The Death of an Alliance, Part XII

South Korea has summarily withdrawn its cooperation from OPLAN 5029, the contingency plan for North Korean collapse, and from other joint contingency planning for natural disasters and WMD recovery. The South Korean decision removes one of the U.S.-Korean alliance’s last remaining raisons d’etre. The Joongang Ilbo reports:

South Korea’s National Security Council said in a statement yesterday, “We have terminated the U.S.-South Korea Combined Forces Command’s efforts to map out a plan, code named 5029, because the plan could be a serious obstacle to exercising Korea’s sovereignty. We reached the conclusion in January and informed the combined forces command through the Ministry of National Defense.”

The asserted loss of sovereignty was Korea’s demand for undiluted leadership of any forces deployed under the plan. The U.S. wanted joint leadership, such as through the U.N. Command. With U.S.-Korea relations in their worst state since 1953, the new Korean decision did not help matters:

A senior military official said the National Security Council’s decision angered General Leon LaPorte, the commander of the U.S.-South Korea Combined Forces Command, because of Seoul’s apparent refusal to permit U.S. troops to intervene in an emergency prompted by internal changes in North Korea. . . . U.S. commanders here were reportedly incensed when the plan was called off in January. It was reported to U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld; he told U.S. defense policymakers to accede to Seoul’s wishes. At the National Assembly yesterday, South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said, “If necessary, the matter can be discussed again at ministerial-level talks.”

The Chosun Ilbo, going for maximum alarm effect, discusses the kinds of crises that could trigger 5029:

“I understand the gist of the plan is five scenarios.” They are the collapse of the North Korean regime in a coup or the like, large-scale disturbances in North Korea, mass defection, preventing weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of rebels, and humanitarian operations following a huge natural disaster in the North.

OK, I’m alarmed. Equally alarming is the sense that appease-at-any-price politics overcame the basic need for military contingency planning:

But in yet another bone of contention between the allies, the NSC wants the plan suspended. The NSC said in a press release it was told by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December that Combined Forces Command was promoting OPLAN 5029, “and after consultations with relevant bureaus, it concluded it was necessary to suspend the promotion of the operational plan. Operational plans are usually considered the exclusive domain of the military, with almost no involvement from the NSC or other outside bodies.

The NSC and Defense Ministry say the contingency plan deals with things it is “inappropriate for Korean and U.S. military authorities to promote,” since several articles in the plan could infringe on South Korean sovereignty. The Defense Ministry said the NSC conveyed this to the CFC and is negotiating with the U.S. military.

So what will happen if North Korea does collapse, and South Korea has gambled everything on a stubborn refusal to even plan for it? Can South Korea reestablish law and order, feed and house the refugees and gulag inmates, and keep the people from stringing up all of those who in all likelihood fully deserve exactly that if it won’t (1) plan for this, or (2) let anyone else do so? Since South Korea can’t cope with the cost by itself, it will certainly end up asking someone to help. I’ll climb out on a limb and say we can safely eliminate the possibility of Japan stepping up. Russia is in no position to do it, financially speaking. China? Sure, if your desired end state for North Korea is the Inner Koguryo Autonomous Zone.

That leaves the United States. In all probability, we will be asked to supply a substantial amount of the cash, planning, and equipment, and Korea will have to supply the majority of the manpower. Where all of this leaves us is in no position to actually prepare to do this right.