 1953 Armistice Agreement. The relevant provision is found in Article II, Paragraph 13(b):
[A]ll the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37 58′ N, 124 40′ E), TAECHONG-DO (37 50′ N, 124 42′ E), SOCHONG-DO (37 46′ N, 124 46′ E), YONPYONG-DO (37 38′ N, 125 40′ E), and U-DO (37 36′N, 125 58′ E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the island on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. (See Map 3).
The agreement did not delineate between the two de facto states’ territorial waters, so we default to international customary law, which provides that a nation’s territorial sea extends for 12 nautical miles (or 14 terrestrial miles, or 22 kilometers) from its coastline at low tide, or to the mid-point to a neighboring nation’s coastline, whichever is less. There are North Korean islets just 1.67 miles north of Yeonpyeong, so South Korea’s territorial sea excludes most of the waters north of the island, but the 14-mile radius from Yeonpyeong-Do overlaps with the 14-mile radius from the nearest South Korean island to the east, meaning that South Korea is entitled to describe the 22-mile wide stretch of water between them as its “territorial sea.” (The status of the waters between Yeonpyeong-Do and the outlying islands to the west is more complex, although the status of the islands and the waters within 14 miles of their coastlines is controlled by the same principles.) Clearly, then, the waters within 14 miles of Yeonpyeong-Do, except those to the North, are South Korean waters. There is no basis in international law for North Korea’s novel and unilateral claim of all of the surrounding waters, save the restrictive corridors to the south of them.
To reasonable minds, “restraint” has nothing to do with what you do on your own side of the border, as long as it poses no threat to your neighbor (otherwise, it’s called “sovereignty”). “Restraint” means not shelling your neighbor or sinking its warships. North Korea has done both of these things in the last seven months. South Korea is contemplating nothing of the kind. Its Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that “the artillery guns on Yeonpyeong will be aimed southwest and away from North Korea for the drill.” It is North Korea that needs to show restraint. A nation that is under the threat of an armed attack has a right under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to defend its territory, and restraint does not require the abandonment of that right, or of the preparedness it demands, or of the exercises that are essential to preparedness. These exercises are taking place inside South Korean territory, spurious North Korean claims notwithstanding.
North Korea counts on weak-minded emissaries like Bill Richardson to meet its utterly unreasonable demands half way, in the same way that disreputable merchants raise prices 50% in September to convince addle-brained customers that a 25% discount in December is a great deal. There isn’t much of a case to be made that his visit has reduced tensions with North Korea; in fact, one can argue that his grandstanding, ill-timed visit has had had exactly the opposite effect.
Update: It’s our big annual apocalypse aversion sale! Save big on all MIA remains! This week only, plutonium fuel rods (see manager for pricing)! Bring your U.N. inspectors to see what Sig Hecker has already seen, but mostly, bring lots of cash!
An Op-Ed article on Monday, about the sea boundary between North and South Korea, listed as an author John H. Cushman, a retired Army lieutenant general who commanded the United States-South Korean First Corps Group from 1976 to 1978. During the editing process, General Cushman asked that his name be removed as a co-author, but because of technical problems his request was not received before publication.
I can’t say I blame him. The correction will be an additional embarrassment for Selig Harrison, but it shouldn’t be a greater embarrassment than the op-ed itself.
Selig Harrison’s latest op-ed is such a bizarre departure, even by his own declining standards, that I had to read it for myself to really believe it. I have little to add to what Kushibo has already said about this, except to stare agape at Harrison’s use of language. He calls South Korea’s elected President Lee Myung Bak is a “hard-liner,” while hereditary tyrant Kim Jong Il is a “leader.” Deaths that North Korea caused with malice aforethought are attributable only to “cycles” that we are duty-bound to break through appeasement and concessions. He mischaracterizes the multinational investigation that found North Korea guilty of sinking the Cheonan as a “South Korean inquiry.”
