Rethinking the Beijing Four©

Yes, I still think it was a stunt.

But why, specifically, does that make it wrong? For one thing, there’s the false drama of feigned outrage, but there’s plenty of reason for real outrage at China’s treatment of the North Koreans, its arrogance toward its neighbors, and its dictatorial quashing of free speech (but not for shock that the Chinese cops blundered in the way they did). There’s the Grand National Party’s own hypocrisy on the North Korea issue, but I don’t know enough about these four assemblymen to convict them of that by association; they could have been dissenters. There’s the Grand National Party’s tendency to engage in cheap political theater, only to have it backfire, and deservedly so. But the real objection to a tactic like this, as I see it, is that it is an end-run around democratic process, respect for the rule of law, and reasoned discourse.

I won’t waste your time discussing the state of the democratic process in China, and I’ll deal with the issue of Korea’s democratic process shortly. China has shown their contempt for the rule of law on the refugee issue by flagrantly violating both the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture, and South Korea isn’t in a much better position there.

That leaves diplomacy, and here, the South Korean government can rightly assert that its executive branch should have a monopoly on the conduct of international relations, no matter how incompetently, passively, and apathetically it has exercised it. But even after a finding of guilt, there’s the matter of sentencing, at which a court considers the extenuating circumstances. The Beijing Four © have a powerful case in extenuation; lives are at stake, and the South Korean government’s “quiet diplomacy” is in fact apathy veiled by secrecy. “Quiet diplomacy” isn’t about saving North Korean refugees that South Korea doesn’t want anyway; it’s about “quieting” legitimate public debate on the refugee issue and the government’s failure to meet its constitutional obligations to protect North Korean refugees. You can debate what constitutions and treaties mean, but there is a point at which there is no reasonable reading other than non-compliance, at which point, the issue ceases to be a simple question of policy; it becomes a requirement under a binding document in force. That’s not a defense, but it’s another strong point in extenuation.

I emphasize that the Chinese are not victims here. They are thugs. They brought this on themselves by giving legitimate Korean grievances no other reasonable means of expression. If anyone here is aggrieved (oh, silly you, you were going to bring up these people?) it’s the South Korean government, which has forfeited its claims on anyone’s sympathy.

Of the charges of drama queenery and the unlicensed practice of “diplomacy”, guilty. The court awards you a serving of chajjangmyon and a pat on the back.