Yet Another Talks Update

It’s bad news if you hold hope in negotiating an easy deal with North Korea, better news if you see North Korea’s self-isolation as a better outcome for the present:

BEIJING, Aug. 4 – Negotiators on the North Korean nuclear program decided today to meet for at least one more day in hopes of breaking a deadlock with North Korea, even as discussions began about what might be salvaged if this round of talks ends without an agreement.

The outcome of this fourth round of nuclear talks appears to rest solely with North Korea, which continued today to resist agreeing to a draft joint statement of principles that would move the disarmament talks forward. The other five nations in the talks have essentially agreed to the draft.

Today, the 10th consecutive day of negotiations, began with growing expectation that the talks would be coming to an end. Reporters rushed to the North Korean embassy as word spread, incorrectly as it turned out, that the North Koreans would hold a news conference to announce their position.

I recommend the Yangban’s excellent analysis about where we stand and what it means. I deduce that his expectations are in line with my own.

I was accused today of being against negotiation with North Korea. Not at all. I’m against unproductive negotiation for illusory gains. To the extent we need to make a public show of this, we should be ready to negotiate at any time, but we should not be ready to concede the essential needs of our own security and our greater principles, such as human rights.

That said, I expect nothing from the negotiations themselves until North Korea fears the consequences of cheating, threats, and calculated recalcitrance. In that case, what we seek from these talks is a diplomatic foundation for “further actions” that will affect changes in North Korea, with or without the regime’s assent. The goal, in other words, is to end these talks with North Korea diplomatically isolated and its enablers undercut by its own intransigence. So far, North Korea is cooperating nicely. If our response threatens the thing that Kim Jong Il values most–his control–those diplomatic channels may prove surprisingly productive on a wide range of issues.

If, as it now appears, the talks end in a deadlock, the question will then be, “now what?” That discussion promises to be a great deal more interesting, relevant, and fruitful than the tired question of how much North Korean mendacity we should have–or still should–tolerate.

It’s unfortunate that it has taken us (at least) this long to reach this question in earnest.