Secretary Rumsfeld Comments on South Korea in Pentagon ‘Town Meeting’

Link here. The substance of the question and Rumsfeld’s answer are reproduced in full without edits, but the boldface portions are my own emphasis.

Staff Sergeant Sharp, U.S. Army:

In regards to United States Forces Korea, we already have a brigade in Iraq, and I recently read in the Army Times that General LaPorte was recommending relocating an additional 3,000 troops. How do you feel about the readiness of United States Forces Korea in regards to the North Korean regime?

Secretary Rumsfeld:

I feel very good about it.

We’re doing exactly what I just said [helping other nations to become self-sufficient] in Korea. The Korean War ended, what, 55 years ago? It was 1950? 53? And we have had a lot of–a large number of forces right along the Demilitarized Zone, in downtown Seoul, . . . for decades, and decades, and decades.

South Korea is a vibrant economy, it’s been an economic miracle, it has an energetic and robust free political system, there isn’t any–there isn’t any reason in the world they can’t provide . . . the security capabilities, along with some assistance from the U.N. forces, the United States, and so what we’ve done–General LaPorte’s done a terrific job, along with Richard Lawless and others who’ve worked on this, to work with the . . . South Koreans, the Republic of Korea, so that they assume a greater and greater share of the responsibility for . . . providing the–both the deterrent and the defensive capability . . . on the Korean peninsula.

Our forces will be over time in a careful way, as we pass off these responsibilities to the South Koreans, we’ll be moving into two hubs . . . , basically a sea hub and an air hub . . . , off the DMZ, out of Seoul, and into positions . . . where we can be helpful, or we can be supportive to the South Korean government, but . . . not behaving in a way that creates a dependency on their part because we’re doing all of those things for them.

And it makes all the sense in the world to be doing what we’re doing . . . the only thing that didn’t make sense was it took so long to get there . . . [smiles] in my opinion.

Exactly right. Look at this partial map of U.S. installations in Korea (horked from GlobalSecurity.org). There are four things to keep in mind when you see this:

• First, it only includes Army installations.
• Second, it’s only installations in Areas I and II; it doesn’t include those at Osan, Pyongtaek, Kunsan, Pusan, Waegwan, Taegu, Chinhae, and other facilities further south. In fact, at least one Area I facility, Camp Market at Inchon, doesn’t appear to be there either.
• Third, the range of most of the North Korean artillery reaches roughly to a line that extends from the “7” to the “15,” and the really long-range guns and multiple rocket launchers can reach about half of the Seoul metro area.
• Finally, most of those installations you see are small, special-purpose posts that aren’t self-sustaining. Camp Kyle, for example, is a tiny installation on the edge of Uijongbu that does mostly intel work. Stanley is pretty much strictly aviation; ditto Page. Casey and Hovey have most of the infantry, artillery, and armor. Red Cloud is mainly a headquarters. Jackson is an NCO academy.

Each dot represents a small, isolated, and potenially inviting target for North Korean artillery, special forces, or terrorists. Each represents an option for the enemy to pick the field of battle. Focusing our forces in hubs to the south gives that option back to us, where it belongs.

Big Dog’s comments suggest that his intention is to extricate most of the U.S. combat forces from Korea over the medium-to-long haul, and perhaps to restore the U.S. option of not getting involved in a potential conflict, with all of the leverage that option gives us. And after all, if North Korea opts for a limited shelling of a U.S. Army post, South Korea is likely to exercise its own option to stay out of it and allow the North to reap the benefits of the resulting American outrage against South Korea.

Rumsfeld argues the unassailable truth that South Korea’s population and economy are more than sufficient to allow it to defend itself against the North. He might have added . . . if they choose to. He might also have added that the South now has twice the North’s population and ten times its economy. All other policy differences aside, there’s simply no reason for the United States to continue to subsidize the defense of a nation as wealthy as South Korea.