Show of Farce

I tend to treat the six-way talks as the irrelevancy they have proved to be. Odds are, if you’re reading this blog, you mostly agree. One hears honesty from a diplomat about as often as Soviet citizens read balanced reporting in Pravda. The analogy carries a step further; diplomacy, Pravda, and other carefully-crafted lies contain revealing omissions and nuances. A reference to party officials’ “mistakes” forecast their one-way ride to the Lubyanka just as surely as shifts in diplomatic positions reveal which party is negotiating from a position of greater strength.

North Korea, after stalling for months, has agreed to rejoin the talks, but still holds to essentially the same demands it held before: drop your “hostile policy” and pay us off. The U.S. State Department–whose own pro-engagement policy is as endangered by President Bush’s reelection as North Korea’s–is dangling a “basket” of economic goodies for a deal (which will never be reached because North Korea will never agree to inspection and verification). The State Department also says that this particular basket contains nothing new. Joseph DeTrani, the State Department’s Special Envoy on Korean Peninsular Affairs, is also expressing his “disappointment” that China has put no substantial pressure on North Korea to do anything but show up and talk.

In the final analysis, none of this suggests a breakthrough is imminent, although the U.S. team certainly enters the next talks with greater strength because of the election results. That new strength makes successful talks more probable, but only if your definition of success doesn’t require a peace that is just, lasting, and trustworthy.