On Lee Jong-Seok, Chung Dong Young’s Replacement

The Joongang Ilbo has an excellent profile of him, including a long and detailed bio. The executive summary: he’s much smarter than Chung–which I realize isn’t saying much–and is a dyed-in-the-wool leftist academic and key theoritician behind Korea’s new neutralist policy, one that ironically depends on the presence of a large U.S. military contingent. His nomination was not well received in Washington. While I think that the significance of his lack of familiarity with the United States may be overstated, Lee has a track record of supporting the North Korean regime’s survival, steering Korea toward the Chinese whirlpool, and keeping Korea’s teeth clenched on America’s tit while pursuing policies that undermine U.S. interests.

“There are many people in Washington who see Mr. Lee as the primary source of changes in the South Korea-U.S. alliance that, at least in Washington’s eyes, had no flaws until Seoul wanted changes made,” said one Western diplomat based in Seoul who spoke on condition of anonymity. “He is not exactly popular.”

. . . .

Seoul’s search for its own role has given birth to concepts that the Roh Administration has dubbed a “balancer role” in the region. Mr. Lee had a large role in devising that policy, which has led to some head-scratching in the Pentagon and at Foggy Bottom about how a military ally can also be a mediator for the target of the alliance.

There are plenty of us who had long concluded that the alliance was outdated, and who still have no use for Lee’s policies. In fact, many Americans are much more willing to part with the alliance than Lee appears to be. Read on if you doubt me.

[Lee] appears to have at least a practical, if not ideological, appreciation of the U.S. role here. In an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo last April, he said, “South Korea and the United States share the same values and goals in democracy and a market economy. There might be some irksome exchange between the two countries, but there is a solidarity that is hard to disconnect. The South Korea-U.S. alliance is very useful to us, and through it we can increase the role of South Korea in the Northeast Asia .”

That pragmatic approach was also reflected in his role in persuading the Blue House to dispatch Korean troops to Iraq as part of the military coalition there. With the conservative opposition calling for a large contingent of fighting troops and many in the administration pushing to rebuff Washington flatly, Mr. Lee won agreement for the dispatch of a brigade, but of engineering and medical troops.

At a workshop for newly elected Uri Party lawmakers in December 2003, Mr. Lee said, “The main reason, publicly and privately in the administration, for dispatching troops to Iraq is the Korea-U.S. alliance.”

Emphasis mine. Those who branded this ruling party’s policies and corporate image delicately and not-so–delicately cultivated and harvested the hatred of America and its soldiers. At the same time, as Mi-Hwa has revealed, those who despise America and its soldiers still want to exploit both for reasons that are mostly financial. The ultimate beneficiaries of this free ride are Kim Jong Il and his friends in the South, who couldn’t afford his protection payments without the USFK. The biggest losers–bigger than the soldiers and U.S. taxpayers–are the people of North Korea. And in exchange for contributing nothing to the effort in Iraq, Korea has purchased the right to continue to set back any effort to find a lasting, verifiable, post-Kim Jong Il solution to the crises in North Korea.

Concern about relations with the United States, however, is only part of the conservative distaste for the administration’s policy of rapprochement with North Korea. South Korean prisoners of war from the 1950s are believed to be alive still in the North, and other Koreans kidnapped there after the war are also deserving of Seoul’s attention, conservatives believe. Human rights abuses in North Korea also draw horrified commentary from conservatives here, and Korean liberals occasionally show some discomfort as they assert that human rights and prisoners must take second place to the development of better ties with the North. Seoul has sent massive amounts of aid to the North, especially fertilizer and rice, and critics ask why no strings of any sort have been attached to that aid.That criticism will continue, and Mr. Lee’s new position will put him in a more exposed position. As always here, interesting times are probably ahead.

I will miss the tatooed-on-the forehead stupidity of men like Comrade Chung Dong-Young and Jeong Se-Hyun. Something tells me that Lee is smart enough to keep his mouth shut in an election year. I sure hope I’m wrong about that.