Bandow: Korea a ‘Foreign Policy Welfare Queen’

The Cato Institute’s Doug Bandow was calling for U.S. forces to leave Korea before that became the majority view among Washington think tanks. This time, the reaction in the Korean papers promises to be a real hoot. What we’re less likely to get is the State Department’s candid reaction.

The U.S. State Department has never met an alliance, treaty, or aid program that it doesn’t like. As a result, the list of Washington’s foreign policy welfare queens is long. The Republic of Korea, however, must be near the top.

In 1950 the U.S. rescued South Korea from an invasion from the North. Today Seoul has about 40 times the GDP, twice the population, and a vast technological edge over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. But the South continues to rely on Washington for a defense arrangement that is expensive for America, unpopular in Korea, and unnecessary for both countries. After the June summit between Presidents George W. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun, President Bush opined: “We’re strategic partners, allies and friends.”

Oh, and remember this?

Delusions about South Korea’s need for assistance infects [sic] Capitol Hill as well. This summer, Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.), vice chairman of the International Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, sent a “Dear Colleague” letter to other House members extolling the U.S.-ROK alliance. “Forged in the heat of battle, the U.S.-South Korean bilateral relationship continues to be one of our most vital and vibrant partnerships,” Burton declared. The congressman cited “the continuing contributions made by South Korea to our mutual alliance–some that are all too often forgotten.”

Contributions, you say? Bandow goes down the list. Trade? A reflection of pure mutual self-interest. Iraq? The Koreans insisted on keeping their troops are “far away from hostilities.” Human rights in North Korea? No, I’m not joking. Burton really brought that up; Bandow responds:

[T]he ROK does not accept North Korean refugees as a favor to America. Moreover, Seoul has turned markedly frigid towards those fleeing North Korean tyranny. Government ministers have publicly denounced activists who organize mass defections and disclaimed any interest in undermining Pyongyang. South Korea seems more concerned about offending the DPRK officials doing the oppressing than the millions of people being oppressed.

More on South Korea’s rejection of mass defections here, and on their absention from U.N. resolutions condemning the North’s human rights record here. What could be next? Claiming that South Korea and the U.S. were stalwart allies during the six-party talks?

ROK Unification Minister Chung Dong-Young recently proclaimed that the North is entitled to have a nuclear program. South Korea has been closer to China than the U.S. in the six-party talks. Moreover, the South is providing substantial economic aid to North Korea without asking for much in return. ROK public opinion increasingly views the U.S. as a greater threat than the DPRK.

Bandow ends up concluding that South Korea is of little strategic value to the United States, in large part because of Seoul’s “balancer” doctrine–its move toward neutrality and insistence that the USFK is strictly for the defense of South Korea, rather than for the defense of American interests. And of course, the real unstated strategic value of South Korea is the potential projection of air and naval power against China, and the prevention of a Chinese takeover in both Korea. To say that South Korea has no lost all of its strategic value may be a bit overstated, but then again, it may not. That depends on South Korea recalling what the first two digits of USFK stand for. If South Korea’s political demographics continue moving in favor of neutrality, then the mutuality of interests just won’t be there.

HT: The Lost Nomad.