The White Tigers
Unconventional warfare operations began Jan. 8, 1951, with a South Korean navy ship patrolling near the Yalu River. The ship discovered more than 10,000 North Korean guerrillas fighting the North Korean People’s Army in Hwanghae Province. Guerrillas were taking over some of the North Korean islands near the river, but they only had about one weapon per 10 men (Japanese and Russian rifles, and U.S. carbines.) They eagerly requested more weapons, ammunition, food and American advisers to lead and train them. The U.S. 8th Army immediately recognized that a guerrilla force could wreak havoc on North Korean supply and communication lines. So Col. John McGee was given this responsibility and on Feb. 15, 1951, he slipped into North Korea and met with the guerrilla leaders.
More here; you can buy the book here. I intend to do so and blog about it.
A spontaneous movement grew, found a ready source of help in America, and then the war ended. No doubt much strong drink was consumed over talk of undying commitments to liberty and bonds of blood before these men were erased from the pages of Korean history. What became of most of these men and their families? Did the declassification of their story in 1990 jeopardize their descendants? Did these groups present a political alternative to the North Korean regime, or did they simply become another arm of the U.N. forces?
Koreans today have little interest in the idea that other Koreans fought anyone but Americans and Japanese, and America prefers to forget what a disloyal friend it has often been. Those who believed in our promises form a trail of graves reaching from the Bay of Pigs to Saigon and the rubble of Kabul, ruined in the disastrous aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan War. Recent reports suggest that some of the CIA-sponsored Hmong guerrillas are still fighting in the Laotian mountains. We almost saw it happen again in Iraq. We still could.
There is a pattern to this in Washington, as predictable as the growth rings in a tree. One political party commits to supporting fighters who are dying and bleeding in the field, fighting an unelected regime for their own freedom, and then another group takes over–this time, a group that believes that legitimacy comes from the ownership of helicopter gunships and a seat in the General Assembly. The second group conducts a “policy review” and decides to abandon the entire enterprise to the predations of a more patient and ruthless enemy, one which doesn’t worry about congressional investigations or lost elections.
Readers of this site know that I believe the best of all bad options we have in North Korea is to help build an internal resistance movement, starting with and focusing on presenting them as a credible political alternative, and turning to military support if necessary and when ready. My deepest fear is that eight years from now, President Howard Dean would reach a secret understanding that would allow North Korea’s ruling junta and their Chinese “volunteers” to liquidate those who would trust us sufficiently to join a North Korean resistance movement.