Can We Leave Yet?
Thank goodness blogs have time stamps for historic moments such as this one. Roh Moo Hyun has finally said something I agree with.
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said Wednesday that it is time for South Korea to shift to a stand-alone diplomacy toward the United States.
“So far, we have made a success through dependence on the U.S. Now it’s time to choose an independent course of diplomacy,” the president said at an American chapter meeting of the National Unification Advisory Council in Seoul.“But living a dependent life is different from living independently and maintaining a close friendship. The two countries will remain friends forever.”
Roh expressed concerns about potential conflicts between China and Japan, or between China and the U.S., but ruled out the recurrence of aggression.
Because it’s absurd to suggest that South Korea could set such a course while the USFK remains for South Korea’s exclusive use, rule out that possibility for a moment. Leave aside the fact that this absurdity is probably lost on Roh himself, and that he probably thinks it’s possible to be both dependent and independent at the same time. Leave aside the fact that Roh’s distorted view of the United States is a perfect example of the unhealthy animosity that results when dependency outlives necessity. Leave aside the fact that this may be mostly hot air and pre-election pandering from a desperate politician trying to whip up his base. Nothing but the fall of Kim Jong Il in a democratic revolution tomorrow would be healthier for Korea’s nationhood than the withdrawal of the USFK and for a healthier U.S.-Korean relationship.*
A post-USFK Korea will have choose its leaders wisely and live with the consequences of those leaders’ policies. It will have to maintain normal relations with other nations and make mature distinctions between friends and foes. Only then is Korea’s relationship with the United States is actually likely to show long-term improvement.
The facts are these: (1) you’re not independent if someone else is protecting you; (2) it’s human nature to resent those on whom you depend; and (3) that resentment is increasing in intensity and mutuality to a point where the broader relationship will become unsustainable.
* I retain my ambivalent position on whether the military benefits of keeping some U.S. air and naval forces based on Korea outweigh the political costs. That depends on events I lack the clairvoyance to predict.
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Yes please! Let’s get outta there; the South Koreans are a lost cause, for now. I’m for helping those who want to get out of NK (and that’s not necessarily everyone) – that’s about it.
Benefits to the US of USFK:
1. Counterweight to China
2. Enhances air & sea control of vital
routes into and out of Asia.
3. Keeps Korea from becoming a hot war
again.
4. Provides in-depth defense to Japan
and American forces in Japan.
5. Guards against chaos should the dear
leaders playpin collapse.
Costs to the US are pretty much as you’ve argued so is it worth it?
Roh and company are serving their country poorly. Perhaps new leadership will recognize Korean national interests and conclude FTA and continued American military presence in Korea. Incidentally its highly unlikely the US would maintain airbases or permanent fleet presence in Korea that aren’t protected by the US army. SO USFK goes, so does everything else. This is a hairy situation, the US presence. There isn’t a simple way to distill it in my mind when Chinese machinations over Korea, North Korean rogue behavior, Japanese national interests and finally ROK’s tortured politics are all added together. Best to play safe for now and not cause greater instability.
I think it’s too early to tell if pulling US forces out is a good idea. The SK political shift to the left may be temporary. The opinions of it’s youth may be pretty fickle too. Also, once the US pulls it’s troops out, it may be extremely difficult getting them back in, if a new situation deems that as appropriate. The GNP may well gain control of the government again and things will change for the better.
Besides, even if the USA left, NK would still accuse it and Japan of having colonial/imperialist aspirations toward all Korean peoples, and many Koreans would completely buy it.
As far as a risk/reward analysis goes, I’d say it is too early for the US to impliment a permenant solution to what may be a temporary problem.
I don’t think things could get much worse.
Changehappens —
Again, my view is that US ground forces should leave, but is open on leaving some air and naval forces behind. And bear in mind that Lewis, Elmendorf, and Wainwright, and Anderson are each, what, 8 hours away by air?
1. Counterweight to China. What do US ground forces add to the counterweight? Are we really going to take on the ChiCom Army in ground combat with 32,000 troops, or even with the rest of them? What good is the USFK as a counterweight to China if South Korea rules out any use of USFK against Chinese forces? Our ground forces are an empty threat.
2. Control of vital routes. That value is added almost exclusively by air and naval forces.
3. Keeps Korea from becoming a hot war.
– a. Our presence could have the opposite effect if NK decided to use commandoes or arty to attack US forces to test us, to retaliate against a strike on a nuke facility, or to try to break a blockade. It thus makes us hostages, limits our options, and could invite such a miscalculation as a “limited” attack on the South.
– b. What if Kim Jong Il decides to go for it? If the US is in Korea and North Korea attacks, we start the war with thousands of dead Americans and all of the disastrous political consequences that come with that. As the North Koreans know all too well, the only likely way to defeat the US is to do so politically. Which also means that our presence invites a first strike, if NK perceives our political leadership is weak.