I don’t think this leaves any real question open as to where Harrison’s sympathies lie. Selig Harrison just saw North Korea shell a South Korean fishing village, kill and maim civilians, and create Korea’s first population of war refugees since 1953 … and still, he not only constructs some elaborate justification for this, he has the chutzpah to demand that South Korea sign a peace treaty, but only after the United States unilaterally cedes its territory first. What else really needs to be said?
I’ll begin this post by offering my congratulations to Liu Xiabao, and extending my hope that he’ll soon collect his Nobel Peace Prize in person. In recent years, Nobel Committee has tarnished the prize with some poor choices, and it may be that a man of Liu’s courage and character lends the Nobel more credibility than the other way around. Even President Obama had to concede that Liu deserved the prize far more than he ever did. The last regime to prevent a laureate from collecting his prize was Nazi Germany.
For China, this has been a week of unforced errors of sufficient magnitude to change the minds of voters and the policies of nations. Its leaders are accustomed to meeting domestic dissent with arrogance and thuggery, global revulsion with arrogance and disdain, and foreign diplomats and generals with just plain arrogance, but all of this goes only so far. Suffering this thin-skinned hubris has become the price of “good relations” with China, at least as so-called China Hands prefer to define them. President Obama tried that approach, and to his credit, he’s realized that it doesn’t work. Which is why I’m pleased to report that Admiral Mike Mullen will not win the 2011 Confucius Peace Prize:
“The Chinese have enormous influence over the North, influence that no other nation on Earth enjoys,” Mullen said. “And yet, despite a shared interest in reducing tensions, they appear unwilling to use it. Even tacit approval of Pyongyang’s brazenness leaves all their neighbors asking, ‘What will be next?’ ” [Washington Post, Chico Harlan]
“I do not believe we should continue to reward that behavior with bargaining or new incentives,” Mullen said. “China has unique influence. Therefore, they bear unique responsibility.” [Yonhap]
… and here:
“Beijing’s call for consultations will not be a substitute for action,” Mullen said, echoing similar statements from other U.S. officials this week. “And I do not believe we should continue to reward North Korea’s provocative and destabilizing behavior with bargaining or new incentives.
Mullen recounted that in the past year, North Korean attacks on the South also killed 46 sailors in the sinking of the naval ship Cheonan, in addition to Pyongyang’s public revelations of advancements in its ability to produce new nuclear weapons. “The ante’s going up,” Mullen said. “And I think the stakes are going up. [Stars and Stripes, Kevin Baron]
I especially liked this one:
“Northeast Asia is today more volatile than it has been in much of the last 50 years,” Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said. “Much of that volatility is owed to the reckless behaviour of the North Korean regime, enabled by their friends in China.” [AFP]
That’s all nice, and yet the comments of a high-level official Chinese official in North Korea reflect nothing more than more support for the North:
China’s most senior foreign policymaker Dai Bingguo visited Pyongyang as pressure intensifies on Beijing to rein in its unruly ally, after North Korea’s deadly shelling of a South Korean island inflamed tensions on the peninsula.
“The two sides reached consensus on bilateral relations and the situation on the Korean peninsula after candid and in-depth talks,” said a brief report from China’s Xinhua news agency, datelined Pyongyang. [AFP]
This is an astonishing insensitivity, a deliberate indifference to the desire of the United States, Japan, and South Korea to prevent another Korean War. Having concluded that China isn’t willing to help, those nations have wisely opted to talk outside of its presence, hopefully with a mind to closer military ties. Bringing Japan and South Korea together is a big change, and it’s not a change in China’s favor. Under Roh Moo Hyun, South Korea even tried to combine military dependence on America with neutrality between the United States and China. Today, the incompetence of Chinese diplomacy has bungled its relationship with South Korea, a country of far greater economic importance than North Korea:
The South Korean government is also looking for Beijing to take a more active role in curbing North Korean behavior. On Nov. 27, Chinese state councilor Dai Bingguo, a high-ranking foreign affairs official, made an unexpected trip to Seoul, informing the South Korean government only at the last minute of his desire to meet with President Lee Myung-bak.
