KCNA Opens Mouth; Removes All Doubt

With even U.S. negotiator Chris Hill joining in the impulse to pretend that North Korea didn’t say what I could swear they said yesterday, it’s an ironic place that I turn today for a dose of reality: Pyongyang’s own Korea Central News Agency. Wouldn’t you know it? KCNA is a hard-liner’s best friend when I need just the right ammo to win an argument:

As clarified in the joint statement, we will return to the NPT and sign the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and comply with it immediately upon the U.S. provision of LWRs, a basis of confidence-building, to us.

As already clarified more than once, we will feel no need to keep even a single nuclear weapon if the DPRK-U.S. relations are normalized, bilateral confidence is built and we are not exposed to the U.S. nuclear threat any longer.

What is most essential is, therefore, for the U.S. to provide LWRs to the DPRK as early as possible as evidence proving the former’s substantial recognition of the latter’s nuclear activity for a peaceful purpose.

The U.S. should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK’s dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs, a physical guarantee for confidence-building. This is our just and consistent stand as solid as a deeply rooted rock. We have so far shaped our policies towards the U.S. hardliners and will do so in the future, too.

One should wait and see how the U.S. will move in actuality at the phase of “action for action” in the future but should it again insist on “the DPRK’s dismantlement of nuclear weapons before the provision of LWRs”, there will be no change in the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. and its consequences will be very serious and complicated.

If the U.S. opts for reneging on its promise, we will go ahead without an inch of deflection along the road indicated by the Songun line, our faith and signpost. September 20, Juche 94 (2005).

This has as much of a factual connection to the deal that was signed two days ago as plutonium has to gummy bears. North Korea–as I argued yesterday—clearly agreed to disarm before LWRs are even open to consideration. That gave the United States exactly what it really needed from these talks: the opportunity to walk away from them and credibly claim to have exhausted all diplomatic options. What good is it to deal with a nation whose commitments have a shelf life of twelve hours?

Yet for reasons that are unclear to me, the White House seems intent on throwing that opportunity away.