The Great Alliance Debate: Won Joon Choe Responds

For new readers, Won Joon-Choe and I are debating the future of the U.S.-Korea alliance. I generally favor a dramatic downsizing, but not the elimination, of the USFK. Mr. Choe favors keeping the alliance in it current form. The debate began with Mr. Choe’s recent op-ed in the Wall Street Journal. My response to the op-ed is here, and Mr. Choe’s counterpoint today is here (my apologies in advance for moving it off the main page due to its length; I obviously wouldn’t edit this).

In a week in which both Americans and Koreans have been acting like asses, Won-Joon Choe’s reason and civility are refreshing, and he’s undoubtedly done a better job of insulating himself from his emotions than I have this week (my defense attorney gene is probably there for good). By all means, read the whole thing. He puts forward a credible defense against the poll numbers I cite, and is right about much of what he says about the instability of Korea’s partisan politics, and the effect of that instability on the 2002 elections. On the overall question of whether the Korean electorate is really conservative, respectfully, I’m not as convinced. Maybe you will be.

First, a note to Mr. Choe above all, and also to the readers: I have another of his pieces in my in-box that I just haven’t had time to get to yet.

I offer these quick points in response until I have time to write more:

• I really don’t believe in “giving up” on South Korea, despite my frustrations with its policies, notably relating to North Korea. The fact that other democratic nations have differences with U.S. policy is no reason to wish them ill or desire the end of their democracy or prosperity; it may at times require some reassessment of our interests, however. I believe it more likely than not that the United States and South Korea will continue to have some looser form of security relationship, perhaps along the lines of our relationship with Taiwan or Israel. Yet I do not believe that the presence of a large U.S. ground force there is “good” for either the United States or Korea.

• I agree that the polling evidence contains inconsistencies, but I do believe that it generally reflects a divergence in Koreans’ and American’s self-perceived interests and values–hence the numbers on press and other personal freedoms.

• I also believe that those numbers might well change if the South Korean government saw fit to speak, and let the media also speak, the whole truth about events inside North Korea. Likewise, the South Korean government has become infamous for using the hatred of various foreign powers to achieve short-term political benefits. The fact that they still choose to apply this tactic, with occasional success, is not comforting.

• Whatever the evidence ultimately shows about the recent incidents involving U.S. soldiers, it’s simply not reasonable to expect that an army of tens of thousands of young (mostly) men thousands of miles from hom will be completely crime-free. Nor is it reasonable to expect those mean to spend their entire tours on lockdown because of the actions of a few. That’s an army no one will join. What is reasonable is to expect the criminal justice system to do its job of investigating the facts and punishing those found guilty. Unfortunately, that’s not sufficient to mollify the ugly political climate that focuses almost exclusively on incidents involving U.S. soldiers and demands retribution without awaiting a dispassionate weighing of the evidence.

Since Dan sent me off in search of my copy of Machiavelli’s The Prince this week, I will leave you with a quotation that seems appropriate in this context:

When one asks a powerful neighbour to come to aid and defend one with his forces, they are termed auxiliaries and are as useless as mercenaries. . . . These force may be good in themselves, but they are always dangerous for those who borrow them, for if they lose you are defeated, and if they conquer you remain their prisoner. . . .

A wise prince, therefore, always avoids these forces and has recourse to his own, and would prefer rather to lose with his own mean than conquer with the forces of others, not deeming it a true victory which is gained by foreign arms.

Any ally should be wary of an excessive dependence on the United States. Our military strength is great, but even when our interests are in perfect unity with those of our allies, it is only as good as our political commitment to victory.