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The Death of an Alliance, Part VII

What kind of diplomatic response could the United States possibly offer to Roh Moo-Hyun’s astonishing announcement that South Korea will now seek to “balance” its long-time protector against the lean, hungry barbarians that surround it? It’s doubtful that any U.S. official could offer a response he’d want printed–particularly in the context of another deadlocked round of cost-sharing negotiations. That might explain why Washington let the Commanding General of the Eighth U.S. Army, Lieutenant General Charles Campbell, do the talking today:

At an urgently called press conference, General Campbell said the U.S. military must reduce spending because the amount Seoul has agreed to pay is not enough to support Korean workers at U.S. bases. There are about 10,000 Korean civilians employed by the U.S. Forces Korea that are affected by cost-sharing contributions, the forces said. Support contracts range from construction to cleaning duties. . . . ”

“Throughout the course of the negotiations, U.S. government officials discussed with [Republic of Korea] officials the potential impact of funding shortfalls,” General Campbell said. “The measures that we expect to implement could include cutting up to 1,000 civilian jobs and reducing our support contracts by as much as 20 percent over the next two years. We notified the Korean Employees Union yesterday of the plan to cut jobs.”

The union got a phone call first. The Blue House didn’t. As an indicator of the state of relations between two “allies,” it’s hard to send a clearer signal than that. Incidentally, expect those support contracts to have a far greater effect on the Korean economy than the layoffs.

The papers alternatively describe LTG Campbell as the USFK commander–which he isn’t–and as the USFK Chief of Staff–which is like describing Paul McCartney as the guy who started “Wings.” Campbell is in fact the commander of the Eighth U.S. Army, which is the main Army component of USFK. Having prepared dozens of memos for EUSA and USFK commanders to sign (and on very rare occasions, read), the difference (mostly) sticks with me.

In any event, the announcement is likely to snap that nasty deadlock in the cost-sharing talks:

South Korean contributions to the USFK have risen over the past four years. Seoul paid $444 million in 2001, and the amount grew to $472 million in 2002, $557 million in 2003 and $622 million in 2004. But the amount is now expected to fall by about 9 percent this year.

Why, can you picture the temerity of it? Those Yankees, demanding that we help pay for our own defense? One concern I do have is that the cuts include reductions of pre-positioned equipment stocks, which to me is one of the best things to leave behind to preserve our flexibility to intervene, should we choose to do so. Perhaps those particular stocks exceed our needs, or are more urgently needed elsewhere. Or perhaps we’ve decided that floating stocks are even more flexible. The Chosun Ilbo lets its concerns be known:

Talking about stores of ammunition, tanks and armored vehicles pre-positioned on the Korean Peninsula for an emergency, Campbell said it would become necessary “to alter the amount and composition of combat equipment currently planned for our pre-positioned program. We are analyzing additional measures we may be forced to take to meet our operations and readiness requirement.” This could directly affect the country’s defence capability in an emergency.

Meanwhile, as the Korean government fumbles around for words of reaction, the Korean General Schedule (KGS) employees’ union is wasting no time in stating how it will react:

The union said it would take legal steps to protect jobs. Nam Hyo-shin, senior official of the union, said, “We will immediately bring the case to the National Labor Relations Commission.”

Yes, I can see it now. The NLRC rules against the USFK and orders it not to lay off the workers. The USFK actually complies, and adds it to the ROK’s “cost-sharing” bill. The USFK makes up for the shortfall by cutting infantry, armor, and missile defense. One thing leads to another, and eventually, 25,000 Korean civilian employees are all fighting over the kickbacks from twelve embassy guards’ apartment leases.

On a related note, a reliable source inside the USFK recently sent me this lovely example of one KGS employee joining the hand-biting fun over at onecorea.org:

