Does the Alliance Have a Future?

It’s emotionally tempting and probably in America’s long-term political interests to pronounce the alliance over and draw up plans to withdraw everyone. For military and economic reasons, however, that’s probably unlikely, and I suspect that the current round of troop reductions (I’ll go out on a limb and predict another one this fall) is likely to remind everyone that a vastly reduced U.S. presence in Korea serves the interests of both countries as long as China continues its military buildup. While a complete breakdown of the alliance would be far from disastrous for America and might even have short-term advantages in freeing us to act with respect to North Korea, bad military and diplomatic relations are never the preferred state.

What interest does the U.S. have in Korea? As of 1991, it’s not to separate North and South or even to defend South Korea. Our interests are in maintaining a counterweight to Chinese intimidation of its other neighbors and preserving our options to deter North Korea. Keeping air and naval bases there serves that interest—even if most of the planes and personnel are based in Guam. Most of the ordnance and spare parts could be pre-positioned. Keeping ground forces in Korea doesn’t contribute much to those goals; certainly the costs outweigh the benefits. Given the obvious peril of getting involved in a land war in Asia, we never want to start our response to a crisis without the flexibility to pick our battles carefully.

Of course, some of the Army forces in Korea continue to serve the interests of both the U.S. and Korea. These include parts of the 3rd and 501st Military Intel Brigades, and the 1st Signal Brigade. The deterioration of our intel relationship with South Korea makes it especially important for us to have intel capabilities of our own, and the South Koreans will still want the benefit of whatever crumbs we brush their way. The 1/43rd Air Defense Artillery serves an important purpose to us because if we move out of arty range, missiles (along with NorK special forces) become our major threat, and the 1/43 has Patriots. Next, we might consider keeping some Apaches around just in case the ROK Army collapses and we need to slow someone down. Plus, lots of Korean nationalists can cling to the rocket pods.

Our remaining forces should consolidate around Osan or Kunsan to the South, again, to get us out of arty range and maintain the strategic flexibility not to participate if war breaks out. It’s also worth considering that in some of our posts there, the houses of Korean civilians literally have their gutters resting on our perimeter walls. This makes us a legit military target right in the middle of crowded population centers, and exposes us to the obvious possibility that a few of the people living in those houses are NorK sleepers (for something truly alarming, see this story). Finally, having a lot of troops in major cities is a political liability. If we decide to keep troops there, we shouldn’t operate under the illusion that the locals will appreciate them.

Our consolidated bases will need some protection, of course. Our current forces there are much too heavy. We have a DIVARTY (an artillery unit equivalent to a brigade) and an armor brigade there now; a brigade of Marines or light infantry would be a better fit for protecting our people.

The lesson of 2002 is that nobody appreciates you when you’re a tripwire, and if you’re not appreciated, you lose your diplomatic influence on your hosts. Today, we find ourselves in a position where America’s North Korea policy is the captive of South Korean interests. That captivity has handcuffed us to South Korea’s whimsical and soft-headed policies, even at the risk of our own security.