Yongbyon Yawner

Why can’t I manage to work myself into a lather over the “news” that North Korea has shut down Yongbyon–suggesting that it may be getting ready to reprocess more fuel rods? Part if it might be that Selig Harrison is one of the source, although he’s not the only one. I suspect it’s because every one of the players is about to feed us the same line of crap they’ve tried to feed us for the last half-decade or so. And because this is so unlikely to change much of anything that other events over the last six months haven’t changed already.

• First and foremost, Selig Harrison is full of it. Harrison, who appears not to have heard who won the election here last November, returns from his red-carpet treatment in Pyongyang to deliver this news, along with the implausible explanation that North Korea is going to the enormous expense of building a fully-functioning nuclear program–much of it hidden underground in unknown locations–just to attract attention (like a blockade?). All of this is based on nothing more than the assertions of the North Koreans and Harrison’s own unimpeachable analytical skill. I’d say it’s Harrison who’s looking for attention with all of his high-profile private diplomacy. For him to attribute that motive to North Korea is what the shrinks call “projection.”
• Ditto the South Koreans. Ban Ki-Moon says the other five nations (which must include North Korea) haven’t discussed U.N. sanctions and that no one’s considering anything rash. Well, maybe they’re not talking sanctions with Ban Ki-Moon, but Condi Rice has been talking about them publicly in Beijing, among other places.
• China is full of it. After denying for years that North Korea has a uranium program, they later said they believed the North Korea had a uranium program after all. Then, around the time of Bush’s reinauguration, they backpedalled and claimed they didn’t believe the evidence, dredging up the bloated corpse of Iraq. That might have worked where there were some intermittent U.N. inspections that were turning up only bits and pieces, but it won’t work where North Korea has admitted it, declared its right to possess a nuclear deterrent, and kicked out all the inspectors.
• The Bush Administration is full of it. The deal-killer, in a single word, is “verification.” Five months after Bush’s reelection removed all lame-duck fears about new policy initiatives, after North Korea walked out of the talks and issued umpteen more threats, after it was caught selling uranium to the A.Q. Khan network (allegedly, once, a “red line”) we’re still entangled in diplomatic rigor-mortis with nations that are not at all serious about solving the problem, with the possible exception of Japan. The Administration has wisely ruled out a direct attack or invasion, but unwisely done so publicly. And when it comes to acknowledging the heart of the problem, which is that North Korea is congenitally secretive, oppressive, and mendacious–and therefore wholly unsuited to meaningful verification–it’s difficult to understand what possible plan they have to achieve anything with their emphasis on diplomacy. To what end? To please South Korea? Trying to disarm North Korea while simultaneously pleasing this South Korean government is like swimming out of a whirlpool in steel-toed galoshes. Beyond a few leaked hints, and beyond the threat of U.N. sanctions (which China would surely block) there’s no sign they know how to get North Korea’s attention, much less make them honest. They claim to have a plan, but it really looks like they’ve got way too many of them and can’t decide which one to use.
• Bush’s critics on the left are full of it. What they propose as a solution suffers from the same essential flaw as Bush’s plan. In fact, they’re really pushing a unilateral version of the same thing Bush has tried for the last four years–a deal we can’t verify. Isn’t that what got us where we are now? The worst part about their plan isn’t even the contents of the plan itself. I can see plenty of merit in cutting China and South Korea out of the talks, from a strictly security-focused POV. The worst part of their plan is them. Specifically, we know they’d never write or enforce a deal that North Korea would have to comply with, and that they’d be happy enough with the appearance of “peace in our time,” reality notwithstanding. I mean, they subcontracted their diplomacy out to Jimmy Carter. What more do you need to know? Except that North Korea almost certainly sees it the same way.

There will never be a lasting solution to the North Korean nuclear issue as long as the North Korean regime remains intact as a closed tyranny. Assessments of North Korea inevitably require some speculation, but a growing body of evidence suggests that the North Korean regime has never been less stable politically or economically, or so hated by America’s natural allies–the North Korean people. It’s long past time to disengage from confronting North Korea’s strengths and go after its weaknesses until either (1) the regime falls, or (2) China and South Korea get serious and force North Korea to fundamentally open its society. Closed societies don’t do honest arms control. Until someone hacks away at the Gordian knot of North Korea’s closed society, our diplomacy will stay hobbled.