ì € 는미군 부대얐 종사하는 한국 군무원 종사자ìž…니다 물ë¡ ì œì§ìž¥ì´ê³ ì›”급을 받아 가족생계를 이어가지만 왜미군놈ë“¤ì´ì² 수해야하냐면 우리국민들을 식민지로 생각합니다 이른ë°” 가지ê³ ë†“다는소리ì£ 샹 산입얐 거미줄치ê² 습니까 짤리는 한이있어도 미군 개쇄이들은 ì² 수양키ê³ 홈해야한다ê³ ì ˆì‹¤í•˜ê²Œ 생각이듭니다 상사가 미군인데 이건 노예부리는 것과 똑같아ìš” 이른ë°” 같이해야하는 일도 3디얅종같은거 위í–˜í•˜ê³ ë”럽ê³ 힘ë“ ê±°ëŠ” 한국 사람시키ê³ 안그런거는 미국놈시키ê³ ì–ì´ 씨발 미국은 무너ì ¸ì•¼í•©ë‹ˆë‹¤
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2005ë…„은 주한미군을 한마리도 남김얆이 ì² 수시키는 í•´…
먼ì € 년초얐 주한미군들얐게 스스로 나가라ê³ ê²½ê³ 하ê³ , 스스로 안나가면 모두 시체를 만들어서라도 ê¼­ 내몰아야 한다.
우리는 반드시 승리한다. 미군ì² 수 이후 자주/통일조국 건설을 위해 2005ë…„ 자주성ì „ì– 모ë“ 것을 ë°”치자!
투쟁!!!
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매향리사건, 한강 독극물 방류사건, 얬중생 장갑차 사건…..미국인들이 ì €ì§€ë¥¸ 만행들은 끝이 얆습니다. 과얰 그들의 만행은 ì–¸ì œê¹Œì§€ 계속되는 걸까ìš”?
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ì•„…. 아직도 냉ì „주의의 찌꺼기인 주한미군.. ì–´ì„œ 꺼ì €ë¼…
주한미군ì² 수만이 통일을 위한 밑거름이며.. 우리나라의 ê²½ì œê°€ 활성í™”되는
지름길이다..
주한미군은 중국봉쇄와 통일을 막기위한 하나의 ìž¥ì• ë¬¼ì¼ë¿ì´ë‹¤.
주한미군의 군사ë ¥ë•Œë¬¸ì– ì–¸ì œë‚˜ 긴장하ê³ 북한과의 불안감을
종식시키지 못한다… ì–´ì„œ 꺼ì €ë¼ 주한미군..

Just a partial translation for you non-Korean speakers:

I am a korean employee at a U.S. Army base. This is my work place, I got a salary from them and my family live on that money. But the reason that the US army should withdraw is that they think of our people as a colony [poor grammar in original].
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And 2005 is finally the year when we will drive the Yankee animals from our shores. If they will not go willingly, we will send them all home as corpses! Our victory is certain! After the U.S. Army withdrawal, we will build an independent and united country–let us devote ourselves in 2005 to the crusade for independence. Resist!!!
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MaeHyangRi, poison discharge in Han River, Korean middle school girls hit by armored vehicle, the Americans’ acts of brutality are [yada yada yada].
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Ah…. The leftover of the Cold War, U.S. Army in Korea, get out soon.
The withdrawal of the U.S. Army is the foundation of Korean unification and the shortcut to the Korean economy’s recovery.
The purpose of the U.S. Army is for blocking China and blocking Korean unification.
Because of the U.S. forces, Korea is always tense and can’t ease North Korea’s anxiety.
Get out of Korea soon, U.S. Army!

Participation in this particular chat room requires registration with a Korean ID number and payment of a subscription fee. So anyone happening across KGS-10 Ms. Kim Hui-Yon, be sure to politely thank her for her patriotism and her patience as we withdraw. Gently remind her that there will be ample time to test all of those theories about unification, economic recovery, blocking China, and learning the meaning of the word “brutality.”

Of course, one person’s view (or two) isn’t evidence that most Koreans or KGS employees share it (you want empirical evidence, you say?). Yet we will soon be subjected to a bombardment of stories about the loss of livelihoods these cuts will cause, and sad as that may be for some, American taxpayer funds must ultimately be devoted to protecting American interests. We don’t advance our interests, win friends, or help Korea learn responsible self-government by being its iron rice bowl. It’s possible that in at least some ways, the onecorea.net crowd is right, albeit for all the wrong reasons.

UPDATE: Seoul appears to have no idea how to react to this. The Chosun Ilbo is doing its best to sow panic, probably with the bi-election in mind. I happen to think the Chosun Ilbo has it right that the alliance is dissolving, but I don’t think that necessarily means that their assessment is sincere. Denial is a powerful force when it comes to Korea’s view of its relationship with America, and the Chosun has an interest in raising the stakes for Roh’s diplomatic bumbling.

Here are links to–

  • Part I, describing the universal unpopularity of the South Korean government in Congress;
  • Part II, Thomas Barnett and the Asian Wall Street Journal reconsider the alliance;
  • Part III, the reconsideration spreads to the left-of-center Brookings Institution;
  • Part III 1/2, Donald Rumsfeld says that Korea must learn to defend itself;
  • Part IV, the GNP leader’s alarm at the unpopularity of Korean government in Washington;
  • Part V, the failure of a symbolic congressional resolution commemorating the alliance; and
  • Part VI, the Korean government’s quixotic declaration of neutrality toward the nation on which it depends for its defense.