Jack Pritchard’s Acheson Moment?

The Yomiuri has an interview with Jack Pritchard, who seems to be running for the job of shadow ambassador-at-large to North Korea. Or maybe I should say, for North Korea. A regular reader informs me that in person, Mr. Pritchard is a fine human being, but as a diplomat, he may have just crossed over from “inept” to “dangerous” by publicly advising the North Koreans exactly how to hold on to a ten-bomb nuclear arsenal:

Pritchard: The problem that we have is that if the peaceful manner in which to resolve the six-party talks fails, and the United States does not have a consensus with South Korea, first, China second, Japan third, and finally Russia, fourth, on how to, in a more confrontational method, force North Korea to give up, through United Nations sanctions and a more constricting economic isolation of North Korea. North Korea, if they are smart, and they do not react negatively, if they simply tell China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia, “We have no desire to export nuclear material. We only have a limited–a deterrent against the United States–and we are shutting down future production of nuclear weapons, and we’re going to contain only what we have here,” then it becomes very difficult for the United States, because other nations won’t like it, but very well could accept a limited nuclear North Korea, because there’s no other alternative.

Maybe none of this is news to the North Koreans, although I don’t necessarily give them much credit for suave diplomacy or skill at reading the intentions of other nations. I also realize that Jack Pritchard is a private citizen who has First Amendment rights just like I do.

There’s still a big difference. I’m a nobody. I don’t know state secrets. I’ve never represented my government in international negotiations. Few newspapers would give the time of day to what I say, and fewer would impute any special significance to what I say. I’m certainly not violating any confidentiality agreements or engaging in unauthorized diplomacy in my blog or over drinks–and hey, maybe Jack Pritchard isn’t either. But it seems to me that when you have the imprimatur of “former senior diplomat,” you’re presumed–rightly or wrongly–to know all the key state secrets and many of the key players in government. He might even be presumed to be speaking on behalf of your government through a back channel set up to protect the administration from domestic criticism. The latter theory is plausible enough for me to wonder if it’s true, and the State Department certainly owes us all a clarification.

Naturally, a sensible negotiator might want to maximize the deterrent power of a “red line” by not telling North Korea where that “red line” is. Forget that now. Now, everyone with a modem can see where the line is: “if North Korea exports certain materials to rogue states or into the hands of terrorists, that would be a real red line.” North Korea, with its history of brinksmanship, could well presume that it’s safe to export non-nuclear WMD, missiles, and perhaps even advice on how to make your own dirty bomb. To the extent that the line is even where Pritchard claims it is, North Korea may already have already crossed it anyway, by reportedly exporting uranium hexafluoride to Pakistan.

Under those circumstances, telling a rogue state that it’s really OK for them to hang on to a ten-bomb arsensal–and furthermore, telling them just how they can get away with doing that–creates a real risk of a dangerous misunderstanding, particularly given that it’s contrary to oft-stated U.S. policy, which calls for (say it with me) complete . . . verifiable . . . irreversible . . . dismantlement.

Why does this matter so much? Because unless we find some way to search every ship, boat, train, plane, and bus leaving North Korea, we have no way of knowing when those ten bombs will become nine.