“The visit was a disaster,” said a Western diplomat in Seoul, who asked not to be quoted by name because of diplomatic sensitivity. “They told them on a Saturday afternoon, ‘I’m going to be there in 15 minutes and by the way I’d like to meet with the president tonight.’ And then there was no significant message, just the same tired old claptrap.”
L. Gordon Flake, a Korea specialist with the Mansfield Foundation, said there is no expectation that Beijing should cut off relations with the ally for which it sent 3 million soldiers to fight during the Korean War. But he argues that Chinese backing for North Korean adventurism should not be unconditional.
“It is not just that China is turning a blind eye to what North Korea is doing, they are enabling North Korea,” Flake said. “China’s overt support for North Korea is blunting the effectiveness of diplomatic measures to curb their behavior.” [L.A. Times, Barbara Demick]
South Korea’s tone toward North Korea has changed beyond all recognition. The indulgence of the Sunshine Era is gone. Its new Defense Minister has now threatened to bomb North Korea so many times, and in language that sounds so, well, North Korean, that I’m almost starting to actually believe him:
“Fellow soldiers, as JCS chairman, I will completely crush the enemy with combined forces in coordination with the United States,” Gen. Han Min-koo, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), told the marines stationed on Yeonpyeong island, according to a statement released by the JCS. [Yonhap]
South Korea will swiftly and strongly respond with force until North Korea surrenders if the communist state launches another assault, the South’s new defence minister said. [....]
“Our enemies will keep trying to attack our weak spots and plot new forms of provocation. We must make them realise how steep a price they would have to pay for their provocations.” On Friday, the new defence minister said South Korea would hit back with air strikes at the North and “punish the attacker thoroughly” should the regime attack the South again. [AFP]
Why am I reminded of the first few minutes of this? (Some rough language here.)
Note that Mullen’s comments suggest that if there’s a response, it will be the South dropping the bombs and the Americans hanging back … and that’s good:
Asked about South Korea’s vows of using fighter jets to bomb North Korea in case of a future attack, Mullen replied, “South Korea is a sovereign nation that has every right to protect its people in order to effectively carry out that responsibility.”
South Korea “also has the right to choose the method which they respond,” Mullen said. [Yonhap]
A very important point to remember here is that North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong both happened around a key lifeline of South Korean commerce. Much of the shipping traffic to the Port of Incheon sails through the waters nearby, and most of its air traffic passes close to North Korea on its way to Incheon International Airport, or in the case of domestic flights, to Kimpo Airport. The South Koreans are right that their vital interests are at stake. I’d just rather they found other, smarter, asymmetric ways to strike at the heart of the North Korean problem.
For China, however, these policy shifts are big, and they could be important setbacks for its campaign to become Asia’s dominant power, and a recognized world power. For all the talk of China’s smooth realpolitik and gift for taking the long view, its recent behavior certainly has been emotional, unsteady, and short-sighted.
So begins a very sober assessment from a man not known, to put it mildly, for his erratic mood swings or his turbulent creative energy. If anything, I think Cha understates the gravity of the situation. North Korea — by the way, it was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008 — has already sunk a South Korean warship, shelled a South Korean island, killed and maimed Marines and civilians, and turned the survivors of the impact zone into South Korea’s first population of war refugees since 1953. How is that not already war — even if it’s still unilateral and limited? Yet with each provocation, another limit is crossed. Cha is also right that South Korea has an urgent need for a way to deter the next escalation, which might be as unthinkable as the last ones still seem. He then gives a persuasive explanation of how conventional deterrence has lost its meaning:
President Lee Myung-bak is forced to respond with calm and measured actions every time the North provokes. The pat responses to the island shelling and the sinking of the Cheonan — of enhanced military readiness, exercises with the U.S., and diplomatic sanctions — do not work. The reality is that Pyongyang’s provocations are getting more deadly, and that Seoul’s strengths are its vulnerabilities: The more affluent, educated, and cosmopolitan South is far more wedded to the peaceful status quo than its northern neighbor, and therefore is forced to tolerate provocations even if they kill soldiers or civilians. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il sees this vulnerability and will continue to exploit it to extort concessions from the U.S. and South Korea. This is a losing strategic spiral for the South. It will soon feel compelled to break it.
