A Marmot in the Ghetto

No, not really, but it fits nicely into an exchange I’ve had with The Marmot over which of us has the goofier conspiracy theory (his, mine) or links to the more dubious stories about what’s going on in North Korea these days. I say we both lose, but I think I’m having more fun. Me, I’m not worthy of journalistic angst. I don’t link stuff I think is crap, I just link stuff I think will interest the readers and stimulate thought.

Oh, and I’m pretty open about my agenda.

There’s no denying that both of us have caved in to the temptation of Kremlinology, and we’re both probably one unnamed source away from bending the trajectory of Oswald’s bullet again. At this post, I kidded Marmot for suggesting that the CIA was behind some of the reports. Now, he’s not promoting his theory as fact anymore than I am with mine, but he takes me to task for calling some of the reports out of NoKo “reasonably credible,” notwithstanding my weasel-word (no pleasing some people!). Here’s what Marmot says:

I’m not sure if much of what we’ve been reading so far can be fairly characterized as “reasonably credible.” I mean, it MIGHT be credible, but given some of the sources — defectors, the Japanese press (the Sankei in particular), Cho Gap-je and the Wolgan Chosun (or the regular Chosun, for that matter, which tends to reprint stories run in the Sankei), nameless sources in China, etc. — credibility questions do come into play. Don’t get me wrong — I’d like to believe some of the stuff coming out of North Korea as of late is true. Some of it certainly is — the removal of the portraits has been confirmed, even by North Korea itself (even if it later went back on this admission). Some of the other stuff, well, I just don’t know. Ultimately, you are right of, course — this is ultimately Kim’s fault for running a complete information block..

As for this being all CIA and stuff, again, I don’t think it all is. Some of the stories are probably legit, and some of the ones that aren’t might be just the Japanese and Korean press being the Japanese and Korean press. I do get the feeling though that some of the stuff coming out is being manufactured/spun in a way that’s not accidental, and should that be the case, I’d have no problem with that at all. The North Koreans play mind games all the time, especially with the South Koreans, and if the CIA were playing “spook the Nork,” more power to them. If creative story telling starts planting doubts in the minds of the North Korean leadership as to their own stability and/or gives some NPA officers the belief that KJI could be taken out, well, tell away. ““The Marmot

Fair enough. His subtitles read, “He’s guessing,” and so do mine. We’re both guessing because we can’t not guess, and of course, we can’t actually verify any of this stuff. But guess we do:

• Marmot on Day One: “I’ll sit back and watch for more before I try to guess.“
• Marmot on Day Eight, after watching for more: “Of course, this is all simply conjecture, and I put it out there mostly to get feedback from readers who might have their own theories on what is going on.

Hey–me too! And he’s not representing this as fact, so all it does is get a good discussion going.

Reasonably credible? Depends on the context. Let’s back away and look at this story in its own context. We’re Korea bloggers, which means we do this stuff from our homes in our hamboks (rather than pajamas). We report a little, but mostly, we comment on what others report. This is a story about what’s happening in North Korea, which means (1) it’s of interest to our readers, who can click the links and judge for themselves, and (2) we’re not talking about a courthouse in Modesto, so ironclad confirmation isn’t coming. We still don’t know what happened in Ryongchon. We have what we have, which is a lot of mostly unverifiable Kremlinology we’re feeding to fairly sophisticated consumers. The consumers of this blog, for example, include folks who’ve been to North Korea fairly recently and were able to largely discredit the story about the Kim Jong Il pins. The blogosphere is a big, happy, dysfunctional, self-correcting family.

And then again, there are some things about this story that most people would consider credible enough to print:

1. The before/after pictures, with “after” having no KJI.

2. The reports of foreign diplomats, including one who went on the record. Admittedly, other travelers saw nothing unusual, but that’s the old “absence of evidence v. evidence of absence” argument.

3. There is something to be said for cumulativeness. Could it be an excellent example of the “Big Lie” theory in action? Maybe, but a lot of different sources telling (hopefully) competent reporters the same thing enough times gives the proposed fact more weight.

Back to speculating on the facts–there’s also a sense of fair play here. The New York Times is speculating. All the papers are speculating. Why not us, too? Just because we’re smart enough not to believe most of it doesn’t mean we should deprive ourselves the pleasure of positing credible theories and sticking on the appropriate warning labels. I say embrace the pleasure, just don’t embrace any of the swirling theories any longer than you’d embrace the Chinese ambassador’s trophy wife at the big embassy dance.

I kid Marmot (What ever possessed him to choose that name?) for his CIA conspiracy theory while openly hoping that it’s true. In fact, his theory and my favorite-by-a-nose–and neither of us is representing them as anything more than that–are not mutually exclusive. What I don’t like about his theory is that some of the reports do indeed appear to be true, plus the fact that this is also the mainstream Pyongyang version.

What I do like about it is that sowing panic can work wonders against closed regimes. My favorite “panic and rumor” story takes place in Buon Me Thout, South Vietnam, in 1975. The North Vietnamese Army started its dry season offensive with an attack on the city, a dirty little town set in beautiful hill country near the Cambodian border–still, I’ll always have an affectionate memory of any town that reeks of plump sacks of inky black coffee as much as Pyongtaek reeked of decomposing brine shrimp–the SVN government decided to announce an “orderly strategic pullback” to more defensible areas. That made military sense, but at the time, the SVN press was tightly controlled and widely distrusted, and rumors spread like grassfires. Worse, the ARVN troops all had their families with them. “Strategic retreat” became “panic, rout, massacre, and collapse” almost instantly.

You know how that one ended, right?