Newt: Destroy NK Missile on the Ground

[Update: John Bolton has the quote of the week:

“You don’t normally engage in conversations by threatening to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles ….”]

National Review has two pieces today on North Korea’s satellite ransom theater possible missile test. The editors argue, as I did here, that the United States should shoot down the missile if the North Koreans launch it. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, no doubt motivated by a desire to make me look like a moderate, goes further:

The American public is being reassured that we have a ballistic-missile defense that will work. No serious person believes this. None of the tests have been robust enough or realistic enough to assure us that we could intercept the North Korean ICBM no matter where it was aimed.

In the immediate and present danger, the United States should not wait to attempt to shoot the missile down after it is launched. There is no proven reliable technology and no evidence that we could succeed. Instead, we should destroy the missile on its site before it is launched. Our ability to preempt the launch is nearly certain.

Gingrich clearly isn’t considering how that will go down in the region, but he does raise two questions whose answers are potentially dispositive: first, I don’t know how good the chances are that our existing defense system would really work; and second, I really don’t know what’s on top of the missile. If we had any reason to believe that it was tipped with a nuke, chem, or bio warhead, I would favor destroying it — and a few others things for good measure — on the ground. If there were a reasonable risk that such a warhead could have been loaded without our knowledge, and if the Air Force lacked confidence that it could intercept the missile, then I’d give serious though to the idea of destroying it on the ground.

Still, the deterrence of mutual assured destruction has effectively kept North Korea from sliming South Korean and Japanese cities with sarin-tipped Nodongs, a capability they’ve probably had for at least a decade. And never mind their conventional artillery, their special forces, or some of the things they could simply fit in a low-flying ANT-2. Deterrence continues to be a big part of this complex cost-benefit analysis, and it strongly suggests that Kim Jong Il isn’t about to bet the whole pleasure squad on Tea Biscuit. It’s also why Kim’s potential proliferation to terrorists is the real danger.

Absent some evidence that North Korea is actually planning an attack, I would oppose a preemptive strike. We have to keep our eye on the bigger picture, which is paving the way for regional peace and prosperity by changing the North Korean government to one that answers to its people. Doing this requires us to isolate the North Koreans politically, economically, and diplomatically. By pulling the trigger first, we would lose the support of some persuadable segments of public opinion in the region. (At the same time, we shouldn’t really care about the reactions of hard-line America-haters like the ANSWER crowd, the KCTU, or Hanchongryon. It’s no use playing to lunatics who’ll hate you regardless.).

Far better, for reasons I’ve already laid out here, is for us to wait for North Korea to take the first offensive act and make a determined, defensive response. For the most part, I’m confident that those who condemn us will discredit themselves through their criticisms.

One point Gingrich makes, and which I find harder to dismiss, is that a preemptive strike would persuade North Korea that we’re serious, something they don’t believe now. While I like the idea of showing that we’re earnest about facing North Korea’s belligerence and preserving the peace, there are ways to do that without substantially raising the risk of war. The end Kim Jong Il fears most is the Ceaucescu solution. The President could substantially raise those fears by increasing funding for the North Korean opposition, by establishing facilities for the screening and vetting of new refugees, and by staffing up those facilities with courses that would train those refugees law, journalism, engineering, politics, medicine, emergency services, law enforcement, and the other essential tasks of reestablishing civil government after Kim’s demise.

Or, to bring this to an even simpler level, he could make sure that the radio broadcasting provided for in the North Korean Human Rights Act is fully and promptly funded.

Even if the North doesn’t launch, which sadly looks more likely with each passing day, those issues will still be with us at the end of week.
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