Nuke Test Speculat-o-rama!

I don’t have much to offer on the various theories about whether the North Koreans are really about to test a nuke, for two excellent reasons. The first of these is that the mother of my two children (also my wife, in case you were going to ask) had the temerity to expect me to pry myself away from the computer over Mother’s Day weekend. We ended up spending most of the weekend eating out, taking long drives in the country, and enjoying the beautiful weather with our kids.

Beyond the speculation, there are some reactions that are occasionally illustrative of the situation itself, but more often illustrative of the observers and where their respective policies may be evolving.

For the most part, the comments coming from the White House seem measured. AFP reports:

“I don’t want to get into discussing intelligence matters, but what I would say is that if North Korea did take such a step, that would just be another provocative act that would further isolate it from the international community,” said White House spokesman Scott McClellan.

More here and here. By today, the White House was adding that it has a “robust” ability to deter the North.

For the pessimistic, alarmist view of events around Gilju, look to the people who are paid to deal in worst-case scenarios. A Pentagon source tells the Chosun Ilbo:

A Pentagon official connected with security on the Korean Peninsula on Saturday backed reports based on other unnamed officials’ comments that North Korea could be advancing preparations for a nuclear test in June. He said there were several tunnels deep enough and with suitable terrain for a test throughout the reclusive country, but only one place with a lot of activity.

The official called “very accurate” a New York Times report of suspicions among U.S. officials that North Korea was building a reviewing stand in Kilju, North Hamgyeong Province and shipping concrete and grouting to the site, possibly to plug the tunnel.

The official stated that the Pentagon has been sharing its intelligence with other countries in the region. Asked whether this was a case of North Korea putting on a show for U.S. satellites or preparing for the real thing, he responded: “We are assuming a worst-case situation, and all the signs . . . point much more to the worst.

The unnamed Pentagon official also gave this rather astonishing comment, not for the fact that it was said, but for the fact that we live in times when it had to be said:

Many responses depend on what South Korea does . . . . If the South Korean government is half-hearted even about a nuclear test and moves toward an understanding of the North Korean position, the global response would fall into confusion.

The AP adds this, on the reaction in Japan:

[A] senior Japanese Defense Agency official told The Associated Press that Japan’s government had information that North Korea might be preparing for a nuclear test. Japan on Friday threatened to put the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program before the U.N. Security Council next month unless six-nation talks on the dispute show progress.

China

Never mind what China says officially. It’s left to foreigners, such as the BBC’s correspondent, to report from a regional summit in Japan on how this could affect China:

The BBC’s Jonathan Head in Kyoto says China’s Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing is likely to come under pressure to show more willingness to try to bring North Korea back to the talks.

Not bloody likely. The only thing that’s likely to persuade China that it has real interests in the matter is a combination of a test, a west-bound wind, and a red-hot rumor that it was done above-ground.

Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said a nuclear test by North Korea would be “a grave mistake.”

“It would have grave implications, security implications, political implications, possibly environmental implications in terms of radiological fallout,” he said in an interview with the Associated Press. “I think the message should be very clear to the North Koreans that nuclear blackmail does not work and that, whatever the settlement, they need to roll back their nuclear weapon program, that the international community in 2005 has zero tolerance for any new nuclear weapon states.”

One can’t help but wonder whether the ultra-accomodationist Maurice Strong’s departure as U.N. Special Envoy to the North could partially clear the way for stronger action by the United Nations . . . although China remains almost certain to obstruct decisive action. North Korea may yet do to the United Nations what Abyssinia did to the League of Nations.

South Korea

Meanwhile, the South Korean government, taking no wisdom from its election defeat on April 30th, remains as oblivious as ever:

South Korea has said it will expand ties with the North in hopes that broader economic and agricultural aid might lure Pyongyang back to stalled talks on ending its nuclear weapons program.

The South Korean Unification Ministry said Thursday it would focus on the North’s agriculture, a pilot industrial complex in the North Korean border town of Kaesong, civilian exchanges, and aid for young and elderly North Koreans.

Minister of Unification Silly Talks Chong Dong-Young remains an impermeable cobble in a river of damning facts, casting doubt on the entire story. Knowing Chong, we can safely assume this is unrelated to any actual fact-based reasons to question the North’s intentions, but no doubt because he’s a man who’s become accustomed to denying uncomfortable facts.

Of course, there’s reason to doubt just about everything that’s reported as happening inside North Korea, but there’s much less reason to doubt that the North Koreans are intentionally trying to scare everyone. The New York Times Reports:

A few intelligence officials urged caution in interpreting the satellite evidence. While they acknowledge finding signs of continued activity near tunnels in the Kilju area, there is clearly some disagreement among intelligence agencies about whether the latest evidence indicates a drive toward a test.

“What worries us most is that there is a progression of openness among the North Koreans about their nuclear capabilities,” said one senior administration official who has been studying the evidence. “They have unfolded new phases of specificity about what they can do, and they seem to have been on a long-term path of ending the ambiguity about their capability.”

The BBC also does a good run-down of the different strains of speculation about what we know.

I had doubts of my own about this quote from the Chosun Ilbo:

A high-ranking U.S. intelligence official who analyzed satellite photos of Kilju County, North Hamgyeong Province said, “There’s grout and concrete that goes into the hole, and normally you don’t see that in a mine. A mine you want as open as possible. There’s a lot of activity, taking stuff in as opposed to taking it out.” He said a nuclear test tunnel needed concrete to plug the entrance to lock in the force of the powerful blast.

Having worked in a few underground mines myself, I can tell you that mine tunnels are often sprayed with grout to prevent rockfalls, and that grout is often pumped into fissures to seal out water and stabilize loose rock. It would be key to know the amount of grout brought in and how it was placed to draw any conclusions from the mere fact that it was being brought in.

A much better question would be whether geologic maps and exploration results indicated the presence of a mineral deposit in that location. I never thought my past life as an exploration geologist would be useful on this site, but here’s one bit of wisdom I can offer: it is absolutely unthinkable that any mining venture would drive a tunnel into an area without having drilled and sampled the site extensively. In other words, our satellites would have shown us pictures of drill rigs running; what’s more, there probably would have been some involvement from a foreign exploration company.

We’ve already seen reports about what Washington’s Plan B might be–details on that here and here. The New York Times adds a second leak about the proposed plan:

At the State Department and the White House, officials said they were considering a range of options for taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council. One idea is to establish a quarantine operation – though the administration says it will not use that word – that would search shipments in and out of the country for weapons. But it is unclear whether China or Russia would be willing to allow such a resolution to pass in the Council.

Officials acknowledged that even if economic sanctions were approved, there would be no way to enforce them along the Chinese border, where most of North Korea’s trade takes place.

Of course, there are ways that this Administration could make China share the pain in the only other way that seems to matter to Beijing: economically. Several sources that don’t want me to name them have been telling me that some of the proposed measures to put severe trade pressure on China, such as those mentioned by Rep. Ed Royce last fall, may be close to being introduced in Congress.

Finally, just a reminder that the speculation that North Korea is about to test a nuke dates back to at least last September, and that some U.S. officials believe that North Korea tested a nuke in 1998, in Pakistan.

UPDATE 5/8: It seems that there is a confluence between nuclear testing and mineral exploitation after all.