When the South Koreans respond to this or future provocations, it will likely be a serious but pinpointed display of military force. The purpose would be to stop the cycle of North Korean provocation through deterrence, but it could very well ignite a major war.
Which brings us to where Cha gets it wrong. Notwithstanding this persuasive deconstruction of conventional deterrence, he still argues that we can only restore it by flooding South Korea with American targets soldiers (long ago, I was one of them). Then, almost as an afterthought, Cha argues that we seek the permission of the spineless Ban Ki Moon and the duplicitous Hu Jintao to do what Article 51 of the U.N. Charter clearly authorizes anyway. But this is a fool’s errand. I think Victor Cha is an honest, decent, and intelligent man, but here, he seems to personify a foreign policy establishment that wasted so many precious years leaning on the only two policies it ever seems to have thought of — conventional military deterrence, which North Korea has clearly circumvented; and diplomatic appeasement, which North Korea has so profitably exploited.
It has finally occurred to most people that we need ways to deter Kim Jong Il. Belatedly, we have learned that financial sanctions can actually hurt his regime, although there’s no clear evidence that they’re working better than China’s malicious, double-dealing efforts to undermine them. North Korea’s apparent desperation might mean that sanctions are working just fine. But if you forced me to guess, I’d side with Carolyn Leddy and guess that China, South Korea’s very own Kaesong Industrial Park, and other sources of income are diluting their potency. I doubt, then, that we’re applying sanctions with the thoroughness, determination, or patience necessary to really inhibit Kim Jong Il’s capacity to provoke, threaten, proliferate, or oppress. Similarly, I do not believe that Kim Jong Il cares particularly that the International Criminal Court might eventually get around to indicting him as a war criminal, given the relatively towering magnitude of his crimes against humanity inside North Korea itself. At best, this would be yet another embarrassment for Kim’s Chinese sponsors, but then, no visible sign of conscience seems to inhibit China’s sponsorship of Sudan, Burma, or Iran.
Stated bluntly, deterrence is about making your enemy afraid of hurting you. But Kim Jong Il does not fear war, and given his health, I do not think he even fears death, so long as death does not come this way. What I believe Kim Jong Il fears has no English word that expresses the idea quite so well as “GÃ¶tterdÃ¤mmerung.” He fears the spiritual and historical apocalypse of his deiocracy, and his messianic place in its history. Are we prepared to attach that consequence to his atrocities? Because if we are, and if we’re not yet out of time and luck, we can restore deterrence after all.
In the interests of debate, here’s an argument in favor of increasing the U.S. troop presence in South Korea. I don’t agree, because having American ground troops there obviously isn’t deterring much of anything that the ROK military can’t deter by itself, and even the threats of South Korea’s new Defense Minister seem hollow when the U.S. military is there, presumably to back those threats. Put differently, U.S. troops only really deter a full-scale North Korean invasion that’s been unlikely for a decade, as asymmetric threats have risen.
I certainly don’t think this is the time for more reductions in U.S. forces in Korea, but if the South gets serious about building a modern, professional military, a stronger South backed by strong American air and naval power might be a more credible deterrent. After all, the North Korean perception of America is that we’re more adverse to casualties than South Korea and inclined to restrain the South from striking back. Given this, the absence of the U.S. Army might even add some credibility to South Korean threats. Overall, however, it’s hard to see how we restore much deterrence in the short term. We begin by not rewarding North Korea’s conduct, but an aggressive subversion campaign might demonstrate some very tangible soft-power influence in the North Korean countryside within the next year or two.
We are all necons: The center-right Korea Times thinks it’s time to prepare for regime collapse in the North. Fine, but why must we merely talk about the weather?
