A Congressional View on the Deal that Wasn’t

By now, you may or may not have heard that North Korea has already reneged on the deal it signed just yesterday (scroll down; next post). But in Pyongyang, agreement and disagreement are both wispy things, and you never know if we’ll have a deal again in six or eight minutes. I keep a stock ticker next to my coffee pot for just that purpose.

Deal or not, it’s an interesting parlor game (albeit, one with deadly serious consequences for millions of people) to try to figure out what this abortive deal would have meant and how Washington would have received it. After all, this mouldering thing could stagger out of its crypt again.

An aide in Congress who advises the members on Korea and Asia policy was queried on the agreed statement by an analyst of a major think tank yesterday, and the aide was kind enough to forward me a copy of his remarks, which have some laugh-out-loud moments. At the aide’s request, I’m not printing his name or telling you which member he works for, but here are his comments, as proof that great minds think alike:

My view is that the Chinese worked hard to get an agreement and Ambassador Hill didn’t want to return to Washington empty-handed, so they kicked the can down the road, to November and beyond, on a number of issues in order to reach an agreement. Besides ignoring human rights issues, as you mentioned, the statement:

1) totally ignored any mention of NK’s HEU program, the raising of which to Mr. Kelly in 2002 triggered the whole present crisis to begin with;

2) the agreement feeds into North Korean propaganda in South Korea over alleged U.S. hostile intent. This is done by stating that “The United States affirmed that is has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons” while failing to mention in any way North Korea’s intention to attack and invade South Korea, represented by the continued forward deployment of KPA forces and of artillery on the DMZ, designed to turn Seoul “into a sea of fire.” Please remember supposed NK hostility toward the South forms the basis of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and is the rationale given to the American people for the continued deployment of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula over fifty years after the war. If the American people are tired of the overseas deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq after less than three years, imagine how tired they must be, if they ever focused on it, of the half century deployment in Korea!

3) Before the leadership in Seoul crows too much about their brilliant diplomacy in pushing forward this agreement they should realize they have cut off their noses to spite their faces.

The statement reads that “The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.” Thus the statement achieves Pyongyang’s unswerving goal pursued since 1953 of delegitimizing “the running dog puppet regime” in Seoul by focusing solely on the question of normalization between the “legitimate” regime of all the Korean people, Pyongyang, on the one hand, and the “foreign occupier” and puppet master, Washington on the other. Where in this agreement is any reflection of Willy Brandt’s osterpolitick of the 1970’s which is supposed to serve as the model for Korean reconciliation, according to no less an authority than Kim Dae Jung? Brandt’s rapprochement included a dual defacto recognition by the two Germanys and an exchange of missions in each other’s capitals. But the North Koreans will have none of that because they continue to believe that “the stooges” they manipulate in Seoul are illegitimate and not a sovereign government.

4) the Japanese, despite enormous pressure, did better than anyone else in protecting their core interests with the North Koreans in the statement. (Of course they could not have totally caved without facing the wrath of the Japanese people.) The statement reads:”The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the (2002) Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.” Translated this seems to mean: NO settlement of the abduction issue, no CASH coming from Tokyo, period.

5) What exactly does this mean as a commitment from Pyongyang?: “returning at an early date to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards.” “At an early date” is, of course, no date certain and leaves an opening for Pyongyang big enough to drive a tank or two through. Based on past negotiating practices, Pyongyang will no doubt drag this one out for years, if not almost a full decade as they did with the Agreed Framework.

6) Let’s look at this: The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (I thought this was the key point of contention in Beijing?)

The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss at an appropriate time the subject of the provision of light-water reactor to the DPRK.

The other parties “expressed their respect?” Not quite the scene of vassals crawling on their bellies to kowtow before the throne of the Son of Heaven in Beijing during its imperial heyday but close enough for Kim Jong Il to point out to his minions as a sign that the foreign barbarians understand their need to respect the Dear Leader who was born miraculously on the sacred Paektu Mountain under a star.

Provision of a light water reactor? Fat chance. In fact, whatever is hinted at or promised diplomatically in any future Beijing talks, with the ballooning Federal budget deficit, the demands made in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,and the general unpopularity of North Korea’s regime with the American people, I would not look for nor expect any Congressional funding of a Six Party settlement along the lines of the heavy fuel oil in the Agreed Framework. Such funding, in my opinion, would never pass the Congress.

7) Ditto on this: provision of energy assistance for North Korea? Hey, American people forget about all those homeless people without electricity down on the Gulf coast; Uncle Sam needs to fund energy for North Korea. That’s right, North Korea! (I never wanted a long career in Congress, anyway.)

China, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia and the U.S. stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK. The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12, 2005, concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK.

8) Look at this: “Committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.” Presume this reads “directly related parties” instead of “six parties” as elsewhere in the document because Pyongyang, at least, recognizes this means negotiating with Washington to get U.S.troops off the peninsula while leaving the “puppets” in Seoul out in the cold.

So, as you can read, I see many major loopholes in this. Well, peace is better than war, and usually a negotiated statement is better than no statement, although this is not universally true — ask Neville Chamberlain, for example.

The reconvention of the talks in November will give the North Koreans, at least, another chance to ruin a major holiday for one of the key players. Having ruined Chinese New Year for Chinese diplomats by their “we are a nuclear power” statement on February 10th, and having ruined Chusok this week for the South Korean delegation by tying them up in Beijing, Pyongyang can now torment the Americans by dragging things out as Thanksgiving approaches.

Pray for Korea.

I’ve always considered obstreperous deal-breaking behavior by the North Korean regime to be the best possible outcome to the talks. I did not even hope for the added bonus of North Korea dramatically raising everyone’s hopes and then cruelly dashing them before a rapt audience that now includes every major newspaper on earth. How many millions will now see North Korea from precisely the perspective I share with this author?

This is a hard-liner’s dream, and as an added bonus, it humiliates the Chinese. My only concern now is whether we indeed intend to wait until November before we try to get back to where we thought we were yesterday. If so, Pyongyang will have managed to successfully stall for another two months. Some ship seizures and asset forfeitures might help set a more positive atmosphere.

Afterthought, in Response to Slim’s Comment: You know, as much of many of us wanted the North Korean people to have the seventh seat at the six-party talks, it looks to me as if Iran occupies it. Whenever North Korea acts up, so does Iran. And vice versa. It’s almost as if they’re coordinating their provocations.