– c. We can deter North Korea by reserving the right to an air or even a nuclear response without having our forces so vulnerable to a NK first strike. Why must we make ourselves hostages to provide a valuable deterrent? Then, say we keep only 2 air bases there. Weren’t we a valuable deterrent to USSR when we had Misawa AB in Hokkaido, with no ground forces nearby?
– d. The North Korean Army couldn’t conquer South Korea through a conventional invasion, with or without US troops. I’d favor assisting the South with air power if the North invaded, but South Korea can and should supply the ground forces.
4. Defense of Japan.
– a. The defense of Japan is going to be done at sea and in the skies, and we have plenty of air and naval assets in that area even without USFK.
– b. The only invasion threat to Japan is China, and South Korea won’t let USFK fight the Chinese.
– c. Third, with the exception of a last-gasp deathbed flail by North Korea, there is no foreseeable circumstance in which any nation — including China — attacks Japan and South Korea simultaneously. We can handle that exceptional circumstance with our Japanese bases and our Navy.
5. Collapse scenario. This one has some merit, but using US ground forces inside North Korea is probably still a bad idea even in those extraordinary circumstances. Doing so would probably provoke a nationalist backlash in North Korea and might even invite China to occupy parts of Northern Korea. Collapse is something for which the South Koreans should be planning to control with their own troops, although I think the US should certainly plan to play a supporting and supplying role in such a contingency. I’d even be open to flying in some Americans to do humanitarian ops, such as feeding, water, tent cities, and field hospitals. The idea of US grunts patrolling Pyongyang or Hungnam is an idea that makes alarm bells flash in my mind.
On protecting air and naval facilities: I could go down a very long list of air and naval bases that don’t host substantial US ground forces and rely on host nation forces and SP’s for force protection (Incirlik, Yokota, Sasebo, Rhein-Main, Misawa . . . ). In fact, if you’re at Osan, the nearest infantry of more than company strength is 80 miles away; much further if you’re at Kunsan.
As for keeping Korea out of the Chinese orbit, only one thing will prevent that: political clarity in the minds of South Korean voters. A US military presence in Korea is only inhibiting that. On the other hand, we have an excellent excuse now to declare victory and go home, pursuing the total victory — the liberation of the North — through political means. We could correctly say that Korea is peaceful and prosperous, and cynically say that hey, South Korea believes it’s on the road to reunification … so bye. This obviously doesn’t mean the complete abrogation of our military and diplomatic relationship with the South. We’d continue to train together, help them arm themselves, etc. But we also hope that this would inspire some sober thinking in the minds of the South Koreans about how much they really trust the Chinese and the North Koreans.
What if South Korea does fall? That would only happen because the SK people refuse to fight for their own country, something for which they’d have absolutely no excuse. North Korea is no longer the tip of the Big Red Spear of global Communism.
Consider, also:
What if we’re already at war somewhere else and in no position to reenforce ourselves when North Korea attacks? What if China joins in? What if the South Korean army collapses or refuses to fight its ethnic brothers? War is an unpredictable business, and under various circumstances, US intervention might not be a good idea. Isn’t it better to give ourselves the luxury of maybe making a cold, rational decision before getting involved in a land war in Asia (hopefully based on better intel this time!) as opposed to putting that choice in Kim Jong Il’s hands?
With the end of the Cold War, simply put, Korea’s importance has gone down tremendously.
One spark here or there can no longer lead to the destruction of the world.
And even in the worst case with a potential China-US Cold War II — there will be plenty of time for adjustments.
In the Cold War, any piece of land was deemed too valuable to give to the other side.
That day is over.
Chaos in Korea minus USFK would be a shock and absorbed. Korea’s economy is not big enough to cause lasting global reprecussions.
And this is all thinking about what could be the worst.
Since South Korea is more than capable of defending itself if it had the national will to do so, basing the US committment (and the costs both now and potential costs if war does happen) on some idea that chaos in Korea would be equally bad for the US if we had no troops in country is a hell of a deal for South Korea.
It is what has allowed them to have their cake and kick it in the nuts too….
And this is not a temporary problem.
The only difference in the society today than when I arrived in 1996 is that the Blue House has finally been occupied by someone who has a mind to put into policy what the vast majority of my adult students liked to pretend they agreed with.
Part of the ball kicking cake having was:
members of the National Assembly, the media, univerisites, elements of pop culture, and other key social institutions could enjoy formenting the “poor us! if only these guys weren’t always pushing us around! if only we didn’t need them!!”
even marching in the street and throwing fire bombs —
to boost Korea’s sense of national pride, Han, Hermit Kingdomness….
with the safe knowledge the Blue House was going to keep the best interest of the nation in mind — along with the firm belief the US wouldn’t leave even if Korean society demanded it.
That was still the dominate thought after Kim Dae Jung was elected.
It changed with Roh because he actually thought the national will, or what they liked to say was the national will, should become the guiding principles of policy.
Stupid him. He obviously didn’t understand the deal.
But there is no reason why I should believe the deal is something the US should continue to accept this far past the end of the Cold War and with everything else on our plate and the near future reality — as opposed to any long term China threat thinking..