Colonel David Maxwell of the U.S. Army Special Forces, whom I’ve know since I was an Army officer myself eons ago, writes about the prospects for “irregular warfare” in North Korea. At the risk of sounding like a broken record here, I think there’s much more we could be doing to shape that battlefield now.
Here’s hoping that three-party talks prove more constructive than six-party talks have. We’ll soon know based on whether South Korea finally decides to shut down Kaesong, and if the three nations decide to combine their pressure against the Chinese companies doing business with North Korea.
What Wikileaks Hath Wrought: So now, everyone — including the North Korean secret police — knows the identities and motivations of several high-level North Korean defectors, and if the defectors’ families had survived this long, they probably don’t have much longer now. Given the nexus between Assange’s leaks and the United States, the people who will have been hurt by Wikileaks may be able to sue in U.S. federal courts.
The other thought on this question is that as much as Julian Assange rages against war, the greatest casualty of Wikileaks is diplomacy. Diplomacy can’t work unless it’s conducted with a frankness, and frankness requires a degree of confidentiality, even secrecy. What diplomat will speak frankly now? And won’t that make it harder than ever to find diplomatic solutions to thorny problems? When diplomacy fails, of course, nations will sometimes resort to war to protect their interests.
Nonsense! Obama and the necons are just trumping up a case for war:
The Obama administration told the United Nations nuclear watchdog that North Korea likely has built more than one uranium-enrichment facility, significantly raising the proliferation threat posed by the secretive communist state.
It’s difficult to imagine the North Koreans giving us full disclosure. By the way, has anyone heard anything from Selig Harrison lately?
Not being a frequent reader of Foreign Policy, I don’t know much about the leanings of the particular bloggers there, although most would call that publication a stalwart of the “realist” view that had so recently become fashionable in Washington, before Al Qaeda in Iraq was squeezed down to a small nub of its former self, and before it became evident that North Korea, Iran, and China weren’t prospective negotiating partners after all. This week, we read one FP contributor calling for us to give up on the six-party talks, and another, Will Inboden, coming to the realization that we need leverage against North Korea to have any prospect of productive negotiations:
In the case of North Korea, the lead officials in the Obama administration realize that they have little leverage, in part as a result of the concessions made in the last two years of the Bush administration (such as removal of the DPRK from the state sponsor of terror list, and lifting of the Banco Delta Asia sanction along with returning Kim Jong Il’s $25 million of ill-gotten gains) that failed to secure a meaningful improvement in North Korea’s behavior. Refusing to negotiate from the current posture is a good starting point and helps turn North Korea’s (possible) desire for talks into a source of some small leverage. To gain more leverage, reimposing the financial market sanctions on the private accounts of the regime’s leaders would help, as would revisiting the state sponsor of terrorism list. Equally important will be exploring ways to change China’s cost/benefit calculation for its support of the DPRK. Perhaps after these kinds of steps are taken, it will be time to talk again.
I knew that if I waited long enough I could be a moderate, too! The consensus, it seems, has washed right past the self-professed Militant Wing of the Korea blogosphere, and we are all neocons again. I don’t mean to pick on these gentlemen, by the way, for their delayed arrival at the idea that negotiation alone is no way to deal with people like the North Koreans. Words like these from Inboden are especially welcome in wresting this debate from the shrill voices who dominated it for too long:
Let me be clear — I support the White House on this aspect of their North Korea policy. But I also think this might be a good occasion for reflection by commentators on all sides, myself included. It seems that the same voices that so indignantly condemned the Bush administration for its occasional refusal to engage in unconditional negotiations with unsavory regimes (such as Iran) now fall silent when the Obama administration does the same thing. Perhaps this is another example of what Ross Douthat perceptively described earlier this week as the “partisan mind” at work.
It is also a reminder to partisans and observers on all sides to resist caricaturing each other’s positions. I hope this latest impasse with North Korea at least helps elevate the policy debate beyond the hackneyed and simplistic “negotiate or not” rut. As any serious policymaker knows, in practice negotiations are one tool in the policy arsenal.
