No APEC Afterglow, Part II

The timing of the announcement made it difficult for U.S. and Korean media to ignore the extent to which Bush and Roh differed in their self-perceived interests and articulable policy goals. Media on both sides of the Pacific could see stress cracks in the alliance through the diplomatic plaster. The Chosun Ilbo reported it this way:

President Roh Moo-hyun . . . told a press conference, “A lot is said about the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Though perceptions may differ depending on one’s viewpoint, let me ask back: Have our two countries since the Korean War ever resolved as many pending issues simultaneously?” President Bush said the links between the two countries had never been firmer. “Of course, there are complicated issues. But what is important, I think, is for our two countries to revolve them together and approach them with a friendly spirit.”

. . . .
Given that diplomatic practice is to swap hail and praise about bilateral relations following a summit, the remarks by the South Korean and U.S. presidents make one suspect that the Seoul-Washington relationship is indeed in trouble.

The New York Times came to a similar conclusion:

In their public comments, both men hailed the strength of their alliance, and Mr. Bush said he would “see a peninsula one day that is united and at peace.” But they steered clear of the differences in tactics that aides said formed the subtext of their daylong conversation here.

The most obvious difference was the diverging approaches to North Korea.

In the weeks leading up to President Bush’s arrival in South Korea, where the annual Asian economic summit meeting opens Friday, Mr. Roh’s government had been engaged in a debate in Parliament about whether to double its aid to North Korea next year, pouring nearly $2.5 billion into its bankrupt neighbor, despite the North’s claims that it has built new nuclear weapons.

The Bush administration is heading in exactly the opposite direction. For months, it has been working behind the scenes to cut off as many of North Korea’s sources of revenue as it can get its hands on. It is closing down bank accounts in Macao and quietly asking allies around the world to seal off their air space to North Korean aircraft suspected of carrying the missiles, drugs or counterfeit currency that are the lifeblood of North Korea’s economy.

The differences were underscored even as Mr. Bush was arriving in the country. South Korea’s unification minister was telling reporters that he envisioned some kind of economic union between North and South Korea within 15 years. Mr. Bush, in contrast, in a speech Wednesday in Kyoto, warned of “prison camps the size of whole cities” in the North, and many in his administration make no secret of their desire to see the government’s collapse.

“Many in his administration,” isn’t enough to break the deadlock and overcome the serious State Department opposition that still prevents the Bush Administration from forming a clear policy toward the North, of course. Aside from a few token words, Bush’s speeches in Beijing and Tokyo otherwise failed to deliver the kind of soaring rhetoric that would give hope to the oppressed and draw the outrage of the cozy intelligentsia that receives blunt truths as so many vampires would receive the full glare of a July sun.

Chris Hill, who recently undid with one signature all the hope that his words had raised, took a baby step toward redemption by summarily rejecting North Korea’s latest proposal, via Chung Dong-Young, its Minister for Southern Affairs, stating that North Korea would face a “heavy blow,” if it conducts a nuclear test or transfers material abroad.