I’ve been as guilty as caricaturing as anyone. It’s fun, and some people just insist on making caricatures of themselves. But to expand on what I said here, I’ve never been a fan of Americans who blame each other for Kim Jong Il’s outrages (here’s a particularly discredited example). I believe those Americans vastly overestimate our influence over Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il’s perceptions of President Obama or Lee Myung Bak may or may not have played a role in his recent decisions, but it’s more likely that once he correctly dismissed our long-lost capacity to deter him, he made his own decisions for domestic reasons. Or, maybe because he’s just not all there anymore.
Actually, I think the administration is playing the talks issue exactly right — refusing to talk when North Korea makes war on its neighbors, but displaying some willingness to talk in the future should talks ever show real promise. I doubt that talks with North Korea will show any promise as long as the Kim Dynasty persists, but if the six-party talks become five-party talks, they might become a useful forum for pressuring China, and for doing the important diplomatic business of averting conflict over North Korea in the event of a sudden or “rolling” collapse of the regime’s authority.
China’s conduct is more rational (if malicious) to us, and more responsive to diplomatic and economic stimuli. In China’s case, there may be more that all of our recent presidents might have done to present an image of an America willing to attach consequences to China’s support for Kim Jong Il. For those Koreans that this regime hasn’t yet killed, there is still time for America to learn that.
Meanwhile, it’s heartening to see conservatives again taking up the idea that (lacking real military or diplomatic options) we should try to undermine the regime from within. Michael Gerson has been particularly persist about this:
There is, however, a third possible outcome that has not been considered seriously enough – an option other than possible war or strategic humiliation. South Korea, America and Japan, employing their technology and vast wealth, could attempt to undermine the North Korean regime from within. An aggressive, sustained campaign to break the North Korean information embargo, expose the barbarity and corruption of the regime to its own people, promote the work of dissidents and defectors, and encourage disloyalty among North Korean elites may or may not work. But the alternatives are increasingly unattractive.
Hat tip to Theresa.
Update: A better-informed reader tells me that I’ve quoted the more conservative “Shadow Government” blog, as opposed to FP’s “The Cable,” which represents a view I’d tend to associate with that publication. That certainly weakens my case that these posts prove that Washington is moving my way, although I do believe that that is the case, for many other reasons. The most important of those is Kim Jong Il’s behavior, but a close second is the Obama Administration’s admirable refusal to reward it. I hope that by now, they’re thinking hard about ways to deter it.
The nation’s top military officer challenged China to respond forcefully to North Korea’s recent attacks on South Korea and rejected Beijing’s calls for a return to negotiations with Kim Jong Il’s regime.
“There is significant leverage [China] could apply to avoiding escalations and improving this troubling situation,” Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a Washington think tank on Wednesday. “We need China to step up. [Stars and Stripes, Kevin Baron]
China is just about the only trading partner, investor, and aid provider Kim Jong Il still has, and it seriously expects us to believe that it doesn’t have enough influence to stop North Korea from shelling its neighbors, or for that matter, from shipping missile parts to Iran through the Beijing International Airport? Do you suppose China would be equally powerless if Kim Jong Il invited the Dalai Lama and Richard Gere over for a state dinner? Isn’t this the same China that had enough influence with South Korea to stop the Dalai Lama from getting a South Korean visa at least three times in the last decade? This was especially rich:
By allowing the Dalai Lama to visit the country, South Korea also risks losing China’s support in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear arms program and in bringing Korean War era defectors home.
Yeah, gosh knows we’d never have disarmed North Korea or gotten it to send those POW’s home at last without China’s help! Oh, right.
Here’s an interesting thought experiment for you. Maybe Lee Myung Bak should invite the Dalai Lama and the President of Taiwan the Republic of China to come and do some land shopping for the future sites of their interest sections in Seoul. Then watch the laissez-faire, stand-offish ChiCom fireworks commence!